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"We see no reason to depart from this general rule [of reasonableness] withrespect to the facts bearing uponthe authority to consent to a search. Whether the basis for such authority exists is the sort ofrecurring factualquestion to which law enforcement officials must be expected to apply their judgment; and allthe FourthAmendment requires is that they answer it reasonably. The Constitution is no more violatedwhen officersenter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the personwho hasconsented to their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is violated when they enter without awarrantbecause they reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who isabout toescape." Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186, quoting Archibald v. Mosel,677 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1982).

In the present case, there is no direct evidence fromMcGee or defendant of what McGee's authority within thehouse was, their relationship, or who lived in the bedroom. The only evidence presented was thehearsay statementsof the police officers that McGee told them defendant lived in the bedroom, that she shared thebedroom with him,and that they were romantically involved. As stated above, there was no way for the trial court todetermine thescope of McGee's actual authority. There was no evidence of who owned the house, and theregistration on theBuick that led the officers to the house in the first place belonged to neither McGee or defendant. The trial courtnever actually ruled on McGee's authority or consent. In its ruling, the trial court accepted theState's representation,that in a prior motion on a related case, McGee was found to have consented to the search, andthat the bedroomMcGee claimed as hers, was one she shared with defendant. However, without more evidentiaryfacts, it isimpossible for us to determine whether the police reasonably relied on any statements McGeemay have made.

Defendant next argues that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearingregarding the admissibility of the I.D. cardoutside the presence of the jury. The State contends otherwise, and further argues that the I.D.card was properlyadmitted to demonstrate the officers' investigatory process. The State also argues that even if thepolice had notsearched the residence and found defendant's I.D. card, it would still have located defendantbecause McGee hadgiven the police defendant's full name when asked who was driving the Buick, thus making anyerror harmless.

In People v. Robinson, 46 Ill. 2d 229, 263 N.E.2d 57(1970), the defendant was convicted of armed robbery. Onappeal, the defendant argued, and the record established, that he was denied a fair hearing on hismotion to suppressevidence of his identification. Our supreme court held that, under the circumstances of the case,"there is noquestion that a defendant has a right to a fair and impartial hearing to determine whether hisidentification was basedsolely on the victim's observation of the robber at the time of the crime or whether it wasimproperly influenced." Robinson, 46 Ill. 2d at 232-33; see also People v. DeJesus, 163 Ill.App. 3d 530, 533, 516 N.E.2d 801 (1987)(following Robinson); People v. Stiles 95 Ill. App. 3d, 959, 964-65,420 N.E.2d 1204 (1981) (holding it "isfundamental that a defendant is entitled to a full and fair hearing on [a] motion tosuppress").

In attempting to distinguish Robinson and the other casesrelied upon by defendant, the State argues that in thepresent case defendant was given a suppression hearing at which he failed to offer evidence thatMcGee's consentwas not given voluntarily or even that McGee's consent was an issue in the case. InPeople v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d221, 229, 522 N.E.2d 1146 (1988), relied upon by the State, the defendant claimed his fourthamendment rightswere violated when the State impermissibly interjected a victim's statement into evidencethrough a police officer. The Gacho court held that the substance of the conversation was admissible toshow the officer's investigatoryprocedure, based on the officer's personal knowledge, and "is admissible although the inferencelogically to bedrawn therefrom is that the information received motivated the officers' subsequent conduct." Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d at248.

In the present case, defendant made it clear to the trial court as soon ashe became aware of the I.D. card, and theState's proposed use of it, that he wanted a continuance to investigate and prepare a motion tosuppress. We find theState's argument, that defendant was afforded a "full and fair hearing," disingenuous. Therecould have been no wayfor defendant to prepare an argument for the suppression of a piece of evidence he did not evenknow was in thepossession of the police until immediately before the trial court's ruling. Defendant did not havethe opportunity tocall witnesses because he could not have anticipated the need to do so before the State disclosedthe location of theI.D. card. Defendant could not make arguments to the trial court without first investigating thefacts surrounding theseizure of the I.D. card. Until he became aware that the police had seized property to be used attrial, there wouldhave been no reason for defendant to file a motion to suppress, and no reason to question McGee. Only once itbecame apparent that the actions of the police in retrieving evidence during a warrantless searchwould produceevidence against him was defendant aware that there was evidence subject to suppression. Infact, even in Gacho,the case relied upon by the State, the defendant was afforded a full evidentiary suppressionhearing where witnessestestified before the trial court made a ruling on the admissibility of the contestedevidence. Accordingly, we findthat, based on Robinson and Stiles, the trial court erred in denyingdefendant's request for a full evidentiary hearingon his motion to suppress.

