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FIFTH DIVISION
May 31, 2002

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a complaint for administrative review by the circuitcourt of Cook County. Defendants, Paul Vallas (Vallas), then the chief executive officer (CEO) ofChicago Public Schools (CPS), and the Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees (the SchoolBoard or Board), brought charges for dismissal against plaintiff, Dr. Maria Prato, allegingviolations of her employment contract as principal of the Clay Elementary School (Clay). Following an administrative hearing, plaintiff was discharged from her position. The circuit courtdismissed plaintiff's subsequent complaint for administrative review against the above-nameddefendants in addition to other defendants, the Illinois State Board of Education (State Board) andhearing officer, Julius Menacker. Defendants Vallas and the Board filed a separate brief fromdefendants the State Board and Menacker.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that: (1) the School Board lacked jurisdiction to terminateplaintiff from her employment contract for failure to issue a statutorily required formal warning;(2) plaintiff's 1998-2002 performance contract rights were improperly terminated by dischargeproceedings involving conduct occurring during a prior performance contract; and (3) the statuteunder which plaintiff was terminated is unconstitutional. For the following reasons, we affirm thejudgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

The following chronology outlines the events relevant to plaintiff's appeal:

The record reveals the following relevant facts. On June 22, 1998, the Chicago PublicSchools, through its CEO, Vallas, and the Board, brought charges against plaintiff, Dr. MariaPrato, seeking her discharge from her position as principal of the Clay Elementary School. Plaintiff was charged with: (1) conduct unbecoming a principal; (2) gross dereliction of duties;(3) violation of her uniform performance contract; (4) improper recruitment activities for theOptions for Knowledge program; (5) violations of student confidentially; (6) retaliation inviolation of the Whistle Blower Protection section of the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/34-2/4c. (West 1998)); (7) insubordination; (8) disregard of practice and procedure; (9) refusing toenroll students; and (10) conduct causing harm to the students of Clay Elementary School.

The Board arranged for a hearing officer to hold a hearing to determine if plaintiff shouldbe suspended without pay pending a hearing on the changes. A presuspension hearing wasconducted on July 15, 1998, and plaintiff was represented by counsel. On July 24, 1998, thehearing officer recommended plaintiff's suspension without pay. On July 27, Vallas notifiedplaintiff that she was suspended without pay effective immediately.

In accordance with section 34-85 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/34-85 (West 1998)), theState Board sent resumes of five prospective impartial hearing officers to both the Board and toplaintiff. A process of elimination resulted in the selection of Julius Menacker as the hearingofficer.

On August 18, 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for theNorthern District of Illinois (District Court), alleging violations of her right to due process andbreach of contract. She sought a temporary retraining order, demanding her reinstatement asprincipal at Clay, and a preliminary injunction. On August 20, 1998, the District Court found thatplaintiff's presuspension hearing was adequate and denied her request for an injunction. Plaintiff'sdismissal hearing commenced on November 17, 1998, and continued for 16 days.

The Board first alleged that plaintiff violated Board guidelines regarding obtainingconfidential information. Clay has an "Options for Knowledge" (Options) program which offersadvanced classes to gifted students. Known within the CPS as a "magnet program," Clay givesfirst preference to neighborhood students. If more space is available, parents outside theneighborhood may apply to send their children to Clay. On May 19, 1997, plaintiff sent out morethan 100 acceptance letters to students from 18 to 20 different schools who had achieved highstandardized test scores. These students had not applied to admission to Clay, and the Boardalleged plaintiff wrongfully obtained access to the students' names, addresses, grades, test scoresand class rank. Parents complained about the letters. The Board alleged that plaintiff enrolled onestudent, "K.H.," who resided outside of the school boundaries.

The Region 6 Education Officer called a meeting of all the principals in the district todiscuss the acceptance letters sent out by plaintiff. At the meeting plaintiff claimed that sheobtained the names of the students from a computer disk which was kept by the Clay OptionsClerk, who died in March 1996. Plaintiff stated that she thought the disk contained the names ofstudents who had applied for admission to Clay. Plaintiff was asked to produce the disk but wasunable to do so, stating that she searched for the disk both at work and at home and could not findthe disk. Plaintiff also stated that Clay had 30 vacancies in the Options program. One week later,however, plaintiff informed Jack Harnedy, the CPS desegregation implementation coordinator,that Clay had no Options vacancies.

The hearing officer rejected plaintiff's explanation that she was unaware of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the acceptance letters because of the death of the Optionsclerk. The hearing officer noted that plaintiff determined that no vacancies existed in the Optionsprogram for qualified applicants only after discovery of plaintiff's unauthorized mailing. The hearing officer further found that plaintiff's testimony that the disc containing the names of improperlyrecruited students was lost was not credible, and that her behavior was in clear violation of Boardregulations and policy.

The Board further charged that plaintiff improperly retaliated against teachers in violationof the Whistle Blower Protection section of the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/34-2.4c). OnJune 12, 1996, the Board charged plaintiff with permitting security breaches that allowed studentsat Clay to study and practice taking standardized tests before they were administered. As a result, all Clay students were tested twice in 1996. After a hearing, plaintiff was suspended without payfor ten school days. Substitute teacher Janet Tisza testified at the July 9, 1996, hearing againstplaintiff. Thereafter, plaintiff gave Tisza a negative evaluation, followed by a dismissal letterdated July 1, 1996, postmarked July 17, 1996.

