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                                                                                                                                                            SIXTH DIVISION
                                                                                                                                                            October 21, 2005

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

The State charged defendant Willie Skillom by information with one count of aiding theescape of Edward Carter, a person in the "lawful custody" of a peace officer arising from anincident that occurred on September 29, 2002. The State also charged Skillom with one count ofattempted disarming of a police officer, and one count of criminal damage to property exceeding$300 but less than $1,000, a charge which the State later nol-prossed. After a bench trial, theHonorable Camille E. Willis found Skillom guilty of aiding escape and not guilty of attempteddisarming of a police officer. The court then sentenced defendant to six years' imprisonment.

On direct appeal, Skillom argues that the State failed to prove that the police had probablecause to arrest Edward Carter; accordingly, Skillom asserts that the State failed to prove his guiltbeyond a reasonable doubt because it failed to prove that he aided the escape of someone in"lawful custody" of a peace officer. Skillom also argues that the trial court erroneously admittedhearsay evidence against him at trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Skillom's convictionand sentence.

BACKGROUND

As they approached the 1500 block of Wentworth Avenue, the officers saw severalvehicles fleeing from the intersection of Wentworth and 16th Avenue and saw a large crowd atthat intersection. As they drove up, they each saw an unidentified African-American malewaving at them from inside a white vehicle heading westbound on 15th Street. Both Stepich andBurke testified that they heard the unidentified man shout "Little Edward's shooting." Stepichand Burke each testified that they knew that "Little Edward" was the nickname of Edward Carter.

At trial, the following exchange occurred when Officer Stepich testified on directexamination about having heard the unidentified man state that "Little Edward's shooting:"

"A: [by the witness, Officer Stepich] On the way to Wentworth, a maleblack subject in a white colored car was waving at us, he was traveling westboundon 15^th Street. We slowed down for him, we were trying to get to the call and hesaid 'Little Edward's shooting, Little Edward's shooting.'

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.

THE COURT: That is stricken. Hearsay testimony.

STATE: Judge, it's not for the truth of the matter, it's going to thefoundation or for the purpose of this investigation.

THE COURT: Counsel, they are contesting it, it does not go to the truth ofthe matter asserted.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: Based upon that statement I am going to reverse myself andoverrule your objection.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You know what, Judge? Actually, if I may, may Iwithdraw my objection?

THE COURT: Withdrawn, fine. The testimony will stand."

During cross-examination by defense counsel, Stepich admitted that he left out anyreference to the unidentified man from the report. He further admitted his report contains nomention of hearing any person state "Little Edward's shooting."

The officers testified that after they heard the statements of the unidentified man, theyapproached the 1600 block of Wentworth and saw Edward Carter and another man, lateridentified as the defendant, Willie Skillom, standing in the middle of the street. The officers alsotestified that they saw Carter and Skillom running from the group. Stepich exited the police carand ordered the men to "stop running" and to "come over to the police car." When Carter andSkillom continued to flee, Stepich pursued them on foot through an alley between Fifth Avenueand Wentworth. Burke remained with the car to contact the police dispatcher by radio.

Officer Stepich testified that as he chased Carter into the backyard of a house at 1512Fifth Avenue, Carter ran into a cable stretching between two houses and fell down. Stepich thenattempted to handcuff Carter, who fought back. Stepich wrestled with Carter for one to twominutes and eventually subdued him by putting one knee in the small of Carter's back andhandcuffing Carter's wrists.

Stepich testified that as he pulled Carter off the ground, he felt a push from behind. AsStepich regained his balance, he turned and saw that he had been pushed by Willie Skillom. Stepich testified that he and Skillom fought; and that, during this struggle, Skillom grabbed atStepich's shirt, duty belt, radio holder, and handgun, which was in a specially designed holster onStepich's belt. Stepich subdued Skillom by striking him in the leg with a police baton untilSkillom fell to the ground. At that time, Officer Burke drove up and assisted Officer Stepich inplacing Skillom in handcuffs. Once he handcuffed Skillom, Stepich noticed that Carter had fled.

Officer Burke testified that after Officer Stepich pursued Carter and Skillom on foot, hehad contacted the police dispatcher then tried to contact Officer Stepich via radio. Hearing noresponse, Burke drove his car around the area trying to locate Stepich. Officer Burke drove upand assisted Officer Stepich in placing Skillom in handcuffs. Burke testified that he saw Skillomand Officer Stepich struggling in the yard, and that Burke came to Stepich's aid in subduing andhandcuffing Skillom.

