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FIFTH DIVISION

OCTOBER 25, 2002

PRESIDING JUSTICE CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court:

Objectors Michael H. Preuter, Marianne King and Ronald J. Lundin appeal an order of thecircuit court of Cook County reversing decisions of the State Board of Elections for the State ofIllinois (Board), sitting as the State Officers Electoral Board (SOEB),⁽¹⁾ sustaining objections to thecandidacies of Chandler Hadraba, Steve Dubovik and John Tepley (Candidates) for State Representative from the 48th, 95th and 41st Representative Districts, respectively. This court grantedthe Objectors' motion to accelerate the appeal.⁽²⁾ For the reasons which follow, we affirm the circuitcourt.

The background of this appeal, as disclosed by the record and relevant statutory law, is asfollows. In the general election held in 2000, Elizabeth Quaintance, a Libertarian candidate,received over 26 percent of the vote for State Representative in the 39th Representative District. Section 10-2 of the Election Act provides in relevant part as follows:

"The term 'political party', as hereinafter used in this Article10, shall mean any 'established political party', as hereinafter definedand shall also mean any political group which shall hereafter undertake to form an established political party in the manner provided forin this Article 10 ***.

A political party which, at the last general election for Stateand county officers, polled for its candidate for Governor more than5% of the entire vote cast for Governor, is hereby declared to be an'established political party' as to the State and as to any district orpolitical subdivision thereof.

A political party which, at the last election in any congressional district, legislative district, county, township, municipality orother political subdivision or district in the State, polled more than5% of the entire vote cast within such territorial area or politicalsubdivision, as the case may be, has voted as a unit for the electionof officers to serve the respective territorial area of such district orpolitical subdivision, is hereby declared to be an 'establishedpolitical party' within the meaning of this Article as to such districtor political subdivision.

Any group of persons hereafter desiring to form a new political party throughout the State, or in any congressional, legislative orjudicial district, or in any other district or in any political subdivision(other than a municipality) not entirely within a single county, shallfile with the State Board of Elections a petition, as hereinafterprovided; and any such group of persons hereafter desiring to forma new political party within any county shall file such petition withthe county clerk; and any such group of persons hereafter desiring toform a new political party within any municipality or township orwithin any district of a unit of local government other than a countyshall file such petition with the local election official or Board ofElection Commissioners of such municipality, township or otherunit of local government, as the case may be. Any such petition forthe formation of a new political party throughout the State, or in anysuch district or political subdivision, as the case may be, shalldeclare as concisely as may be the intention of the signers thereof toform such new political party in the State, or in such district orpolitical subdivision; shall state in not more than 5 words the nameof such new political party; shall at the time of filing contain acomplete list of candidates of such party for all offices to be filled inthe State, or such district or political subdivision as the case may be,at the next ensuing election then to be held; and, if such newpolitical party shall be formed for the entire State, shall be signed by1% of the number of voters who voted at the next precedingStatewide general election or 25,000 qualified voters, whichever isless. If such new political party shall be formed for any district orpolitical subdivision less than the entire State, such petition shall besigned by qualified voters equaling in number not less than 5% ofthe number of voters who voted at the next preceding regularelection in such district or political subdivision in which suchdistrict or political subdivision voted as a unit for the election ofofficers to serve its respective territorial area. However, wheneverthe minimum signature requirement for a district or politicalsubdivision new political party petition shall exceed the minimumnumber of signatures for State-wide new political party petitions atthe next preceding State-wide general election, such State-widepetition signature requirement shall be the minimum for such districtor political subdivision new political party petition.

For the first election following a redistricting of congressional districts, a petition to form a new political party in a congressionaldistrict shall be signed by at least 5,000 qualified voters of thecongressional district. For the first election following a redistrictingof legislative districts, a petition to form a new political party in alegislative district shall be signed by at least 3,000 qualified votersof the legislative district. For the first election following aredistricting of representative districts, a petition to form a newpolitical party in a representative district shall be signed by at least1,500 qualified voters of the representative district.

***

The filing of such petition shall constitute the political groupa new political party, for the purpose only of placing upon the ballotat such next ensuing election such list or an adjusted list inaccordance with Section 10-11, of party candidates for offices to bevoted for throughout the State, or for offices to be voted for in suchdistrict or political subdivision less than the State, as the case maybe, under the name of and as the candidates of such new politicalparty.

