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THIRD DIVISION

July 25, 2001

No. 1--00--1366

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs Juan Andres Pinilla, as administrator of the Estateof Juan M. Pinilla Osorio, deceased, Pablo Gonzalez Bergez, HectorLanfranco, and Martin Campbell appeal from an order of the circuitcourt granting defendant Harza Engineering Company's motion todismiss plaintiffs' petition for registration of a foreign judgmentand petition to revive judgment pursuant to sections 2--619 and 2--615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--619, 2--615 (West 1998)). On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the statuteof limitations set forth in section 12--108(a) of the Code (735ILCS 5/12--108(a) (West 1998)) does not apply to registration offoreign judgments; that the 20-year revival period set forth insection 13--218 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13--218 (West 1998)) shouldbe applied to foreign judgments; that their revival petition wasnot premature; and that the documents attached to their petitionfor registration were properly authenticated judgments. For thereasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.

Plaintiffs seek enforcement of two judgments for attorney feesordered payable to them from defendant in an action in Argentina inwhich plaintiffs represented the Argentina plaintiffs againstdefendant. On September 27, 1990, an Argentina trial court enteredjudgment against defendant in favor of plaintiffs. On March 21,1991, the court of appeals of Argentina modified the judgment,reducing the amount of attorney fees awarded to plaintiffs.

On December 3, 1999, plaintiffs filed a "Notice of FilingPetition to Register" in the circuit court of Cook County. OnDecember 30, 1999, plaintiffs filed a "Petition for Revival ofJudgment" (revival petition), seeking to revive the Argentinajudgments. On January 3, 2000, defendant objected to plaintiffs'December 3 notice of filing, arguing that plaintiffs failed toattach a copy of a "Petition to Register Foreign Judgment." OnJanuary 11, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file instantera petition to register foreign judgment, indicating that they hadinadvertently failed to attach a copy of the petition to theirnotice of filing. The trial court granted this motion and, onJanuary 20, plaintiffs filed a "Petition to Register ForeignJudgment" (registration petition or petition to register), seekingto register the two Argentina judgments. Plaintiffs attached twodocuments in Spanish and an unofficial English translation of each. These documents contain various stamps, seals, and attestations.

On February 10, 2000, defendant filed a motion to dismiss bothpetitions. It sought to dismiss the registration petition pursuantto section 2--619(a)(9) of the Code, arguing that the petition wasbarred by the seven-year statute of limitations period set forth insection 12--108(a) of the Code.⁽¹⁾ It also sought to dismiss theregistration petition pursuant to section 2--615 of the Code basedon plaintiffs failure to attach duly authenticated copies of theforeign judgments to the petition; plaintiffs only attached whatappeared to be two affidavits which included excerpts from thecourt records and proceedings. With respect to the revivalpetition, defendant sought to dismiss this petition pursuant tosection 2--619(a)(9) of the Code, arguing that plaintiffs had nojudgment to revive because they had no valid enforceable Illinoisjudgment and, therefore, plaintiffs' petition was premature.

In its memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss,defendant alleged that this was plaintiffs' seventh attempt in oversix years to obtain recognition and enforcement of the Argentinajudgments. In this regard, plaintiffs first filed an actionagainst defendant in the federal district court in September 1993,seeking to recognize and enforce the Argentina judgments. Afterbeing allowed the opportunity to amend their complaint, thedistrict court dismissed plaintiffs' second amended complaint,finding that plaintiffs had simply attached a letter rogatory totheir complaint, which was not enforceable, and that plaintiffs hadnever provided the court with a copy of the judgments they soughtto enforce.

In August 1995, plaintiffs again filed a complaint againstdefendant, this time in the circuit court of Cook County. Thecircuit court dismissed the complaint because plaintiffs attachedletters rogatory, which were not judicially enforceable, and failedto attach a copy of the judgments they sought to enforce. Plaintiffs amended their complaint on two occasions, adding Englishtranslations of the Spanish documents they had attached to theircomplaint. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' second amendedcomplaint on June 12, 1996, finding that plaintiffs still hadfailed to attach a copy of the judgments they sought to enforce totheir complaint.

On March 24, 2000, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs'petitions in the present case pursuant to section 2--619 andsection 2--615 of the Code. With respect to the registrationpetition, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to file theirpetition within the seven-year statute of limitations period and,therefore, the petition was barred. The court dismissed therevival petition, finding that it was premature since plaintiffsdid not yet have an Illinois judgment to enforce, e.g., plaintiffshad no right to enforce their judgments until they were recognizedin Illinois. The trial court additionally stated that defendant'smotion pursuant to section 2--615 had merit and dismissed both ofplaintiffs' petitions with prejudice on that basis. This appealfollowed.

"A section 2--619 motion to dismiss affords a defendant ameans of obtaining a summary disposition when the plaintiff's claimcan be defeated as a matter of law or on the basis of easily provedissues of fact." McGee v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 315 Ill.App. 3d 673, 680, 734 N.E.2d 144 (2000). A motion pursuant tosection 2--619 admits as true all well-pleaded facts and inferencesto be drawn from the facts. McGee, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 680. Amotion to dismiss pursuant to section 2--619(a)(5) permitsdismissal when "the action was not commenced within the timelimited by law," and a motion pursuant to section 2--619(a)(9)permits dismissal when "the claim asserted against defendant isbarred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of ordefeating the claim." 735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(5), (9) (West 1998). We review the trial court's decision de novo. Kedzie & 103rdCurrency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116, 619 N.E.2d732 (1993).

The enforcement of judgments rendered by courts outside theState of Illinois is governed under two uniform statutes:⁽²⁾ theUniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Recognition Act)(735 ILCS 5/12--618 et seq. (West 1998)) and the UniformEnforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Enforcement Act) (735 ILCS5/12--650 et seq. (West 1998)). The Recognition Act recognizesjudgments of a foreign state, which is "any governmental unit otherthan the United States, or any state." 735 ILCS 5/12--618(a) (West1998). The Recognition Act provides that as long as a foreignjudgment is "final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered"(735 ILCS 5/12--619 (West 1998)), it "is enforceable in the samemanner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to fullfaith and credit" (735 ILCS 5/12--620 (West 1998)). TheEnforcement Act governs enforcement of foreign judgments of "acourt of the United States or of any other court which is entitledto full faith and credit in this State." 735 ILCS 5/12--651 (West1998).

The Recognition Act serves the purpose only of allowing aUnited States court a means to recognize a foreign judgment. TheRecognition Act does not establish the procedure to file or enforcea foreign judgment. See 9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, Invalidityof Judgment of Court of Foreign Country,