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JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

On April 12, 1998, outside a bar on the south side ofChicago, Guadalupe Rios (Rios) shot and killed Pablo Fernandez(Fernandez). Rios was charged with first degree murder. A juryfound him guilty and he was sentenced to thirty years.

At trial, Rios did not deny firing the fatal shot. Hecontended he fired in self-defense. The trial judge agreed toinstruct the jury on the law of self-defense, but he gave a firstdegree murder definition instruction that did not include thewords "without lawful justification."

The defendant claims the omission of those three words froman otherwise correct set of instructions deprived him of a fairtrial. We do not agree. We find no fatal error in theinstructions or in the other issues raised by the defendant. Weaffirm his conviction and sentence.

FACTS

Both the victim and defendant were drinking in a bar on thesouth side of Chicago just before the shooting. Laticia Martinez(Martinez) testified she was an employee of the bar and wasworking the night Fernandez was killed. Martinez said Fernandezwas a regular customer at the bar. Martinez saw defendant arguewith Fernandez before the shooting, and testified defendantthreatened to "fuck up" Fernandez during that argument. Defendant left soon after the argument ended. Fernandez left afew minutes later.

After Fernandez left the bar, Martinez heard three or fourgun shots. When she went outside, she saw Fernandez lying on theground. Martinez identified defendant from a police lineupseveral days after the shooting as the man she saw arguing withthe victim. She identified him again at trial.

Rosendo Garcia (Garcia) testified he and defendant workedfor the same company prior to defendant's arrest. On April 17,1998, Garcia was at work when he received a phone call fromdefendant. Defendant told him he was not coming to work becausetwo of his brothers had been arrested. When Garcia askeddefendant why they were arrested, defendant told him he shot twopeople.

Brian Mitchell (Mitchell), a forensic pathologist, testifiedhe performed the autopsy on the victim. He said Fernandez diedfrom two gunshot wounds, to the left abdomen and the left hip. Mitchell said the shots were not fired at close range.

Chicago police detective Thomas Cepeda (Cepeda) testified heand his partner were assigned to investigate Fernandez's death. They approached defendant on April 17, 1998. Defendant and hisstepson were getting out of defendant's car in the alley behindtheir apartment. Cepeda told defendant he was a policeman andasked defendant his name. Defendant told him his name was"Manuel." Cepeda told him he knew him to be Guadalupe Rios, anddefendant admitted that was his name. Cepeda asked defendant whyhe lied about his name and defendant said "he knew he was introuble because he *** shot somebody the weekend before."

After Cepeda and his partner arrested defendant, Cepedaasked him why he shot Fernandez. Defendant told him Fernandez"had aggravated him." Cepeda asked him where the gun was hidden,and defendant told him he had thrown it away. Cepeda tolddefendant he knew he hadn't thrown away the gun, and defendantsaid the gun was in the house. He told Cepeda his wife couldshow the detectives where the gun was hidden. Cepeda's partnerrode to the station with defendant while Cepeda went inside andspoke to defendant's wife. She showed him defendant's gun, whichwas hidden under the mattress of their bed.

Cepeda returned to the police station where he questioneddefendant about the shooting. Defendant told him that afterdrinking all afternoon, he and his nephew went to the bar whereFernandez was shot. His nephew fell asleep at the bar, anddefendant took him home. He then returned to the bar and orderedanother beer. Defendant told Cepeda he must have bumped intosomeone while he was walking toward the pool table because "allof a sudden a guy started arguing with him." Defendant said heleft the bar after arguing with the man for a few minutes. Defendant identified Fernandez from a photo as the man he arguedwith.

Defendant told Cepeda that Fernandez and another manfollowed him outside and started arguing with him again. Defendant told Cepeda they were standing about three feet fromeach other while they were arguing. As they were arguing,defendant saw another man come out of the tavern. Defendant saidthis man was carrying a knife. After the man with the knifewalked outside and saw them arguing, he walked back inside thebar. Though Fernandez and the other man did not have weapons,defendant pulled out his gun and shot Fernandez three times. Defendant then got into his car and went home.

