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SIXTH DIVISION

No. 1-01-1231

PRESIDING JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Stephen Ruppenthal, was convicted of two countsof indecent solicitation of a child and was sentenced to two years of probation. Ruppenthal wasarrested at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago after communicating on the Internet with aperson whom he believed to be a 14-year-old girl named "Stacy," but who was actually a CookCounty sheriff's detective. On appeal, defendant first argues that because he did not in fact solicita minor but instead communicated with an adult, he should not have been charged with indecentsolicitation of a child under section 11-6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (720 ILCS5/11-6 (West 2000)). He asserts that section 11-6 of the Code is unconstitutional and representsan improper exercise of state power because prohibiting the solicitation of an adult by anotheradult who mistakenly believes the object of the solicitation is a minor is not causally related tothe protection of children. In addition, defendant claims that Illinois courts lack jurisdiction toadjudicate his case because he communicated with "Stacy" via computer from California. Forthe reasons stated below, we affirm defendant's conviction.

Prior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based upon the same argumentsthat he now raises on appeal, and his motions were denied. The following facts were presented ata stipulated bench trial. On April 26, 2000, Cook County sheriff's detective Michael Antonlogged onto a Internet site titled "sex" and assumed the identity of a 14-year-old girl named"Stacy." Defendant, who was 53 years old and lived in Tomales, California, communicatedprivately with "Stacy" for about two hours using his home computer. The State entered intoevidence a transcript of their on-line conversation, which is included in the record.

We relate only the pertinent portions. Defendant told "Stacy" that he was 46 years old. "Stacy" replied that she would "be 15 real soon." Defendant said his flight would stop inChicago the following day and suggested they meet at O'Hare and "find a private place and betogether." Defendant said he wanted to rub her chest and vagina and that they "would find aplace in the airport without many people and sit together" and they could be under a blanket sono one would see what they did. Defendant told "Stacy" his flight number and asked her to meethim at his gate. Defendant said that if she was ready tomorrow, they could "find a place,"perhaps a restroom, where he could put his penis in her vagina; he later stated, "I can't promisewe can do it. It will depend if we can find a place." "Stacy" told defendant her last name wasHugh and she would wear her school uniform.

When defendant arrived at O'Hare, a female sheriff's detective dressed as "Stacy" met himat his gate. The female detective approached defendant and said his name. Defendant replied,"Yes, I thought it was you, but I wasn't sure. It's good that you wore your uniform. Then I knewit was you." After further conversation between the female detective and defendant, DetectiveAnton asked defendant who he was meeting. Defendant said he was meeting Stacy Hugh. Defendant was placed under arrest. After his arrest, defendant told Anton and a prosecutor thathe thought "Stacy" was "about 15" years old. The remainder of defendant's statement wasconsistent with the evidence presented at trial. The trial court convicted defendant of two countsof indecent solicitation of a child with the intent to commit aggravated criminal sexual abuse,pursuant to section 11-6(c)(3) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/11-6(c)(3) (West 2000)). Those countswere premised upon defendant's stated intent to touch the vagina of a minor child. The trial courtacquitted defendant on a third count of indecent solicitation, stating that although the partiesstipulated that defendant had suggested sexual intercourse, defendant's intent on that issue"seem[ed] to be unresolved."

On appeal, defendant first challenges the constitutionality of the statute under which hewas convicted, arguing that the law violates his "first amendment right to freedom of thought andbelief." He asserts that his conviction was "a function of one element only - his belief that hewas speaking to a child" and that the only act that accompanied his belief was the communicationwith Detective Anton, an adult. Defendant claims that because he did not commit an illegal act,he was punished only for his "bad state of mind."⁽¹⁾

Section 11-6 of the Code provides:

"A person of the age of 17 years and upwards commits the offense ofindecent solicitation of a child if the person, with the intent that the offense ofaggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, predatory criminalsexual assault of a child, or aggravated criminal sexual abuse be committed,knowingly solicits a child or one whom he or she believes to be a child to performan act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct as defined in Section 12-12 of thisCode." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/11-6(a) (West 2000).

The statute defines "solicit" as:

"to command, authorize, urge, incite, request, or advise another to performan act by any means including, but not limited to, in person, over the phone, inwriting, by computer, or by advertisement of any kind." 720 ILCS 5/11-6(b)(West 2000).

"Child" is defined as "a person under 17 years of age." 720 ILCS 5/11-6(b) (West 2000).