Defendant next argues that the State should have been either barredfrom using the I.D. card as a sanction for failingto disclose it, or in the alternative, he should have been granted a continuance to investigate theevidence andprepare a motion to suppress. The State argues that defendant was not entitled to any sanctionsagainst it or acontinuance because it did tender the I.D. card to defendant and immediately notified him whenit was apparent theI.D. card was inventoried under another defendant's name. The State further argues thatdefendant's counsel was onnotice that the I.D. card was inventoried because counsel represented all the other defendants inrelated cases,including the one in which the I.D. card was inventoried. The State also argues that defendantwas given asuppression hearing and, even if he did not receive the hearing as he so argues, he has waivedthis issue by failing toproperly preserve his objection.

For the reasons previously discussed above, we find that defendant hasnot waived this issue on appeal. As to themerit of defendant's argument, the record shows that the State disclosed that it possessed the I.D.card the nightbefore opening statements, after defendant's trial had begun. The State informed the trial court itintended tointroduce the I.D. card as evidence for the limited purpose of establishing the officers' course ofconduct inidentifying defendant. The previous day, however, defendant had questioned the State onwhether any photographsor other materials had not yet been disclosed, and the State answered that everything had beendisclosed. The Statemaintains, nonetheless, that it did not violate the discovery rules because the document wastendered, and even if itdid violate the rules, any violation was harmless.

In People v. Chambers, 258 Ill. App. 3d 73, 629 N.E. 2d606 (1994), the defendant was charged with delivery of acontrolled substance. He was arrested for selling narcotics to an undercover police officer. Athis trial, the Stateintroduced police photographs of the defendant that the officers used to confirm his identity. Inaddition, the Stateelicited testimony about how the police received their initial information about the defendant,mainly by filling out acontact card when he was interviewed immediately after the sale, but before he was arrested. Onappeal, thedefendant claimed the State failed to timely present the contact card and police photographs tohim and as suchviolated the discovery rules. The Chambers court held that any argument relatingto the contact card had beenwaived by the defendant in failing to raise it at trial or in a post-trial motion. As for thephotographs, the court notedthe general rule that Supreme Court Rule 412 relating to discovery, "is mandatory, andcompliance is only excusedwhen the State, exercising due diligence, could not have learned of the information before trial." Chambers, 258 Ill.App. 3d at 86. However, the Chambers court noted that not every instance ofnoncompliance will automaticallynecessitate a new trial. A new trial is only necessary when the defendant was prejudiced. Chambers, 258 Ill. App.3d at 86. The court further noted that "[a]mong the factors to be considered in determiningwhether a new trial isrequired because of a discovery violation are the closeness in the evidence, the strength of theundisclosed evidence,and the likelihood that prior notice could have helped discredit the undisclosed evidence." Chambers, 258 Ill. App.3d at 86. It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate how he was prejudiced and to show howearlier disclosure"would have altered [his] trial strategy and possibly changed the outcome of the case." Chambers, 258 Ill. App. 3dat 86, quoting People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d 163, 173, 514 N.E. 2d 970 (1987). Inaffirming the defendant'sconvictions, the Chambers court found that the defendant had not demonstratedhow he was prejudiced by theintroduction of the photographs; he had prior knowledge that there were photographs, had notrequested acontinuance to investigate, and failed to show how previous knowledge would have helped himin discrediting thephotographs. Chambers, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 86-87.