If, at such ensuing election, the new political party's candidate for Governor shall receive more than 5% of the entire votes castfor Governor, then such new political party shall become an'established political party' as to the State and as to every district orpolitical subdivision thereof. If, at such ensuing election, the othercandidates of the new political party, or any other candidate orcandidates of the new political party shall receive more than 5% ofall the votes cast for the office or offices for which they were candidates at such election, in the State, or in any district or political subdivision, as the case may be, then and in that event, such new political party shall become an 'established political party' within theState or within such district or political subdivision less than theState, as the case may be, in which such candidate or candidatesreceived more than 5% of the votes cast for the office or offices forwhich they were candidates. It shall thereafter nominate its candidates for public offices to be filled in the State, or such district orpolitical subdivision, as the case may be, under the provisions of thelaws regulating the nomination of candidates of established politicalparties at primary elections and political party conventions, as nowor hereafter in force.

A political party which continues to receive for its candidatefor Governor more than 5% of the entire vote cast for Governor,shall remain an 'established political party' as to the State and as toevery district or political subdivision thereof. But if the politicalparty's candidate for Governor fails to receive more than 5% of theentire vote cast for Governor, or if the political party does notnominate a candidate for Governor, the political party shall remainan 'established political party' within the State or within such districtor political subdivision less than the State, as the case may be, onlyso long as, and only in those districts or political subdivisions inwhich, the candidates of that political party, or any candidate orcandidates of that political party, continue to receive more than 5%of all the votes cast for the office or offices for which they werecandidates at succeeding general or consolidated elections within theState or within any district or political subdivision, as the case maybe.

Any such petition shall be filed at the same time and shall besubject to the same requirements and to the same provisions inrespect to objections thereto and to any hearing or hearings uponsuch objections that are hereinafter in this Article 10 contained inregard to the nomination of any other candidate or candidates bypetition ***." 10 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 2000).

Section 8-17 of the Election Code addresses the nomination procedures for various types ofvacancies, stating in part as follows:

"The death of any candidate prior to, or on, the date of theprimary shall not affect the canvass of the ballots. If the result ofsuch canvass discloses that such candidate, if he had lived, wouldhave been nominated, such candidate shall be declared nominated.

In the event that a candidate of a party who has beennominated under the provisions of this Article shall die beforeelection (whether death occurs prior to, or on, or after, the date of theprimary) or decline the nomination or should the nomination for anyother reason become vacant, the legislative or representativecommittee of such party for such district shall nominate a candidateof such party to fill such vacancy. However, if there was no candidate for the nomination of the party in the primary, no candidate ofthat party for that office may be listed on the ballot at the generalelection, unless the legislative or representative committee of theparty nominates a candidate to fill the vacancy in nomination within60 days after the date of the general primary election." 10 ILCS5/8-17 (West 2000).

In 2001, the Illinois legislative map was redistricted, placing parts of the former 39thRepresentative District in the new 41st, 42nd, 47th, 48th and 95th Representative Districts.

The Board issued a "State of Illinois Candidate's Guide 2002" (Guide). The Preface to theGuide states that it lists the offices to be nominated or elected, filing dates, general requirementsfor filing, specific requirements for individual offices and answers to some of the more frequentlyasked questions about the nominating process, including signature requirements. The Preface alsostates in part as follows:

"Legal interpretations contained in this guide, however, arenot binding and should not be construed as sufficient argument inresponse to an objection to any candidate's nominating papers. TheState Board of Elections recommends that all prospective candidatesconsult with competent legal counsel when preparing theirnominating papers."

The Guide's subsequent discussion of the requirements for the office of StateRepresentative states in part as follows:

"NOTE: The Libertarian Party received more than 5% of thevotes cast at the November 2000 General Election inthe 39th Representative District. Accordingly, to theextent the boundaries of the 39th RepresentativeDistrict are changed by legislative redistricting, theState Board of Elections will consider the LibertarianParty to be an established party in any representativedistrict which includes any portion of the former 39thRepresentative District until directed to the contraryby a court of competent jurisdiction."

The Guide's discussion of the requirements for the office of State Representative also states in partthat established party candidates would be required to obtain the signatures of at least 300 primaryelectors of the candidate's party in the district, whereas new party candidates would be required toobtain the signatures of at least 1,500 qualified voters in the district, citing section 10-2 of theElection Code as the basis for the latter requirement.