Stepich and Burke each testified that they had difficulty attempting to put Skillom in thepolice car. Both officers also testified that Skillom head-butted Officer Stepich while in thebackseat of the police car. Stepich further testified that Skillom repeatedly kicked him and that Stepich had to hold Skillom down during most of the ride to the police station.

The defense submitted the stipulated testimony of Tom Rogers, another Chicago Heightspolice officer. Rogers' stipulation provided that on September 30, 2002, pursuant to aninvestigation into the incident of September 29, 2002, he observed a handgun holster thatbelonged to Officer Stepich. Rogers' stipulation provided that Rogers would have testified thatthe holster was damaged and that the holster was inventoried under tag number 34173. Theholster itself was never introduced as evidence, a fact that defense counsel discussed duringclosing argument.

Willie Skillom testified on his own behalf that on the evening of September 28, 2002, hewas at a party at the intersection of 16th Street and Wentworth in Chicago Heights, Illinois. Atabout 12:45 a.m. on September 29, 2002, he left the party and began walking to his mother'shouse. While walking on Wentworth toward 15th Street, Skillom heard several gunshots. As heapproached the corner, he saw his brother, Edward Carter, and his friend, Mark Williams,standing on the corner of Fifth Avenue and 15th Street. Skillom testified that he spoke with hisbrother for 5 to 10 minutes before Stepich and Burke arrived in a marked police car.

Skillom then testified that when the police arrived, they ordered him and Edward Carterto put their hands on the squad car and that they complied. Skillom testified that as he was beinghandcuffed by Burke and placed into the back of the police car, Carter ran away and OfficerStepich ran after him. Skillom testified that he was waiting quietly in the car as Officer Burkechecked to see if there were any outstanding warrants on him. He further testified that whenOfficer Stepich returned from his pursuit, Stepich struck him in the face. Skillom admitted toputting his feet up to protect himself when Stepich hit him, but he denied head-butting Stepich. Skillom also denied fighting with Stepich and further denied that he helped Edward Carterescape.

The trial court found Skillom guilty of aiding the escape of Edward Carter but not guiltyof attempted disarming of a police officer. The court then sentenced defendant to six years'imprisonment. This appeal follows.

ANALYSIS

Second, Skillom argues that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay evidence againsthim at trial, namely, the statements of the unidentified African-American male who purportedlystated "Little Edward's shooting." The State argues that Skillom waived any objection to theadmission of the purported hearsay statements of the unidentified eyewitness when defensecounsel withdrew his objection to the evidence and did not mention it in his motion for a newtrial.

We address each of these arguments in turn.

A. Whether the State Proved All the Elements of the Offense of Aiding Escape Beyond aReasonable Doubt.

On appeal, defendant notes that the aiding escape statute, section 31-7(e) of the CriminalCode of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/31-7(c) (West 2002)), makes it a crime to aid in the escape of aperson who is in the "lawful custody of a peace officer." He next argues that "lawful custody" issynonymous with "arrest accompanied by probable cause," and concludes that the State failed toprove beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of probable cause to arrest Edward Carter. Fromthis line of reasoning, Skillom concludes that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond areasonable doubt of aiding the escape of Edward Carter.

When considering a challenge to a criminal conviction, a reviewing court is usually calledupon to determine whether, when viewing evidence in the light most favorable to theprosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyonda reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct.2781, 2789 (1979); People v. Edwards, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209 (2004). In this case, however, wemust first determine the elements of "aiding escape" as set forth in section 31-7(e). This requiresus to interpret the aiding escape statute, a question of pure law which we review de novo. SeePeople v. Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d 212, 216-17 (2004) (reviewing courts consider questions ofstatutory interpretation de novo). In so doing, we are mindful that the cardinal rule of statutoryconstruction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. See People v.Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d 472, 485 (2003).

