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                                                                                                                                        Fifth Division
                                                                                                                                        December 23, 2005

JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the modified opinion of the court:

After a jury trial, Daniel Wead was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to 38years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Wead's motion for a new trial was denied. Wead nowappeals and presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the police had probable causeto arrest Wead on January 16, 1999, when the police did not have a warrant for his arrest and did notobserve him commit a crime prior to his arrest; and (2) whether Wead's January 18, 1999, statementwas voluntary when, prior to making the statement, he was isolated in an interview room at a policestation for 54 hours.

Originally, we reversed Wead's conviction and remanded for a new trial, instructing the trialcourt to suppress the defendant's post-arrest statement. However, we were directed by the IllinoisSupreme Court in a supervisory order to vacate the judgment and reconsider our decision in light ofPeople v. Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517 (2005), and we have complied with the order in this modifiedopinion.

BACKGROUND

THE HEARING ON THE MOTION TO QUASH ARREST AND SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

OFFICER BILL QUINN

Officer Bill Quinn of the Chicago police department was detailed to the Area One MissionTeam at 51st Street and Wentworth Avenue. Officer Quinn testified that on January 16, 1999, thedetectives on the team asked him to find Daniel Wead and bring him to the police station. OfficerQuinn testified that he and his partner were dressed in civilian clothing and riding in an unmarkedpolice car. They drove to the area Wead was known to frequent and observed Wead on the sidewalkin front of 2306 West 51st Street. Officer Quinn stated that it looked like Wead was exiting abuilding. Officer Quinn testified that he did not have a search warrant to search Wead or the premises,and he did not see Wead commit a crime prior to approaching him. According to Officer Quinn, aftera conversation with Wead, Wead got into the backseat of the unmarked police car and rode to AreaOne. Officer Quinn testified that he took Wead to the Area One detectives division and put him inan interview room and left the door open. Finally, Officer Quinn testified that he had not beenapprised of the facts of the case before he was directed to pick up Wead and he had no involvementwith Wead after bringing him to the interview room.

On cross-examination, Officer Quinn testified that before he was sent to pick up Wead, he wasat the Bruno Kopec homicide scene and Terry Lasa came forward and spoke with the detectives.Officer Quinn stated that he spoke with Lasa in the car after the detectives directed him to take Lasaback to Area One. After speaking with Lasa, the detectives asked Officer Quinn about the name "BillyReid" and gave him the description Lasa gave them. Officer Quinn testified that he told the detectivesthat Wead fit the description of the person they were looking for, so he retrieved a photograph ofWead and gave it to the detectives. Officer Quinn stated that he believed the detectives showedWead's photograph to Lasa.

Officer Quinn testified that he first saw Wead around 1:30 p.m., and he told Wead that theArea One detectives were investigating a homicide and interviewing people. Officer Quinn testifiedthat he asked Wead to accompany him to the station and Wead agreed. Officer Quinn testified thatWead would not have been taken to the police station if he had stated that he did not want to go withthe police. Officer Quinn patted Wead down before he got into the backseat of the car. Officer Quinnstated that he took a small folding knife clipped to Wead's belt because no weapons were allowed inthe backseat of the police car. Officer Quinn told Wead that the knife would be returned. Finally,Officer Quinn testified that he did not handcuff Wead at the station. On redirect examination, OfficerQuinn testified that he never gave the knife back to Wead, but gave Wead's knife to a detective atArea One.

DETECTIVE TIMOTHY NOLAN

Detective Timothy Nolan testified that he never told Wead that he wanted him to be a witnessfor "Bob Reid." When he spoke to Wead on January 16, 1999, Nolan stated that he told Wead theywere investigating Kopec's murder. Detective Nolan also testified that Wead stated that he knew thatKopec had been murdered. According to Detective Nolan, when he asked Wead if he could inventoryhis knife, Wead stated that he was using drugs on January 15, 1999, the date Kopec was killed, andraised his sleeves to show Detective Nolan the track marks. Detective Nolan testified that he had notseen Wead's arm prior to January 18, 1999, because Wead had on a long-sleeved sweatshirt.Detective Nolan stated that Wead blurted out that he should take Lasa for a polygraph examination.Detective Nolan testified that when he told Wead that Lasa had already volunteered for a polygraphexamination, Wead stated, "okay officer, I did it." Detective Nolan testified that at no time prior toWead's confession had any officer accused Wead of killing Kopec or demanded that he admit that hekilled Kopec. Detective Nolan also testified that Wead was never handcuffed when they weretogether and was never forced to wear a paper outfit.