Eileen Reardon, taught at Clay from September 1995 until June 1996. Reardon testified atplaintiff's hearing in July 1996, that she reported testing violations to the Clay CurriculumCoordinator, Ms. Margaris. On May 3, 1996, in the middle of the day, Board investigators pulledReardon out of her classroom for questioning. The same day, plaintiff was removed from theschool and assigned to the Central Office. The next day, Reardon received a telephone call athome from plaintiff's husband, an attorney. Reardon testified that plaintiff's husband threatenedReardon's job and demanded that she tell him what happened at Clay on the previous day. Reardontestified that on June 13, 1996, she received a negative evaluation from plaintiff. On July 20,1996, Reardon received a letter from plaintiff dated July 1, 1996, postmarked July 17, 1996,advising that her position had been filled by an assigned teacher. Reardon obtained a new positionand requested an administrative transfer on August 15, 1996.

The Board further charged that plaintiff discriminated against homeless children and youthagainst the Board's enrollment policies. Witnesses testified that they had difficulty enrollingchildren who lived in a shelter for abused and neglected children. Plaintiff was charged withimproper conduct regarding numerous incidents involving a particular student, H.A. H.A., a ten-year old student in foster care, who was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder,was suspended by plaintiff many times for at total of 44 days. At one time plaintiff caused a policereport to be filed against H.A., and to deny certain special education services to H.A.

Plaintiff was also charged with failure to provide copies of Clay employment commitmentagreements to the Board's General counsel. In July 1996, the Board learned that plaintiff requiredteachers to sign employment commitment agreements before obtaining Board approval. Plaintiff'saction violated the Board's employment policies and procedures which require that only the Boardand the Union negotiate the terms and conditions of Board employment. Plaintiff was ordered tocease her use of the commitment agreement in August 1996, and to provide copies of all signedagreements to the Board. Plaintiff failed to provide the signed agreements, and later informed theBoard that the agreements had been destroyed.

The Board further charged plaintiff with violating a student's confidentiality by sending acarbon-copy of a letter plaintiff wrote to a school administrator about a student to plaintiff's ownattorney. The allegations further stated that plaintiff placed undue restrictions upon Boardpersonnel providing services to her school; failed to provide records of student suspensions to theadministration on a timely basis; violated staffing procedures with one teacher; insubordinatelyfailed to provide to the Regional Education Officer the school's "Toilet Recess Policy"; andimproperly cancelled a state pre-kindergarten program. The Board concluded that plaintiff'sconduct as described was "cruel, immoral and negligent, and caused psychological harm to theClay students, staff and community." The Board also alleged that plaintiff's conduct wasirremediable.

Five members of the Local School Counsel (LSC) testified at the hearing that they wereunaware of any of the alleged improper conduct by plaintiff.

On May 12, 1999, the hearing officer issued a decision recommending that the SchoolBoard's dismissal of plaintiff be upheld. The hearing officer noted that plaintiff possessed a validemployment contract for the period 1998-2002. The contract contained a provision for "removalfor cause" pursuant to section 5/34-85 of the School Code. The hearing officer found that theBoard sustained the charges and specifications against plaintiff for (1) flagrant violation of theBoard's policy in her efforts to recruit high quality students to attend Clay School who had notapplied; (2) retaliated against teachers who cooperated with an investigation of plaintiff; (3) wasinsubordinate to requests and orders from Board personnel; (4) failed to observe the due processrights of students; and (5) engaged in a clear pattern of resistance to, delay in responding to and/ormaladministration of various Board rules and policies.

On June 17, 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court. Plaintiff challenged the decision of the hearing officer alleging that it was against the manifestweight of the evidence and that the hearing officer denied her a fair and impartial hearing. Plaintiff asked that the court reverse the decisions of the hearing officer and the Board.

The Board reviewed the hearing officer's findings of fact and recommendation. OnJune 23, 1999, the board formally adopted the recommended decision of the hearing officer. In aletter dated June 24, 1999, Vallas informed plaintiff that the Board had accepted the hearingofficer's recommendation and that she was discharged upon receipt of the letter.

On August 17, 1999, plaintiff filed a seven-count amended complaint. In count I, plaintiffsought administrative review of the decision of the hearing officer. Counts II through IV soughtreview of the decision of the School Board. In Count II, plaintiff sought review underAdministrative Review Law. In count III, plaintiff sought review by way of a petition for a writ ofmandamus, and in count IV, plaintiff sought review through a common-law writ of certiorari.

Plaintiff also challenged her dismissal as a violation of her rights to due process under boththe state and federal constitutions. In count V, plaintiff alleged that the procedures establishedunder section 34-85 of the Illinois School Code violated due process in that the procedures: (1) allowed the Board to ignore the decision of the hearing officer without providing any rationalefor its decision; (2) provided no standards to guide the Board in reviewing the hearing officer'sdecision; (3) did not require the Board to review the record of the hearing or the hearing officer'sdecision before either accepting or rejecting the recommendation; and (4) ensured that the Boardwould "sit as judge in its own case." In count VI, plaintiff asserted a due process claim pursuant to42 U.S.C.