Here, the State charged Skillom with violating section 31-7(e), which reads, in relevantpart, as follows:

"Whoever knowingly aids a person in the lawful custody of a peace officerfor the alleged commission of a felon offense in escaping from custody commits aClass 2 felony *** ." 720 ILCS 5/31-7(e) (West 2002).Defendant asserts that the statute's use of the phrase "lawful custody" is a reference to an arrestaccompanied by probable cause. The defendant, however, fails to cite any legal authority wherethe phrase "lawful custody" means an arrest accompanied by probable cause. In fact, as the Statepoints out, there is recent, relevant authority from this court explicitly rejecting thatinterpretation. People v. Brexton, 343 Ill. App. 3d 322 (2003).

Although the Brexton court considered a purported violation of the "escape" statute ratherthan the "aiding escape" statute, the two statutes use almost identical language. The aidingescape statute provides:

"Whoever knowingly aids a person in the lawful custody of a peace officerfor the alleged commission of a felony offense in escaping from custody commitsa class 2 felony * * *." 720 ILCS 5/31-7(e) (West 2002).

The escape statute provides that:

"A person in the lawful custody of a peace officer for the allegedcommission of a felony offense and who intentionally escapes from custodycommits a Class 2 felony *** ." 720 ILCS 5/31-6(c) (West 2002).

Both statutes use the phrase "lawful custody" to describe the condition of the escapee, and bothdescribe very similar crimes. Also, the defendant in Brexton argued, just as Skillom argues inthe instant case, that the statute's use of the phrase "lawful custody" meant that the State mustprove that there was probable cause to arrest the alleged escapee.

The Brexton court, however, affirmed Mr. Brexton's conviction for escape and explicitlyrejected Mr. Brexton's interpretation of the phrase "lawful custody." Brexton, 343 Ill. App. 3d at326. After examining the holdings in People v. Lauer, 273 Ill. App. 3d 469, 474 (1995)(affirming the escape conviction of defendant when a police officer had restrained the defendantand physically moved him from the back to the front room of a house before the defendant brokefree and ran out the back door of the house), and People v. Kosyla, 143 Ill. App. 3d 937, 951-52(1986) (reversing the conviction of a defendant convicted of escape because the State neverproved that the police ever established "custody" over defendant; officer only told the defendantthat he was under arrest without establishing physical custody over defendant), the Brexton courtstated that Illinois courts traditionally define "lawful custody" by looking to the level of controlexercised by the police over the defendant, rather than the existence or absence of probable causeto arrest. Brexton, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 326. The court then held as follows:

"Thus, given that (1) section 31-6 [the escape statute] does not mentionprobable cause, (2) the case law is contrary to defendant's position, and (3) theusual challenge to probable cause places the initial burden on the defendant, weconclude that the State did not have the burden to demonstrate that probable causeexisted when defendant was taken into custody for retail theft." Brexton, 343 Ill.App. 3d at 326.

In our view, the escape statute at issue in Brexton and the aiding escape statute at issue inthe instant case are so similar, especially in their respective uses of the phrase "lawful custody,"that the interpretation of the phrase "lawful custody" provided by the Brexton court should alsoapply to our interpretation of the aiding escape statute. Thus, we hold that section 31-7(e)'s useof the phrase "lawful custody" does not mean that the State must prove that the police hadprobable cause to arrest the escapee in order to convict a defendant of the offense of aidingescape.

While we find that Brexton convinces us that the defendant's interpretation of the statuteis wrong, we also disagree with the State's suggestion that we should only consider whether thepolice had the defendant in physical custody. We agree with the Brexton court that the phrase"lawful custody" does not mean the same thing as arrest accompanied by probable cause, thoughwe also note that the Brexton court never directly addressed what meaning should be given to theword "lawful" in the phrase "lawful custody." The State urges us to ignore the word "lawful"and focus exclusively on the word "custody" in our application of the aiding escape statute. Wecannot, however, ignore the fact that the General Assembly, in enacting the aiding escape statute,qualified the term "custody" with the word "lawful." It is a basic precept of statutoryinterpretation that a court must give meaning to each and every word in the statute. See Kraft,Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990) (noting that statutes "should be construed so that noword or phrase is rendered superfluous or meaningless"); see also Snyder v. Olmstead, 261 Ill.App. 3d 986, 989-90 (1994) (noting that "[e]ach word, clause, or sentence must not be renderedsuperfluous but must, if possible, be given some reasonable meaning"). Thus, we mustdetermine what meaning the General Assembly intended when it enacted the aiding escapestatute using the phrase "lawful custody." 720 ILCS 5/31-7(e) (West 2002).