No candidate ran for the Libertarian nomination for State Representative from the 41st,48th and 95th Representative Districts in the general primary election held on March 19, 2002. OnMay 20, 2002, the management committees for the Libertarian Party in these three districts eachfiled with the Board a "Resolution to Fill a Vacancy in Nomination," naming Tepley as thenominee for the 41st Representative District, Hadraba as the nominee for the 48th RepresentativeDistrict, and Dubovik as the nominee for the 95th Representative District.

On May 28, 2002, Lundin, Preuter and King filed objections to the Libertarian candidacies;each alleged in relevant part that the Libertarian Party was not an established political party in theirrespective districts. In each case, the objector moved for judgment on the pleadings, and thecandidate moved to strike and dismiss the objection, all raising similar issues. All three caseswere considered by hearing officer Colleen Burke, who recommended that the motions forjudgment on the pleadings be denied and that the motions to strike in dismiss be granted in partand denied in part. Burke ruled that the objectors had standing to object, but ruled that the Board'sdetermination as outlined in the Guide was correct and that the Libertarian Party should beconsidered an established political party in the 41st, 48th and 95th Representative Districts.

On July 15, 2002, the Board convened as the SOEB to consider the cases. The Board'sChairman, after noting Burke's recommendation, also sought a recommendation from The Board'sGeneral Counsel, who agreed with Burke. Members of the Board discussed the issue at length,some expressing the opinion that the statement in the Guide was not consistent with the ElectionCode or the Illinois Constitution. The Board ultimately voted unanimously to sustain theobjections, issuing written decisions to this effect the same day.

On July 22, 2002, the Candidates filed a Complaint for Expedited Judicial Review in thecircuit court of Cook County. On August 22, 2002, the circuit court entered an order reversing thedecisions of the SOEB, and remanded the case with instructions to place the names of eachcandidate on the ballot for the November 5, 2002 General Election, for the reasons stated in opencourt. The transcript shows that the circuit court ruled that the SOEB had misinterpreted section10-2 of the Election Code and that the SOEB was estopped from barring the LibertarianCandidates in light of the specific statement on the issue in the Guide. The Objectors then filed atimely Notice of Appeal to this court. On September 19, 2002, this court granted the Objectors'motion to expedite the appeal and set an expedited briefing schedule, which was concluded onOctober 7, 2002.

Initially, this court addresses the procedural posture of the case, the jurisdiction of thiscourt, and the standard of review. Section 10-10.1 of the Election Code provides that an objectoraggrieved by a decision of an electoral board may secure judicial review in the circuit court. 10ILCS 5/10-10.1 (West 2000). However, section 10-10.1 does not generally adopt the provisions ofthe Administrative Review Law; rather, the Administrative Review Law is expressly adopted onlywith respect to objectors or proponents aggrieved by decisions of an electoral board regarding apetition filed under section 18-120 of the Property Tax Code. 10 ILCS 5/10-10.1 (West 2000). Thus, this case is not governed by the standards of the Administrative Review Law. See 735 ILCS5/3-102 (West 2000). It follows that jurisdiction would not lie in this case under theAdministrative Review Law. See 735 ILCS 5/3-102, 3-112 (West 2000).

Of course, common law methods of obtaining judicial review of final administrativedecisions may be proper. See, e.g., Smith v. Department of Public Aid, 67 Ill. 2d 529, 541, 367N.E.2d 1286, 1292 (1977). The right to appeal from all final judgments, conferred by Article VI,section 6, of the Illinois Constitution, includes final judgments in cases where the trial court hasreviewed a decision of an electoral board. Havens v. Miller, 102 Ill. App. 3d 558, 429 N.E.2d1292 (1981). A common law writ of certiorari is a general method for obtaining judicial review ofadministrative actions when the law conferring power on the agency does not provide for anotherform of review. Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 272, 673 N.E.2d 251, 253 (1996). Thestandards of review under a common law writ of certiorari are essentially the same as those underthe Administrative Review Law. Hanrahan, 174 Ill. 2d at 272, 673 N.E.2d at 253-54.

Accordingly, in examining the Board's factual findings, a reviewing court should not weighthe evidence or substitute its judgment; a reviewing court is limited to ascertaining whether suchfindings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See City of Belvidere v. IllinoisState Labor Relations Bd., 181 Ill.2d 191, 205, 692 N.E.2d 295, 302 (1998). The Board's ruling ona question of law, on the other hand, is reviewed on a de novo basis. See City of Belvidere, 181Ill.2d at 205, 692 N.E.2d at 302. A mixed question of fact and law is reviewed under the clearlyerroneous standard. See City of Belvidere, 181 Ill.2d at 205, 692 N.E.2d at 302. Applying thislast standard to mixed questions provided some deference to the experience and expertise of anadministrative agency or board. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill.2d at 205, 692 N.E.2d at 302.