On cross-examination, Detective Nolan testified that when he questioned Lasa about hisknowledge of disagreements Bruno Kopec had with people before his death, Lasa stated that Kopectold him that he was upset with an individual named Billy Reid or Tim Reid for taking $10 and notreturning it. Detective Nolan testified that on January 16, 1999, and January 17, 1999, he did notoffer Wead a ride home or ask him if he wanted to be taken home. Detective Nolan stated that whenWead told him that he wanted to help the investigation, he informed Wead that to help he would haveto stay at the station while other witnesses were interviewed. Detective Nolan testified that Weadconfessed around five minutes after he walked into the interview room on January 18, 1999.Detective Nolan stated that he did not speak to Wead prior to Wead's confession. However, afterfurther cross-examination on the matter, Detective Nolan testified that he did walk into the room andspeak to Wead before he confessed. Detective Nolan testified that Wead's confession was not the firststatement made by Wead when he entered the interview room.

DANIEL WEAD

Wead testified that on January 16, 1999, he was leaving to go buy some coffee when OfficerQuinn approached him and stated that he wanted him to be a witness for a man named Bob Reid.Wead asked Officer Quinn "what he was going to be a witness of" and Officer Quinn said he did notknow but that Wead would have to go to the station. Wead testified that Officer Quinn took his knifeand keys before he got in the police car. Wead also testified that he only agreed to go to the policestation because of what Officer Quinn had told him. He later testified that "they [the police officers]told me one thing and done something else."

Wead testified that Officer Quinn and his partner put him in a room and closed the door. Hestated that at this point, he did not feel that he could leave the interview room and go home. Weadtestified that he was handcuffed by his right hand on the left side of the wall as soon as he walked intothe interview room. Wead testified that the police did not speak to him regarding a murderinvestigation until the third day he was at Area One. Wead stated that he was up for three days andnights in the interview room sitting on the bench. He testified that he was only unhandcuffed on thetwo occasions he was taken to the bathroom and that he was fed only on January 16, 1999.

Wead testified that the detectives told him that a man named Bob Reid told them that he knewthe victim. Wead responded that he did know the victim. Wead testified that he was never told thatthe victim had been murdered. He was asked the last time he saw the victim and responded Thursdaymorning. According to Wead, when he was questioned on January 16, 1999, he did not know thevictim was dead and the police never told him that the victim was dead, only that he, Wead, wasgoing to be a witness. Wead testified that he did not ask for a lawyer until he found out on January18, 1999, that the victim had been murdered.

Wead testified that his apartment was searched without his consent because he did not signa consent to search form. Initially, Wead stated that the signature on the consent to search form washis, but he later said that he did not remember signing the form and that he did not recognize thesignature. Wead stated that he was unable to read or write. Wead testified that Detective Nolan wasnot the first detective to speak with him. Wead stated that he did not tell the officers that he wantedto go home because it would have done no good, since the door was locked and he was handcuffed.Finally, Wead testified that he was not homeless and that he planned to live at the place he wascurrently rehabbing until someone moved in.

Before the State was permitted to cross-examine Wead, the trial judge asked Wead somequestions. Wead testified that on January 16 and 17, 1999, he thought he was a witness. Weadtestified that on January 18, 1999, when the detectives told him how the victim was killed and howhe had done it, he knew that he was not a witness but a suspect. Wead testified that he never told thedetectives that he had a drug problem. After the trial judge asked his questions, the State waspermitted to cross-examine Wead.

On cross-examination, Wead testified that on January 16 and 17, 1999, he thought he was awitness because he was told he was a witness. Therefore, he agreed to be there as a witness. Hefurther stated that he was put in a paper uniform on January 16, 1999. Finally, Wead testified that onJanuary 18, 1999, Detective Nolan never asked whether he could inventory Wead's knife to do sometests.

DETECTIVE JOHN HENRY

Detective John Henry was called by the State in rebuttal and testified that the consent tosearch form was read and explained to Wead, including the fact that he had the right to refuse to signit. Detective Henry further testified that Wead stated that he wished to cooperate with the detectivesand signed the consent to search form for his apartment. Finally, Detective Henry testified that heprovided Wead with cigarettes and food and permitted him to use the washroom during his stay inthe interview room.

On cross-examination, Detective Henry testified that Wead indicated that he could not read,so Detective Henry read the consent to search form to him. Detective Henry stated that he explainedto Wead that they would look through his apartment for (1) a matchbook with telephone numbersand the names of the two individuals that could verify Wead's alibi, and (2) for bloody clothing.Detective Henry testified that the police were looking for physical evidence because the murder wascommitted by a knife or sharp object, but the police were not looking for a knife.

