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FOURTH DIVISION
Filed: 06/14/01

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Daniel Vallo, was found guilty of first degree murderand sentenced to 50 years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argued that he had been deniedeffective assistance of counsel, that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him, and thatthe case must be remanded for a hearing to examine the circumstances surrounding his use ofpsychotropic drugs at the time of trial. On June 20, 1997, this court issued an order addressing thoseclaims. People v. Vallo, No. 1-95-1899 (1997) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We concluded that the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and excessive sentencewere meritless and will address those claims no further. We did, however, remand the case withdirections that the trial court conduct a hearing, pursuant to People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 680N.E.2d 357 (1997), regarding the defendant's use of psychotropic drugs and their effect upon him,if any. We ordered that, if the trial court determined that the defendant did not take psychotropicdrugs at or near the time of his trial and sentencing or that the defendant did take such drugs at therelevant time but suffered no resulting impairment, the defendant's conviction and sentence wouldstand. We further ordered, however, that, if the trial court determined that the defendant wasimpaired as a result of psychotropic drugs taken in proximity to his trial and sentencing, it mustvacate his conviction. People v. Vallo, No. 1-95-1899 (1997)(unpublished order under SupremeCourt Rule 23).

Pursuant to our order, the trial court conducted a hearing and concluded that the defendantdid take psychotropic drugs during the relevant time frame but that he suffered no resultingimpairment. The defendant now appeals the latter finding, arguing it is against the manifest weightof the evidence. He further argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for theappointment of an expert witness.

On remand, defense counsel, on February 5, 1999, filed a motion requesting, inter alia, thatthe court allow him to retain an expert witness to review the defendant's medical records with feesfor said expert to be paid by the county. Defense counsel explained that he had been unable tocontact either of the two psychiatrists that had treated the defendant at Cermak Hospital as neitherdoctor was still employed by that facility. In response to the defendant's request, the State informedthe court that it intended to give the defendant's medical records to a psychiatrist at Forensic ClinicalServices for review. It asserted that this doctor would be an independent expert, rather than anexpert witness for the State, because Forensic Clinical Services is not part of the State's Attorney'soffice and because "that office is used for BCX's [behavioral clinical examinations] all the time inthe court system here." The trial judge denied the defendant's request for the appointment of anexpert witness. Instead, it ordered both the defendant and the State to attempt to locate thedefendant's treating doctors. Defense counsel voiced concerns that even if the doctors were located,they would likely require compensation before speaking to him. The judge responded that the partiescould issue subpoenas for the doctors and the doctors could submit fee petitions to the court.

On a subsequent status date, May 12, 1999, the parties informed the court they had locatedone of the psychiatrists in question but did not identify the doctor by name. The record contains awritten order entered on July 28, 1999, ordering that Dr. Roxane Sanders review the defendant'smedical and psychiatric records in preparation for her testimony. The order was prepared by theState but is marked as an agreed order. The record contains no transcript of proceedings for the dateit was entered.

At the beginning of the August 19, 1999, hearing, the parties stipulated that jury selectionfor the defendant's trial took place on May 1, 1995, that the trial itself took place on May 2 and 3,1995, and that the defendant was sentenced on June 5, 1995. The parties further stipulated that, ifcalled, the records custodian from Cermak Health Services would testify that the defendant's medicalrecords state that he was administered one or two doses of Haldol and/or one or two doses ofCogentin daily from April 13, 1995, to the end of May 1995. With specific regard to the trial dates,the records showed the defendant was administered both Haldol and Cogentin at 9 a.m. and againat 9 p.m. on May 1 and 2. On May 3, he was administered Haldol at 5 p.m. and Cogentin at 9 p.m. No records were available for the month of June. The State pointed out that it was stipulating onlythat the records stated that the defendant had been administered these drugs, not that he actuallyingested them. It questioned whether the defendant could actually have been given the drugs inquestion at Cermak Hospital at 9 a.m. on the dates he appeared in court for his trial. The partiesfurther stipulated that Haldol is a psychotropic drug and that Cogentin is a drug prescribed inconjunction with Haldol to prevent some of its side effects.

After the parties presented these stipulations, the trial court made a finding that the defendantwas, in fact, administered psychotropic drugs in proximity to the dates of his trial and/or sentencing. Defense counsel then objected to continuing with the hearing in light of the fact that the trial courthad not allowed the defendant to retain his own expert witness. Defense counsel informed the courtthat, after the parties had located Dr. Sanders, he sent her a letter asking her to review the defendant'smedical records. According to counsel, Dr. Sanders refused to do so without compensation. Counsel further informed the court that he had again contacted Dr. Sanders after the court issued anorder requiring her to review the defendant's records but that Dr. Sanders still refused to speak to himas she could not be assured of compensation. Defense counsel informed the trial court that Dr.Sanders did, however, inform him at that time that she would have no opinion regarding thedefendant's fitness. The trial judge treated defense counsel's objections to continuing with thehearing as a renewed motion for the appointment of an expert and denied the motion.

The hearing continued, with the State calling as its first witness Dr. Sanders, who, during thelatter part of 1994 and early part of 1995 was a staff psychiatrist and the Director of Mental HealthServices at Cermak Hospital. Dr. Sanders was qualified as an expert in the field of forensicpsychiatry. She testified that she had reviewed the defendant's medical records for the time periodof October 1994 through May 1995. According to Dr. Sanders, those records revealed that Dr.Vacula had prescribed, and the defendant was administered, Haldol and Cogentin daily fromNovember 1994 to January 1995. The doctor acknowledged that the records indicate the defendantwas also administered Haldol and Cogentin on a daily basis from mid-April through the end of May1995, but testified that she saw no prescription in the records for that time period. Dr. Sandersfurther testified that, according to the records, Dr. Vacula had given the defendant a diagnosis ofschizophreniform disorder, a psychotic reaction which lasts longer than a couple of weeks. Therecords indicated he had based his diagnosis on the fact that the defendant was experiencing "a breakwith reality where he was hearing voices".

Haldol, the doctor testified, is an antipsychotic medication used to treat severe psychiatricsymptoms or severe anxiety. Dr. Sanders testified that a typical dose of Haldol can range from