Find Legal Information

JUSTICE TULLY delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant was charged in the circuit court of Cook County with first degree murder in thedeath of his father. In a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged and was sentencedto twenty-eight years in the state penitentiary. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial courterred in excluding expert testimony and thereby denying the defendant his right to present a defense. The principal controversy on appeal concerns whether expert testimony about what has been calledin the record the "battered child syndrome"⁽¹⁾ is admissible to help establish an affirmative defenseof self-defense in a homicide case.

On March 29, 1996, defendant, Brendan Shanahan, killed his father, Anthony Shanahan, bybeating him with a pipe. The defendant did not deny killing his father but asserted that it was in self-defense. In order to establish the requisite state of mind for a self-defense claim, the defendantsought to call Dr. Larry Heinrich as an expert witness to testify about battered child syndrome. Ata pretrial hearing, the trial judge granted the State's motion to preclude evidence on battered childsyndrome stating, "there is no acceptable scientific method yet applicable to the syndromeconcerning children and therefore it has not the validity that the battered woman syndrome hasreceived throughout many of the states in the United States." The trial judge further declined to holdany hearing concerning the scientific validity of battered child syndrome. During a bench trial, thedefense presented testimony about past abuse inflicted upon the defendant and requested acontinuance so that Dr. Heinrich could testify about the effects of this abuse. The judge denied therequest for a continuance but allowed the written report of Dr. Heinrich to be submitted as an offerof proof.

On appeal the defendant contends that (1) he was denied the right to put on a defense whenthe trial court denied his request to present expert testimony on battered child syndrome; (2) the trialcourt abused its discretion by denying him the right to make an offer of proof regarding experttestimony on battered child syndrome; (3) the trial court erred in holding that evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder is not admissible; and (4) the trial court erred in refusing to allow theexpert testimony. Based upon the record before us, we reverse the judgment of conviction andremand with instructions.

As we stated above, the principal issue on appeal is the admission of evidence on batteredchild syndrome. The defendant argues in his brief that the trial court abused its discretion by denyinghis request to present expert testimony on battered child syndrome and that the trial court erred inholding that evidence of battered child syndrome is not admissible under Frye v. United States, 293F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The defendant asserts that battered child syndrome is analogous tobattered woman syndrome and is not a new scientific theory so that this is not a Frye case.

The difficulty with determining whether or not expert testimony should have been allowedin this case is that it is not clear from the record about what the expert was to testify. The defendantasserts that Dr. Heinrich's testimony would not present a new scientific theory; while the Statecontends that it would. The defendant contends that battered child syndrome is analogous to batteredwoman syndrome, merely dealing with a different victim of abuse. Moreover, in the defendant'sappellate briefs he refers to post-traumatic stress syndrome. The State maintains that importantdistinctions exist between the battered child and battered woman syndromes.

This Court cannot determine from this record whether Dr. Heinrich would testify aboutbattered child syndrome, battered victim syndrome or post-traumatic stress syndrome because thetrial court did not allow a continuance in order to conduct voir dire of the expert. Thus, we cannotdetermine whether these are all related syndromes or whether important distinctions exist. Moreover, we cannot determine whether the expert testimony was admissible.

After a trial has begun, a reasonably brief continuance may be granted to either side in theinterest of justice. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 114-4(f).) However, the granting of a continuanceis within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the refusal to grant one will be reversed onappeal only if it is shown that the trial court abused its discretion and the refusal somehowprejudiced the defendant. People v. Ward, 154 Ill.2d 272, 304, 609 N.E.2d 252, 265 (1992).

Here, the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's request for a continuance tobring Dr. Heinrich into court the next day. At the time the continuance was requested, the defendantwas ready to call Dr. Heinrich to testify the next day. The defendant made every attempt to showthat Dr. Heinrich's testimony was material to the defense and might affect the verdict. Defensecounsel also requested that he be allowed to make an oral offer of proof but the trial judge onlyallowed the written report of Dr. Heinrich. More importantly, the defendant was prejudiced by thedenial of the motion for continuance because it prevented the voir dire of Dr. Heinrich. As a result,the record does not contain any testimony from Dr. Heinrich, and the offer of proof merely consistsof a written report. While this report makes reference to battered victim syndrome and post-traumatic stress disorder, it is not sufficient for this Court to determine whether or not the experttestimony would consist of novel scientific evidence. Therefore, we find the trial court's denial ofdefendant's motion for a continuance to be reversible error.

Furthermore, even if we could determine from the record that Dr. Heinrich would havetestified that the defendant suffered from battered child syndrome, we would decline from ruling onthe admissibility of such testimony at this time. The term "battered child syndrome" was first usedto describe the clinical presentation of young children who had received serious physical abuse atthe hands of their parents and has come to describe both the physiological and psychological effectsof a prolonged pattern of physical, emotional and sexual abuse. See generally S. Hicks, Admissibilityof Expert Testimony on the Psychology of the Battered Child, 11 L. & Psychol. Rev. 103, 108-11(1987). While battered child syndrome has long been used to prosecute child abusers, its acceptanceas evidence of self-defense is limited.⁽²⁾ No other Illinois case has addressed the question ofadmissibility of battered child syndrome and this record does not contain any testimony concerningthe validity of such a syndrome.

Illinois follows the Frye standard for the admission of novel scientific evidence. People v.Miller, 173 Ill.2d 167, 187, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731 (1996). The Frye court explained the standard asfollows:

"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental anddemonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidentialforce of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admittingexpert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thingfrom which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained generalacceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Frye, 293 F. at 1014.

Thus, if Dr. Heinrich's testimony concerns battered child syndrome, which has yet to be accepted ina court proceeding in Illinois, the trial court must conduct a Frye hearing. A Frye hearing determinesthe admissibility of novel scientific evidence based on whether the scientific principle on which itrests has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. People v. Miller, 173 Ill.2d 167, 187-88, 219 Ill. Dec. 43, 670 N.E. 2d 72 (1996). A Frye hearing would determine whetherthe scientific principle on which battered child syndrome rests has gained general acceptance in thepsychology community.

In conclusion, the trial court committed reversible error by denying defense counsel's requestfor a continuance. Further, based upon the record before us, we decline at this time to determine thevalidity of the expert testimony. We reverse and remand the case to the trial court with the followinginstructions: (1) allow live-testimony, voir dire of the expert, Dr. Heinrich; (2) determine the precisesyndrome the defendant suffers from based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty in theopinion of Dr. Heinrich; (3) if Dr. Heinrich's testimony concerns a syndrome which has beenadmitted into evidence in other cases in Illinois, then the testimony should be admitted; (4) if thetestimony concerns a syndrome which has not been admitted in Illinois, then the trial court shouldconduct a Frye Hearing to determine the scientific validity (or invalidity) of the syndrome.

MCNULTY, P.J., and O'MARA FROSSARD, J., CONCUR.