Detective Henry testified that on January 16 and 17, 1999, he never took Wead to the lockup.Detective Henry stated that he escorted Wead to and from the bathroom because there wereinconsistencies in Wead's comments that were being investigated; because it was not known at thattime whether Wead was an offender; and because the detectives did not want Wead to walk out. Onredirect examination, Detective Henry stated that he escorted Wead to and from the bathroombecause it was police procedure for each detective to escort his suspects or witnesses to and from thebathroom when they are at Area One. On re-cross-examination, Detective Henry testified that he didnot know if the procedure of escorting witnesses to and from the bathroom is written down and thatit is just a procedure used for safekeeping individuals.

DETECTIVE TIMOTHY NOLAN

Detective Nolan was called by the State in surrebutal and he testified that on January 17,1999, he learned that Detectives Henry and Holmes had searched for bloody clothes and physicalevidence.

THE HEARING ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS

DETECTIVE TIMOTHY NOLAN

Detective Nolan testified that he first met Wead on January 16, 1999, at approximately 2:30p.m., in an Area One detective division interview room. Detective Nolan stated that he had noknowledge of whether anyone spoke with Wead before he and his partner entered the interview room.Detective Nolan started the interview by "Mirandizing" Wead. According to Detective Nolan, Weadstated that he understood his Miranda rights. The interview lasted 15 to 20 minutes. When his shiftended, Detective Nolan turned the case over to the third-shift detectives.

Detective Nolan testified that on January 17, 1999, he entered the interview room alone and"Mirandized" Wead before beginning any discussions. The interview lasted "almost a whole day,"beginning at approximately 8:30 a.m. and lasting until approximately 3 p.m. No one other thanDetective Nolan interviewed Wead on January 17, 1999.

On January 18, 1999, Detective Nolan entered the interview room alone at approximately2:30 p.m. and asked Wead if he could inventory the knife in Wead's coat pocket. Detective Nolanstated that Wead became agitated and started yelling because he wanted Detective Nolan to take Lasain for a polygraph examination. Detective Nolan further testified that Wead then stated that he wasa drug user, at which point Detective Nolan advised Wead of his Miranda rights and proceeded toquestion him.

Detective Nolan testified that Assistant State's Attorney Adam Monreal and a court reporterwere called to the Area One interview room to take a statement from Wead. Before taking thestatement, Monreal "Mirandized" Wead. According to Detective Nolan, Wead never questionedwhether he needed a lawyer during their earlier conversations. However, Detective Nolan read fromWead's statement that Wead did ask Monreal "if it would be good if he got a lawyer?" In thestatement, Monreal replied "you have a right. You have not asked for a lawyer up until now,correct?" Detective Nolan continued reading from the statement and testified that Wead then asked,"[W]ould it be good to have a lawyer?" Monreal replied to Wead's question, "[Y]ou have not askedat any time, right?" Detective Nolan continued reading from the statement and testified that Weadsaid "he was just thinking about [having a lawyer] and wondering if he should--." Detective Nolantestified that Monreal then asked Wead if he wished to have a lawyer present and Wead replied, "Idon't know. Just go ahead." Detective Nolan testified that Monreal again asked Wead if he wishedto have a lawyer present and Wead replied, "No." Detective Nolan testified that Wead providedMonreal with a 12-page statement at approximately 8:17 p.m.

Detective Nolan stated that in his presence no one physically coerced or struck Wead, madethreats or promises to Wead, or made misrepresentations to Wead in an effort to get him to speak.He never saw any signs of physical abuse on Wead's body. Additionally, Detective Nolan testified thatWead stated he was treated "decent" by the detectives.

On cross-examination, Detective Nolan testified that on January 16, 1999, when he met Weadfor the first time in the interview room, Wead was not free to leave. Detective Nolan testified thathe was not with Wead at all times on January 16 and 17, 1999. Detective Nolan stated that onJanuary 17, 1999, Wead was moved into a different interview room and was not in the same interviewroom he left him in on January 16, 1999. Detective Nolan testified that on January 17, 1999, hewalked out of the interview room when Wead said he was not going to speak anymore. On redirectexamination, Detective Nolan testified that Wead never asked to leave the police station and was notdenied access to leave. He stated that Wead was given food and allowed to use the bathroom. Finally,on re-cross-examination, Detective Nolan testified that on January 18, 1999, Wead did not come tohim and say that he wanted to talk about the murder.

Before Detective Nolan was permitted to exit the witness stand, the trial judge askedDetective Nolan some questions. Detective Nolan testified that he wanted to inventory the knifebecause he knew the victim had been stabbed and the murder weapon had not been found. DetectiveNolan testified that the knife had no visible stains that looked like blood.