During cross-examination, Cepeda remembered defendant saidthat while he was arguing with Fernandez inside the bar,defendant told the victim, "If you don't shut up, I'm going tofuck you up." Cepeda also said defendant told him he shotFernandez because he was afraid the man with the knife might comeback out of the bar.

Curt Marcucci (Marcucci) testified as a witness for thedefendant. He said he was standing at the bus stop across thestreet from the bar when the shooting occurred. Marcuccitestified while he was waiting at the bus stop, he saw defendantpark his car on the sidewalk in front of the bar. Defendant gotout of the car alone and went into the bar. Approximately fiveminutes later, Marcucci saw defendant get back into his car anddrive away. According to Marcucci, nobody was with defendantwhen he left.

Later, Marcucci saw defendant in front of the bar again. Three men were standing in front of defendant, close to the doorof the bar. They stood about three feet from defendant. Theywere talking to defendant, but Marcucci could not hear theconversation. Marcucci saw defendant pull a gun out, aim it atthe victim's groin, and fire three times. Marcucci ran to a gasstation and called the police.

Defendant testified he shot Fernandez in self-defense. Defendant said Fernandez "came at" him after he accidentallybrushed against him. He claimed Fernandez hit him in the chestand knocked him down while they were arguing. Defendant said heleft the bar after the confrontation, but Fernandez and two othermen followed him outside. Defendant testified once the men wereoutside the bar, they threatened to kill him.

According to defendant, one of the men was carrying a knife,though Fernandez was unarmed. When defendant saw the knife, hepulled out his gun and fired three times. Defendant said he didnot intend to kill anyone when he fired the gun, and fired onlybecause he was afraid.

After hearing the evidence, the jury found defendant guiltyof first degree murder. Defendant filed a motion for a newtrial, which the trial court denied. Defendant was sentenced to30 years in prison. Though defendant failed to file a post-sentencing motion in the trial court, he now appeals both hisconviction and sentence.

DECISION

Jury Instructions

The jury instructions given by the trial court includedIllinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI), Criminal, No. 7.01A(3dEd. 1995)(IPI 7.01A), an instruction which defines first degreemurder, as well as IPI, Criminal 3d No. 7.06A, which is a firstand second degree murder issues instruction. The jury also wasgiven IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.05A, an instruction which defines amitigating factor for purposes of second degree murder, and IPICriminal 3d No. 24-25.06, a self-defense instruction.

The definitional instruction for first degree murder did notinclude the phrase "without legal justification," despitedefendant's self-defense argument. It simply read:

"A person commits the offense of first degreemurder when he kills an individual if, in performingthe acts which cause the death,

he intends to kill or do great bodily harm to thatindividual; or

he knows that such acts will cause death to thatindividual; or

he knows that such acts create a strong probability ofdeath or great bodily harm to that individual." Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 7.01A(3d Ed. 1992).

According to the IPI commentary for this instruction, if the juryis given a self-defense instruction, the words "without legaljustification" should be inserted so that the instruction says:

"A person commits the offense of first degreemurder when he kills an individual without lawfuljustification if, in performing the acts which causethe death,

he intends to kill or do great bodily harm to thatindividual; or

he knows that such acts will cause death to thatindividual; or

he knows that such acts create a strongprobability of death or great bodily harm to thatindividual." (Emphasis added). IPI Criminal 3dNo. 7.01A.

The issues instruction included the appropriate self-defenselanguage. It said, in part:

"To sustain either the charge of first degreemurder or the charge of second degree murder, the Statemust prove the following propositions:

First: That the defendant performed the actswhich caused the death of Pablo Fernandez; and

Second: That when the defendant did so,

he intended to kill or do great bodilyharm to Pablo Fernandez; or

he knew that such acts would cause deathto Pablo Fernandez; or

He knew that such acts created a strongprobability of death or great bodilyharm to Pablo Fernandez;

and

Third: That the defendant was not justified inusing the force which he used.

