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FIFTH DIVISION
December 31, 2001

No. 1-99-1888

Defendant, Luis Vasquez, was charged by indictment with firstdegree murder, armed robbery and aggravated battery. Following ajury trial defendant was found guilty of armed robbery andacquitted of the other charges. After the verdict, the State movedto have defendant, who was 16 at the time of the offense, sentencedas an adult. The trial court granted the motion and defendant wassentenced to a term of 30 years' imprisonment in the IllinoisDepartment of Corrections. Defendant now timely appeals.

On appeal defendant argues that his case must be remanded fora new sentencing hearing where: (1) the sentencing statute underwhich defendant was charged as an adult is unconstitutional asbeing violative of the single subject rule; (2) the trial courtabused its discretion in failing to take into account all statutoryfactors enumerated in the sentencing statute; and (3) defendant'ssentence was disparate to that of his codefendants.

I. Background

The pertinent facts of the case involve the events that tookplace during the evening hours of January 24, 1997. AssistantState's Attorney Kari Mason testified at trial that she wasassigned to investigate the first degree murder and armed robberyof Joaquin Diaz. Mason stated that after speaking with detectivesassigned to the case, she met with the sixteen-year-old defendantat Area 1 police headquarters on January 27, 1997. Defendant'smother was present for this interview. After advising defendant ofhis Miranda rights, defendant stated that on January 24, 1997, at8 p.m. he was with Claudio Martinez, Anthony Saucedo and MarcosSanchez in a van driving around. Defendant told Mason that whiledriving they saw two members of the Party People gang, a gang whichwas a rival of his gang. Defendant stated that he was a member ofthe La Raza gang. Defendant stated that they stopped the van andexited the vehicle looking to fight with the Party People.

Defendant said that as they approached the two Party People,he noticed that there was nothing in their hands. He said that oneof "his boys" threw a bottle at one of the Party People. Defendanttold Mason that the person who was struck picked up the bottle andthrew it back, striking defendant in the eye. Defendant statedthat he then approached the person who threw the bottle at him andpunched him in the head. He said that he saw his friend AnthonySaucedo, also know as T-Bone, with a stick or pipe. Masontestified that at that point defendant's mother told defendant notto answer any more questions. Mason also stated that she observeddefendant's left eye was bruised and cut.

Ivan Flores testified for the State under a grant of useimmunity. Flores testified that on January 24, 1997, he was amember of the La Raza gang and was nicknamed "Little Popeye." Flores stated that defendant was also a member of La Raza on thatdate and that his nickname was "Popeye." Flores testified that hewas riding in a van on January 24, 1997, with defendant, Martinez(nicknamed "Flaco"), Saucedo (nicknamed "T-Bone"), Sanchez(nicknamed "Pelon") and two girls, drinking beer. Flores said thatwhile riding in the van someone yelled there were some PartyPeople. Flores stated that the van stopped and Pelon, T-Bone,Flaco and Popeye got out of the van. Flores testified he saw abunch of people fighting and beating each other, but he was unableto identify each person's exact activity. Flores testified that hesaw one of the four La Raza gang members with a pipe striking oneof the Party People, but he could not identify which of the four itwas.

Assistant State's Attorney John Maher then testified that onJanuary 26 he obtained a written statement from Flores. Flores'statement provided a more detailed version of the incident. Mahertestified that Flores told him that Martinez exited the van with abeer bottle. Flores stated Saucedo had a pipe in the van, butSanchez actually exited the vehicle with that pipe. Maher alsotestified that Flores told him that one of the Party People, theone who was hit with the bottle, was "getting his ass kicked bythree or four La Raza guys" while the other Party People member hadrun away. Flores told Maher that Martinez hit one of the two memover the head with a bottle. Additionally, Flores told Maher thatdefendant came back to the van wearing the leather coat of the boywhom everyone was "stomping." Maher stated that Flores read thestatement, reviewed it, made corrections and signed every page.