DETECTIVE JOHN HENRY

Detective Henry testified that on January 16, 1999, he and his partner were working the thirdwatch from 4:30 p.m. to 1 a.m. They took over the Kopeck murder investigation from DetectiveNolan when the second watch ended. Detective Henry testified that he "Mirandized" Wead at 8:30p.m. and that he and his partner spoke with him for approximately 90 minutes. Detective Henry spokewith Wead on and off throughout the evening. His partner was never alone with Wead. On cross-examination, Detective Henry testified that he was not with Wead at all times during the investigation.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS

The trial court considered the pretrial record in making its finding on Wead's pretrial motions.After hearing arguments on the motions to quash arrest and suppress evidence and the motion tosuppress statements, the trial judge denied the motions to quash arrest and suppress evidence, findingthat: (1) Wead willingly and voluntarily accompanied the police to the police station, believing himselfto be a witness as opposed to a suspect, on January 16, 17, and 18 of 1999; (2) probable causeexisted to arrest Wead on the afternoon of January 17, 1999, based on Lasa's information of the theftincident and inconsistencies in Wead's statements to the police, when he indicated to Detective Nolanthat he no longer wished to talk; (3) Wead was not in custody until January 18, 1999, at the time ofhis inculpatory statement; and (4) other than the time spent in the Area One interview room, noindicia of arrest were present and the stay was voluntarily initiated. The trial judge also denied themotion to suppress the statement, finding that: (1) the police scrupulously honored Wead's right toremain silent on January 17, 1999, when the questioning of Wead was immediately stopped, thepolice did not speak to Wead substantively for nearly 24 hours, and Miranda warnings were givenbefore the police resumed questioning; and (2) the request to inventory Wead's knife was notsubterfuge to induce Wead to further talk on January 18, 1999, but was a reasonable administrativerequest.

Wead maintains in his brief that the trial court erred when it denied the motion to quash arrestand suppress evidence and the motion to suppress his statement. Wead did not raise any issues in hisbrief regarding the trial.

On appeal, Wead argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to quash his arrestand suppress the evidence. In light of the trial court's ruling, we must decide whether the police hadprobable cause to arrest Wead when the police officers stopped Wead when he was exiting a buildingand asked Wead to accompany them to the police station to assist with a homicide investigation.Wead argues that his detention by the police officers constituted an arrest or seizure under the fourthamendment and his subsequent confession was the product of that illegal arrest. Wead contends thatthe police did not have probable cause to arrest him on January 16, 1999, when he was stopped onthe street by the police, transported to the police station, and placed in an interview room forquestioning. The State maintains that Wead was not illegally arrested because he voluntarilyaccompanied the police officers to the police station. Further, the State maintains that Weadvoluntarily stayed at the police station and spent two nights in an interrogation room. We note thatthe trial court found (1) that Wead was not in custody when he stayed at the police station in aninterview room lacking sleeping facilities because he was homeless; (2) that the police had probablecause to arrest Wead on January 17, 1999; and (3) that Wead was not arrested until January 18,1999.

We begin our analysis by identifying the relevant standard of review. In Ornelas v. UnitedStates, 517 U.S. 690, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996) the United States Supreme Courtheld that reviewing courts should review de novo the ultimate finding with respect to probable causeor reasonable suspicion. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 116 S. Ct. at 1663; Peoplev. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001). The court cautioned, however, that findings of historicalfact should be reviewed only for clear error and that reviewing courts must give due weight toinferences drawn from the facts by the fact finder. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 921,116 S. Ct. at 1663; Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d. at 431.

WEAD'S INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE POLICE ON THE STREET

The first question we must answer is whether an arrest occurred on January 16, 1999, whenWead walked out of a building, had a discussion with Officer Quinn, and then got into a police carand accompanied Officer Quinn and his partner to the police station. We note "that whenever a policeofficer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207 n.6, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 832 n.6, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2254 n.6(1979), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 903, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968);People v. McKinney, 277 Ill. App. 3d 889, 893 (1996). In the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963,an arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody and is accomplished by an actual restraintof that person or by his submission to custody. See 725 ILCS 5/102-5 (West 2002); People v.Herron, 89 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1051 (1980). The test for determining whether a suspect has beenarrested is whether, in light of all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case, a reasonableperson would have believed that at the time in question he was no longer free to leave. Michigan v.Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 572, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1979 (1988); People v.Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (1994); People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 437 (1992); People v.Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d 84, 95 (1990). Among the circumstances a court may consider in determiningwhether a person has been seized for fourth amendment purposes are the presence of multiple policeofficers, the display of weapons by an officer, the touching of the person by the officers, the officers'use of language suggesting that the person is compelled to obey, and the occurrence of practices thatnormally accompany an arrest, such as searching, booking, handcuffing, photographing, andfingerprinting. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877; see also People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 391, (1990); People v. Wicks, 236 Ill.App. 3d 97, 104 (1992).