***

The defendant has the burden of proving by apreponderance of the evidence that a mitigating factoris present so that he is guilty of the lesser offenseof second degree murder instead of first degree murder. By this I mean that you must be persuaded, consideringall the evidence in this case, that it is probably moretrue than not true that the following mitigating factoris present: That the defendant, at the time heperformed the acts which caused the death of PabloFernandez, believed the circumstances to be such thatthey justified the deadly force he used, but his beliefthat such circumstances existed was unreasonable."(Emphasis added). IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A.

The jury also was given a self-defense instruction and aninstruction defining a mitigating factor for purposes of second-degree murder. The self-defense instruction:

"A person is justified in the use of force whenand to the extent that he reasonably believes that suchconduct is necessary to defend himself against theimminent use of unlawful force.

However, a person is justified in the use of forcewhich is intended or likely to cause death or greatbodily harm only if he reasonably believes that suchforce is necessary to prevent imminent death or greatbodily harm to himself." IPI Criminal 3d No. 24-25.06.

The instruction defining a "mitigating factor" said:

"A mitigating factor exists so as to reduce theoffense of first degree murder to the lesser offense ofsecond degree murder if at the time of the killing thedefendant believes that circumstances exist which wouldjustify the deadly force he uses, but his belief thatsuch circumstances exist is unreasonable." IPICriminal 3d No. 7.05A.

Defendant claims the failure to include the "without lawfuljustification" language in the first-degree murder definitionalinstruction constitutes reversible error. The State contendsdefendant waived this issue by failing to raise it at trial. Defendant concedes the issue was not raised at trial, but saysthe failure to include the language constitutes a substantialdefect under Supreme Court Rule 451(c). 134 Ill. 2d R. 451(c).

Rule 451(c) says, in part:

"Except as otherwise provided in these rules,instructions in criminal cases shall be tendered,settled, and given in accordance with section 2-1107 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure, but substantial defectsare not waived by failure to make timely objectionsthereto if the interests of justice require." 134 Ill.2d R. 451(c).

This rule has been interpreted as a plain-error exception to thewaiver rule. People v. Huckstead, 91 Ill. 2d 536, 544, 440N.E.2d 1248 (1982).

The plain error rule allows a reviewing court to considerissues that were not properly raised before the trial court if:(1) the evidence is closely balanced; or (2) the error is sofundamental and of such magnitude that the defendant was denied afair trial." People v. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d 461, 482, 603 N.E.2d460 (1992).

A review of the record does not show the evidence wasclosely balanced. Defendant claims he shot Fernandez because hewas afraid Fernandez was going to kill him. The evidence showedthe defendant was involved in a physical altercation withFernandez inside the bar. Laticia Martinez remembered hearingdefendant threaten Fernandez during the argument, a threatdefendant admitted making when Detective Cepeda interviewed himafter his arrest.

When defendant left the bar, Fernandez followed him outside. While defendant claims that one of the men who accompanied thevictim threatened him with a knife, he does not claim that manattacked him. Detective Cepeda testified defendant told him theman with the knife went back inside the bar before defendant shotFernandez. It is undisputed Fernandez was unarmed and wasstanding several feet from defendant when the defendant fired thegun.

Though defendant claims Curt Marcucci's testimony supportshis self-defense theory, Marcucci simply testified he sawdefendant talking to the victim and two other men just before hepulled out a gun and started firing. Marcucci never indicatedthe men appeared to be attacking or threatening defendant, and hesaid the men were standing about three feet from defendant whenhe started firing. None of the evidence, not even defendant'stestimony, supports his self-defense theory.

Defendant's discussion of plain error focuses on hiscontention that the trial court's omission of the appropriatelanguage from the definitional instruction denied him a fairtrial. He compares the error in this case to the one committedby the trial court in People v. Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d 61, 63, 370N.E.2d 532 (1977), where the Illinois Supreme Court helddefendant was denied a fair trial because the jury was givencontradictory issues instructions.

In Jenkins, the attempt murder issues instruction submittedby the prosecution did not include language indicating the juryhad to find defendant was not justified in using the force heused. Defendant objected to this instruction, and submitted onewhich directed the jury to find against him only if he was notjustified in his use of force. The court gave both instructionsto the jury.

