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SECOND DIVISION
MAY 11, 2004

In this permissive interlocutory appeal taken pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 306(a)(2) (166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(2)), thedefendant, Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation, d/b/aAdvocate Good Shepherd Hospital (Advocate), appeals from thecircuit court's order denying its motion to transfer this casefrom the circuit court of Cook County to the circuit court ofLake County, based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Advocate claims that the trial court abused its discretion indenying the motion to transfer because private and publicinterest factors heavily weigh in favor of transfer. Advocatealso claims that plaintiff's choice of Cook County is forumshopping.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Toni Lee Prouty, filed a multicount complaintalleging medical malpractice in the treatment of her daughter,Dezirae Prouty. The complaint named several defendants,including Advocate, Tri-County Emergency Physicians, Ltd.; JosephGiangrasso, M.D.; Geralynn S. Renner, M.D.; John Beckerman⁽¹⁾,M.D.; and Pediatric Care, P.C. Specifically, Prouty alleges thaton September 17, 1997, when Dezirae was only one day old, a well-baby visit was conducted by Dr. Beckerman at Good ShepherdHospital. The complaint alleges that sometime between September18 and 20, 1997, a representative of Dr. Beckerman's officecontacted Prouty and cancelled a scheduled well-baby visit thatwas to occur sometime between September 18 and 20, 1997, becauseDr. Beckerman would not accept Prouty's Illinois Department ofPublic Aid medical card. On September 20, 1997, Dezirae wasbrought to Good Shepherd Hospital's emergency department withcomplaints of poor feedings, inability to produce wet diapers,vomiting and apnea. Dr. Beckerman was notified that his patientwas in the emergency department. However, he did not examineDezirae, but provided consultation by telephone to the emergencydepartment physician. Dezirae was examined by defendants Dr.Joseph Giangrasso and Dr. Geralynn Renner. A jaundice test wasordered. After being in the hospital for just three hours,Dezirae was discharged from the emergency department with adiagnosis of jaundice.

Prouty alleges that the defendants negligently treatedDezirae because they failed to order radiographic tests, failedto admit Dezirae to the hospital, failed to do a work-up forapnea, failed to diagnose Dezirae with dehydration, and failed totake her weight or pulse. The plaintiff alleges that as a resultDezirae suffered severe cardiac arrest on September 23, 1997,which resulted in brain damage. On September 23, 1997, Deziraewas again brought to Good Shepherd Hospital, but was taken byhelicopter to Lutheran General Hospital, located in Cook County. She was admitted to Lutheran General's emergency department forone or two days, and remained at Lutheran General for two weeksin the pediatric intensive care unit. At Lutheran General,Dezirae had major surgery on her gastrointestinal tract. Sheexhibited severe dehydration and renal failure.

On September 19, 2003, Advocate filed a motion to dismissfor venue, requesting a transfer from Cook County to Lake Countypursuant to Supreme Court Rule 187 (134 Ill. 2d R. 187) and thedoctrine of forum non conveniens. In support of its motion,Advocate argued: (1) that all of the alleged negligent treatmentwas rendered at Good Shepherd Hospital in Lake County; (2)Pediatric Care is located in Lake County; (3) Dr. Beckermanresides in Lake County; (4) Tri-County Emergency Physicians islocated in Lake County; (5) Dr. Giangrasso resides in LakeCounty; (6) Dr. Renner resides in Cook County; (7) Prouty residesin Lake County; and (8) Good Shepherd's risk manager, thedesignated trial representative for Good Shepherd Hospital,resides in McHenry County. On December 30, 2003, Proutyresponded to Advocate's motion to transfer. In support of hermotion, Prouty argued that Cook County is appropriate because itis the residence of three defendants, Dr. Renner, Tri-County, andAdvocate. Prouty argued that a majority of the treatment wasadministered at Lutheran General, that the substantial injuriesoccurred in Cook County, and that relevant medical doctors andrecords were in Cook County, mainly at Lutheran General. Eventhough the negligent action occurred in Lake County, the injury,treatment and diagnosis occurred in Cook County.

Citing to Bland v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 116 Ill. 2d217, 506 N.E.2d 1291 (1987), Advocate argued that the fivetreating physicians from Lutheran General should not have asignificant bearing on the forum issue. The trial court notedthat these treating physicians were different from thoseconsidered in Bland. The trial court noted that this case doesnot indicate forum shopping because Dezirae was transferred fromGood Shepherd Hospital to Lutheran General Hospital:

"THE COURT: I think one of thesimilarities in those cases is that thereason the Courts don't consider treaters --or many of them -- is because they say, well,they say you are forum shopping and you canjust go get treaters in any county you want. Certainly, that's not the case here. Thecase here is [s]he was transferred, you know,from the Defendant's hospital. So I thinkthat's a consideration."

On January 28, 2004, the trial court denied Advocate'smotion to dismiss for venue. In rendering its decision, thetrial court reasoned:

"THE COURT: I've read the arguments. I've read the briefs and the case law. Forumconvenience allows the trial court to denyjurisdiction in exceptional cases. ThePlaintiff has a substantial interest inchoosing the forum, and the choice shouldrarely be disturbed. Plaintiff's choice,however, receives somewhat less deferencewhen neither the Plaintiff's residence [n]orthe site of the accident or injury is locatedin the chosen forum.

Defendant must show the chosen forum isinconvenient to Defendants and the witnesses. Defendant cannot assert that the Plaintiff'schosen forum is inconvenient to thePlaintiff. The test is an unequal balancingtest. Transfer is appropriate only whenlitigation has no practical connection, nonexus with the Plaintiff's choice of forum.

In our case, we have witnesses sproutout over three different counties, Cook,Lake, and McHenry. I believe that since theDefendants transferred the Plaintiff toLutheran General and to Cook County, thesewitnesses were not chosen for any otherreason than Plaintiff's care -- Plaintiff'schild's care and should be considered as anyother witnesses. Therefore, this Court findsthe Defendant has not met its heavy burdenand the motion is denied."

Advocate filed a petition for leave to appeal, which wegranted on March 25, 2004, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule306(a)(2) (166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(2)).

ANALYSIS

There is no venue issue presented in this case. Bothparties acknowledge that venue would be proper in Lake County orCook County. The issue presented falls under the doctrine offorum non conveniens. Forum non conveniens is an equitabledoctrine founded in considerations of fundamental fairness andsensible and effective judicial administration, which allows atrial court to decline jurisdiction in the exceptional case wheretrial in another forum with proper jurisdiction and venue wouldbetter serve the ends of justice. First American Bank v.Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d 511, 515, 764 N.E.2d 54 (2002); Wieser v.Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 98 Ill. 2d 359, 365, 456 N.E.2d 98(1983).

A trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on aforum non conveniens motion; its decision will be reversed onlyif it is shown that the court abused its discretion in weighingthe relevant considerations. Washington v. Illinois Power Co.,144 Ill. 2d 395, 398, 581 N.E.2d 644 (1991); Griffith v.Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc., 136 Ill. 2d 101, 106,554 N.E.2d 209 (1990). In ruling upon a forum non conveniensmotion, a trial court must apply a balancing test of variousprivate interest factors affecting the litigants' convenience andvarious public interest factors affecting the administration ofthe courts. See Washington, 144 Ill. 2d at 399; Bland, 116 Ill.2d at 223-24.

The private interest factors include:

"'the relative ease of access to sources ofproof; availability of compulsory process forattendance of unwilling, and the cost ofobtaining attendance of willing, witnesses;possibility of view of premises, if viewwould be appropriate to the action; and allother practical problems that make trial of acase easy, expeditious and inexpensive.'" Washington, 144 Ill. 2d at 399, quoting GulfOil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 91L. Ed. 1055, 1062, 67 S. Ct. 839, 843 (1947). Whereas, the public factors include:

"the status of the court docket where theaction was filed, imposition of jury duty onthe community, and the local interest inhaving a localized controversy resolved athome." Washington, 144 Ill. 2d at 399.