In this case, the evidence establishes that Officer Quinn and his partner were dressed in civilianclothes and riding in an unmarked police car when they approached Wead on the street. Officer Quinn told Wead that the Area One detectives were investigating a homicide and asked him to accompanythem to the police station. Wead agreed to accompany Officer Quinn and his partner to the policestation. The evidence establishes that when Wead encountered the police on the street and wastransported to the police station, the officers did not display their weapons and there was no formaldeclaration of arrest or a show of police authority which compelled him to go to the police station.In addition, Wead was not handcuffed or given a Miranda warning prior to being placed in the policecar, although he was searched and his pocket knife was removed from his belt. See People v. Bolden,197 Ill. 2d 166, 180 (2001). More importantly, Officer Quinn testified that had Wead refused toaccompany him back to the police station or stated at any time that he no longer wished to help thepolice, he would have been free to leave. See McKinney, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 893, quoting People v.Young, 206 Ill. App. 3d 789, 800 (1990) ("[W]e will consider as true only the testimony of the policeofficers, except where defendant's testimony was unrebutted, so as not to substitute our judgment forthat of the trial court on issues of credibility"). The evidence establishes that once the officers arrivedat the police station, Officer Quinn placed Wead in an interview room and informed the detectiveshandling the Kopec murder investigation that Wead was at the police station.

The circumstances which might suggest that Wead was under arrest are not present in thiscase: (1) only two officers were present for Wead's trip to the station; (2) the officers did not displaytheir weapons; (3) the officers did not use language suggesting that Wead was required to go to thepolice station; and (4) while Wead was searched and his pocket knife was confiscated on the street,once at the police station, he was not fingerprinted or photographed. Therefore, considering all thefacts and circumstances at the time of Wead's initial encounter with Officer Quinn on the street, wefind that an arrest or seizure did not occur because (1) Wead agreed to accompany Officer Quinn andhis partner to the police station; (2) Wead was not compelled to go to the police station with a displayof weapons or handcuffs or with the use of language; and (3) Wead would not have been deprivedof his freedom and forced to go to the police station, according to Quinn, had he stated that he didnot want to assist with the investigation.

WEAD'S DETENTION AT THE POLICE STATION

The next question we must address is whether Wead was arrested when he was detained atthe police station. The answer to this question is yes. Dunaway , 442 U.S. 200, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99S. Ct. 2248; Young, 206 Ill. App. 3d 789. In Dunaway, the police received information from aninformant that the defendant was involved in the crime. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 203, 60 L. Ed. 2d at829, 99 S. Ct. at 2251. The police questioned the informant but did not receive "enough informationto get a warrant." Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 203, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 829, 99 S. Ct. at 2251. A policedetective ordered other detectives to "pick up" the defendant and bring him in. Dunaway, 442 U.S.at 203, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 829, 99 S. Ct. at 2251. The defendant "was taken into custody; although hewas not told he was under arrest, he would have been physically restrained if he had attempted toleave." Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 203, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 830, 99 S. Ct. at 2252. He was driven to policeheadquarters in a police car and placed in an interrogation room, where he was questioned by officersafter being given the warning required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86S. Ct. 1602 (1966). Defendant waived counsel and eventually made a statement that incriminated himin the crime. The Supreme Court held in Dunaway that the defendant was arrested when the policeinvoluntarily took defendant to the police station for questioning in violation of his rights under thefourth amendment. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 207, 60 L. Ed.2d at 832, 99 S. Ct. at 2253-54. TheDunaway court noted that fourth amendment protections apply during investigatory seizures.Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 214-15, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 837, 99 S. Ct. at 2257-58.

The facts in this case are similar to the facts in Dunaway: (1) the police received informationabout Wead and his connection to the crime from Lasa; (2) the police did not receive enoughinformation from Lasa to obtain a warrant; (3) detectives ordered Officer Quinn to pick Wead up andbring him to the station; (4) Wead was not told that he was under arrest during his initial encounterwith the police on the street; (5) when Wead agreed to go with the police, he was driven to the policestation and placed in an interrogation room; (6) once Wead arrived at the station, Detective Nolanstated that Wead was not free to leave the station and, therefore, Wead would have been physicallyrestrained if he had attempted to leave; (7) Wead was given his Miranda warning and questionednumerous times by the officers; and (8) Wead made a statement after being in police custody for 54hours. In this case Wead's voluntary act of going to the police station became an involuntary act oncehe arrived at the station and was not free to leave the police station. The Dunaway Court would findthat Wead was under arrest when he was not free to leave the police station. See Dunaway, 442 U.S.at 214, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 837, 99 S. Ct. at 2257-58.