The supreme court found the two instructions contradictory,and said:

"[W]here the instructions are contradictory, thejury cannot perform its constitutional function. Thisinability is the fault of the court, whose duty it isto give the jury proper guidance, not to generateconfusion, as was the case here *** While it is truethat an instruction may be inaccurate, and otherinstructions may remove this error, such cannot be sowhen the instructions are in direct conflict with oneanother, one stating the law correctly and the othererroneously *** Where the instructions arecontradictory, the jury is put in the position ofhaving to select the proper instruction a functionexclusively that of the court *** [W]e are of theopinion that where there are two separate issuesinstructions, one proper and the other erroneous, eachinconsistent with the other, our Rule 451(c) isapplicable." Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d at 66-7.

Here, the jury was not forced to choose between twoinconsistent issues instructions. Nor did the instructiondefining first degree murder contradict the issues instruction. Though the "without lawful justification" language waserroneously omitted from the definitional instruction, the issuesinstruction told the jury it could not find defendant guilty ofthat offense unless the State proved he was not justified inusing the force he used. Rather than contradict the definitionof first degree murder given to the jury, the issues instructionand the self-defense instruction complemented it. There was noconflict.

In each of the remaining cases cited by defendant, the juryinstructions either were contradictory, as in Jenkins, orcompletely lacked an essential element of the crime charged. SeePeople v. Ogunsola, 87 Ill. 2d 216, 222-23, 429 N.E.2d 861(1981)(element of intent to defraud completely omitted from juryinstruction defining deceptive practices); People v. Marsico, 100Ill. App. 3d 691, 693, 427 N.E.2d 351 (1981)(in obscenity trial,definitions instruction and issues instruction werecontradictory); People v. Dordies, 60 Ill. App. 3d 621, 625-26,377 N.E.2d 245 (1978)(jury not instructed on defendant's theorythat intervening factors caused victim's death). In this case,the issues instruction properly advised the jury as to theelements of first and second degree murder, and did notcontradict any of the other instructions. The jury wasinstructed that in order to find defendant guilty of first degreemurder, it would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt he wasnot justified in using the force he used.

People v. Huckstead and People v. Casillas, No. 83911(November 16, 2000), are on point. In Huckstead, the defendantcontended he killed the victim in self-defense. The jury wasgiven a self-defense instruction, but the issues instructionfailed to say the State was required to prove beyond a reasonabledoubt defendant was not justified in his use of force. Defendantdid not object at trial, and did not raise the issue in his post-trial motion. On appeal, he claimed the error constituted a"substantial defect" under Rule 451(c).

The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, finding the trialcourt's failure to properly instruct the jury did not deprivedefendant of a fair trial. The court said:

"In the instant case, the instructions informedthe jury that the defendant was justified in usingdeadly force if he reasonably believed that force wasnecessary to prevent imminent death or great bodilyharm *** Further, the record reveals that, in closingargument, defense counsel repeatedly and specificallyemphasized that the State had the burden of provingdefendant was not justified in the force he used. Additionally, the record discloses that the State, inrebuttal argument, also acknowledged the burden ***.

We believe in this case, the instructions, incombination with the closing arguments by counsel forboth sides, apprised the jury that the State had theburden of proving that defendant was not justified inthe force he used. Consequently, the failure of thetrial court to give [the appropriate instruction] didnot constitute 'grave error'." Huckstead, 91 Ill. 2dat 544-45.

The same analysis was employed recently in Casillas, wherethe defendant claimed his right to a fair trial was violated whenthe trial court failed to give an instruction on the State'sburden of proof (IPI Criminal 3d No. 2.03) or an instructioninforming the jury the indictment was not to be used as evidence(IPI Criminal 3d No. 2.02). Casillas, slip op. at 7. Thesupreme court looked to the "totality of the circumstances,"including "all the instructions to the jury, the arguments ofcounsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming andany other relevant factors" to determine whether the failure togive the instructions denied the defendant a fair trial. Casillas, slip op. at 8. The court found the trial court'srepeated references to the burden of proof and presumption ofinnocence, combined with the properly given jury instructions andaccurate final arguments of the lawyers, were adequate to informthe jury of the State's burden. Casillas, slip op. at 12-13.