Before determining the meaning of this phrase, we reiterate the fundamental principles ofstatutory interpretation:

" 'In the exercise of statutory construction, our primary task is to ascertainand effectuate the intent of the legislature. In interpreting a statute we mayconsider the reason and necessity for the law, the evils it was intended to remedy,and its ultimate aims. Also, we must assume that the legislature did not intend anabsurd or unjust result. However, our inquiry must always begin with the languageof the statute, which is the surest and most reliable indicator of legislative intent.The language of the statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, andwhere the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we have no occasion toresort to aids of construction. Nor, under the guise of statutory interpretation, canwe "correct" an apparent legislative oversight by rewriting a statute in a mannerinconsistent with its clear and unambiguous language. [Citations.]' " (emphasisadded) Village of Mundelein v. Franco, 317 Ill. App. 3d 512, 517 (2000), quotingPeople v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000).

The aiding escape statute provides no definition for the phrase "lawful custody." Also,there is no legislative history that provides any insight as to what specific meaning the GeneralAssembly intended to give to the phrase "lawful custody" when it enacted the section 31-7(e). Further, none of the cases addressing either the aiding escape statute or the escape statute addressthe meaning of the word "lawful" in the phrase "lawful custody." See Brexton, 343 Ill. App. 3dat 326 (noting that past Illinois cases have looked primarily at the issue of whether an allegedescapee was in "custody" for purposes of the escape statute). Where, as here, the statute providesno guidance on the meaning of a particular word or phrase, it is a "well-settled principle ofstatutory interpretation that undefined terms in a statute shall be given their ordinary andpopularly understood meanings." People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 325 (2005), citing GemElectronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 477-78 (1998), Peopleex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (1991), and People v. Hicks, 101 Ill. 2d366, 371 (1984). In this case, there is no dispute over the meaning of "custody," instead, we willfocus on the meaning of the adjective "lawful."

It is appropriate to turn to a dictionary when determining the meaning of an otherwiseundefined word or phrase. See Ward, 215 Ill. 2d at 325 (relying heavily on Black's LawDictionary in defining the statutory term "possession"). Black's Law Dictionary, arguably thedefinitive American legal dictionary and one that is routinely used by Illinois courts to aid instatutory interpretation (see Ward, 215 Ill. 2d at 325 (relying heavily on Black's Law Dictionary);see also People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 439-45 (2005) (relying heavily on Black's LawDictionary in defining legal terms such as "waiver" and "res judicata")), provides the followingdefinition of "lawful"⁽²⁾:

"Not contrary to law; permitted by law <the police officer conducted alawful search of the premises>. See LEGAL." Black's Law Dictionary 902 (8thed. 2004).

Black's second definition of the word "legal" relates it to "lawful":

"legal, adj. *** 2. Established, required, or permitted by law; LAWFUL<it is legal to carry a concealed handgun in some states>." Black's LawDictionary 912 (8th ed. 2004).

A popular and well-regarded nonlegal dictionary provides a similar definition of "lawful":

"1 *** being in harmony with the law <a ~ judgment>, *** constituted,authorized, or established by law: rightful <~ institution>.

2 *** "law-abiding <~ citizens>." Merriam-Webster's CollegiateDictionary 659 (10th ed. 1999).

Construing these definitions of the word "lawful" in light of this court's prior rulingsinterpreting the phrase "lawful custody" (see Brexton, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 326 (and cases citedtherein)) we find that section 31-7(e) prohibits a person from aiding the escape of any personwho is in the physical custody of a peace officer who was acting in a manner permitted orauthorized by law. Thus, we find that if a police officer, in carrying out his duties as a peaceofficer in a manner permitted by law, places a person in custody, we can say that the person wasin "lawful custody of a peace officer" as defined by section 31-7(e). 720 ILCS 5/31-7(e) (West2002).

While we acknowledge that this interpretation has not been explicitly articulated by otherIllinois courts considering either the aiding escape statute or the escape statute, we note that thisdecision does not present a new interpretation of the phrase "lawful custody." Instead, we aremaking an explicit statement of the plain meaning of the statute. Further, by explicitly stating theplain meaning of the phrase "lawful custody," we prevent an absurd or illogical interpretation ofthe statute. To consider the adjective "lawful" to be mere surplusage, as the State suggests,would be to ignore the directive of the Illinois Supreme Court, which has repeatedly endorsed thecanon that we must give meaning to all the words in a statute enacted by the Illinois GeneralAssembly. See Kraft, 138 Ill. 2d at 189 (statutes should not be interpreted to render a word orphrase "superfluous or meaningless"); see also Snyder v. Olmstead, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 989-90(noting that "[e]ach word, clause, or sentence *** must, if possible, be given some reasonablemeaning").