Urbano Alvarez testified, through the assistance of aninterpreter, that on January 24, 1997, at around 8 p.m., he lefthis house with Joaquin Diaz headed for Diaz's house on WashtenawAvenue. Alvarez stated that both he and Diaz were wearing leatherjackets that evening. Alvarez testified that while crossing 60thStreet, he noticed a group of people, all dressed in black, walkingtoward them. Alvarez said he turned around and saw a van behindthem. Alvarez stated that one of the people in the group, whom helater identified as Martinez, pulled off his hood, said "La Raza ------------" and hit Diaz with a beer bottle. Alvarez stated thata different person, whom he later identified as Saucedo, had ametal or wood pipe. Alvarez stated that while he was held by thearm, he saw about four people beating Diaz, who was lying on theground. Alvarez testified that he managed to free himself and runtoward Diaz's home to get help from Alfredo Monroy and JamesMonroy, Diaz's cousins. Alvarez stated that the group was stillbeating Diaz when he left. Alvarez said that when he returned,Diaz was lying on the opposite side of the street covered in blood.

Jamie Monroy testified that on January 24, 1997, Urbano cameto his house on Washtenaw Avenue, yelling that Diaz was beingbeaten. Jamie was living at that house with his brother Alfredo,Diaz and two friends. Jamie testified that as he left the house,shortly after Urbano and Alfredo, he saw a blue van parked in frontof his house. Jamie stated that he walked slowly past the van andthen ran to where Diaz was lying on the ground. Jamie testifiedthat Diaz was covered in blood and that when he put his handsbehind Diaz's head he felt that the back of Diaz's head was open. Alfredo Monroy testified that after Urbano came to the househe ran to where Diaz was being beaten. Alfredo testified that hesaw Diaz on the ground and another "guy" beating him in the chestand face. Alfredo said he yelled and the "guy" pulled Diaz'sjacket off and ran through a passage way between two houses. Alfredo later identified Sanchez in a lineup as the person still ontop of Diaz as they approached.

Dr. Mitra Kalelkar, assistant chief medical examiner,testified that on January 26, 1997, she performed an autopsy onJoaquin Diaz. Dr. Kalelkar testified regarding the extensiveinjuries to Diaz's head. Dr. Kalelkar noted very severehemorrhages underneath the scalp, a fractured and depressed skullcap and a severely contused brain. In Dr. Kalelkar's opinion,these injuries were consistent with being struck with a metal pipe. Dr. Kalelkar opined that Diaz died as a result of extensive cranialcerebral injuries.

Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial. Defendantadmitted that in January of 1997 he was a member of the La Razagang. Defendant testified that on January 24, 1997, he was with T-Bone, Flaco, Pelon, Little Popeye, and two girls "drinking andsmoking weed" in a van. Defendant stated that while driving aroundin the area of 59th and Washtenaw, he and Flaco (Martinez) exitedthe van at a friend's house. Defendant testified that at thatpoint they saw two Party People walking towards them. Defendantadmitted that 59th and Washtenaw was Party People territory andthat the Party People gang was at war with the La Raza gang. Defendant stated that when they approached the Party People, a fistfight began. Defendant stated he was hit with a beer bottle nearhis eyebrow. Defendant testified that at that point he returned tothe van and left Martinez still fighting. He saw T-Bone (Saucedo)exit the van with a pipe. Defendant testified that he remained inthe van until the fight was over. Defendant denied that they weredriving in the area looking to fight with Party People. Defendantadmitted that he was arrested and taken to Area 1 with Martinez,Sanchez and Flores on January 25 but denied ever speaking to anypolice officers while there.

In rebuttal, Officer Frank Valdez testified that he spoke withthe defendant on January 26th at Area 1. Valdez stated that thedefendant told him that he was home all day on January 24th underhome confinement.

At the close of all the evidence, the jury returned a verdictfinding defendant guilty of the armed robbery of Joaquin Diaz butnot guilty of the first degree murder of Diaz and not guilty of theaggravated battery of Alvarez. The State subsequently filed a motion to have the defendant sentenced as an adult pursuant tosection 5-4-(6)(c)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-4(6)(c)(ii) (West 1996)). On May 5, 1999, the motion was grantedand the case proceeded to sentencing.

During sentencing, the State called Officer Bill Quinn. Quinntestified that on January 23, 1996, in responding to a gangdisturbance call, he arrested defendant, along with 11 others, forunderage drinking. A handgun, thrown to the floor by MichaelReyes, was recovered at the scene. Saucedo was arrested on thatdate along with the defendant. On the way to the police station,defendant admitted he was a member of the La Raza gang.

Officer Bochnak testified that he arrested defendant on April7, 1996, for assault. The victim informed officers that he anddefendant got into a verbal altercation when defendant pointed ahandgun at the victim. Defendant admitted that he was a member ofthe La Raza gang.

Officer John C. Haggerty testified that on November 22, 1996,he responded to a battery call at approximately 8:00 p.m. Thevictim informed Haggerty that about five La Raza gang membersapproached him and began to beat him. The victim identified bothdefendant and Saucedo as two of the people who beat him. Defendantagain admitted that he was a member of the La Raza gang.

Defendant did not present any evidence in mitigation. Thetrial court sentenced the defendant to 30 years' imprisonment inthe Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant's motion toreduce or reconsider the sentence was denied. Defendant now timelyappeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Constitutionality of the sentencing statute

In his opening brief, defendant argued that the amendment tosection 5-4(6)(c)(ii) was passed as part of Public Act 88-680 (eff.January 1, 1995), known as the "Safe Neighborhoods Law" which wassubsequently struck down by our supreme court in People v.Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80 (1999). The State responded that theamendment was actually passed in Public Act 88-239. Defendantconcedes this issue for the purposes of appeal and therefore, wedeem it waived for review.

B. Abuse of discretion

Defendant argues that his sentence must be remanded for a newhearing on his eligibility for sentencing as an adult where thetrial court abused its discretion. In this case, althoughdefendant was only 16 years old at the time of the offense, he wascharged as an adult pursuant to section 5-4(6)(a), which provided:

"The definition of delinquent minor under Section 5-3 ofthis Act shall not apply to any minor who at the time ofthe offense was at least 15 years of age and who ischarged with first degree murder * * *. These charges andall other charges arising out of the same incident shallbe prosecuted under the Criminal Code of 1961." 705 ILCS405/5-4(6)(a) (West 1992)

Although defendant was acquitted of first degree murder, thedefendant was convicted of armed robbery. Therefore, defendant wassentenced under section 5-4(6)(c)(ii), which provided:

"(ii) If after trial or plea the minor is only convictedof an offense not covered by paragraph (a) of thissubsection (6), the conviction shall not invalidate theverdict or the prosecution of the minor under thecriminal laws of the State; however, unless the Staterequests a hearing for the purpose of sentencing theminor under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Correction,the Court must proceed under Sections 5-22 and 5-23 ofthis Act. Should the State request a hearing it must doso by written motion within 10 days following the entryof a finding or the return of a verdict. Reasonablenotice of the motion shall be served upon the minor orhis counsel. If the motion is made by the State, thecourt shall conduct a hearing to determine if the requestshould be granted. In making its determination on themotion, the court shall consider among other matters: (a)whether there is evidence that the offense was committedin an aggressive and premeditated manner; (b) the age ofthe minor; (c) the previous history of the minor; (d)whether there are facilities particularly available tothe Juvenile Court or the Department of Corrections,Juvenile Division, for the treatment and rehabilitationof the minor; (e) whether the best interest of the minorand the security of the public require sentencing underChapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections; and (f)whether the minor possessed a deadly weapon whencommitting the offense." 705 ILCS 405/5-4(6)(c)(ii)(West 1996).

We note that section 5-4(6)(c)(ii) was amended effectiveJanuary 1, 1994. Prior to that date, section 5-4(6)(c)(ii)required the trial court to sentence the defendant to the juveniledivision of the Department of Corrections when the defendant wasfound not guilty of murder. Defendant maintains that the trialcourt failed to take all statutorily enumerated factors intoaccount when determining whether he should be sentenced as an adultor transferred back to juvenile court for a dispositional hearing.