"With these considerations in mind, the [Gulf Oil] Courtconcluded that 'unless the balance is strongly in favor of thedefendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely bedisturbed.'" Washington, 144 Ill. 2d at 399, quoting Gulf Oil,330 U.S. at 508, 91 L. Ed. at 1062, 67 S. Ct. at 843. The trialcourt does not weigh the private factors against the publicfactors. Instead, the trial court must evaluate the totality ofthe circumstances in an effort to determine whether the defendanthas proven the balance of factors strongly favor transfer. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 518.

In addition to balancing the private and public interestfactors, the trial court must also consider the plaintiff'ssubstantial right to choose the forum in which to bring anaction. Griffith, 136 Ill. 2d at 106. Unless the private andpublic interest factors strongly weigh in favor of a transfer,the plaintiff's choice of forum will rarely be disturbed. Griffith, 136 Ill. 2d at 106. Courts have long recognized thedeference given to the plaintiff's choice of forum, which iscommonly referred to as an unequal balancing test. Griffith, 136Ill. 2d at 106-07; Wieser, 98 Ill. 2d at 366. However, where theplaintiff is not a resident of the chosen forum, the plaintiff'schoice deserves less deference. Griffith, 136 Ill. 2d at 106.

In Guerine, the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged thatIllinois forum non conveniens law is less than clear. Guerine,198 Ill. 2d at 526. The court attempted to clarify the doctrine:

"[A] trial court abuses its discretion ingranting an intrastate forum non conveniensmotion to transfer venue where, as here, thepotential trial witnesses are scattered amongseveral counties, including the plaintiff'schosen forum, and no single county enjoys apredominant connection to the litigation. The balance of factors must strongly favortransfer of the case before the plaintiff canbe deprived of his chosen forum." Guerine,198 Ill. 2d at 526.

In the instant case, Advocate argues that Lake County is amore convenient forum because Prouty is not a resident of CookCounty, the alleged malpractice has no connection to Cook County,Prouty is forum shopping, and Cook County would be aninconvenient forum because the hospital and medical records arelocated in Lake County. Advocate claims that Cook County wouldbe inconvenient for the hospital's risk manager and witnesses. Advocate further contends that Dezirae's treating physicians'location should not be considered based on Bland.

Advocate contends that because the private and publicinterest factors strongly favor transfer to Lake County, thetrial court abused its discretion in denying its motion totransfer. According to Advocate, a majority of the potentialwitnesses reside in or near Lake County. In addition, Advocatemaintains that Lake County, as the site of the allegedmalpractice, has a stronger interest in resolving the instantlitigation than does Cook County. Advocate contends that CookCounty lacks any significant factual connection to this case andthat the Cook County docket is overcrowded.

Upon review of the record in this case, we are unable toconclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying

Advocate's motion to transfer to Lake County. Although we accordthe nonresident plaintiff's choice of forum less deference thanwe would if she resided in Cook County, we cannot conclude thatthe relevant factors weigh strongly in favor of transfer. First,there is unimpeded access to evidence and sources of proof inCook County. Second, the witnesses are dispersed fairly evenlyamong Cook, Lake and McHenry Counties. Third, Cook County'sinterest in resolving the instant litigation is as strong as thatof Lake County.

Considering first the relevant private interest factors, wecannot conclude that trial in Cook County would obstruct theparties' access to evidence and sources of proof. Advocatemaintains that the relevant postincident medical records arelocated in Lake County at Good Shepherd Hospital. However, thiscontention is not accurate. Although the alleged malpracticeoccurred in Lake County at Good Shepherd Hospital, all of therelevant medical records and testimony relating to the injuriescaused by the alleged malpractice are located at Lutheran GeneralHospital in Cook County. Dezirae received the majority of hertreatment at Lutheran General Hospital. She was admitted toLutheran General's emergency department for one or two days andwas admitted to the pediatric intensive care unit for two weeks. While admitted at Lutheran General, Dezirae experiencedgastrointestinal surgery, dehydration and renal failure. Shereceived a diagnosis and treatment from the physicians atLutheran General. Although the facts are not clear as to howlong Dezirae was at Good Shepherd Hospital, it is obvious fromthe facts that Dezirae spent more time at Lutheran General thanat Good Shepherd, and the majority of treatment was done atLutheran General. The Lutheran General admission generatedsubstantial medical records concerning Dezirae's condition andtreatment. Therefore, the medical records and testimony of thetreating physicians will be relevant in this case and should beconsidered under the unique circumstances of this case.