In Young, this court considered the following facts to determine if an illegal arrest had takenplace: (1) whether the defendant was asked to wait in the public waiting room at the police station;(2) whether the defendant was put in an interrogation room with the door closed; (3) whether thedefendant was released or told he was free to leave after he was questioned by a police officer, eventhough he had not implicated himself; (4) whether the defendant spent the night in a room with nosleeping facilities; (5) whether the defendant was denied telephone calls; (6) whether the defendantwas in the police station for an extended length of time before making a statement; and (7) whetherthe defendant was briefly questioned only once after the initial interview. Young, 206 Ill. App. 3d at800-01. The Young court held that under such circumstances a reasonable person would concludethat he or she was not free to leave. Young, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 801. Applying Young to the facts inthis case, we conclude that Wead was under arrest once he arrived at the police station because (1)Wead was not free to leave the police station and; therefore, his agreement and voluntary act of goingto the police station were nullified once he was divested of his freedom when Detective Nolandecided he could not leave the station; (2) Wead was not asked to wait in the public waiting room;(3) Wead was questioned several times over numerous hours by different officers after his initialinterview; (4) Wead was never told that he was free to leave the police station after he wasquestioned on January 16 and 17, 1999, and failed to make an inculpatory statement; (5) Wead spentthree days in an interrogation room with no sleeping facilities (he was not allowed to bathe or brushhis teeth and had to be escorted to the washroom); and (6) Wead was in the police station for 54hours before making a statement. Young, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 800-01. Therefore, following Dunawayand Young, we hold that Wead was under arrest when he was no longer free to leave the policestation.

PROBABLE CAUSE

Next, in light of our holding that Wead was arrested on January 16, 1999, once he arrived atthe police station, we must now determine whether the police had probable cause to detain Wead.Our task on review is simply to ensure that the trial court had a substantial basis for concluding thatprobable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548, 103 S. Ct.2317, 2332 (1983); People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 248 (1984). The trial court, when making aprobable cause determination, is to apply standards at least as stringent as those that guide amagistrate in deciding whether to issue a warrant. People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 209 (1991),citing People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 398 (1989), and Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 236. The trial courtmust determine whether " 'a reasonable and prudent man, having the knowledge possessed by theofficer at the time of the arrest, would believe the defendant committed the offense.' " Tisler, 103 Ill.2d at 237, quoting People v. Wright, 41 Ill. 2d 170, 174 (1968). Whether the necessary probablecause exists is governed, not by technical legal rules, but rather by common sense considerations thatare factual and practical. People v. Mitchell, 45 Ill. 2d 148, 153-54 (1970). This review cannot betainted by hindsight which may luckily seem to be supported by the fruit of some criminality; rather,the review must center on the information available to the officers preceding the arrest. Adams, 131Ill. 2d at 398. It is basic that an arrest with or without a warrant must stand upon firmer ground thanmere suspicion (see Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134, 138, 80 S. Ct. 168,170 (1959); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479, 1483, 77 S. Ct. 1356,1359 (1957)), though the arresting officer need not have in hand evidence that would suffice toconvict. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 450, 83 S. Ct. 407, 413(1963); People v. Marino, 44 Ill. 2d 562, 573 (1970).

A person is lawfully arrested when the police: (a) have a warrant commanding that suchperson be arrested; or (b) have reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant for the person's arresthas been issued in the State or in another jurisdiction; or (c) have reasonable grounds to believe thatthe person is committing or has committed an offense. People v. Mathis, 55 Ill. App. 3d 680, 685(1977) ("In Illinois, an arrest without a warrant is not proper unless the conditions prescribed bystatute are met"); 725 ILCS 5/107-2 (West 1992). The Illinois Supreme Court has held the reasonablegrounds standard is synonymous with probable cause. Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d at 95, citing People v.Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 128, 145 (1985); see 725 ILCS 5/102-5(c)(West 2002). Absent probable causeor a warrant based thereon, an arrest is violative of the fourth amendment protections. Melock, 149Ill. 2d at 436, citing Dunaway, 442 U.S. 200, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248.

The evidence establishes that Officer Quinn and his partner were assisting with the Kopecmurder investigation but they did not have a warrant for Wead's arrest and did not have any evidencethat Wead had committed a crime. In fact, Officer Quinn testified that he was not apprised of the factsof the case prior to being directed by the detectives to bring Wead to the police station. We foundthat probable cause was unnecessary when Officer Quinn encountered Wead on the street andbrought him to the police station because Wead agreed to assist the police with an investigation andvoluntarily accompanied the officers to the station. Therefore, prior to arriving at the station, Wead'sfreedom to make a decision and to refuse to accompany the police to the station was unconstrainedby interference from the police officers.