The Objectors argue that the circuit court erred in rejecting the SOEB's interpretation ofsection 10-2 of the Election Code. The parties treat the issue as one of pure statutory construction. The Objectors also argue that the trial court erred in reversing the SOEB's ruling that theCandidates were not entitled to rely on the Guide's statement regarding the status of the LibertarianParty in newly redrawn districts encompassing the former 39th Representative District. Thedoctrine of estoppel is as applicable to questions of law as it is to questions of fact. See Du PageForklift Service, Inc. v. Material Handling Services, Inc., 195 Ill. 2d 71, 80, 744 N.E.2d 845, 850(2001). As there is no dispute regarding the underlying facts of each case, this court may reviewthe issues de novo. However, this court need only address the second issue, as it disposes of theappeal.

In Merz v. Volberding, 94 Ill. App. 3d 1111, 419 N.E.2d 628 (1981), objectors challengedthe right of three independent candidates to appear on the ballot, claiming that the candidates'petitions did not contain the minimum number of signatures required by section 10-3 of theElection Code. The local electoral board ruled that the candidates' petitions did meet the statutorysignature requirement. The objectors sought judicial review of the electoral board's ruling; the trialcourt affirmed the decision of the electoral board. The objectors appealed.

This court affirmed in part. The record in Merz established that the city clerk in the pasthad issued information sheets which set forth the minimum and maximum signature requirementsfor candidates running for the offices of mayor, clerk, treasurer and alderman. The Merz courtanalyzed section 10-3 of the Election Code, ruled that it was not clear and unambiguous, and thatthe objectors had correctly interpreted the statute. Merz, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1114, 419 N.E.2d at630. Accordingly, the information on the information sheets regarding the number of signatureswas incorrect. Merz, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1117, 419 N.E.2d at 633. Nevertheless, because the cityclerk traditionally handed out such information sheets prior to elections and the practice had goneunchallenged for several years, this court ruled that reliance on such information was justified. Merz, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1117, 419 N.E.2d at 633.

This case involves the requirements imposed on new political parties for obtaining andretaining the status of an "established political party" under section 10-2 of the Election Code. TheObjectors argue that Merz is inapplicable in this context, as this court distinguished Merz in Fosterv. Municipal Officers Electoral Bd., 113 Ill. App. 3d 721, 726, 447 N.E.2d 990, 993 (1983), on theground that it involved section 10-3, not section 10-2. However, Foster addressed a party that lostestablished status by failing to run candidates in the "last election in the territorial area of suchdistrict or political subdivision" under section 10-2. In Foster, there is no discussion of theestoppel issue addressed in Merz. There is no suggestion in Foster that the government providedthe party or candidates with incorrect information. Moreover, Foster does not involve the effect ofdecennial redistricting on parties that were previously established on a less than statewide basisunder section 10-2 of the Election Code. Accordingly, Foster is not controlling in this case.

In this case, as in Merz, the first consideration is whether the statute at issue is clear andunambiguous. A statute is ambiguous if it "is capable of being understood by reasonablywell-informed persons in two or more different senses." People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 288,642 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (1994). A statute may also contain a latent ambiguity. Stewart v.Industrial Commission, 115 Ill. 2d 337, 340, 504 N.E.2d 84, 86 (1987). A latent ambiguity arises"where the language employed is clear and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning, butsome extrinsic fact or extraneous evidence creates a necessity for interpretation or a choice amongtwo or more possible meanings." Hoglund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 148 Ill. 2d272, 279, 592 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (1992), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 102 (3d ed. 1933).

In this case, in one paragraph alone, section 10-2 of the Election Code refers to a "politicalsubdivision or district," a "territorial area or political subdivision," "the respective territorial areaof such district or political subdivision," and ultimately again to a "district or political subdivision." The Libertarian Party polled more than 5% in the 39th Representative District in the2000 general election. The question presented in this case was whether, having so voted as a unitto serve that territorial area and become an established political party as to such district or subdivision, the Libertarian Party lost its status when that territorial area of the 39th RepresentativeDistrict was redistricted into numerous other districts. The record shows that the Board's GeneralCounsel and legal staff anticipated this exact question and specifically answered it in the negativein the 2002 Guide. The record shows that the hearing officer in this case wrote that section 10-2did not specifically address the question, but rejected an interpretation of section 10-2 under whichthe Libertarian Party would not be an established political party in any district followingredistricting, which appears to be the argument adopted by the Objectors. The hearing officerultimately agreed with the interpretation of section 10-2 reflected in the guide, concluding that theObjectors' argument rendered other parts of section 10-2 meaningless. The SOEB rejected theinterpretation given by the General Counsel and the hearing officer as contrary to the statute. Onreview, the circuit court agreed with the interpretation given in the guide.