In People v. Heinzmann, 232 Ill. App. 3d 557, 597 N.E.2d 942 (1992), the defendant and a codefendant werecharged with stealing pigs. The defendants' first trial resulted in a mistrial after the State failedto disclose somediscovery materials. Heinzmann, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 558. After declaring themistrial, the trial court "stronglysuggest[ed]" the State sit down with the defendants' attorney and make sure all discoverablematerials had beendisclosed. Heinzmann, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 558. During the examination of the firstwitness at defendant's secondtrial, it was discovered that yet another piece of material had not been disclosed. This time it wasa prior writtenstatement of a witness, who was also involved in the theft, to the police that also mentionedanother individualpreviously unknown to the defendants. The trial court dismissed all the charges against thedefendants as a result ofthe State's failure to comply with discovery. Heinzmann, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 558. This court affirmed, stating thatnone of the less severe discovery sanctions would provide acceptable relief to the defendantsbecause the trial hadalready begun, the jury was sworn, the nondisclosed document contained the name of a potentialwitness for thedefendants who was previously unknown, and any continuance would have highlighted theincriminating testimonyof the witness in the jurors' minds. Heinzmann, 232 Ill. App. 3d at561.

In the present case, unlike Chambers, defendant didrequest a continuance to investigate. We do not understand howa short continuance, which, as the Heinzmann court noted is the "preferred sanctionfor a discovery violation"(Heinzmann, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 560), would have substantially prejudiced eitherside. The State's entire caserevolved around the identification of the man the officers saw flee from the Buick. Obviously,any evidence theState sought to introduce relating to that identification is relevant, and defendant should havebeen given anopportunity to challenge it. However, unlike Heinzmann, a lesser sanction thandismissal is appropriate in this case. While we recognize that the jury had been sworn, and the trial court was not at liberty to simplydismiss the jurywithout implicating double jeopardy concerns (see People v. Blake, 287 Ill. App.3d 487, 490-91, 678 N.E.2d 761(1997)), we fail to see how a short continuance would have prejudiced either party. Instead, acontinuance wouldhave afforded defendant an ability to have a full and fair hearing to which he was entitled on hismotion to suppress. Accordingly, we find that the trial court's denial of defendant's request for a continuance was anabuse of discretion. See generally Robinson, 46 Ill. 2d 232-33 (a defendant is entitled to a full and fairevidentiary hearing).

We also reject the State's argument, that defendant was on notice of theexistence of the I.D. card because hiscounsel was representing other defendants who lived in the same house, including the defendantwhose case the I.D.card was actually inventoried under, is unsupported by the record. The State makes blanketstatements thatdefendant's counsel must have been aware of the information because it was contained in othercourt files, but failsto point to anywhere in the record where the information appears. Discovery documents fromanother case arisingfrom the seizure of narcotics from the same house appear in the record but nowhere in that reportdoes the I.D. cardappear even though there is a long narrative of events, and a long list of narcotics, currency, andweaponsinventoried. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the I.D. card was disclosed duringthe course of the case of anotherdefendant who was represented by the same counsel representing both defendants in separatetrials, the State fails tocite to authority, and our research reveals none, supporting its argument that the disclosure in onedefendant's casecan be deemed to have been disclosed pursuant to a discovery request in another defendant'scase.

The State also argues that even if the trial court should have granted acontinuance and had a full evidentiary hearingon defendant's motion to suppress, reversal is not necessary because the error was harmlessbeyond a reasonabledoubt. Defendant argues that it is impossible to determine whether the error washarmless.

A harmless error is one where "a reviewing court [is] satisfied beyond areasonable doubt that the error did notcontribute to the defendant's conviction." People v. St. Pierre, 122 Ill. 2d 95,113-14, 522 N.E.2d 61 (1988). "[T]odetermine whether an error is harmless, 'it is necessary to review the facts of the case and theevidence at trial' todetermine the effect of the unlawfully admitted evidence 'upon the other evidence adduced attrial and upon theconduct of the defense." St. Pierre, 122 Ill. 2d at 114, citing Fahy v.Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 87, 11 L. Ed. 2d171, 84 S. Ct. 229 (1963).

Defendant here has failed to demonstrate how the introduction of theI.D. card, used simply in the identification ofdefendant, prejudiced him. See Chambers, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 86. Additionally,defendant has failed to show howearlier disclosure would have altered his trial strategy or possibly changed the outcome of thecase. See Chambers,258 Ill. App. 3d at 86. Since the police officers had all the information they needed to identifydefendant, based ontheir discussion with McGee, before even seeing any photographs of defendant or the I.D. card,and could have usedthis previously obtained information to identify defendant, we find that any error in failing tohold an evidentiaryhearing and allowing introduction of the I.D. card was harmless beyond a reasonabledoubt.