While Officer Quinn did not arrest Wead, Detective Nolan did because Wead was detainedand deprived of his freedom once he arrived at the police station. Wead's voluntary act of agreeingto accompany the police to the station to assist in the investigation was nullified by Detective Nolan'sdecision that Wead could not leave the station, thereby depriving him of his freedom. The police needprobable cause when they arrest or seize a citizen and deprive him of his freedom. 725 ILCS 5/107-2(West 1990). The evidence establishes that Detective Nolan did not have a warrant for Wead's arrestand did not observe Wead commit a crime or have reasonable grounds to believe that he hadcommitted a crime when he talked with Wead in the interview room for 54 hours as part of the Kopecmurder investigation. 725 ILCS 5/107-2 (West 2003). If Detective Nolan had evidence of Wead'sinvolvement in any crime, he would have charged him on January 16 or 17 1999; instead, he detainedWead for 54 hours in the police station and charged him on January 18, 1999, after he made astatement.

We note that the trial court found that probable cause did not exist to arrest Wead on January16, 1999, and the State conceded during oral argument that the police did not have sufficientevidence on January 16, 1999, or January 17, 1999, to obtain a warrant for Wead's arrest. We findthat the State's concession is also an admission that the police did not have probable cause to arrestWead until Wead made the statement on January 18, 1999. In light of the aforementioned facts andcircumstances, we hold that probable cause did not exist to detain Wead because the facts andcircumstances within Detective Nolan's knowledge, prior to Wead's statement in the interview roomon January 18, 1999, were not sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that Weadhad committed a crime or murdered Bruno Kopec. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 214, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 837,99 S. Ct. at 2257; 725 ILCS 5/107-2 (West 2002). Therefore, absent a warrant and reasonablegrounds to believe Wead had committed a crime on January 16 and 17, 1999, Wead's 54-hourdetention was illegal and violated the fourth amendment.

We also note, however, that the trial court found that the police had probable cause to arrestWead on January 17, 1999, for two reasons: (1) because Lasa provided the police with informationabout Wead's involvement in a theft; and (2) because Wead made inconsistent statements to thepolice. We find that the trial court did not have a substantial legal basis for concluding that probablecause existed. Wead's alleged involvement in a theft was obviously nothing more than a suspicion.See Henry, 361 U.S. at 101, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 138, 80 S. Ct. at 170. (rumors, reports, suspicion orstrong reason to suspect are not adequate to support a warrant for arrest). The Criminal Code of1961 provides that a theft occurs when a person obtains unauthorized control over property. 720ILCS 5/16-1(a)(West 2002). Here, Lasa had no personal knowledge of the theft he discussed withthe police. In addition, the person named by Lasa and suspected of the theft was Billy or Tim Reid.Lasa did not name Wead as the person who committed the theft; therefore, Lasa did not provide thepolice with information that Wead obtained unauthorized control over Kopec's property. Consequently, the police did not have probable cause to believe that Wead committed a crimebecause Lasa named Billy or Tim Reid as the person who committed the theft. Moreover, Wead'sinconsistent statements to the police after his arrest do not provide probable cause for his arrestbecause an arrest is never justified by evidence discovered during an interrogation subsequent to anarrest. Henry, 361 U.S. at 103; 4 L. Ed. 2d at 139; 80 S. Ct. at 171.

THE ADMISSIBILITY OF WEAD'S CONFESSION

Wead next argues that his confession is inadmissible because it is the product of his illegaldetention and not the result of an independent act of his free will. The determination that an illegalarrest has occurred is not dispositive of the issue of the admissibility of Wead's subsequentconfession. People v. Reynolds, 257 Ill. App. 3d 792, 805 (1994). Statements given during a periodof illegal detention are inadmissible even though voluntarily given if they are the product of the illegaldetention and not the result of an independent act of free will. Reynolds, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 805,citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326 (1983).Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal detention must be suppressed absent significant interveningcircumstances that purged the taint of the illegal arrest. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 219, 60 L. Ed. 2d at840, 99 S. Ct. at 2260; see also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 692-93, 73 L. Ed. 2d 314, 321,102 S. Ct. 2664, 2668-69 (1982) (Court held confession inadmissible as the fruit of an illegal arrestwhen defendant confessed after police arrested defendant without a warrant and used defendant'sfingerprints to link him to the crime); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 95 S. Ct.2254 (1975) (Court held defendant's inculpatory statements inadmissible when defendant was arrestedwithout probable cause or a search warrant for the purpose of questioning during a murderinvestigation); Reynolds, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 805. To determine whether the confession was obtainedby exploiting the illegality of the arrest, the court must focus on the causal connection between theillegality and the confession. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 217-18, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 839, 99 S. Ct. at 2259;Reynolds, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 805. Thus, if the causal chain between the initial illegality and theevidence sought to be excluded is broken, the link to the evidence is sufficiently attenuated todissipate the taint of the illegal conduct. See U.S. v. Ienco, 182 F. 3d 517, 526 (7th Cir. 1999).

