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SECOND DIVISION
December 18, 2001

JUSTICE CAHILL delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Billy Wade filed this appeal after the trial court struck as untimely, "for thetime being," defendant's pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and reconsider his sentences. Defendant contends on appeal that the cause must be remanded for a hearing on his motion,which, in relevant part, bore proof that it was timely mailed. The State argues that the appealshould be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because no final order was entered regardingdefendant's motion. We conclude that we do have jurisdiction and that the cause must beremanded for a hearing on the merits of defendant's motion.

Defendant, represented by private counsel, entered negotiated pleas of guilty on August25, 1999, to seven Class X charges of delivery of a controlled substance and one Class 1 chargeof possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. He was sentenced to concurrent12-year prison terms on the Class X charges and a consecutive 4-year prison term on the Class 1charge.

Defendant then filed a pro se "Motion to Withdraw Plea and/or In the AlternativeReconsider Sentence." The second page of the motion contained a handwritten "proof ofservice" section in which defendant, "being first sworn on oath," asserted the motion was placedin a stamped envelope, addressed as shown (to the clerk of the court and to the State's Attorney'soffice), and deposited in the United States mail at the correctional center on September 23, 1999. A notary seal and signature beneath the proof of service showed that the motion was notarized onSeptember 23, 1999. The motion was not file stamped.

Defendant also filed a separate pro se motion for reduction of his sentence, which wasnotarized on September 23, 1999, and file stamped on September 29, 1999. In addition, therecord contains a letter dated November 13, 1999, and file stamped on November 17, 1999, fromdefendant to the clerk of the court, in which defendant asserted he filed a motion to withdraw hisplea and in the alternative to reconsider his sentence on September 23, 1999, but he had notheard anything concerning the status of his motion. The record also contains a handwritten notefrom defendant, dated December 3, 1999, "to inform the clerk" that he sent two motions to theclerk and the State's Attorney's office and was sending them again because he had not heard fromanyone, including his attorney.

On March 7, 2000, when defendant's case was called, an assistant Public defenderappeared for defendant and told the court that he had contacted defendant's trial attorneyregarding the allegations in defendant's pro se motions. Defendant's former attorney said he had"no recollection" of defendant's allegation that he was promised double credit for time incustody. He also said he did not intend to "get involved again." The trial court asked theassistant Public defender if defendant's motions were timely filed. He responded that there wereno timely file stamped motions and no timely filed postmarks from the penitentiary. Theassistant Public defender said that defendant said he would contact the penitentiary and obtainproof of his timely filed mailing, but he had not yet received the proof. The trial court stated,"When we receive those, we can have them put on the call. For the time being, motion stricken,not timely filed. Off call." The memorandum of orders for that date states, "Motion Stricken NotTimely Filed. Off Call as to Co 1."

Defendant now appeals, contending that the cause must be remanded for a hearing on histimely filed motion. The State asserts that we have no jurisdiction to hear the appeal becausethere was no final order entered.

Defendant maintains we have jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R.603), which provides that, except for cases in which a statute has been held invalid or thedefendant has been sentenced to death, all appeals in criminal cases shall be taken to theappellate court. This rule does not provide an independent basis for appellate review and merelystates which court should hear an otherwise appealable case. People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148,151, 676 N.E.2d 665 (1997). Subject to certain exceptions, this court is without jurisdiction toreview judgments or orders which are not final. People v. Baptist, 284 Ill. App. 3d 382, 388, 675N.E.2d 398 (1996); accord People v. Hobbs, 301 Ill. App. 3d 581, 585, 703 N.E.2d 943 (1998).

Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)), which deals with an appeal by adefendant from a judgment entered on a plea of guilty, relevantly states, "If the motion [towithdraw the plea or reconsider the sentence] is denied, a notice of appeal from the judgment andsentence shall be filed within [30 days], measured from the date of entry of the order denying themotion."

We must assess the "substantive effect of the order rather than its form." Truitt, 175 Ill.2d at 152; People v. Scholin, 62 Ill. 2d 372, 373, 342 N.E.2d 388 (1975). In this case, the trialcourt stated, "For the time being, motion stricken, not timely filed." We conclude we havejurisdiction over this appeal because, despite the language "for the time being," the trial courtstruck defendant's motion, specifically finding it "not timely filed." 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d); seePeople v. Dragaj, 47 Ill. App. 3d 86, 88-89, 361 N.E.2d 792 (1977) (an appellate court is notdeprived of jurisdiction where the charge has been stricken with leave to reinstate); see alsoYazzin v. Meadox Surgimed, Inc., 224 Ill. App. 3d 288, 291, 586 N.E.2d 533 (1991) (striking themotion would have been tantamount to denying it because it could not have been refiled if it wasstricken more than 30 days after the judgment); Workman v. St. Therese Medical Center, 266 Ill.App. 3d 286, 291, 640 N.E.2d 349 (1994) (distinguishing Yazzin on the ground that in Workmanthe stricken motion was reinstated as a pending motion).

The basis for defense counsel's comments and the trial court's finding that defendant'smotion was untimely is unclear. In fact, the record refutes the conclusion that defendant's motionwas untimely. Defendant's proof of service stated he placed the motion in a stamped, addressedenvelope in the prison mail on September 23, 1999 (within 30 days), and the motion bearing theproof of service was notarized on that date. See People v. Saunders, 261 Ill. App. 3d 700, 704-05, 633 N.E.2d 1340 (1994) (depositing in prison mail is prisoner's only option, and he must relyon institution's notary public); People v. Aldridge, 219 Ill. App. 3d 520, 523, 580 N.E.2d 158(1991) ("because defendant's proof of certificate of service recited a timely mailing date, thedefendant's motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea was timely"). Defendant's affidavit withinhis motion established that he placed the motion in a stamped, addressed envelope and depositedit in the United States mail at the correctional center on September 23, 1999. The proof ofservice complied with Supreme Court Rules 11 (manner of serving papers) and 12 (proof ofservice). 145 Ill. 2d Rs. 11, 12; see In re Plank, 169 Ill. App. 3d 411, 414, 523 N.E.2d 614(1988).

We reverse the trial court's order and remand for a hearing on the merits of defendant'smotion.

Reversed and remanded.

BURKE, P.J., and GORDON, J., concur.