Here, during closing argument, the prosecutor discussed thedefinitional instruction for murder and included the "withoutlegal justification" language:

"The Judge is going to instruct you and he's goingto tell you that a person commits the offense of firstdegree murder when he kills an individual withoutlawful justification ***."

The issue of justification was repeatedly referred to during boththe prosecutor's and the defendant's closing arguments. Theprosecutor said:

"[T]he Judge is going to instruct you on thisissue about justification. Justification. The Judgeis going to read to you and tell you that a person isjustified in the use of force when and to the extentthat he reasonably believes that such conduct isnecessary to defend himself against the imminent use of*** unlawful force. However, a person is justified inthe use of force which is intended or likely to cause*** great bodily harm only if he reasonably believesthat such force is necessary to prevent imminent deathor great bodily harm to himself."

During his closing argument, the defense attorney said:

"[O]ne of the instructions the Judge is going togive you is the law on justifiable use of force. That's the question you must debate *** was his use offorce justified under the circumstances."

Given the extensive discussion of the justification issueduring both parties' closing arguments and the use of theappropriate language in the issues and self-defense instructions,we believe the jury was adequately instructed. After reviewingthe "totality of the circumstances," we find defendant was notdeprived of a fair trial by the trial court's failure to include"without lawful justification" language in the murder definitioninstruction. The issue concerning the missing language wasforfeited by defense counsel's failure to object. Even if wewere to consider the unfortunate omission, we would not findreversible error.

Prosecutor's Allegedly Improper Closing Comments

Defendant first claims the prosecution's characterization ofa second-degree murder verdict as "a gift" was an improperattempt to infer second-degree murder was not a serious crime andthat it carried a light sentence. During rebuttal, theprosecutor said:

"So what he's hoping for, what he's hoping for is thatyou'll bite on number 3 *** and give him the seconddegree. Give him his gift."

The prosecution generally has wide latitude in fashioningits closing argument, and reversal is unwarranted unless theprosecution's comments substantially prejudice defendant. Peoplev. Thomas, 266 Ill. App. 3d 914, 922, 641 N.E.2d 867 (1994). Adefendant is substantially prejudiced by a comment if it isimpossible to say whether or not it resulted in the verdict ofguilt. People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 323, 568 N.E.2d1234 (1990).

Defendant relies on People v. Howard, 232 Ill. App. 3d 386,597 N.E.2d 703 (1992)("involuntary manslaughter does not apply;it is a cop-out *** it is a cop-out in this case"), and People v.Crossno, 93 Ill. App. 3d 808, 417 N.E.2d 827 (1981)("If you wantto slap him on the wrist find him guilty of involuntarymanslaughter"). In each case, the appellate court's ruling waspremised on its finding that the evidence was so closely balancedthat the prosecutor's comment could have affected the outcome ofthe trial. Howard, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 390; Crossno, 93 Ill.App. 3d at 823. That is not the case here.

In People v. Washington, 257 Ill. App. 3d 26, 40, 628 N.E.2d351 (1993), the appellate court dealt with a similar statement. There, the prosecutor said:

"You have to consider whether mitigating factors hadbeen proved so that the defendant is guilty of lessor[sic] offense of second degree murder instead of firstdegree murder. And that's what he is counting on. Ifhe gets that he wins." Washington, 257 Ill. App. 3d at38.

The court found these comments were permissible argument based onthe facts in evidence. Washington, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 40.

We have examined the prosecutor's comments in this case inlight of the entire record. Though the remarks are better leftunsaid and would endanger a conviction in a closer case, we donot find "they engender substantial prejudice against a defendantsuch that it is impossible to say whether or not a verdict ofguilt resulted from these comments." People v. Nieves, No.83670, slip op. at 13 (November 16, 2000); People v. Henderson,142 Ill. 2d 258, 323, 568 N.E.2d 1234 (1990). Because we do notmake that finding we conclude the remarks, while improper, do notconstitute reversible error.

Defendant next claims the prosecutor misstated the law whenhe said:

"Now, defendants are presumed innocent when theywalk in the door before the trial starts. But whenthey hit the stand, they're not presumed to tell thetruth."

The State claims defendant waived this issue when he failedto object to this comment at trial and failed to raise it in hisposttrial motion. Since the evidence in this case is not closelybalanced, the prosecutor's comment will constitute plain erroronly if it was so prejudicial it denied defendant a fair trial. Hayes, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 1049.

Defendant contends the prosecutor's comment denied him afair trial because it shifted the burden from the State andplaced it on the defendant. We do not agree.

In People v. Porter, 96 Ill. App. 3d 976, 422 N.E.2d 213(1979) and People v. Matthews, 69 Ill. App. 3d 65, 387 N.E.2d 10(1979), the appellate court analyzed similar comments. InPorter, the prosecutor said:

"He chose to put on an entire defense, and ladies andgentlemen of the jury, I believe that you will bereceiving an instruction that says *** the defensedoesn't have to prove his innocence, but thedefendant's testimony has to be judged in the same wayas any other witness."

This comment was held not to have denied the defendant a fairtrial because it did not misstate the law and could not "beconstrued as either a statement or implication that the defendanthad the burden of introducing evidence to create a reasonabledoubt of guilt." Porter, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 986.

In Matthews, the prosecutor said:

"[I]t is certainly true that the law says that you areto go through the trial with the presumption ofinnocence, and you should retain that attitude upthrough that point. But once you walk into that Juryroom you no longer have that responsibility." Matthews, 69 Ill. App. 3d at 66.

Though it found the comment to be a misstatement of law, theappellate court held it did not "constitute a material factor indefendant's conviction or result in substantial prejudice tohim." Matthews, 69 Ill. App. 3d at 67.

Here, the comment contained two correct statements of thelaw. They should not have been in the same sentence, since thejurors could have been mislead. Though the comment may haveimplied the jury was not required to presume defendant innocentafter the trial began, the jury was properly instructed on thepresumption of innocence. The implication defendant complains ofis not so significant in this case that it can be said to haveaffected defendant's right to a fair trial. Porter, 96 Ill. App.3d at 956.

Defendant last contends the prosecutor misstated the law,misled the jury, and suggested his lawyer fabricated a defensetheory when he said:

"[I]f you remember at the very end [defense counsel]starts tlaking [sic] about second degree. Oh, yeahthere is second degree too. The reason he's talkingabout second degree, ladies and gentlemen, is he knowsthat there was no reasonable belief that he had to pullout that gun and shoot that victim. He knows that. Sohe knows that you can't get around that reasonablebelief. Because if you believe that he had reasonablebelief, you would have to find him not guilty, period. He knows you're not going to do that because he knowsthe evidence doesn't show that."

Defendant failed to object to these comments at trial anddid not include them in his posttrial motion. Though defendantcontends the comments constitute plain error because theyattacked defense counsel's integrity, the cases cited bydefendant involve far more egregious comments than those made inthis case. See People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 455 N.E.2d 41(1983); People v. Starks, 116 Ill. App. 3d 384, 451 N.E.2d 1298(1983).

In Emerson, the supreme court found the assistant State'sAttorney's statements that the defense had to "make somethingup," that all defense attorneys try to "dirty up the victim" todistract the jury, and that defense counsel's argument was a"smokescreen" were prejudicial. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d at 498.

In Starks, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to defendantas a liar, said he was engaged in a "ridiculous fabrication," andreferred to defense counsel's closing argument as "forty-fiveminutes *** of the most ridiculous double talk that I have everheard in my life." Starks, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 394. The courtfound these remarks resulted in prejudice to defendant becausethey disparaged defense counsel's integrity and implied thatcounsel fabricated a defense. Starks, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 394.

In this case, the prosecutor's remarks fall just short ofsuggesting defense counsel lied or fabricated a defense. Thoughwe agree it was inappropriate for the prosecutor to speculate asto defense counsel's opinion of the self-defense theory, thecomment does not constitute plain error in this case. Washington, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 40 (prosecutor's comments "that'swhat he's counting on" and "[t]hat's what he wants, a seconddegree murder" not improper).

Excessive Sentence

Defendant asserts the trial court's sentence of 30 years inprison was excessive. He claims the trial court failed toconsider his rehabilitative potential and several mitigatingfactors including absence of prior convictions, his age,employment, and support of a young child.

The State contends defendant's failure to file a posttrialmotion to reduce sentence precludes him from raising this issueon appeal. See People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 395, 686 N.E.2d584 (1997). Defendant responds by claiming the trial court didnot admonish him that such a motion must be filed within 30-daysof sentencing. We find this claim to be mistaken since therecord shows defendant was properly admonished according toSupreme Court Rule 605. 145 Ill. 2d R. 605; see also People v.Corrie, 294 Ill. App. 3d 496, 508, 690 N.E.2d 128 (1998). Theissue was forfeited.

Even if defendant had filed the appropriate post-sentencingmotion, we would find defendant's sentence is not excessive.

A reviewing court will not alter the judgment of thesentencing court absent a showing that the punishment imposedconstitutes an abuse of discretion. People v. Beals, 162 Ill. 2d497, 512, 643 N.E.2d 789 (1994). The sentencing range for firstdegree murder is from 20 to 60 years in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(West 1998).

A review of the record shows the trial court considered allof the mitigating factors presented by defendant before reachingits conclusion. It specifically referred to defendant's lack ofprior convictions, as well as its finding that defendant did notintend to kill the victim, as factors in mitigation. The trialcourt reviewed both the pre-sentence investigation report and avictim impact statement prepared by the victim's daughter. Thecourt considered defendant's conduct and the impact on thevictim's family in aggravation. The sentence is well within thestatutory range for first degree murder, and nothing in therecord indicates it represents an abuse of discretion.

Death of Victim as Improper Factor in Sentencing

Defendant claims the trial court improperly considered thedefendant's death as an aggravating factor during sentencing. In discussing defendant's sentence, the trial court said:

"Basically *** the aggravation results from ***the defendant's conduct that evening and the tragicimpact on the family of the victim, not to mention thetragic impact on the victim himself."

Defendant cites People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 497N.E.2d 1138 (1986), as support for his theory. In Saldivar, thedefendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. When thetrial court sentenced the defendant it focused primarily on thedeath of the victim as an aggravating factor. In fact, the trialcourt specifically said it found the death of the victim to bethe "number one factor in aggravation." 113 Ill. 2d at 272.

In Beals, 162 Ill. 2d at 509, defendant contended the trialcourt improperly considered the victim's death as an aggravatingfactor. In that case, the trial court said:

"In aggravation the first guideline indicated in thestatute is 'whether the conduct of the defendant causedor threatened serious harm.' Well, we all know thatyour conduct caused the ultimate harm. It caused theloss of a human life." Beals, 162 Ill. 2d at 509.

The supreme court held this statement did not indicate the trialcourt considered the victim's death as an aggravating factor, butinstead "was simply a general passing comment based upon theconsequences of the defendant's actions." Beals, 162 Ill. 2d at509. We believe the same is true of the remarks made by thetrial court in this case.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant alleges his trial counsel was ineffective due tohis failure to object to the improper jury instruction and theinappropriate remarks made by the prosecutor during closingargument, and his failure to file a motion to reduce sentence. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 80L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984), inorder to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, adefendant must allege facts demonstrating counsel'srepresentation fell below an objective standard of reasonablenessand that there is a reasonable probability that, but forcounsel's errors, the result of the trial would have beendifferent. Because we have found that none of the errors raisedby defendant was prejudicial, we reject defendant's ineffectiveassistance argument. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Casillas,slip op. at 14.

CONCLUSION

For reasons we have set out, we affirm the defendant'sconviction and sentence. Both parties agree that the mittimusshould be corrected to reflect one charge of first degree murderrather than two. We so order.

Affirmed.

CERDA, and BURKE, JJ., concur.