Factors to be considered in determining whether a confession was the product of an illegalarrest include: (1) whether Miranda warnings were given; (2) the proximity in time between the arrestand the confession; (3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (4) the purpose and flagrancyof the police misconduct. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 427, 95 S. Ct. at 2262. TheState has the burden of establishing the admissibility of the statement. Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 45L. Ed. 2d at 427, 95 S. Ct. at 2261-62.

First, the presence of Miranda warnings alone will not purge the taint from an illegal arrest.Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66-86 (1990). In this case, the evidence establishes that Wead was given Mirandawarnings each time he was questioned by the police. Wead waived his Miranda rights on eachoccasion. The presence of Miranda warnings is a factor that weighs in favor of attenuation. Foskey,136 Ill. 2d at 86; People v. Sneed, 274 Ill. App. 3d 274, 284 (1995).

Second, we consider the length of time between the illegal arrest and Wead's inculpatorystatement. The temporal proximity between an arrest and a confession is often an ambiguous factor,the significance of which will depend upon the particular facts of each case (People v. White, 117 Ill.2d 194, 223-24 (1987)), particularly if there are additional indicia of coercion. People v. Wilberton,348 Ill. App. 3d 82, 86 (2004) citing People v. Willis, 344 Ill. App. 3d 868, 886 (2003); People v.Ollie, 333 Ill. App. 3d 971, 986 (2002). Where no intervening circumstances are present, a long andillegal detention may in itself impel the defendant to confess. White, 117 Ill. 2d at 224. In this case,Wead gave an inculpatory statement to the police 54 hours after his arrest. Rather than dissipatingthe taint of his illegal arrest, Wead's 54-hour detention was an ongoing violation with cumulativeeffects. Willis, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 886, citing People v. Franklin, 115 Ill. 2d 328 , 335 (1987). Theevidence establishes that each day Wead stayed in the interview room was another day he was forcedto go without bathing, brushing his teeth, and changing his clothes. During his detention, Wead hadno assurance that he would receive a meal. The police officers' decision to detain Wead in aninterview room with no sleeping or washing facilities for 54 hours was coercive in nature.

Courts have held that detaining a suspect without a warrant for more than 48 hours requiressuppression of statements that are unpurged of the taint created by the illegal arrest. Gerstein v. Pugh,420 U.S. 103, 125, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 71-72, 95 S. Ct. 854, 868-69 (1975) (Court held that "anysignificant pretrial restraint of liberty" requires a determination of probable cause "made by a judicialofficer either before or promptly after arrest"); County of Riverside v.McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56,114 L. Ed. 2d 49, 63, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1670 (1991) (court held promptness requirement of Gersteinrequires probable cause determinations within 48 hours of warrantless arrest); 725 ILCS 5/109-1(a)(West 2002) (a person arrested with or without a warrant shall be taken without unnecessary delaybefore the nearest and most accessible judge in that county). The evidence establishes that fromapproximately 2:30 p.m., on January 16, 1999, until approximately 8:17 p.m., on January 18, 1999, Wead was detained in an interview room at the police station. After his 54-hour detention in theinterview room, Wead made an inculpatory statement. The evidence establishes that Wead was neverbrought before a neutral magistrate for a probable cause hearing within 48 hours of his warrantlessarrest. The State has failed to present any evidence which establishes that an emergency orextraordinary circumstance necessitated Wead's denial of a probable cause hearing for 54 hours afterhis warrantless arrest. Therefore, since the State has failed to establish that an emergency orextraordinary circumstance occurred that delayed Wead's presentment before a neutral magistrate fora probable cause hearing, Wead's statement must be suppressed because it is unpurged of the primarytaint created by the State's violation of Gerstein and McLaughlin. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 114 L.Ed. 2d 49, 111 S. Ct. 1661; Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854. See Willis, 344Ill. App. 3d at 887; Mitchell, No. 1--02--1244, slip op. at 20. This factor supports suppression ofWead's statement.

Third, our analysis now focuses on whether an intervening circumstance occurred betweenWead's illegal arrest on January 16, 1999, and his inculpatory statement on January 18, 1999.Intervening circumstances are an important factor in attenuation because they break the causalconnection in the chain between unconstitutional police conduct and a confession. Wilburton, 348Ill. App. 3d at 86, citing People v. Austin, 293 Ill. App. 3d 784, 788 (1997). The confrontation of adefendant with properly obtained evidence which induces a voluntary confession from the defendantwill be considered an intervening circumstance. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d at 87; Ollie, 333 Ill. App. 3d at985; see also 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure