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FOURTH DIVISION
September 30, 2004

Following a jury trial, defendant Anthony Smythe was convicted of aggravated unlawfuluse of a weapon (UUW) and sentenced to one-year probation.⁽¹⁾ On appeal, he contends (1) hewas not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt where the statute requires proof that theweapon was "uncased" (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)/(3)(A) (West 2002)), and the evidencesubmitted demonstrated that the handgun was cased; and (2) pursuant to section 5/5-4-3 of theUnified Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 2002)), the compulsoryextraction and perpetual storing of his DNA violated his fourth amendment right to be free fromunreasonable searches and seizures. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

At trial, Officer Paul Morache testified that atapproximately 4:30 p.m. on May 19, 2002, he was patrolling in amarked squad car at the intersection of 162nd and EllisStreet in South Holland. Morache explained that he wasrunning registration checks on the license plates ofrandom vehicles when he determined that the licenseplate of the Ford Expedition located in front of him wasregistered to a Porsche. Morache questioned the driver,whom he later identified in court as defendant. Moracheasked defendant for his driver's license and proof ofinsurance. After handing over his license, defendant toldMorache that he was a Cook County sheriff police deputy,although he failed to produce a badge or other proof ofidentification. Morache then determined that defendanthad a suspended driver's license. Accordingly, he re-approached the vehicle, asked defendant to step out,informed him of the status of his suspended driver'slicense, and took him into custody.

At that point, Morache asked defendant if there wereany weapons in the vehicle, and defendant affirmativelyreplied. Morache testified that he placed defendant inthe back seat of the squad car and returned to thevehicle to find what would later be identified in court asa SIG Sauer nine-millimeter automatic pistol. The gun waslocated underneath the driver's seat of the Expedition ina snapped holster. The holster did not fully enclose thegun, but rather left portions of the gun exposed. Uponreturning to the squad car, Morache unsnapped theholster to remove the gun, emptied a bullet from the gun'schamber, removed the gun's ammunition (the clip), anddetermined that the gun was not stolen. After retrievingthe gun, Morache transported defendant to the policestation, determined that he was not a Cook Countysheriff police deputy, and read defendant his Mirandarights. At that point, defendant admitted to Morachethat he was not a Cook County police deputy but, rather,he was an armed security officer on suspension.

Defendant testified that he became an armed securityguard in 1996. At that time, he purchased a gun and storedit in several places including under his mattress, in hisnightstand, and then in his basement. After his basementhad been broken into in March 2002, he stored the gun inhis Expedition. From March 2002 until May 19, 2002,defendant did not move the gun from its locationunderneath the driver's seat of the Expedition. Defendanttestified that the gun was unloaded, inside of a snapped-shut holster, and the gun's clip was inside the centerconsole between the driver and passenger seats. Defendant further testified that the only way to get thegun out from underneath the seat would have been totake it out from the backseat.

Defendant further testified that, on May 19, 2002, he was driving the Expedition in SouthHolland when Officer Morache pulled him over and told him his driver's license was suspended. Defendant stated that he had forgotten that the gun was underneath the seat, but remembered thatthere was a weapon in the car when Morache began questioning him. From the backseat of thesquad car, defendant saw Morache pull an object out from underneath the driver's seat, and asMorache was walking back to the squad car, defendant identified the object as his gun. Defendant believed that all of the bullets were in the clip at the time Morache brought the gunback to the squad car.

The jury then found defendant guilty of one count of aggravated UUW. After the courtdenied defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict and motion for a newtrial, the court sentenced defendant to one-year probation.

ANALYSIS

Defendant contends that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt ofaggravated UUW because the evidence was insufficient to show that his gun was "uncased"where it was undisputed that the police discovered the gun inside of a holster that was snapped-shut. Specifically, defendant argues that the failure to show that the gun was uncased requiresthat we reduce defendant's felony conviction to the misdemeanor and lesser-included offense ofUUW (720 ILCS 5/24-1 (West 2002)), and remand for re-sentencing within the Class Amisdemeanor range.

In resolving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether,after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact couldhave found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Evans, 209Ill. 2d 194, 209, 808 N.E.2d 939, 948 (2004). However, to the extent that we are asked tointerpret the meaning of the statutory term "uncased" (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)/(3)(A) (West2000)), we apply a de novo standard of review to that determination. People v. Lamborn, 185 Ill.2d 585, 590, 708 N.E.2d 350, 354 (1999).

A person commits the offense of aggravated UUW in Illinois by knowingly carrying afirearm in a vehicle that was uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible at the time of theoffense, unless the person was carrying the firearm on his or her land, abode, or fixed place ofbusiness. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)(3)(A) (West 2002). In the present case, defendant does notdispute that the gun was loaded and immediately accessible. Rather, the question here is whetherdefendant's gun was "uncased." The term "uncased" is not explicitly defined in the statute, andtherefore the court will assume that the word has its ordinary and popularly understood meaning. People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 229, 657 N.E.2d 953, 962 (1995). We are also mindful that ourprimary objective when construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to thetrue intent of the legislature. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308, 776 N.E.2d 218,223 (2002). All provisions of a statute are to be viewed as a whole, and words and phrasesshould not be construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisionsof the statute. Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 308, 776 N.E.2d at 223.

Webster's dictionary defines the term "case" as "a box or receptacle to contain or holdsomething." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 346 (1986). Additionally, insubsection (c)(iii) of the statute, the legislature specifically provided that the offense of aggravatedUUW does not apply to the transportation or possession of weapons that are "unloaded andenclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container." 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(c)(iii) (West 2002). To "enclose" means "to envelop" (Webster's Third New InternationalDictionary 746 (1986)), and to "envelop" means "to enclose completely with a garment or othercovering" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary 759 (1986)). Thus, given the plainmeaning of the term in light of all of the relevant provisions of the statute, it is evident that theterm "case" refers to an item that completely encloses the weapon in a firearm carrying box,shipping box, or other container.

Here, the evidence revealed that the gun was found underneath the driver's seat in aholster that was snapped-shut and partially exposed. A holster is traditionally defined as "aleather case for a pistol that is often open at the top to facilitate quick withdrawal, that oftenconforms to the pistol's shape, and that is usually carried at the belt or under one arm or often atthe front of a saddle." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1081 (1986). Accordingly,a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant's holster was "uncased," as the butt of thegun was left exposed for ease of access and did not completely enclose the gun.

Moreover, defendant's argument that a holster is a "case" lacks merit because it isantithetical to the purpose of the aggravated UUW statute. The legislature's purpose in enactingthe aggravated UUW statute was to prevent any person from carrying a loaded weapon on hisperson or in his vehicle due to "the inherent dangers to police officers and the general public." People v. Grant, 339 Ill. App. 3d 792, 806, 791 N.E.2d 100, 11 (2003); See also People v. Marin,342 Ill. App. 3d 716, 724, 795 N.E.2d 953, 959 (2003); People v. McGee, 341 Ill. App. 3d 1029,1037, 794 N.E.2d 855, 861 (2003); People v. Pulley, 345 Ill. App. 3d 916, 803 N.E.2d 953(2004); People v. Spivey, No. 1-03-1810 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 5, 2004). As discussed in Grant, thisstatute was designed to prevent the situation where one has a loaded weapon that is immediatelyaccessible, and thus can use it at a moment's notice and place other unsuspecting citizens inharm's way. Grant, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 807, 791 N.E.2d at 112.

Defendant's interpretation of the statute would permit citizens to carry loaded,immediately accessible guns in holsters on the public streets of Illinois. This scenario out of theWild West is not what the legislature had in mind when seeking to prevent the felony situationwhere a loaded, immediately accessible weapon could be used at a moment's notice and placeother unsuspecting citizens in harm's way. Grant, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 807, 791 N.E.2d at 112.

Even if we were to concede that the term "uncased" is ambiguous, defendant's argumentlacks merit when examining the legislative history. When the language used is susceptible to morethan one equally reasonable interpretation, the court may look to additional sources to determinethe legislature's intent. People v. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d 218, 222, 647 N.E.2d 257, 260 (1995). It isevident from the legislative history that the legislature intended "uncased" to mean that theweapon is not completely enclosed in a container. During the legislative debate on Public Act 91-690, Representative Cook specifically defined the term "case" as follows:

REPRESENTATIVE COOK: "* * * And, John, why don't I go ahead and giveyou a definition of what 'case' is. Case is defined in the Wildlife Code, Chapter520, 'case means a container specifically designed for the purpose of housing a gunor bow and arrow device which completely encloses such gun or bow and arrowdevice by being zipped, snapped, buckled, tied or otherwise fashioned with noportion of the gun or bow and arrow device exposed.' 91st Ill. Gen. Assem.,House Proceedings, April 10, 2000, 50-51 (statements of Representative Cook)(Emphasis added).

Therefore, the legislative history also establishes that the legislature intended for the gun to beenclosed in a container specifically designed for the purpose of housing a gun and that leaves nopart of the gun exposed.

We further reject defendant's reliance on the dissent in People v. Bartimo, 345 Ill. App. 3d1100, 1104, 803 N.E.2d 596, 601 (2004). In Bartimo, the defendant's conviction for UUW wasaffirmed by the majority where the gun was in a nylon holster that had a full clip of ammunition inits front pocket and was located in a laundry basket in the back seat of the car. The defendant didnot argue that the gun was not "uncased" but, rather, argued that it was not immediatelyaccessible due to its placement underneath a pile of clothes in a laundry basket. The dissent, suasponte, raised the issue of whether the gun was cased, and furthermore, the dissent has noprecedential value. Accordingly, we need not consider it.

We next address defendant's contention that the compulsory extraction of his DNApursuant to section 5-4-3 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 2002)) constitutes anunreasonable search, violating his fourth amendment rights. We recently rejected a similarchallenge to this statute and held that section 5-4-3 is constitutional in People v. Ramos, No. 1-03-2963 (Ill. App. Ct. September 30, 2004). We continue to adhere to the holding of Ramos andsimilarly reject defendant's argument.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

GREIMAN and QUINN, J.J., concur.

1. Defendant's original trial on January 29, 2003, ended in a mistrial because the jury failedto reach a verdict. He was subsequently re-tried on May 7, 2003.