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FOURTH DIVISION
August 5, 2004

Following a bench trial, defendant Kavin Spivey was convicted of unlawful use of aweapon (UUW) by a felon and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and was sentenced to 10years' imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that (1) his conviction for aggravated UUW violatesdue process in that the statute lacks a culpable mental state and criminalizes innocent conduct; (2)the State failed to establish his conviction for UUW by a felon beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) thetrial court based its findings on an incorrect recollection of the evidence and ignored a materialdiscrepancy in the State's testimony; (4) the trial court failed to correctly admonish defendantpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(a) (188 Ill. 2d R. 605(a)); and (5) the mittimus should becorrected to reflect that defendant's offense did not involve a vehicle. For the following reasons,we affirm the judgment of the circuit court and correct the mittimus.

BACKGROUND

Officer Timothy Baker testified that on August 28, 2002, he and his partner, OfficerPatrick McDonough, were investigating a continuing complaint of loitering gang members usingnarcotics in Touhy Huber Park in Chicago. Officer Baker stated that at about 10 p.m., they saw alarge group of people in the park. Defendant was seated on a bicycle. They approached thegroup in their unmarked vehicle, and McDonough got out of the car to speak to the group. Thepark was lit. As they approached, defendant peddled away on his bicycle. Baker was directlybehind him and saw him take an object that appeared to be a pistol out of his waistband, throw itto the ground, and then flee on his bicycle. Baker followed defendant in his vehicle andMcDonough ran after him on foot. As Baker looked back in his rearview mirror, he could seeMcDonough bend down to pick something up from the ground, but he did not see him recoverthe object. Defendant was arrested several blocks away in an alley near Adams and Oakley.

Officer McDonough testified that he was chasing defendant on foot. As defendant fled,McDonough saw him reach into his waistband and drop a handgun to the ground. Defendantwas about 25 feet away from him when he dropped the gun. McDonough stated that he sawexactly where the gun landed. As defendant dropped the gun, the vehicle driven by Officer Bakerpassed by him. McDonough then picked up the weapon, a loaded, uncased, .25-caliber blue steelhandgun, and continued to pursue defendant on foot. When he arrived at Adams and Oakley,defendant was sitting in the back of a marked police car.

Additionally, the parties stipulated that "defendant ha[d] been convicted of a prior felonyof aggravated discharge of a firearm, Case No. 98-CR-21155." Defendant rested withoutpresenting any evidence. The trial court found defendant guilty of aggravated UUW and UUW bya felon. He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. Defendant's posttrial motions were deniedand he filed a timely appeal.

ANALYSIS

Defendant contends the provisions of the aggravated UUW statute under which he wasconvicted violate substantive due process. He argues that while the statute requires defendant toknowingly carry or conceal a loaded, uncased and immediately accessible firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)(3)(A) (West 2002)), it requires no criminal purpose and therefore potentially punishesinnocent conduct. Whether a statute complies with substantive due process requirements isdetermined under the rational basis test. People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24, 740 N.E.2d 755, 767(2000). Under that test, a statute is upheld where it " 'bears a reasonable relationship to a publicinterest to be served, and the means adopted are a reasonable method of accomplishing thedesired objective.' " Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 24, 740 N.E.2d at 767, quoting People v. Adams, 144Ill. 2d 381, 390, 581 N.E.2d 637, 642 (1991).

Defendant recognizes that his argument was considered and rejected in People v. Grant,339 Ill. App. 3d 792, 791 N.E.2d 100 (2003), and its progeny. See People v. McGee, 341 Ill.App. 3d 1029, 794 N.E.2d 855 (2003), appeal denied, 205 Ill. 2d 621, 803 N.E.2d 493 (2003);People v. Marin, 342 Ill. App. 3d 716, 795 N.E.2d 953 (2003), appeal denied, 206 Ill. 2d 631,806 N.E.2d 1070 (2003); People v. Pulley, 345 Ill. App. 3d 916, 803 N.E.2d 953 (2004), appealdenied, 208 Ill. 2d 536, 809 N.E.2d 1291 (2004). In these cases, the defendants, like the instantdefendant, relied upon the supreme court decisions in People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 740 N.E.2d755 (2000), People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62, 481 N.E.2d 676 (1985), and People v. Zaremba, 158Ill. 2d 36, 630 N.E.2d 797 (1994), to support their contentions of unconstitutionality. Defendantargues, as the defendant in Grant argued, that these supreme court cases stand for the broadproposition that whenever a statute contains a mental state of knowledge without a furthercriminal purpose, the statute is unconstitutional. This argument is erroneous. The court has notestablished such a broad proposition of law. See, e.g., People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194, 650N.E.2d 1006 (1995); People v. Thoennes, 334 Ill. App. 3d 320, 777 N.E.2d 1075 (2002) (whereknowledge without a criminal purpose was sufficient to withstand the rational basis test). Rather,in Wright, Wick and Zaremba, the supreme court held that the specific statute at issue did notmeet the rational basis test in that the statute was not rationally related to its specific legislativepurpose or the means used to accomplish the legislative purpose was not reasonable in thatinstance.

In Wright, the statute at issue made it a felony for certain individuals licensed under theVehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 1996)) to knowingly fail to maintain recordsrelating to the acquisition and disposition of vehicles and parts at their place of business. Thepurpose of the statute was to prevent or reduce the transfer or sale of stolen vehicles or theirparts; the purpose was not to punish those who made a slight lapse in record keeping without anyunlawful purpose. Therefore, where the statute potentially punished innocent conduct, the courtheld that the statute was not a reasonable means of preventing the trafficking of stolen vehiclesand parts. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 28, 740 N.E.2d at 768-69.

In Zaremba, the statute made it a felony to obtain or exert control over property in thecustody of any law enforcement agency where the individual has knowledge that the property wasstolen. The court found that the statute did not bear a rational relationship to its stated purposeof breaking up "fencing" operations because it potentially punished the lawful actions of a policeevidence technician who retained the proceeds of a theft for safekeeping. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at38, 630 N.E.2d at 798.

In Wick, the aggravated arson statute made it a felony to knowingly damage a building byfire where the fire injures a fireman or policeman. The court found that the statute wasinconsistent with the simple arson statute, which required the offender to knowingly damage byfire another's property without authority or with the intent to defraud the insurer, thus requiring agreater degree of malice. Where the aggravated arson statute did not require the same unlawfulpurpose as that required for simple arson, the statute did not bear a reasonable relationship to itsstated purpose of providing a more severe penalty for arsonists whose conduct resulted in injuryto a fireman or policeman. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d at 66, 481 N.E.2d at 678-79.

In the present case, the statute does not fail the rational basis test. The statute at issuemakes it a felony to knowingly possess a loaded, readily accessible, uncased weapon on one'sperson, except on one's own property or fixed place of business. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)(3)(A)(West 2002). Contrary to defendant's contention, the purpose of the statute was not merely tolimit possession of firearms by members of street gangs and organized crime figures. Rather, theintended purpose was broader in scope, designed to impose greater punishment for conduct thatthe legislature has determined creates "inherent dangers to police officers and the general public. This is so even if the person carrying the weapon has no criminal objective." Grant, 339 Ill. App.3d at 806, 791 N.E.2d 100. As we found in Marin, there is no question that such a purpose is alegitimate state interest properly regulated by the legislature. Illinois courts have consistently heldfirearm controls to be within the purview of the State's police power. Marin, 342 Ill. App. 3d at722, 795 N.E.2d at 959, citing Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1182(N.D. Ill. 1981).

The statute is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose because it does notcriminalize as a strict liability offense mere lawful gun ownership in any circumstance. Rather, thestatute penalizes the knowing possession of a weapon with the aggravating factors that it beloaded, readily accessible, uncased, and in a specific environment, a circumstance the legislaturehas determined belies innocent conduct. Penalizing those who knowingly carry or transportweapons in this manner is a rational way to accomplish the legislative goal of improving publicsafety. McGee, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 1037, 794 N.E.2d at 860. Thus, unlike the supreme courtcases cited by defendant, the aggravated UUW statute is rationally related to its legislativepurpose.

Additionally, the means of accomplishing the legislative purpose are reasonable. Defendant argues, as did the defendant in Grant, that the statute subjects innocent conduct to afelony conviction and therefore sweeps too broadly. Defendant again provides us with the remoteexample of the hunter who receives a call that an emergency has arisen at home. In his haste toattend to the emergency, he returns to his car and drives away with the loaded, uncased gun nextto him on the seat of his car. As we have previously stated in McGee, this conduct is notinnocent. McGee, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 1037, 794 N.E.2d at 860 ("[e]ach of the aggravatingfactors in the statute is a circumstance that belies innocent conduct"). Contrary to defendant'sassertion, one can perform an act with a knowing mental state without a criminal purpose wherethe acts that comprise the offense are criminal in nature. McGee, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 1036, 794N.E.2d at 860. Here, the hunter's actions pose a threat to public safety. Requiring intent woulddefeat the statute's purpose of "protecting the public and law enforcement officers from thedanger of weapons in public places." Marin, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 727, 795 N.E.2d at 962.

Indeed, the legislature specifically designed the statute to carve out exemptions that it hasdetermined constitute innocent conduct. For example, section 24-2(b)(4) specifically provides anexemption for those persons who transport weapons even when they are not able to break themdown into a nonfunctioning state, as long as the weapons are not immediately accessible. 720ILCS 5/24-2(b)(4) (West 2002). In the above hypothetical, the hunter could have taken an extramoment to place the weapon in a safe place to conform his conduct to the statute. Accordingly,we find the means utilized are reasonable to accomplish the legislature's objectives.

In support of defendant's argument that Grant and its progeny misapplied the rational basistest, defendant cites the United States Supreme Court case of Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.600, 128 L. Ed. 2d 608, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994). We find this case lends support to our decisionthat knowledge is a sufficient mental state under the aggravated UUW statute to satisfy therational basis test. In Staples, the statute at issue made it a felony under the National FirearmsAct (26 U.S.C.