Advocate next argues that virtually all of the occurrencewitnesses reside or work in or near Lake County. The recordreveals that the trial court carefully considered the number ofwitnesses listed by the parties and their residences. The trialcourt conducted a detailed analysis of the witnesses likely to becalled at trial and concluded that the witnesses likely totestify were dispersed fairly evenly across Cook, Lake, andMcHenry Counties. Advocate argues, however, that the location ofDezirae's treating physicians should not be considered in lightof Bland. Advocate's argument fails to recognize the uniquecircumstances in this case. Dezirae, by no choice of her own,was transferred to Lutheran General Hospital in Cook County. Therationale behind not considering the locale of treatingphysicians was addressed in Bland:

"One should be cautious, however, not to giveundue weight to the fact that a plaintiff'streating physician or expert has an office inthe plaintiff's chosen forum. To do so wouldallow a plaintiff to easily frustrate theforum non conveniens principle by selectingas a witness a treating physician or expertin what would, in reality, be an inconvenientforum." Bland, 116 Ill. 2d at 227.

However, in the instant case, Prouty was not engaged inforum shopping when choosing a treating physician. In fact, shedid not choose these physicians. Prouty came in contact withthese physicians because Advocate transferred Dezirae to LutheranGeneral for medical treatment. Also, as discussed above, themajority of Dezirae's treatment and diagnosis took place atLutheran General. The majority of the medical records arelocated at Lutheran General in Cook County. Therefore, the trialcourt properly considered the location of the treatingphysicians.

We turn next to the public interest factors to beconsidered. Advocate argues that the public interest factorsstrongly favor transfer to Lake County. Advocate asserts thatthe action should be transferred to Lake County because it has aninterest in protecting persons within its borders. In addition,Advocate argues that the docket of the Cook County court systemis significantly more congested than that of Lake County.

Although we agree that Lake County has an interest inresolving this litigation, we cannot conclude that Cook Countylacks such an interest. Any county to which Advocate providesservice has an interest in the outcome of the case. SeeWashington, 144 Ill. 2d at 403. Advocate maintains hospitalsthroughout Cook County, including Advocate Christ Hospital. Furthermore, Dezirae remained in Lutheran General for over twoweeks, compared to the few hours she was treated at Good ShepherdHospital, and received the majority of her treatment in CookCounty. This treatment will be examined as part of thelitigation, and, therefore, Cook County has an interest in theoutcome of this litigation.

As for the congestion factors, figures compiled by theAdministrative Office of the Illinois Courts indicate that theaverage length of time from the date of filing to the date offinal disposition for jury cases in excess of $50,000 is 23.5months in Lake County. In Cook County, the average time to trysuch a case is 38.1 months. According to these figures, the CookCounty court system is significantly more congested than that ofLake County. However, "[c]ourt congestion is a relativelyinsignificant factor." Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 517. None of theother relevant factors, individually or collectively, can be saidto weigh strongly in favor of transfer, however, and we find thatthe court congestion factor alone is not enough to justifytransfer to Lake County.

CONCLUSION

Based on all of the unique circumstances presented in thiscase, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in weighing the public and private interest factors. It is clear from the record that the trial court considered allof the relevant arguments and factors in denying Advocate'smotion to transfer. It is evident that the trial court carefullyweighed the relevant considerations and found that the factors donot weigh strongly in favor of transfer to Lake County. Weconclude, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion in denying Advocate's motion to transfer and affirmthe trial court's decision.

Affirmed.

WOLFSON, P.J., and BURKE, J., concur.

1. The caption spells this defendant's name as Breckerman.However, the complaint and both parties' briefs spell his name asBeckerman, and, therefore, we refer to him as Beckerman.