The criminal act defined by the statute is knowingly soliciting a child or one believed tobe a child to perform an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct, with the intent that theconduct be committed. 720 ILCS 5/11-6(a) (West 2000). The offense of solicitation is completewhen the principal offense is commanded, encouraged or requested with the intent that it becommitted. People v. Edwards, 243 Ill. App. 3d 280, 289, 611 N.E.2d 1196, 1202 (1993)(discussing solicitation to commit murder); see also People v. Schnurr, 206 Ill. App. 3d 522, 533,564 N.E.2d 1336, 1344 (1990). "Whether or not the actual crime took place is meaninglessunder the applicable statute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 8-1 [now 720 ILCS 5/8-1 (West2000)]). Defendant's offense was complete when the words at issue were spoken. ***" Edwards, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 289, 611 N.E.2d at 1202.

Defendant argues that although he intended to commit a sexual act with a child, hecommitted no crime by speaking words of solicitation to an adult. We disagree. Defendant isbeing punished for his intent to engage in sexual activity with someone he admittedly believed tobe under the age of 17 and his solicitation of that activity. The fact that defendant's words weretransmitted to an adult does not negate defendant's belief that he was speaking to a minor, whichis the culpable act defined by the statute.⁽²⁾

The specific intent required to prove the elements ofthe offense of solicitation can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and acts of thedefendant. People v. Lewis, 84 Ill. App. 3d 556, 561, 406 N.E.2d 11, 15 (1980). Defendant's tripto Illinois for the admitted purpose of meeting a girl he knew to be "about 15" exhibited hisintent to engage in the sexual activity discussed on the Internet.

Regarding defendant's attempt to claim first amendment protection for the substance ofhis on-line conversation with "Stacy," the element of criminal intent "transforms mere recitationof 'loose' words which may mandate first amendment protection into the offense of solicitation." Lewis, 84 Ill. App. 3d at 561, 406 N.E.2d at 15. It would be impossible for the act of solicitationto occur without the exchange of words between offender and victim, and defendant's "beliefs"and his discussions with children or those he believes to be children regarding sexual activity donot rise to the level of constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Powell,315 Ill. App. 3d 1136, 1145-46, 735 N.E.2d 119, 126-27 (2000); People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d210, 227, 657 N.E.2d 953, 961 (1995) (in stalking case, "[w]here speech is an integral part ofunlawful conduct, it has no constitutional protection"); People v. Williams, 133 Ill. 2d 449, 457,551 N.E.2d 631, 634 (1990) (in case involving child abduction statute, the State may "validlyproscribe the luring or attempted luring of children into motor vehicles for criminal purposes,although that attempt may involve speech").

The Williams court further discussed the necessarily inchoate nature of the childabduction statute:

"[T]he luring or attempted luring of a child into an automobile for acriminal purpose is in no way protected by the first amendment. *** Once achild is taken into a vehicle and whisked away by a person harboring a criminalmotive, it becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for law enforcementpersonnel to intervene for the protection of the child. The State undoubtedly hasbroad powers to avert such potentially dangerous situations." Williams, 133 Ill. 2dat 457, 551 N.E.2d at 634.

That principle also can be applied to the indecent solicitation statute. Furthermore, wereject defendant's protests that he was the victim of a Cook County sheriff's department "thoughtpatrol" that polices beliefs that defendant contends are "beyond the reach of the legislature." Officers did not invade defendant's home during his on-line conversation with "Stacy" and arresthim based upon the contents of that conversation. Indeed, hundreds of similarly inappropriateexchanges undoubtedly take place every day on the Internet. Those discussions, althoughdisturbing, are not illegal if not acted upon. Defendant, however, demonstrated his intent tocommit the sexual acts by traveling to Illinois to meet "Stacy," whom he believed to be under theage of 17, at an arranged time and place. See People v. Patterson, 314 Ill. App. 3d 962, 969-70,734 N.E.2d 462, 468 (2000) (State proved defendant's specific intent to commit aggravatedcriminal sexual abuse by his arrival at agreed place and time and his admission that he waswaiting for minor boy with name that detective assumed on Internet). Defendant's behavior issufficient to support his conviction for indecent solicitation of a child.

Defendant next contends that section 11-6 of the Code represents an improper exercise ofthe Illinois legislature's power because prohibiting discussion of sexual activity between adults,as occurred between defendant and Detective Anton on the Internet, is not causally related to theprotection of children. Defendant's assertion is premised on his flawed argument that it is notillegal for an adult to ask another adult, whom the perpetrator believes to be a child, to commit asex act. As already discussed, that is precisely the behavior that section 11-6 prohibits, when it iscoupled with the intent to engage in sexual activity.

