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THIRD DIVISION
Date Filed: May 26, 2004

No. 1-02-2772

JUSTICE HALL delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Terrence Richardson,was found guilty of the first degree murder of Destiny Redeauxand the attempted first degree murder of Woodrow Hubbard. Thedefendant was sentenced to 60 years for the murder of Ms. Redeauxand 30 years for the attempted murder of Mr. Hubbard. The trialcourt ordered the sentences to run consecutively to each otherand to an 85-year sentence imposed in Wisconsin for attemptedmurder and first degree criminal sexual assault.⁽¹⁾

The defendant appeals his convictions and sentences, raisingthe following issues on appeal: whether the use of a witness'sprior consistent statement deprived the defendant of a fairtrial; whether the prosecutor's closing argument deprived thedefendant of a fair trial; and whether the defendant's sentenceexceeded the maximum term allowable under section 5-8-4(c)(2) ofthe Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(c)(2)(West 1996)).⁽²⁾

At trial, Mr. Hubbard testified that, on November 5, 1996,Ms. Redeaux and he, accompanied by the defendant and WilliamSummers, got into a car driven by Robert Parker. While drivingaround, the defendant accused Mr. Hubbard of telling the policesomething about the defendant. Mr. Hubbard denied talking to thepolice, but Mr. Summers told him he was lying. Eventually, thecar drove into an alley. The defendant grabbed Mr. Hubbard bythe collar and told Mr. Summers to get Mr. Hubbard out of thecar. Mr. Hubbard noticed that the defendant had a gun. Mr.Summers removed Mr. Hubbard from the car while the defendantgrabbed Ms. Redeaux. Ms. Redeaux was taken to the front of thecar by Mr. Summers.

The defendant took Mr. Hubbard to the back of the car andordered him to lie down on the ground. The defendant shot Mr.Hubbard in the face. Mr. Hubbard heard Ms. Redeaux hollering notto kill her. Mr. Hubbard jumped up and tried to grab Ms.Redeaux, but he was unable to get her loose from Mr. Summers'sgrip. When Mr. Hubbard saw the defendant coming towards him withthe gun, he ran. As he ran, he heard the defendant shooting athim.

After failing to secure help at a gas station, Mr. Hubbardreturned to the alley. The defendant, Mr. Summers and Mr. Parkerwere gone, and Ms. Redeaux appeared to be dead. Mr. Hubbard flagged down a fire truck. The firemen began working on Ms.Redeaux. When the police arrived, Mr. Hubbard described what had happened and gave the police the names of the defendant and thetwo other men. Mr. Hubbard was hospitalized for a week or two.

Mr. Hubbard acknowledged that, in 1993, he had pleadedguilty to attempted murder and had been sentenced to six years inthe Department of Corrections. He further acknowledged that hehad a pending charge for possessing a gun but that no promiseshad been made to him with respect to that case.

On cross-examination, Mr. Hubbard denied having beeninterviewed by defense counsel a year prior to trial.

Dr. Eupil Choi, deputy chief medical examiner for CookCounty, testified that Ms. Redeaux died from multiple gunshotwounds.

Robert Parker testified that he met the defendant, whom heknew only as "Tim," through Mr. Summers a couple of months priorto incident in this case. He had known Mr. Summers for abouttwo years. Mr. Parker also knew Mr. Hubbard through Mr. Summers. On November 5, 1996, Mr. Parker and his date were watchingmovies when he received a page from Mr. Summers, stating that hewas about to be stranded at a gas station. Mr. Parker ignoredthe first page because this was his first date with the younglady. However, after he received a second page, he called thetelephone number and spoke with Mr. Summers. Mr. Summersconvinced him that he really needed a ride home.

Mr. Parker then drove to a Mobile gas station on 55thStreet. While waiting there, he received another page from Mr.Summers directing him to 106th Street and Eggleston Avenue, whereMr. Hubbard's residence was located. When Mr. Parker arrived atMr. Hubbard's residence, the defendant, Mr. Summers, Mr. Hubbardand Ms. Redeaux got into Mr. Parker's car. Mr. Summers directedMr. Parker to drive around. Mr. Parker needed gas to do so andstopped at a Mobile gas station at 98th Street and HalstedStreet.

After leaving the gas station, Mr. Summers told Mr. Parkerthat the defendant wanted to go west. Mr. Parker entered the DanRyan expressway, driving northbound. The defendant stated thathe needed to make a telephone call, so Mr. Parker exited theexpressway at 43rd Street and proceeded to an Amoco gas stationat 43rd Street and Wentworth Avenue. The defendant and Mr.Summers used one of the pay telephones, while Mr. Parker used theother one to call his date and tell her he would be back afterdropping the defendant off.

After the men returned to the car, the defendant accused Mr.Hubbard of giving him up to the police, which Mr. Hubbard denied. The defendant then asked Mr. Parker to drive around the block. The defendant continued to accuse Mr. Hubbard of giving him up. The defendant then stated that he wanted to talk to Mr. Hubbardin private and instructed Mr. Parker to turn into an alleybetween Wentworth Avenue and Wells Street.

At the defendant's direction, Mr. Parker stopped the car atabout the middle or towards the end of the alley. The defendanttold Mr. Summers to get out of the car and to grab Mr. Hubbard. The defendant then put his arm around Mr. Hubbard and Ms. Redeauxand pulled a gun out, which he placed at her side. Aftereveryone else exited the car, Mr. Parker pulled the car over tothe side of the alley.

As Mr. Parker sat in the car facing southbound, he heard ashot. As he looked in the rearview mirror, he saw Mr. Hubbardrunning northbound and the defendant shooting at him. Ms.Redeaux begged the defendant not to kill her, but the defendanttold her to lie down. The defendant then put the gun to Ms.Redeaux's head and shot her twice.

After shooting Ms. Redeaux, the defendant and Mr. Summers gotback into Mr. Parker's car. Mr. Summers warned Mr. Parker thatif he said anything, the police would be after him. Thedefendant directed Mr. Parker to drive to 55th Street. Thedefendant and Mr. Summers got out at the Mobil gas station at55th Street, and Mr. Parker drove back to his date's residence.

Mr. Parker acknowledged that he had pleaded guilty toconspiracy to commit first degree murder in connection with thisincident for which he received a sentence of four years in theDepartment of Corrections. He also agreed to testify in thiscase.

Mr. Parker admitted that he did not call the policefollowing the shootings of Mr. Hubbard and Ms. Redeaux but statedit was because he feared for his life.

On November 9, 1996, Mr. Parker was arrested. When firstquestioned by the police, he denied any involvement in theshootings. Mr. Parker was then questioned by the prosecutor asfollows:

"Q. There came a point in time during that day and thedate of November 10 of 1996 when you in fact told the policeand state's attorney what had actually happened in front ofyou back on November 5 of 1996, isn't that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And your statement or the same testimony you hadgiven before these ladies and gentlemen was taken down - -

MR. KATZ (defense counsel): Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained. Disregard where he told thepolice same thing on - - November 10, 1996."

On cross-examination, Mr. Parker testified that, while hewas in police custody, he had been handcuffed to a wall, was notpermitted to use the restroom when he requested and was notallowed to make any telephone calls for quite some time. Finally, he was permitted to use the telephone. After contactinghis mother, he agreed to speak to the police.

Mr. Parker was charged with first degree murder. Afterdiscussing the sentencing ranges with his attorney, Mr. Parkerentered into a plea agreement with the State. Under the terms ofthe agreement, the State would drop the first degree murdercharge, Mr. Parker would be sentenced to four years forconspiracy to commit first degree murder, and he would testifyagainst the defendant.

Following Mr. Parker's testimony on cross-examination, The prosecutor argued that, in light of the defense's question ofMr. Parker regarding the plea agreement, on redirect examinationhe should be permitted to use Mr. Parker's prior consistentstatement to rebut the defense's suggestion of recentfabrication. Defense counsel denied that he had made anysuggestion of recent fabrication. He pointed out that Mr. Parkerhad told the same story prior to entering into the pleaagreement. However, the trial court ruled that the pleaagreement created the inference that Mr. Parker changed histestimony and permitted the prosecutor to use Mr. Parker's priorconsistent statement.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defendantguilty of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. After the defendant was found ineligible for the death penalty,he was sentenced to 60 years for first degree murder and 30 yearsfor attempted first degree murder. The sentences were to runconsecutively to each other and to the defendant's Wisconsinsentence. This appeal followed.

The defendant contends, first, that he was deprived of afair trial by the prosecutor's use of Mr. Parker's priorconsistent statement.

Although a reviewing court might have ruled differently, thetrial court's evidentiary ruling may not be reversed absent anabuse of discretion. People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20, 743N.E.2d 126, 138 (2000). An abuse of discretion will only befound where the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, orunreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the viewadopted by the trial court. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d at 20, 743 N.E.2dat 138.

It is well established that proof of a prior consistentstatement made by a witness is hearsay and therefore inadmissibleto bolster a witness's trial testimony. People v. West, 263 Ill.App. 3d 1041, 1047, 636 N.E.2d 948, 953 (1994). The improperbolstering of a witness's credibility through the use of priorconsistent statements "'preys on the human failing of placingbelief on that which is most often repeated.' [Citation.]" West,263 Ill. App. 3d at 1047, 636 N.E.2d at 953. Prior consistentstatements may not be admitted merely because a witness has beendiscredited or impeached. People v. Mullen, 313 Ill. App. 3d718, 730, 730 N.E.2d 545, 555 (2000).

Two exceptions to the above rule exist: prior consistentstatements are properly admitted (1) to rebut a charge that thewitness is motivated to testify falsely or (2) to rebut a chargethat the testimony is of recent fabrication. Mullen, 313 Ill.App. 3d at 730, 730 N.E.2d at 555. Charges of recent fabricationand charges of a motive to testify falsely are separateexceptions to the general rule which prohibits proof of priorconsistent statements. Mullen, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 730, 730N.E.2d at 555. The party seeking to introduce the priorconsistent statement has the burden of establishing that thestatement predates the alleged recent fabrication or predates theexistence of the motive to testify falsely. Mullen, 313 Ill.App. 3d at 730, 730 N.E.2d at 555-56.

The defendant argues that the prosecutor should not havebeen allowed to use Mr. Parker's November 10, 1996, statementbecause Mr. Parker's motive to testify falsely existed prior tohis November 10, 1996, statement. The defendant points out that,following his arrest on November 9, 1996, Mr. Parker denied anyinvolvement in the shootings of Ms. Redeaux and Mr. Hubbard. Thedefendant further points out that Mr. Parker's November 10, 1996,statement naming the defendant as the shooter came only after Mr.Parker had been handcuffed to the wall at the police station anddeprived of restroom and telephone usage for an extended periodof time. Therefore, Mr. Parker was prompted to lie about theshooter's identity in order to alleviate his treatment by thepolice and thus his motive to lie was present prior to his makingthe November 10, 1996, statement.

However, it is the recent charge of fabrication exceptionthat applies in this case.

In People v. Antczak, 251 Ill. App. 3d 709, 622 N.E.2d 818(1993), N.H., a witness, testified that the defendant indicatedhis involvement in the burglary of N.H.'s mother's boyfriend'sapartment. On cross-examination of N.H., defense counselelicited that, until right before the trial, N.H. had notmentioned her conversation with the defendant until theirrelationship had been broken off and then only to her mother. TheState was permitted to introduce the testimony of a formerassistant State's Attorney who testified that, 11 months beforethe trial, N.H. had related her conversation with the defendantto him. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing, interalia, that the use of the N.H.'s prior consistent statement waserror.

After discussing the case law on the use of prior consistentstatements, the reviewing court adopted the view that treatedcharges of recent fabrication and charges of a motive to testifyfalsely as separate exceptions. Antczak, 251 Ill. App. 3d at715-17, 622 N.E.2d at 822-23. The court then stated as follows:

"In the case at bar, defendant essentially attackedN.H.'s credibility on two distinct bases. First defendantsuggested that N.H.'s testimony was the product of herhostility toward defendant for breaking off theirrelationship. However, as noted above, defendant alsosought to persuade the jury that N.H.'s testimony wassuspect because she waited essentially until the eve oftrial to come forward. This theory of impeachment could beviewed as independently viable without proof of anyparticular motive. The jury could have rejected the chargethat well over a year after their breakup N.H. was stillangry enough at defendant to commit perjury. But even ifthe jury had rejected this alleged motive, it might stillhave doubted N.H.'s testimony simply because N.H. had notcome forward earlier. We believe that N.H.'s statements to[the former assistant State's Attorney] were admissible torehabilitate N.H. against this general charge of recentfabrication." Antczak, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 717, 622 N.E.2dat 823.⁽³⁾

In his cross-examination of Mr. Parker, defense counseltouched on the circumstances surrounding Mr. Parker's initialdenial of any involvement in the shooting and his subsequentnaming of the defendant as the shooter. However, defense counselextensively cross-examined Mr. Parker as to his plea agreementwith the State. There is no dispute that the plea agreement wasentered into subsequent to Mr. Parker's November 10, 1996,statement.

Thus, regardless of any motive to lie, the defendant'sNovember 10, 1996, statement was admissible to rehabilitate Mr.Parker's testimony that the defendant was the shooter against anycharge that he fabricated his story in exchange for the pleaagreement.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion in admitting Mr. Parker's prior consistent statement.

The defendant contends that the prosecutor improperlybolstered Mr. Parker's credibility in his closing argument.

A prosecutor has great latitude in closing argument, and thetrial court's determination about the propriety of the remarksshould be followed absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v.Taylor, 244 Ill. App. 3d 806, 818, 612 N.E.2d 943, 951 (1993).

The defendant concedes that he failed to preserve this issuefor review, but urges this court to review the issue pursuant tothe plain error doctrine found in Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134Ill. 2d R. 615(a)).

However, before invoking the plain error exception towaiver, we must determine, first, if any error occurred. Peoplev. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 226, 743 N.E.2d 48, 72 (2000).

The defendant complains of the prosecutor's statements inclosing argument that Mr. Parker was the defendant's "dupe," thatMr. Parker had no idea of what was going on and that, after Mr.Parker saw the defendant with a gun and heard the first shot, hehad "no options."

The defendant argues that the prosecutor's statements werenot proper inferences from the testimony. The defendantmaintains that the prosecutor's portrayal of Mr. Parker as avictim was inaccurate. The defendant points out that Mr. Parkerdid not come forward voluntarily and that it was only after hewas arrested that he implicated the defendant. The defendantfurther notes that Mr. Parker pleaded guilty to conspiracy tocommit first degree murder. Finally, the defendant maintainsthat the prosecutor's argument prejudiced the defendant becausethe jury would likely disregard the accomplice instruction toview Mr. Parker's testimony with caution.

The credibility of a witness is a proper subject for closingargument if it is based on the evidence or inferences drawn fromit. People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 445, 626 N.E.2d 161, 180(1993). It is improper for a prosecutor to argue assumptions orfacts not based upon the evidence in the record. People v.Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 151, 705 N.E.2d 850, 885 (1998).

In this case, the prosecutor's argument was based on Mr.Parker's testimony. There was no evidence that Mr. Parker hadany awareness of the defendant's ultimate intentions regardingMs. Redeaux and Mr. Hubbard until he saw the gun pressed againstMs. Redeaux. He merely drove where Mr. Summers or the defendanttold him to drive. A proper inference from the evidence wasthat, once the gun was revealed, Mr. Parker was deprived of anyviable options which might have aided both himself and thevictims.

Initially, Mr. Parker was charged with first degree murder.Compare Mullen, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 726, 730 N.E.2d at 552-53(Mr. Mullen properly found guilty of first degree murder underaccountability theory where, as the victim was beaten, thedefendant did not offer help, did not discourage or disapprove ofthe crime, came and left with the group that activelyparticipated in the beating and did not report the crime). However, Mr. Parker was ultimately allowed to plead guilty to alesser offense. Unlike the evidence in Mullen, which showed thatMr. Mullen shared the criminal intent of the group that killedthe victim, the evidence in this case did not show Mr. Parker'sparticipation in the defendant's ultimate decision to shoot Ms.Redeaux and Mr. Hubbard. Mr. Parker's choice not to act onbehalf of the victims, while perhaps not a noble one, wasdictated by his fear for his own safety.

As the prosecutor's statements in closing argument werebased upon the evidence and the proper inferences from theevidence in the record, they were not error.

The defendant contends that his sentence is improper becauseit exceeds the sum of the maximum terms authorized under section5-8-4(c)(2) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(c)(2) (West 1996)).

Issues as to statutory construction are reviewed de novo. Revolution Portfolio, LLC v. Beale, 332 Ill. App. 3d 595, 600,774 N.E.2d 14, 19 (2002).

Section 5-8-4(c)(2) of the Code provides in pertinent partas follows:

"For sentences imposed under the law in effect on orafter February 1, 1978, the aggregate of consecutivesentences shall not exceed the sum of the maximum termsauthorized under Section 5-8-2 for the 2 most seriousfelonies involved." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(c)(2) (West 1996).

Section 5-8-2 of the Code provides for the imposition ofextended term sentences and states in pertinent part as follows:

"(1) for first degree murder, a term shall be not lessthan 60 years and not more than 100 years;

(2) for a Class X felony, a term shall be not lessthan 30 years and not more than 60 years[.]" 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996).

In this case, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 60years for the first degree murder, its own class of felony, ofMs. Redeaux and 30 years for the attempted first degree murder, aClass X offense, of Mr. Hubbard. The trial court ordered thatthe sentences be served consecutively for a total of 90 years'imprisonment.

However, the defendant contends that his sentence isimproper because the trial court ordered the 90-year sentence inthis case to be served consecutively to an 85-year sentenceimposed on the defendant by the Wisconsin court. The Stateargues that a reading of section 5-8-4(c)(2) of the Code makes itclear that the legislature did not intend out-of-state sentencesto apply to Illinois statute.

It is well settled that the primary objective of a court inconstruing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and giveeffect to the intention of the legislature. In re Detention ofLieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 307, 776 N.E.2d 218, 223 (2002). Thestatutory language is to be given its plain, ordinary andpopularly understood meaning, and a court is to afford thestatutory language the fullest, rather than narrowest, possiblemeaning to which it is susceptible. Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at308, 776 N.E.2d at 223. Where the language of a statute is clearand unambiguous, it will be given effect without resort to otheraids for construction. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443-444, 677 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1997). Criminal or penal statutes areto be strictly construed in favor of an accused, and nothingshould be taken by intendment or implication beyond the obviousor literal meaning of the statute. Woodard, 175 Ill. App. 3d at444, 677 N.E.2d at 939.

The purpose of section 5-8-4(c)(2) is to limit the totallength of consecutive sentences imposed on the defendant, whilestill punishing the defendant in relationship to the severity ofthe crimes. People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 436, 657 N.E.2d1009, 1012 (1995).

Contrary to the State's argument, nothing in section 5-8-4(c)(2) limits the application of the aggregate maximum toconsecutive sentences imposed for convictions in Illinois. Moreover, the State does not address People v Brown, 275 Ill.App. 3d 1105, 657 N.E.2d 642 (1995), relied on by the defendant,which resolved this issue.

In Brown, the defendant contended that the trial court couldnot order his 47-year sentence to be served consecutively to hisIndiana 90-year term sentence because it violated section 5-8-4(c)(2). Agreeing with the defendant, the reviewing court statedas follows:

"In light of our supreme court's recent decisionconstruing section 5-8-4(c)(2) in People v. Tucker (1995),167 Ill. 2d 431, we agree that defendant's sentence must bemodified. In Tucker the court wrote:

'As the statute [section 5-8-4(a) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)(West 1992))]⁽⁴⁾ provides for the imposition of aconsecutive sentence on a defendant already subject toa sentence, both sentences are "involved" under thestatutory scheme. Thus, the limitations on consecutivesentences articulated in section 5-8-4(c)(2) logicallyapplies regardless of whether the consecutive sentencesarise from separate incidents.' (167 Ill. 2d at 436.)

We must therefore consider all sentences defendant isserving in considering whether his current sentence exceedsthe limitations set by section 5-8-4(c)(2)." Brown, 275Ill. App. 3d at 1116, 657 N.E.2d at 650.

Pursuant to Brown, the defendant's sentence, including hisWisconsin sentence, violates section 5-8-4(c)(2) if it exceedsthe sum of the maximum terms under section 5-8-2. Under section5-8-2, the maximum allowable terms are 100 years for first degreemurder, its own class of felony, and 60 years for attempted firstdegree murder, a Class X felony, for a total of 160 years. Therefore, the defendant's 175-year sentence exceeds theallowable term-of-years sentence by 15 years.

However, the defendant maintains that maximum aggregatesentence allowable under section 5-8-4(c)(2) is 130 years. Heargues that, under section 5-8-2, a judge may impose an extended-term sentence only for the class of the most serious offense ofwhich the offender was convicted. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West1996). The defendant reasons that, under section 5-8-2, the trialcourt was only authorized to impose an extended-term sentence of100 years for first degree murder, the most serious of thecharged offenses, and a nonextended term of 30 years forattempted murder. We disagree.

Under section 5-8-4(c)(2), "the aggregate of [thedefendant's] consecutive sentences may not exceed the sum of themaximum terms authorized under Section 5-8-2 for the 2 mostserious felonies involved." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(c)(2) (West 1996).

Under section 5-8-2, an extended-term sentence may beimposed only for the most serious class of offense of which thedefendant was convicted. People v. Terry, 183 Ill. 2d 298, 302,700 N.E.2d 992, 994 (1998); People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192,204-06, 469 N.E.2d 569, 575 (1984). Under section 5-8-2,therefore, the defendant could only receive an extended-termsentence for his conviction for first degree murder.

Because all provisions of a statutory enactment are viewedas a whole, words and phrases should not be construed inisolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevantprovisions of the statute. Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 308, 676N.E.2d at 223. Each word, clause and sentence of the statute, ifpossible must be given reasonable meaning and not renderedsuperfluous. Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 308, 676 N.E.2d at 223.

The defendant's reading of section 5-8-4(c)(2) would requirethe phrase, "for the 2 most serious felonies" be read "for the 2most serious felonies of the same class." However, in enactingsection 5-8-4(c)(2) the legislature did not require that the twomost serious felonies be of the same class. If the legislaturehad wanted the aggregate maximum of the consecutive sentences todepend on whether the trial court could impose an extended-termsentence on each of the offenses committed, it would have limitedthe language to "shall not exceed the maximum terms authorizedunder Section 5-8-2."

The unambiguous language of section 5-8-4(c)(2) authorizedthe trial court to impose a maximum sentence of 160 years in thiscase. This is not a case where, in order to fulfill thelegislative purpose, we need to modify, alter or supply words toa statute to "'"obviate any repugnancy or inconsistency with thelegislative intention."' [Citations.]" People v. Smith, 307 Ill.App. 3d 414, 418, 718 N.E.2d 640, 643 (1999). The legislatureintended to limit, not eliminate, lengthy consecutive sentencesto be served by defendants.

Our reading of section 5-8-4(c)(2) finds additional supportin Brown. After determining that Mr. Brown's sentence exceededthe limitation set forth in section 5-8-4(c)(2), the court statedas follows:

"The record shows defendant's two most serious offensesare the aggravated criminal sexual assault committed inIllinois and a Class A child molestation offense committedin Indiana. Both offenses correspond to Class X offensesunder section 5-8-2. [Citation.] Only first-degree murderis a more serious crime under our extended-term sentencingscheme. A Class X offense carries a maximum term of 60years. [Citation.] Thus, the maximum sentence defendant canreceive under section 5-8-4(c)(2) in Illinois is the sum oftwo Class X offenses, or 120 years." Brown, 275 Ill. App.3d at 1116, 687 N.E.2d at 650.

In the present case, the defendant's two most seriousfelonies were the Illinois first degree murder and attemptedfirst degree murder charges.⁽⁵⁾ Under section 5-8-2, first degreemurder carries a maximum extended-term sentence of 100 years, andattempted murder carries a maximum extended-term sentence of 60years. Therefore, the maximum sentence the defendant couldreceive under section 5-8-4(c)(2) is 160 years.

As the defendant's sentence exceeds the maximum allowed byunder section 5-8-4(c)(2) by 15 years, the defendant's 60-yearsentence for murder must be modified to 45 years.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Cook County is affirmed as modified.

Affirmed as modified.

HOFFMAN, P.J., and KARNEZIS, J., concur.

1. The defendant's Wisconsin sentence is apparently beingserved concurrently with a 365-month sentence imposed by thefederal court in an unrelated case.

2. Following the commission of the offenses in this case, thelegislature amended section 5-8-4(c)(2) to provide that themaximum term limitation contained in that section does not apply"for offenses that were not committed as part of a single courseof conduct during which there was no substantial change in thenature of the criminal objective." Pub. Act 90-128