The trial court is bound to consider the specific criteria setforth in the Juvenile Court Act. People v. Ollins, 231 Ill. App.3d 243, 247, 595 N.E.2d 1295 (1992). However, no one factor isdeterminative nor must each factor be given equal weight. Peoplev. Martin, 285 Ill. App. 3d 623, 631, 674 N.E.2d 90 (1996). Notall of the statutory criteria must be resolved against the minor tojustify treating him as an adult. See People v. Sistrunk, 259 Ill.App. 3d 40, 48, 630 N.E.2d 1213 (1994). "Where the record showsthat the [trial] court considered all the factors and itsdetermination is not an abuse of discretion, then the ruling willbe affirmed on appeal." People v. Martin, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 631.

The record in this case shows that the State filed a motionrequesting a hearing for the purpose of sentencing the defendant asan adult. The defense requested and received a 30-day continuanceto prepare a response to the State's motion. The trial court thenconducted a hearing and reviewed the evidence relating to thestatutory factors. Defendant only takes issue with the trialcourt's evaluation of the fourth and fifth factors provided in thestatute. As the trial court properly evaluated and applied thestatutory factors, we find that the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion in sentencing the defendant as an adult.

We first note that defendant maintains that the statutoryfactors in section 5-4(6)(c)(ii) to be considered in a "transferback" hearing are "nearly identical to the factors the juvenilecourt must consider in making a determination whether to transfera juvenile to the adult court" under 5-4(3)(a). Defendantconcludes, therefore, that the factors should be evaluated inprecisely the same manner. However, defendant cites no case lawfor the proposition that the factors are to be analyzed in such amanner.

Defendant cites People v. Brown, 301 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1008,705 N.E.2d 162 (1998), which stated:

"By allowing the trial court discretion to determinewhether to transfer the juvenile back to juvenile court,the trial court is afforded the opportunity to balancethe interests of the community and the minor in reachinga sentencing determination, just as it had an opportunityto balance the interests in reaching a prosecutorialdetermination. Further, the trial court should use thesame guidelines provided in section 5-4(3)(b) in reachinga decision on whether to transfer the juvenile."

However, the defendant in Brown was 14 at the time of the offenseand therefore was not subject to the mandatory transfer provisionin section 5-4(6)(a).

The State points out that in cases involving mandatorytransfer, our supreme court has held: "[t]he legislature itselfbalanced the competing interests of minor offenders and societywhere it is alleged that a minor has committed 'murder, [or]aggravated criminal sexual assault' and 'was at least 15 years ofage' at the time of the alleged offense. [Citation.] Under thesecircumstances, the legislature struck the balance in favor ofsocietal security by vesting exclusive jurisdiction over thesealleged juvenile offenders within the criminal court." People v.Clark, 119 Ill. 2d at 13. Therefore, while the factors may beevaluated similarly, unlike the straight balancing between theinterests of the minor and society when the defendant is under 15years of age in section 5-4(3)(a), when a minor is mandatorilytransferred to criminal court pursuant to section 5-4(6)(c)(ii), abalancing has in essence already occurred, weighing in favor ofprotecting society.

We note that there are subtle differences in the language ofthe two statutes. While the fourth factor under section 5-4(3)(b)requires the court to consider whether "there are facilitiesparticularly available to the Juvenile Court for the treatment andrehabilitation of the minor" (705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(b) (West 1996))the fourth factor under section 5-4(6)(c)(ii) requires the court toconsider whether "there are facilities particularly available tothe Juvenile Court or the Department of Corrections, JuvenileDivision, for the treatment and rehabilitation of the minor" (705ILCS 405/5-4(6)(c)(ii) (West 1996)). Likewise, the fifth factorunder section 5-4(3)(b) requires the court to consider whether "thebest interest of the minor and the security of the public mayrequire that the minor continue in custody or under supervision fora period extending beyond his minority" (705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(b)(West 1996)) where the fifth factor under section 5-4(6)(c)(ii)asks whether "the best interest of the minor and the security ofthe public require sentencing under Chapter V of the Unified Codeof Corrections" (705 ILCS 405/5-4(6)(c)(ii) (West 1996)).

Even if we were to accept defendant's argument that trialcourts should consider the factors in section 5-4(6)(c)(ii) in thesame manner as the factors in section 5-4(4)(3), we note thatsection 5-4(4)(3.3)(a) provides:

"If the State's Attorney files a motion under subsection(3)(a) to permit prosecution under the criminal laws andthe petition alleges the commission by a minor 15 yearsof age or older of: (i) a Class X felony other than armedviolence***and the State's Attorney's motion to transferthe case alleges that the offense committed is infurtherance of the criminal activities of an organizedgang***and, if the juvenile judge designated to hear anddetermine motions to transfer a case for prosecution inthe criminal court determines that there is probablecause to believe that the allegations in the petition andmotion are true, there is a rebuttable presumption thatthe minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealtwith under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, and that,except as provided in paragraph (b), the case should betransferred to the criminal court." 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3.3)(a) (West 1996).

In the instant case, it is clear that the attack on Diaz wascommitted in furtherance of the criminal activities of defendant'sgang. Consequently, even if we were to apply the factors ofsection 5-4(3.3)(a), we would be compelled to find that defendanthas failed to rebut the presumption that he is not a fit and propersubject to be dealt with under the Juvenile Court Act.

Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously evaluatedthe fourth factor under the statute because, in sentencingdefendant, the court did not specifically refer to the defendant'sexposure to juvenile programs. The record reveals that the trialcourt, at the conclusion of the hearing on the State's section 5-4(6)(c)(ii) motion, stated:

"Based on the factors enumerated in the statute, I findthat this crime, under subsection A, was committed in anaggressive and premeditated manner. The evidence beforeme suggested that the defendant joined with his fellowgang members in a specific mission to seek out and harmrival gang members. The aggressiveness of the crime isshown by the numbers of the defendant and his gangmembers against the victim in this case, and the deadlyweapon that was used to kill the victim. The defendantwas 16 at the time of the offense. The only evidencebefore me at this juncture is a prior aggravated assaultfinding as a juvenile. Based on the actions of thedefendant and his accountability for the actions of hisfellow co-defendants, his rehabilitative potential iscertainly questionable. Based on his actions, even athis young age, certainly the public needs to be protectedfrom him. And the defendant was accountable for a deadlyweapon being possessed and used to beat to death thevictim in this case. For all these reasons, I find thatthe defendant shall be sentenced as an adult under theUnified Code of Corrections Chapter 5."

Although defendant is correct in stating that the trial judgedid not specifically mention the availability of treatment orrehabilitation services in juvenile court or the juvenile divisionof the Illinois Department of Corrections, that alone is notconclusive proof that the trial judge did not evaluate this factor. See People v. Luckett, 295 Ill. App. 3d 342, 348, 692 N.E.2d 1345(1998). As the court in Luckett noted, the fourth factor wasmentioned to the trial judge by both the prosecutor and the defensecounsel.

In the case at bar, defense counsel addressed the fourthfactor stating "there's been no evidence that he is incapable underD of being held in a particular juvenile Department of Corrections. There's been no evidence to suggest that this young man cannot goto the juvenile Department of Corrections or that he or hisbehavior is somehow indicative of an individual that has to behoused in an adult facility." In the written section 5-4(6)(c)(ii)motion, the State addressed the fourth factor, stating "given thefact that defendant is now 18 years old, the State does not believethe defendant requires a specific or a particular juvenilefacility." Additionally, the prosecution notified the trial courtin its section 5-4(6)(c)(ii) motion that defendant was on juvenileprobation for a prior aggravated assault when he committed theinstant offense and listed defendant's numerous contacts with thelaw. Some of those prior contacts involved codefendants in thisparticular case. The trial court's comment regarding itsskepticism of defendant's rehabilitative potential was based uponthe information provided by both defense counsel and the State. Inconsidering defendant's continued criminal actions, "even at hisyoung age," the court determined defendant's proper place remainedin the criminal court. This determination was made in a mannerconsistent with this court's holding in People v. Luckett, 295 Ill.App. 3d 342, 348, 692 N.E.2d 1345 (1998).

In the instant case, the defendant makes the additionalargument that the trial court could not properly consider whetherdefendant was amenable to treatment where the record does notreflect that the court was informed as to whether defendant wasever in any rehabilitation programs unique to the juvenile court orthe juvenile division of the Department of Corrections. However,the fourth factor requires the trial court to consider "whetherthere are facilities particularly available to the Juvenile Courtor the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, for thetreatment and rehabilitation of the minor." (Emphasis added.) 705ILCS 405/5-4(6)(c)(ii) (West 1996). Defendant's contention onappeal that a sentencing court cannot comply with the fourth factorunless it is aware of the defendant's prior participation, if any,in rehabilitation programs is simply belied by the plain languageof the statute.

Defendant also argues that the trial court erroneouslyevaluated whether the best interest of the minor and the securityof the public required sentencing defendant as an adult. Duringthe section 5-4(6)(c)(ii) hearing, the court explicitly stated,"based on his actions, even at a young age, certainly the publicneeds to be protected from him." The court further stated that"defendant was accountable for a deadly weapon being possessed andused to beat to death the victim in this case." The prosecutorargued that "the acts of this defendant clearly show that he has tobe sentenced as an adult and not to think of the best interest ofthe defendant because obviously he, under the theory ofaccountability, is responsible for every single harm that was doneto our victim and the taking of a leather jacket is what the juryfound him guilty of." The prosecutor briefly reminded the court ofthe extensive injuries the young victim suffered and the fact thatdefendant is a self-admitted gang member. The State's motionindicated that the prior criminal history of the defendantsupported sentencing him as an adult to protect the public.

Although defendant insists that the fifth factor requires acourt to take into account the potential time in prison a juvenilewill face, defendant cites to cases that evaluate the statutoryfactors used in a section 5-4(3)(a) determination. See People v.Clark, 119 Ill. 2d 1, 518 N.E.2d 138; see also People v. D.B., 202Ill. App. 3d 194, 559 N.E.2d 873 (1990). Cases interpreting thefactors enumerated in section 5-4(6)(c)(ii), however, have notrequired the same. The court in Luckett merely stated, whenreviewing the trial court's section 5-4(6)(c)(ii) determination,"[a]s far as the fifth factor, the defendant's actions clearlyindicate a need to protect the public by sentencing the defendantas an adult." People v. Luckett, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 348. Further, as recently noted by our supreme court in People v.Morgan, Nos. 88508, 88513 cons., (October 18, 2001):

"[I]t is worth noting that in a later version of the Act,the legislature amended the statute on discretionarytransfers to add: 'In considering these factors, thecourt shall give greater weight to the seriousness of thealleged offense and the minor's prior record ofdelinquency than to the other factors listed in thissubsection.' (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-805 (West2000)." Morgan, slip. op. at 12.

Importantly, in a "transfer back" hearing, the decisionwhether to sentence defendant as an adult is made by the same courtthat will ultimately sentence the defendant. In making adetermination pursuant to section 5-4(3)(a), the juvenile court isconsidering mere allegations. In making a determination pursuantto section 5-4(6)(c)(ii), the criminal court is considering theproper disposition of a defendant's case when he has been convictedafter a trial. In the instant case, immediately prior to trial,the court advised defendant of the potential sentences he faced. In sentencing a defendant as an adult to a specific term of years,the criminal court judge is obviously taking into account not onlythe term of years the defendant potentially faces, but also theterm of years he or she will actually impose. Based upon therecord, we find that the trial court properly weighed the fifthfactor in its determination as well.

Defendant does not contend that the trial court improperlyweighed the other four factors under section 5-4(6)(c)(ii): theoffense could not have been committed in a more aggressive manner,defendant was 16 at the time of the offense and 18 at the time ofsentencing, the previous history of the defendant, and thedefendant's codefendants used a deadly weapon to murder the unarmedvictim. For all the above reasons, we hold that the trial courtdid not abuse its discretion when it determined that the defendantshould be sentenced as an adult.

Defendant also argues that his sentence should be reduced orhis cause remanded where defendant's sentence was disparate to hiscodefendants' sentences. Specifically, defendant maintains thatwhile he was sentenced to 30 years in prison for armed robbery, hiscodefendants were sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment for firstdegree murder and a consecutive 6-year sentence for armed robbery. Although his sentence was nearly equivalent to that of hiscodefendants, defendant maintains that the sentences are disparatebecause he was convicted of a less serious crime. We disagree.

Sentencing is a matter taht rests within the sound discretionof the trial court, and therefore, if it is within the statutorylimits, a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trialjudge abused that discretion. People v. Nutall, 312 Ill. App. 3d620, 635, 728 N.E.2d 597 (2000). "The general rule as to thequestion of whether defendant's sentence was unfairly disparate isthat arbitrary and unreasonable disparity between the sentences ofsimilarly situated codefendants is impermissible." People v.Taylor, 318 Ill. App. 3d 464, 477, 742 N.E.2d 357 (2000). A meredisparity in sentences does not, by itself, establish a violationof fundamental fairness. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205,216, 688 N.E.2d 658 (1997). In addition, the trial court is in thebest position to determine the appropriate punishment, and itsdecision is entitled to great weight and deference. People v.Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53, 723 N.E.2d 207, 209 (1999); People v.Modrowski, 296 Ill. App. 3d 735, 751, 696 N.E.2d 28 (1998).

In Taylor, this court rejected an argument virtually identicalto the defendant's argument in the case at bar. In Taylor, thedefendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 24 years on chargesof armed robbery and home invasion, and 4 years on a charge ofresidential burglary. Defendant argued that his sentence wasdisproportionate where Caples, an equally culpable codefendant,pled guilty to the more serious crime of murder and received onlya 20-year sentence. We held that "[a] sentence imposed on acodefendant who pleaded guilty as part of a plea agreement does notprovide a valid basis of comparison to a sentence entered aftertrial." People v. Taylor, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 477, citing Peoplev. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d at 217, 688 N.E.2d 658. As weacknowledged:

"In Caballero, the supreme court found that thecodefendant who pled guilty (1) acknowledged his guiltand showed willingness to assume responsibility for hisconduct; (2) made a public trial unnecessary; and (3)gave cooperation which resulted in the successfulprosecution of another offender engaged in equallyserious or more serious criminal conduct. [Citation.] Asa result, the supreme court found that the defendantcould not establish that the disparate treatment ofhimself and his codefendant was unreasonable orunwarranted." People v. Taylor, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 477.

"Dispositional concessions are properly granted to defendants whoplead guilty since the public interest in the effectiveadministration of criminal justice is served." People v. Nutall,312 Ill. App. 3d at 636.

In the case at bar, defendant was sentenced to 30 years'imprisonment for armed robbery. Armed robbery is a Class Xoffense, carrying a sentencing range from 6 to 30 years. 720 ILCS5/18-2 (West 1996); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1996). Therefore,although it was the maximum nonextended sentence allowable,defendant's sentence was clearly within the statutorily permissiblerange. The record establishes that the codefendants in this caseentered into voluntary negotiated guilty pleas, whereby they pledguilty to the offenses of first degree murder and armed robberywith respect to Joaquin Diaz. In exchange, the State recommended,and the trial court imposed, consecutive sentences of 25 years forfirst degree murder and 6 years for armed robbery. The State nol-prossed the remaining attempted armed robbery and aggravatedbattery charges with respect to victim Urbano Alvarez. Thedefendant declined the plea agreement and chose to proceed totrial. In this case, defendant cannot establish that his sentencewas disparate to that of his codefendants.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant'sconvictions and sentence.

Affirmed.

CAMPBELL, P.J., and GREIMAN, J., concur.