The Illinois Constitution empowers the legislature to define conduct that constitutes acrime and determine the nature and extent of the punishment for that offense. People v.Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 468-69, 705 N.E.2d 91, 95 (1998). The State of Illinois has alegitimate interest in protecting minor children from the indecent solicitation of sex acts byadults. If defendant had actually discussed sexual activity with a willing 14- or 15-year-old girlwho agreed to meet him at the airport, the police could not likely intervene before actuallycatching defendant and the girl in the unlawful behavior. As with the child abduction statute inWilliams, if an adult and a minor discuss sexual activity and the adult displays the intent toengage in that activity, it is virtually impossible for law enforcement to prevent such a crimefrom occurring unless the legislature treats it as an inchoate offense.

Defendant again questions the legislature's ability to classify his belief that he wasspeaking to a minor into "an element to be proved by the prosecution." He argues that the Statedoes not normally concern itself with a defendant's belief, and that "all that mattered was whetherthe defendant's act[] constituted an offense." The Illinois legislature defined the offense ofindecent solicitation of a child as requiring the specific intent to engage in the indecent conductthat is solicited by the defendant. Defendant admitted that he thought he was speaking to aminor. Defendant's arguments are without merit.

Defendant's final contention is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this casebecause the words of solicitation were spoken in California, not in Illinois. He cites section 1-5of the Code (720 ILCS 5/1-5 (West 2000)), which defines state criminal jurisdiction and states inrelevant part:

"(a) A person is subject to prosecution in this State for an offense which hecommits, while either within or outside the State, by his own conduct or that ofanother for which he is legally accountable, if:

(1) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the State; or

(2) the conduct outside the State constitutes an attempt to commit anoffense within the State[.]

* * *

(b) An offense is committed partly within this State, if either the conductwhich is an element of the offense, or the result which is such an element, occurswithin the State." 720 ILCS 5/1-5(a), (b) (West 2000).

Defendant argues that the crime with which he is charged was not committed wholly orpartly within Illinois because the only element of the offense of indecent solicitation of a child -the utterance of words of solicitation - occurred in California. He claims that the prosecution didnot have to prove that his words of solicitation were communicated to an Illinois resident andthat therefore no part of the offense took place in Illinois.

Both defendant and the State cite People v. Baker, 268 Ill. App. 3d 16, 643 N.E.2d 286(1994), which we find supports the State's position. In Baker, the defendant was charged withmaking a harassing telephone call from Ohio to an individual in Illinois. Baker, 268 Ill. App. 3dat 16, 643 N.E.2d at 287. Based upon section 1-5(b) (720 ILCS 5/1-5(b) (West 2000)), whichgives Illinois jurisdiction over a crime if the conduct or the result occurs within the state, theBaker court held that because the alleged result of the conduct was harassment in Illinois, theoffense was committed partly in Illinois, and jurisdiction was proper here. Baker, 268 Ill. App.3d at 17, 643 N.E.2d at 287. The court noted Illinois' "valid public interest in protecting peoplein Illinois from harassing telephone calls originating outside the State." Baker, 268 Ill. App. 3dat 17, 643 N.E.2d at 287.

Defendant asserts that the solicitation statute defines the offense only in terms of culpableconduct and not as to any result, and therefore jurisdiction is only proper where the words ofsolicitation were spoken. However, defendant's crime is distinguishable from a conduct-basedoffense such as gambling outside Illinois, as in Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d759, 656 N.E.2d 123 (1995), on which defendant partially relies. Although the offense ofsolicitation is complete upon the utterance of words of solicitation, no solicitation can occurunless the offending words are heard by another person. Defendant attempted to solicit sexualactivity with a girl under the age of 17 living in Illinois, and he traveled to Illinois with theadmitted intent of engaging in the sexual acts. The result of defendant's solicitation brought himwithin Illinois' borders. As with the telephone harassment discussed in Baker, Illinois has a validpublic interest in protecting minor children in this state from individuals who seek underagesexual partners using the Internet. We find that Illinois had proper jurisdiction over this case.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. As partof this judgment, we grant the State's request to assess defendant $100 as costs for this appeal.

Affirmed.

1. Defendant finds "troubling" the State's method of proving that he believed he wasspeaking to a minor. However, defendant admitted to police that he thought "Stacy" was about15 years old.

2. In discussing its solicitation law, which was modeled on the Illinois statute, theMontana Supreme Court noted that "the status of the person solicited is neither an element of nora defense to the crime of solicitation." State v. Sage, 255 Mont. 227, 229, 841 P.2d 1142, 1143(1992).