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FIRST DIVISION
August 21, 2000

No. 1-99-4353 consolidated with 1-99-4477

JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal is a consolidation of plaintiff Christina Puleo's two separate appeals, onepursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307 (155 Ill. 2d R. 307) and the other pursuant to IllinoisSupreme Court Rules 301 and 303 (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 303), from an order entered by the trialcourt on November 30, 1999, requiring her to deposit funds in the sums of $1,003,806.45 and$510,652.60 with the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County. These amounts had been paid toplaintiff in partial satisfaction of a judgment in her underlying personal injury suit againstdefendants, McGladrey & Pullen and Clarence Johnson. Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford)tendered $1,003.806.45 on behalf of McGladrey & Pullen, its insured. State Farm InsuranceCompany (State Farm) tendered $510, 652.60 on behalf of Clarence Johnson, its insured. Subsequently, this court reversed the judgment in plaintiff's personal injury suit and remandedthe case for a retrial on damages only. Hartford and State Farm then filed petitions for leave tointervene in the underlying suit in order to file motions for restitution of the funds they had paid. Over objection, that intervention was granted. After a hearing on the merits of the motion forrestitution of funds brought by Hartford and joined by State Farm, the trial court denied themotion to the extent it sought return of the funds directly to Hartford and State Farm (theintervenors), but granted the alternative relief requested by intervenors, ordering the plaintiff todeposit the funds with the court to be placed in an interest-bearing account subject to theredetermination of damages owed to plaintiff.

Plaintiff now appeals from that order of the trial court. With respect to this court'sjurisdiction, she argues two positions. One appeal is based upon Illinois Supreme Court Rule307 governing certain nonfinal orders. The other is based upon Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301governing final orders. The intervenors agree with plaintiff's position that this court hasjurisdiction pursuant to Rule 307, but disagree with her position regarding jurisdiction underRule 301. Finally, McGladrey & Pullen, defendant in the case below, although not a direct partyto this appeal, has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. We took that motion with this case. Inits motion, defendant contends that the order below was final and this court lacks jurisdictionbecause the trial court refused to grant the necessary language required under Illinois SupremeCourt Rule 304 (155 Ill. 2d 304), which governs appeals of final orders entered in multipartyactions. We agree with defendant. For the reasons stated below, we dismiss the appeal for lackof jurisdiction.

Appellate jurisdiction is restricted to reviewing final judgments unless the order to bereviewed comes within one of the exceptions for interlocutory orders specified by our supremecourt. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Rosewell, 262 Ill. App. 3d938, 950, 635 N.E.2d 413, 424 (1992). A judgment or order is considered final if it "disposes ofthe rights of the parties either upon the entire controversy or upon some definite and separate partthereof." In re Estate of French, 166 Ill. 2d 95, 101, 651 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (1995); see alsoTyler v. Tyler, 230 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1011, 596 N.E.2d 119 (1992). A final judgment has alsobeen defined as one which "decides the controversy between the parties on the merits and fixestheir rights, so that, if the judgment is affirmed, nothing remains for the trial court to do but toproceed with its execution." In re J. N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 127, 435 N.E.2d 473 (1982). In addition,this court has defined a claim as " 'any right, liability or matter raised in an action. [Citation.]' " Inre Estate of French, 166 Ill. 2d at101, 651 N.E.2d at 1128. We first consider whether the orderbeing appealed here is final or nonfinal.

In determining whether the order in the instant case was final, we believe it helpful toconsider the particular nature of the order here. One of the positions advanced by the parties isthat the order directing plaintiff to tender funds to the court constitutes an injunction. The IllinoisSupreme Court has defined an injunction as follows:

" 'a judicial process, by which a party is required to do a particular thing, or torefrain from doing a particular thing, according to the exigency of the writ, themost common sort of which operate as a restraint upon the party in the exercise ofhis real or supposed rights.' " In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 261, 537 N.E.2d 292(1989), quoting Wangelin v. Goe, 50 Ill. 459, 463 (1869).

We believe that this definition applies here and conclude that the order was an injunction.

Plaintiff and the intervenors contend that, because the order below was an injunction, thiscourt has jurisdiction over this pursuant to Rule 307(a)(1), which provides that an appeal may betaken to the appellate court from an interlocutory order "granting, modifying, refusing,dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction." 155 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1). This rule,however, is applicable only to either preliminary injunctions or temporary restraining orderswhich are granted to preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits and conclude norights. Such orders are limited in duration and in no case extend beyond the conclusion of theaction. Steel City Bank v. Village of Orland Hills, 224 Ill. App. 3d 412, 416, 586 N.E.2d 625, 628(1991). Orders which are not limited in duration and which alter the status quo are permanent innature and, therefore, constitute final orders for purposes of appeal. Davis v. Human RightsComm'n, 286 Ill. App. 3d 508, 515, 676 N.E.2d 315, 320 (1997); Steel City Bank v. Village ofOrland Hills, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 417, 586 N.E.2d at 628. The status quo is defined as " 'the lastactual, peaceable, uncontested status which [preceded] the pending controversy.' [Citation.]" Steel City Bank v. Village of Orland Hills, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 417, 586 N.E.2d at 629.

Regardless of whether the "pending controversy" originated when this court ordered aretrial on damages, when the trial court granted the motion to intervene, or when the trial courtentered its order requiring the deposit of funds, "the last peaceable uncontested status" before thecontroversy would show plaintiff in possession of the funds. Whether plaintiff here was entitledto retain the funds given to her by the intervenors, in view of our prior decision ordering a retrialon damages, is not before us. Rather, the legal propriety of the status quo relates to the merits ofthe instant appeal. We believe that the order, which affirmatively required plaintiff to tender thefunds to the court, altered, rather than preserved, the status quo. See, e.g., Rock Island Bank v.Paul, 48 Ill. App. 3d 874, 879, 362 N.E.2d 815, 819 (1977) (where, at the time an injunctionissued that prevented both party and her bank from transferring funds in her account, the lastactual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the controversy would show that the partyhad $25,000 in an account at the bank in her name and, as such, the injunction actually changedthe status quo rather than preserved it). By its order, the trial court already addressed the meritsof the intervenor's motion for restitution, granting alternative relief and denying the direct returnof the funds to the intervenor. Because the order altered the status quo, it was a permanentinjunction and not within those orders that are appealable as of right under Rule 307(a)(1).

Moreover, the order was final because it "disposes of the rights of the parties *** uponsome definite and separate part [of the controversy]"(In re Estate of French, 166 Ill. 2d at 101,651 N.E.2d at 1128) by completely disposing of the intervenors' claim so that nothing furtherneed be done apart from executing the order by securing deposit of the funds. See In re J. N., 91Ill. 2d 122, 127, 435 N.E.2d 473 (1982). Thus, because the order is a final order, if appellatejurisdiction exists here, it must be pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R.304(a)), which states in pertinent part:

"If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, anappeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all ofthe parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding thatthere is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both. Such afinding may be made at the time of the entry of the judgment or thereafter on thecourt's own motion or on motion of any party." (Emphasis added.) 155 Ill. 2d R.304(a).

Under Illinois law, an intervenor has all the rights of an original party. 735 ILCS5/2-408(f) (West 1998). At the point in time when the trial court granted the intervenors' motionto intervene, the instant case became a multiparty action. See, e.g., Johnson v. Levy OrganizationDevelopment Co., 789 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1986); Huckeby v. Frozen Food Express, 555 F.2d 542,545 (5th. Cir. 1977).⁽¹⁾ "The purpose of Rule 304(a) is ' "to discourage piecemeal appeals in theabsence of just reason, and to remove the uncertainty which exists when a final judgment isentered on less than all the matters in the controversy." ' [Citations.]." Noland v. Steiner, 213 Ill.App. 3d 611, 614, 572 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (1991). As our supreme court has explained, albeit inthe context of the effect of a severance order, "[t]he use of Rule 304(a) certification shall be therule in cases involving judgments as to fewer than all parties or claims." (Emphasis added.)Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co.,119 Ill. 2d 296, 308, 518 N.E.2d 1031, 1037(1988). Thus, because this case is a multiparty action, and the trial court did not include Rule304(a) language, we conclude that we have no jurisdiction over this appeal.

The decision to enter a Rule 304(a) finding is within the trial court's discretion. FremontCompensation Insurance Co. v. Ace-Chicago Great Dane Corp., 304 Ill. App. 3d 734, 740, 710N.E.2d 132, 137 (1999). Although the trial court's decision not to give the Rule 304(a) languageis not before us, our review of the record indicates that the decision was based, at least in part, onthe trial court's conclusion that the order entered was not a final order. The trial court consideredimportant the fact that the intervenors had taken no steps to enforce the order yet. This factor,however, has no bearing upon the nature of the order as a final order. ⁽²⁾ The order, however, wasfinal for the purposes of Rule 304(a). Nor does the fact that the intervenors had taken no steps toenforce the order have any bearing upon the analysis of whether any "just reason" exists to delayenforcement or appeal. As this court has explained: " [I]n the context of Rule 304(a), a trialcourt's finding that no just reason exists to delay an appeal is nothing more than a discretionarydetermination that permitting an immediate appeal, under the circumstances, would bedesirable." (Emphasis added.) Fremont Compensation Insurance Co., 304 Ill. App. 3d at 740,710 N.E.2d at 137. Thus, the order here can only be appealed if the trial court, in its discretion,determines that an immediate appeal would be desirable and makes the necessary Rule 304(a)finding.

Plaintiff, however, has also argued here that, even if this court determines that the orderbelow was final, the Rule 304(a) finding is not required to confer jurisdiction upon this courtover the present appeal. Plaintiff essentially contends that the instant case presents an exceptionto the requirement of Rule 304(a) certification in multiparty actions.

In support of her contention, plaintiff has cited Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v.Filos, 285 Ill. App. 3d 528, 673 N.E.2d 1099 (1996), a case involving an insurer's declaratoryjudgment action consolidated with an underlying action at law in which the insurer's motion forsummary judgment was granted. The Nationwide court decided that, although the order grantingsummary judgment did not dispose of all claims raised in the consolidated action and also did notcontain a Rule 304(a) finding, the court nonetheless had jurisdiction to entertain the injuredemployee's appeal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer underRule 301. Nationwide, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 531-32, 673 N.E.2d at 1102. The court supported itsdecision by noting that "[b]ecause the consolidation was done only for convenience andeconomy, 'it did not merge the causes into a single suit, or change the rights of the parties, ormake those who were parties in one suit parties in another.' [Citation.]" Nationwide, 285 Ill. App.3d at 532, 673 N.E.2d at 1102. The court further noted that one of the actions "retained itsdistinct identity." Nationwide, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 532, 673 N.E.2d at 1102. Plaintiff nowcontends that there is no meaningful distinction between the consolidation in Nationwide and theintervention in the present case, because the intervenors' claims were distinct and their petitionsfor relief were entirely disposed of. We disagree.

The present case does not consist of two consolidated actions; Hartford and State Farmfiled petitions to intervene into an existing action. Despite plaintiff's argument to the contrary,the intervention in the instant case is clearly dissimilar from a consolidation. Even if we were toagree with the approach taken by the Nationwide court and the cases cited therein,⁽³⁾ we find theNationwide case distinguishable. That the intervenors here have separate claims is part of thereason for Rule 304(a) in the first instance. If no distinction is made between a separate claim ina single action and a separate action in a consolidated case, the exception would swallow therule. We decline to extend the decision in Nationwide to the present case.

In so deciding, we keep in mind our supreme court's admonition that "[t]he use of Rule304(a) certification shall be the rule in cases involving judgments as to fewer than all parties orclaims. The perfecting of an appeal under Rule 303(a)(1) in such cases must be the exception."Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co., 119 Ill. 2d 296, 308, 518 N.E.2d 1031, 1037(1988). In Carter, our supreme court held that where a trial court has not made the Rule 304(a)certification, for appellate jurisdiction to exist over a severed claim, the trial court, in itsseverance order, must clearly and unequivocally state that the claim has indeed been severed andthat the severed claim shall proceed thereafter separate from the other claims, counterclaims orparties to the case. Carter, 119 Ill. 2d at 307-08, 518 N.E.2d at 1037. Interestingly, the Carterdecision also limited the holding in Northtown Warehouse & Transportation Co. v.Transamerica Insurance Co., 111 Ill. 2d 532, 490 N.E.2d 1268 (1986), which was the case reliedupon by the Nationwide court for its statement that "Rule 304(a) does not necessarily apply to allactions involving multiple claims or parties." Nationwide, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 532, 673 N.E.2d at1102. The instant case is no exception to the requirements of Rule 304(a) in cases involvingjudgments as to fewer than all parties or claims.

In view of the foregoing, we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For thesereasons, we also grant defendant McGladrey & Pullen's motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal forlack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we do not consider the merits of plaintiff's appeal.

Appeal Dismissed.

O'MARA FROSSARD, P.J. and GREIMAN, J., concur.

1. ¹Although these federal cases were interpreting the federal rule (Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)),the same principle applies here. As our supreme court stated in Carter v. Chicago & IllinoisMidland Ry. Co.,119 Ill. 2d 296, 303, 518 N.E.2d 1031,1035, (1988), the federal rule (Fed. R.Civ. P. 54(b)) is similar to our Rule 304(a), and it is the rule after which our rule was patterned.

2. ²One court has even opined that it would violate due process to permit enforcement of anorder without allowing appeal. See Rauscher v. Albert, 138 Ill. App. 3d 799, 804, 485 N.E.2d1362, 1364 (1985).