Having reviewed the arguments presented in the record and in the briefs on appeal, weconclude that the Objectors, the Candidates, the SOEB, its staff, and the circuit court judge wereall reasonably well-informed and that section 10-2 is capable of being understood by reasonablywell-informed persons in two or more different senses, given the facts and circumstancespresented here. An argument based on section 10-2's requirements for new political partiesfollowing redistricting of representative districts begs the question of whether the Libertarian Partymust be considered a new political party following such redistricting. On the other hand, theObjectors correctly note that section 10-2 does not expressly state that political parties establishedon a less than statewide basis retain that status after redistricting, and if so, where it retains thatstatus. The interpretation given in the Guide appears to be based on the determination that, insofaras section 10-2 refers to "5% of the entire vote cast in such territorial area or political subdivision,"the term "such territorial area" relates back to section 10-2's initial reference to "any congressionaldistrict, legislative district, county, township, municipality or other political subdivision or districtin the State," thereby allowing the Libertarian Party to claim that it is established in the territorialarea of the old 39th Representative District, even though the districts have since been redrawn,because redistricting did not wipe the territorial area at issue from the face of the earth..

Either interpretation of section 10-2 may lead to absurd results. Had the statewideredistricting of representative districts created a new 39th Representative District with the exactboundaries of the previous 39th Representative District, minus one city block, the Objectors'argument would suggest that the Libertarian Party could nevertheless be disestablished in the 39thRepresentative District, because the redrawn district is technically new. On the other hand, underthat same scenario, the Candidates' interpretation of the statute establishes the Libertarian Party notonly in the 39th Representative District, but also the district to which that one city block wasallocated. However, the fact that either interpretation may lead to absurd results does not changethe fact that either interpretation may reasonably find support in the language of section 10-2. Accordingly, this court must conclude that the statute is ambiguous in the context of this appeal.

It is undisputed that the Board issued a "State of Illinois Candidate's Guide 2002" thatspecifically addressed the issue on review in this case, stating as follows:

"NOTE: The Libertarian Party received more than 5% of thevotes cast at the November 2000 General Election inthe 39th Representative District. Accordingly, to theextent the boundaries of the 39th RepresentativeDistrict are changed by legislative redistricting, theState Board of Elections will consider the LibertarianParty to be an established party in any representativedistrict which includes any portion of the former 39thRepresentative District until directed to the contraryby a court of competent jurisdiction."

The Objectors raise a number of arguments as to why the Candidates should not be allowed to relyon this language in the Guide. We address each in turn.

The Objectors argue that the SOEB should not be estopped because invoking the doctrinewould prevent the SOEB from correcting its mistakes and permit violations of the law to remain inperpetuity. See, e.g., Halleck v. County of Cook, 264 Ill. App. 3d 887, 894, 637 N.E.2d 1110,1115 (1994). The Objectors' concern is valid in general, but not persuasive in the context of thiscase. The Election Code requires that a political party established on a less than statewide basismust continue to gain a given percentage of the vote to remain an established political party in agiven district or other political subdivision. Moreover, the Objectors have cited no authorityprecluding the Board or SOEB from informing people in future Guides that it is adopting adifferent interpretation of section 10-2 in future elections from that found in the 2002 Guide.

The Objectors correctly note that to invoke equitable estoppel against a public body, theregenerally must be an affirmative act on the part of the public body that induces substantialreliance, and that affirmative act generally must be an act of the public body itself such as alegislative enactment, rather than the unauthorized acts of a ministerial officer or a ministerialmisinterpretation. E.g., Hamwi v. Zollar, 299 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1095, 702 N.E.2d 593, 598(1998). Accordingly, the Objectors argue that the Candidates' reliance on the Guide was notreasonable, particularly given the disclaimer set forth at the beginning of the Guide.

The objectors in Merz made a similar argument regarding the information sheetsdistributed by the city clerk. The Merz court rejected the argument, stating as follows:

"We find this argument unpersuasive. Since the city clerktraditionally has handed out information sheets prior to elections andsince the practice has gone unchallenged for several years, we do notfind that reliance on such information was unjustified." Merz, 94 Ill.App. 3d at 1117, 419 N.E.2d at 633.

In this case, the Guide was alleged to be issued under the Board's authority, and the Objectors didnot dispute the allegation. As the Objectors note, the transcript shows that some members of theBoard were unaware that the language at issue was in the Guide. Of course, the Candidates didnot have the benefit of the transcript when they relied on the Guide.

Although the Guide includes a general disclaimer, it then proceeds to not only address theprecise factual situation presented in these cases, but also states that the SOEB "will consider theLibertarian Party to be an established party in any representative district which includes anyportion of the former 39th Representative District until directed to the contrary by a court ofcompetent jurisdiction." (emphases added). The Objectors interpret this language as supportingtheir position against estoppel, but it is more reasonably read to the contrary. The specificlanguage not only stated a position on the exact issue involved in this appeal, but also stated thatthis would be the Board's position until ordered to rule to the contrary by a higher authority. It iswell-established that "where a document contains both general and specific provisions relating tothe same subject, the specific provision is controlling." Continental Casualty Co. v. Polk Bros.,Inc., 120 Ill. App. 3d 395, 399, 457 N.E.2d 1271, 1274 (1983).

Moreover, while the Guide's disclaimer directs candidates to consult counsel whenpreparing their nominating papers, this court has stated that "it would be a great injustice topenalize any candidate for failure to understand a provision in the Election Code which weourselves have had considerable difficulty in interpreting." Merz, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1117, 419N.E.2d at 632-33. As noted above, in this case, the statute at issue is subject to severalinterpretations; competent legal counsel would have had no way of determining that the Guide wasclearly wrong on this point. Furthermore, before the SOEB, when the Candidates moved to strikethe objections, the Objectors filed responses that cited the Guide as an authority. In sum, theCandidates' reliance on the Guide was reasonable, given the facts and circumstances here.

Citing Lindahl v. City of Des Plaines, 210 Ill. App. 3d 281, 568 N.E.2d 1306 (1991), theObjectors argue that a party seeking to estop the State must prove the fraudulent intent of the statebody. However, Lindahl cited Bank of Pawnee v. Joslin, 166 Ill. App. 3d 927, 521 N.E.2d 1177(1988), for this proposition; in turn, Joslin cited Lincolnland Properties, Inc. v. ButterworthApartments, Inc., 65 Ill. App. 3d 907, 912, 382 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (1978), which states thatfraudulent intent is not essential for recovery on a theory of estoppel. Indeed, our supreme courthas expressly stated that "[a] fraudulent intent is not necessary to estoppel." Cessna v.Montgomery, 63 Ill. 2d 71, 86, 344 N.E.2d 447, 454 (1976). Notably, one of the cases the Ceesnacourt cited in support of its statement was Trustees of Schools v. Village of Cahokia, 357 Ill. 538,543, 192 N.E. 565 (1934), a case involving public bodies. Thus, in Merz, this court applied thedoctrine of estoppel, even though it was "obvious that in distributing the information sheetscontaining information which was incorrect under our reading of the statute, the clerk's intentionwas not to undermine the statutory scheme, but rather to perform a meaningful public service." Merz, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1117, 419 N.E.2d at 633.

Finally, we agree with the Objectors that reasonable limitations on ballot access arelegitimate because they serve an important interest in maintaining the integrity of the ballot. However, we also agree with the Candidates that ballot access is a substantial right that should notbe lightly denied. The ostensible limitation on ballot access in section 10-2 is ambiguous,particularly given the facts of this case; imposing the limitation in this case would be neitherreasonable nor just. Indeed, the Board's decision to bar the Candidates after issuing of apurportedly misleading determination on that exact issue (and included in the Guide preciselybecause the staff thought it likely to arise in this election) cannot be deemed a reasonablelimitation on ballot access.

For all of the aforementioned reasons, the decision of the circuit court of Cook County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

BUCKLEY and REID, JJ., concur.

1. The Board has not filed a brief in this appeal.

2. This court's order, entered on September 19, 2002, required the Objectors to submittheir reply brief by October 7, 2002. Although the Objectors did not file their reply untilOctober 11, 2002, this court has read and considered the argument therein.