In summary, since the State had conceded, and the trial court properlyfound, that defendant had standing tochallenge the search of his bedroom and the seizure of the I.D. card, and there was no evidencethat a shortcontinuance would have unduly prejudiced The State, it was error for the trial court not tocontinue the matter andhold an evidentiary hearing to determine the factual question of what authority McGee had toconsent to a searchand whether it was reasonable for the officers to rely on her assertion of authority if in fact shehad no actualauthority. However, the officers would have discovered all the necessary facts of defendant'sidentification with theinformation they previously obtained from McGee, mainly defendant's name. Therefore, we holdthat defendant wasnot prejudiced, and the trial court's error in denying him a continuance and an evidentiaryhearing, was harmless,and does not require reversal for a new trial or a remand for a hearing on his motion tosuppress.

We also reject defendant's additional contention that he was denied afair trial "when officer Jedlowski testified, overobjection, that he ran a check at the police station on the defendant's State of Illinoisidentification card and on thedefendant and a positive result came back from the check." Defendant argues the testimonytended to show that hewas a bad person who had prior contact with the police. Defendant further argues that since heturned himself in tothe police, any testimony concerning the officers' attempt to procure a warrant against himbecame irrelevant. TheState argues that the testimony of the actions taken by Jedlowski after receiving defendant's namewas admissible toshow the officers' investigatory procedure based on the officers' direct knowledge.

Defendant fails to cite to authority in support of the proposition that anofficer's testimony concerning his proceduresafter receiving information to investigate is inadmissible. There was no evidence presented thatthe officer stated heran a criminal history check on defendant which came back positive. Nor does defendant cite toany authority insupport of his argument that simply because a defendant surrendered himself makes the officers'attempt to procurea warrant irrelevant. On the contrary, we believe it is logical that there would have been noreason for defendant tosurrender himself had a warrant not been issued. Defendant did not surrender himself during theday after theseizure of the evidence, but instead waited until after he knew the police were looking forhim.

In People v. Griggs, 104 Ill. App. 3d 527, 432 N.E.2d1176 (1982), the defendant was charged with armed robbery. During his trial, a police investigator testified that after speaking with a witness, he went back tothe police stationand ran a partial license plate that subsequently came back registered to the defendant. Thiscourt held that thetestimony was proper. Specifically, the Griggs court found, citing with approvalthe rule articulated in People v.Dunning, 88 Ill. App. 3d 706, 410 N.E.2d 1052 (1980), that "[w]here a police officertestifies that he had aconversation with an individual and that he subsequently acted thereon, without revealing thesubstance of theconversation, such testimony is based upon the officer's personal knowledge and is competent toshow the officer'sinvestigatory procedure." Griggs, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 531, citingDunning, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 709.

In People v. Wilson, 168 Ill. App. 3d 847, 523 N.E.2d 43(1988), the defendant was convicted of murder andattempted armed robbery. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred in admitting an officer'stestimony concerningthe officer's investigatory procedures. At the trial, a police detective testified that he received ananonymoustelephone call, and as a result, gathered evidence on the defendant's accomplice and arranged fora witness to view aphotobook with the accomplice's photograph in it. Wilson, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 849. The detective testified that afterthe accomplice's arrest and questioning, the defendant became a suspect. This court, inreaffirming the ruleestablished in Dunning and Griggs, further stated that "[w]here suchtestimony is confined strictly to the officer'sphysical activities, the bare occurrence of the conversation and the testimony is subject tocross-examination, thisevidence is not within the legal definition of hearsay. Wilson, 168 Ill. App. 3d at850, citing People v. Sander, 37Ill. App. 3d 236, 345 N.E.2d 757 (1976).

In the present case, Officer Jedlowski testified that after he askedMcGee, "Do you know whose car this is," she tookhim downstairs to defendant's bedroom. After recovering the I.D. card, Jedlowski then ran acheck on defendantand received a result from that check. The evidence Jedlowski testified to was confined to hisphysical activities andJedlowski was subject to cross-examination. The evidence in the present case, like that inGriggs and Wilson,demonstrated Jedlowski's investigatory procedure and, as such, we find that it was not error toadmit the testimony.

For the reasons stated, we therefore affirm defendant's convictions andsentences.

Affirmed.

CAHILL, P.J., and LEAVITT, J., concur.