Further, the interpretation of the statute discussed above avoids absurd results. SeeVillage of Mundelein v. Franco, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 517 (noting that a reviewing court " 'mustassume that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unjust result' "), quoting Pullen, 192 Ill.2d at 42. If, for example, an off-duty police officer were to unlawfully harass a citizen and thenunlawfully restrain that citizen, it would be absurd to find that the person was in "lawfulcustody." Consider the case of People v. Becker, 315 Ill. App. 3d 980 (2000). DefendantBecker, an off-duty police officer, provoked an altercation with a stranger. Becker, 315 Ill. App.3d at 982-83. The defendant retrieved a gun from his car, identified himself as a policeman, andthreatened to arrest and imprison the stranger; the two men scuffled and the stranger was shotand killed. Becker, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 984-86. A police officer testified at the trial thatdepartment rules prohibited defendant from engaging in an unjustifiable altercation with a citizenand from using his weapon in an unlawful manner, whether an officer was on duty or off duty. See Becker, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 985. The court found that "by displaying that weapon andengaging in an altercation with the victim, defendant committed an act contrary to his trainingand contrary to the oath he took as a police officer." Becker, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1004 (affirmingone of defendant's convictions for official misconduct but reversing and remanding on othercounts, including armed violence, involuntary manslaughter and official misconduct, the courtfound that, based on the totality of the circumstances, there was "sufficient evidence to provedefendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of official misconduct and armed violence"). If wewere to adopt the State's interpretation of the phrase "lawful custody" and ignore the use of theword "lawful" in the aiding escape statute and focus exclusively on physical custody, then aperson helping the victim in Becker escape would have been open to prosecution under section31-7(e). Such an interpretation would create an absurd result that the General Assembly couldnot have intended.

The interpretation suggested by the plain language of the statute, however, is that if apolice officer (whether on duty or not) is acting pursuant to his duties as a police officer andplaces a person in custody, that apprehended person is in "lawful custody." This is true even if itlater proves that the police arrested the wrong person or did not have probable cause to arrest thatparticular person. We further note that this interpretation in no way creates a defense to offenseof aiding escape, nor does it encourage citizens to engage in some sort of on-the-street legalanalysis as to whether a particular officer is acting pursuant to his official duty, any more than itencourages a citizen to engage in an analysis of whether he or she is actually in physical custodyof a police officer. We simply hold that in a prosecution for aiding escape, the burden is on theprosecution to show that the peace officer was acting in accordance with his duties as a policeofficer. This burden is not unduly onerous.

In this case, the evidence elicited at trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the policewere acting in a manner permitted by law and had Edward Carter in "lawful custody." On thenight in question, Officer Stepich was employed as a police officer by the City of ChicagoHeights, Illinois. At the time that Officer Stepich placed Edward Carter in physical custody,Stepich had been carrying out his official duties as a peace officer. Specifically, while Stepichand his partner were investigating the firing of a handgun, Stepich identified Carter as a potentialsuspect, saw him flee, and pursued him. When he placed Carter in handcuffs, he had Carter in"custody." See Brexton, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 326. On these facts, there can be no question that theprosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Edward Carter was in the "lawful custody ofa peace officer" as defined by the aiding escape statute. 720 ILCS 5/31-7(e) (West 2002). Thus,the State met its burden of proof in this case.

B. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Admitting Into Evidence the

Purported Hearsay Statements of an Unidentified Person.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it permitted Officer Stepich totestify that while on the way to the scene of the alleged shooting, he saw an unidentified African-American man and heard that unidentified man state that "Little Edward's shooting." Accordingto defendant, this testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay and constitutes plain error requiringthis court to remand this matter for a new trial.

First, it is not clear that the statements of the unidentified person were inadmissible. Though technically hearsay, the statements may have been admissible through a hearsayexception allowing testimony showing the course of the police investigation or an excitedutterance. See generally M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence