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FOURTH DIVISION
November 10, 2005

No. 1-04-1405

JUSTICE GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant Juan Quinones was found guilty of two counts ofdefacing firearm identification marks and two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon(UUW). Defendant was sentenced to four years in prison for each count of defacing a firearmand to three years in prison for each count of aggravated UUW, to be served concurrently, andwas ordered to submit a blood specimen for genetic testing. On appeal, defendant contends (1)that section 24-5(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2002)) containedan unconstitutional mandatory presumption that relieved the State of its burden of proving that adefendant knowingly or intentionally defaced the identifying marks on a firearm beyond areasonable doubt; (2) that his multiple convictions of defacing a firearm and multiple convictionsof aggravated UUW violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine; (3) that the trial court's mistakenbelief that aggravated UUW was a Class 3, rather than a Class 4, felony influenced its sentencingdecision; (4) that he was prejudiced when the trial court failed to completely admonish him of hisappellate rights; and (5) that the compulsory extraction of his DNA was a violation of hisconstitutional rights.

At trial, Federal Bureau of Investigations Special Agent Ralph Anthony Renno testifiedthat on April 11, 2003, he received a phone call from Maria Garza. Garza told Renno that earlierthat morning she had received a note on her door that read "we have David [Villarreal]" andinstructed Garza to call a certain phone number. Garza had also received calls concerning thekidnaping from a different phone number. Renno sought and was granted permission to tap andtrace both phone numbers. At 7 p.m., Garza met Renno at the FBI office. From 7 p.m. until 2a.m., Garza engaged in six discussions with a person at the number written on the note. At 2a.m., Garza and the party on the phone agreed to talk again in the morning. From 9 a.m. on April12, 2003, until the afternoon, Garza engaged in several more conversations with the party at thenumber written on the note. The parties agreed to meet at Garza's sister-in-law's house at 1944South 55th Court in Cicero, Illinois, where Garza would give the other party a certain amount ofmoney in exchange for Villarreal's release.

Several FBI agents, a Chicago police officer and Garza proceeded to 1944 South 55thCourt. Several agents and Garza entered the house while Renno, Special Agent Brian Murphy,Special Agent Dennis Timothy and FBI employee Susana Herrera, who would act as aninterpreter, remained in a van across the street from the residence to conduct surveillance. WhileGarza and the agents were in the residence, several calls were placed between Garza and a mannamed Antonio, further negotiating the exchange. At trial, Renno testified that the voice of theman on the recordings of these conversations was defendant's. He further testified that, whenapprehended, defendant identified himself as Antonio.

At 6:06 p.m., a Chevrolet Astro van pulled up to the house at 1944 South 55th Court. The driver got out of the van and approached the house while the passenger, who Rennoidentified as defendant, remained in the van. The driver knocked on the front door of the housebut Garza and the agents inside did not answer. The driver walked back to the car, got in andexchanged words with defendant. Defendant then picked up a cellular phone and held it to hisear. Thereafter, the driver again went to the front door of the house and knocked. The agentsstationed in the house opened the door and arrested the driver. Defendant then got out of thevan, put his head down and began briskly walking away. Renno and the officers in thesurveillance van apprehended defendant. Through Herrera, Renno asked defendant whereVillarreal was being kept. Defendant offered to lead the officers to the location. On the way, inresponse to questions posed by Renno, defendant indicated that there were two people guardingVillarreal and that they had a gun.

The agents arrived at a basement apartment at 207 West Quincy in Riverside, Illinois, thelocation where defendant had indicated Villarreal was being held, at 6:45 p.m. The agentsattempted to call the men inside the apartment but received no answer. The agents went to thedoor of the apartment, knocked, received no answer and pried the door open. When he enteredthe apartment and turned on the lights, Renno observed two men lying on the living room floorwith a third man, who was bound with duct tape, lying between them. In the kitchen, the agentsrecovered a Ruger handgun. The serial number on the handgun had been filed off.

Defendant was transported to a nearby police station. Defendant had keys which heindicated were to the apartment at 207 West Quincy and a cellular phone in his possession. Thenumber of the cellular phone matched the number from which Garza had received calls on April11 and 12. When Renno interviewed defendant at the police station, defendant stated that he hadalso been a victim of the kidnaping. According to defendant, earlier that week an acquaintancenamed Arqui had invited defendant and Villarreal to lunch. The next morning, when they went toArqui's apartment, they were abducted. Arqui told defendant that he had given Roglio Aguirre$80,000 to hold but that Aguirre had stolen the money. Because defendant had known Aguirrefor a long time, Arqui believed abducting defendant would help him find Aguirre. Arqui hadthreatened to hurt defendant's family in Mexico if he did not assist him. Defendant admitted thathe had placed the phone calls to Garza.

Herrera's testimony was consistent with Renno's. She testified that she had spokenSpanish all of her life and that she had translated the conversation between defendant and Rennoafter defendant was apprehended to the best of her ability. In Herrera's opinion, the voice on therecorded phone calls was defendant's.

FBI Special Agent Sean Burke was assigned to the kidnaping on April 11, 2003. Histestimony regarding the events leading up to the agents' arrival at 1944 South 55th Court wasalso consistent with Renno's. Burke, other agents and Garza entered the residence at 1944 South55th Court through the back door so that they would not be seen if the house were beingwatched. At about 6 p.m., Burke received a radio transmission from Renno indicating that a vancontaining two men had stopped in front of the house. When the driver knocked on the door ofthe residence, Burke intructed the other agents and Garza not to answer. Immediately thereafter,Garza received a phone call. The caller indicated that someone had been sent to the door of thelocation where they were to meet but that no one had answered. The driver again approached thedoor and knocked at which point he was arrested. After securing the driver, Burke saw thatRenno and the other agents had defendant in custody down the street. Burke also proceeded to207 West Quincy and entered the apartment with Renno. His account of what was found in theapartment was consistent with Renno's.

Brian Wilson, an Illinois State Police forensic scientist specializing in firearm and toolmarks, identified a Ruger P 89 DC semiautomatic handgun as that recovered from the apartmentat 207 West Quincy. Wilson testified that the gun was in operating condition and that it fired asintended. Wilson testified that the serial number on the gun had been obliterated but concededthat he could not say when the obliteration occurred or who had caused the number to beobliterated.

The parties stipulated that a proper chain of custody of all physical evidence had beenmaintained, that defendant's fingerprints were not found on the gun but that those of one of themen found in the apartment were, and that defendant did not have a firearm owner's identification(FOID) card.

At the close of the State's case-in-chief, defendant's motion for a directed finding wasdenied. Defendant rested and the trial court found defendant guilty of two counts of defacing afirearm and two counts of aggravated UUW, noting that defendant had constructive possession ofthe gun. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied and the trial court sentenced defendant toconcurrent terms of four years for each defacing a firearm count and three years for eachaggravated UUW count.

On appeal, defendant first contends that section 24-5(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (theCode) (720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2002))⁽¹⁾ was unconstitutional because it contained a mandatorypresumption that relieved the State of its burden of proving that a defendant knowingly orintentionally defaced the identifying marks on a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 24-5 of the Code provided:

"(a) Any person who shall knowingly or intentionally change, alter, removeor obliterate the name of the maker, model, manufacturer's number or other markof identification of any firearm commits a Class 2 felony,

(b) Possession of any firearm upon which any such mark shall have beenchanged, altered, removed or obliterated shall be prima facie evidence that thepossessor has changed, altered, removed or obliterated the same." 720 ILCS5/24-5 (West 2002).

We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413,418 (2000). While a statute carries a strong presumption of constitutionality and we have a dutyto interpret a statute in a manner that upholds its constitutionality if it can be reasonably done(People v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (2000); People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 448 (1998)),"we are also mindful of the well-established principle that penal statutes are to be construedstrictly in favor of the defendant" (People v. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d 198, 209 (2003), citing Peoplev. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1999)).

The State is constitutionally required to prove every element of a crime beyond areasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 571, 99 S. Ct. 2781,2787 (1979). Nonetheless, the State may rely on certain presumptions or inferences to prove itscase. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 203. Presumptions are legal devices that permit or require a factfinder to assume that a fact exists, after predicate or basic facts have been established. People v.Watts, 181 Ill. 2d 133, 141 (1998). Presumptions "play a vital role in the expeditious resolutionof factual questions, with the value of the presumption or inference resting on the strength of theconnection between the elemental or ultimate fact presumed or inferred and the basic orevidentiary fact." People v. Hester, 131 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1989).

Permissive presumptions allow, but do not require, a finder of fact to infer the existence ofan ultimate fact upon proof of a predicate fact while mandatory presumptions require a fact finderto accept a presumption. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 142. Mandatory presumptions are eitherconclusive or rebuttable. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 203.

"The United States Supreme Court has held that mandatory conclusivepresumptions are unconstitutional, as they conflict with the presumption ofinnocence. [Citation.] The Supreme Court has further held that mandatoryrebuttable presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant areper se unconstitutional, because they relieve the State of its burden to prove eachelement of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In Watts, this courtheld that mandatory rebuttable presumptions that shift the burden of production tothe defendant are also unconstitutional. [Citation.] Thus, under Illinois law, allmandatory presumptions are now considered to be per se unconstitutional." Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 203-04.

Defendant argues that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Pomykala supports hiscontention that section 24-5(b) creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. In Pomykala,the defendant was convicted of reckless homicide when his car hit a vehicle while he was drivingunder the influence of alcohol. The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with the languageof 9-3(b) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/9-3(b) (West 2000)), which provided:

" 'In cases involving reckless homicide, being under the influence ofalcohol or any other drug or drugs at the time of the alleged violation shall bepresumed to be evidence of a reckless act unless disproved by evidence to thecontrary.' " Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 202, quoting 720 ILCS 5/9-3(b) (West 2000).

The supreme court recognized that the previous version of the statute had provided:

" 'In cases involving reckless homicide, being under the influence ofalcohol or any other drug or drugs at the time of the alleged violation shall beprima facie evidence of a reckless act.' " Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 204, quoting Ill.Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9-3(b).

The court noted that, in amending the statute, the legislature had simply omitted the term "primafacie" and had inserted in its place the definition of prima facie. The court found that section 9-3(b) of the Code contained an unconstitutional mandatory presumption because the definition ofprima facie necessitated "a finding of recklessness without any factual connection between theintoxication and the reckless act, unless this presumed connection is disproved." Pomykala, 203Ill. 2d at 208.

After Pomykala was decided, in People v. Miles, 344 Ill. App. 3d 315 (2003), theappellate court examined a similar statute to the statute challenged here. In Miles, the defendantwas convicted pursuant to section 16 of the Illinois Credit Card and Debit Card Act (the Act)(720 ILCS 250/16 (West 2002)). On appeal, she contended that the second sentence of section16 of the Act contained an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. Section 16 provided, inrelevant part:

" 'The possession by a person other than the purported issuer of 2 or more creditcards or debit cards which have been counterfeited is prima facie evidence that theperson intended to defraud or that he knew the credit cards or debit cards to havebeen so counterfeited.' " Miles, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 317, quoting 720 ILCS 250/16(West 2002).

The appellate court held that "[c]onsistent with the Pomykala analysis, if a statute incorporatingthe definition of 'prima facie' to establish an element of a criminal offense creates a prohibitedmandatory presumption, then a statute that uses the object of the definition, that is, 'prima facie,'to establish an element is similarly prohibitive." Miles, 344 Ill. App. 3d 319-20. Accordingly, thecourt found that section 16 of the Act created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption.

Here, defendant argues that, as in Miles, because section 24-5(b) of the Code providedthat evidence that a defendant possessed a defaced firearm was prima facie evidence that thedefendant knew or intended that the firearm be defaced, it created a mandatory presumption andwas therefore unconstitutional.

The State does not address Pomykala, arguing simply that Miles was wrongly decidedbecause its holding contradicts the rule that "prima facie language used in statutes only creates apermissive inference." (Emphasis in original.) In support of its argument, the State cites Peoplev. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53, 75 (1995), in which the Illinois Supreme Court stated:

"In the criminal context, prima facie evidence is in the nature of apresumption, more accurately described as an instructed interference. [Citation.]Prima facie evidence may be defined as a quantum of evidence sufficient to satisfythe burden of production concerning a basic fact that allows an inference of apresumed fact. [Citation.] Where the burden of production is satisfied, the trier offact is permitted but not required to find the presumed fact. [Citation.]

Even where the State satisfies the burden of production concerning a basicfact, a defendant bears no actual burden to produce evidence to prevent operationof the inference. ***

***

Once the burden of production is satisfied, the judge is permitted but notrequired to find the burden of persuasion satisfied depending on the judge'sconsideration of all the evidence."

As defendant points out, Pomykala overruled this court's decision in People v. Peshak,333 Ill. App. 3d 1052 (2002). In Peshak, the defendant contended on appeal that section 9-3(b)of the Code contained an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. The appellate court notedthat section 9-3(b) had been amended to replace the term "prima facie" with the term's definition. The court relied on Robinson in finding that the amended language of section 9-3(b) of the Codecreated a permissive, rather than a mandatory, presumption, stating that "[o]ur supreme court inRobinson makes clear that even if the State satisfies its burden of producing 'prima facieevidence,' the trier of fact may reject the presumed fact, even where the defendant has failed toproduce any evidence." Peshak, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1063.

We agree with defendant that, inasmuch as Robinson stands for the proposition thatstatutory language that incorporates the term "prima facie" to establish an element of a criminaloffense creates a permissive presumption, it has been implicitly overruled by Pomykala. Wefurther find that this case is similar to Pomykala and Miles. Under the statute scrutinized here, aprima facie case that a defendant knowingly and intentionally defaced a firearm was establishedupon the State's showing that a defendant possessed a defaced firearm. When the State rested,therefore, the burden shifted to defendant to show that he had not knowingly or intentionallydefaced the firearm. "The placement of such an evidentiary burden on a defendant is alwaysunconstitutional" (Miles, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 320, citing Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 147), and effectivelyrelieves the State of its burden of proving an essential element of the offense beyond a reasonabledoubt (see Miles, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 320). Accordingly, giving the language of the statute itsplain and ordinary meaning (People v. Jordan, 354 Ill. App. 3d 294, 299-300 (2004)), we find thatsection 24-5(b) of the Code created an impermissible mandatory rebuttable presumption and wastherefore unconstitutional.

The State further argues that, even if section 24-5(b) contained an unconstitutionalmandatory presumption, defendant's convictions of defacing a firearm need not be reversedbecause the record is devoid of any showing that the trial court relied on the presumption.

In People v. Taylor, 344 Ill. App. 3d 929, 936-37 (2003), the defendant was convictedpursuant to a retail theft statute that the First, Second and Fourth District Appellate Courts hadheld to contain an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. On appeal, the court rejected thedefendant's contention that his conviction should be reversed, noting that the court was presumedto know that the provision had been held unconstitutional and that the record revealed that thetrial court had not referenced the provision in entering judgment against the defendant. The courtfound that "we may assume that the trial judge found the defendant guilty of retail theft withoutrelying on the constitutionally infirm presumption but, rather, inferred the requisite intent from thesurrounding circumstances." Taylor, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 937.

In People v. Mendoza, 354 Ill. App. 3d 621 (2004), after the defendant was convicted ofseveral counts of reckless homicide, the supreme court determined, in Pomykala, that section 9-3(b) of the Code created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. On appeal, the defendantcontended that because the trial court had applied the unconstitutional provision, his convictionsshould be reversed. In rejecting the defendant's contention, the trial court noted that at the timeof his conviction, the Third District Appellate Court had found the provision unconstitutional andthe supreme court had held that mandatory presumptions were unconstitutional. The appellatecourt held that "we may assume that the trial judge was aware that the presumption wasmandatory and thus unconstitutional and that the court did not rely on it in finding defendantguilty of reckless homicide." Mendoza, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 626. Further supporting its holding,the court noted that the record contained "no indication that the trial court applied the section 9-3(b) presumption in determining defendant's guilt, and affirmatively demonstrat[ed] that the courtbased its ruling on the considerable evidence establishing the elements of the charged offense." Mendoza, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 626.

We find this case distinguishable from Taylor and Mendoza. Here, at the time ofdefendant's conviction, other courts of appeal had not held that section 24-5(b) of the Codecreated an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. Additionally, unlike in the cited cases, in thiscase, though the trial court did not indicate that it relied on the presumption in convictingdefendant, the fact that defendant "knowingly or intentionally change[d], alter[ed], remove[d] orobliterate[d] the name of the maker, model, manufacturer's number or other mark of identificationof [the] firearm" (720 ILCS 5/24-5(a) (West 2002)) was established only by the State's evidenceshowing that defendant possessed a defaced firearm. Accordingly, we find that defendant's dueprocess rights were violated by the application of section 24-5(b) of the Code and reverse hisconviction of two counts of defacing a firearm.

Defendant next contends that his convictions of two counts of defacing a firearm and oftwo counts of aggravated UUW are in contravention of the one-act, one-crime doctrine andtherefore, this court should vacate one of each of the convictions. The State notes that, becausehe failed to object at trial and to raise the issue in a posttrial motion, defendant has waived thiscontention. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Defendant asks that we considerhis contention, nonetheless, pursuant to the plain error doctrine.

The plain error rule may be invoked when "(1) the evidence in a criminal case is closelybalanced or (2) the error is so fundamental and of such magnitude that the accused is denied theright to a fair trial and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicialprocess." People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (2003); People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87(2005). We review defendant's contention for plain error because " 'the potential for a surplusconviction and sentence affects the integrity of the judicial process, thus satisfying the secondprong of the plain error rule.' " People v. Carter, 213 Ill. 2d 295, 299 (2004), quoting People v.Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 389 (2004).

As discussed above, we have determined that defendant's convictions of defacing afirearm should be vacated on other grounds. Accordingly, here, we need only address defendant'scontention that his multiple aggravated UUW convictions contravene the one-act, one-crimedoctrine.

The aggravated UUW statute provides:

"(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weaponwhen he or she knowingly:

(1) Carries on or about his or her person or in any vehicle orconcealed on or about his or her person except when on his or her land or in his orher abode or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or otherfirearm;

***

*** and

(3) One of the following factors is present:

(A) the firearm possessed was uncased, loaded andimmediately accessible at the time of the offense; or

***

C) the person possessing the firearm has not been issued acurrently valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card[.]" 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West2002).

In this case, the State charged, pursuant to the language of subsections 24-1.6(a)(3)(A)and (C), that defendant:

"Knowingly carried on or about [his] person, a firearm, to wit: RugerP89DC semi-automatic handgun[,] at a time when [he was] not on [his] own landor in [his] own abode or fixed place of business and the firearm was uncased,loaded and immediately accessible at the time of the offense, *** and

Knowingly carried on or about [his] person, a firearm, to wit: RugerP89DC semi-automatic handgun[,] at a time when [he was] not on [his] own landor in [his] own abode or fixed place of business and the person possessing thefirearm had not been issued a currently valid firearm's [sic] owner's identificationcard."

Defendant was convicted of both counts of aggravated UUW.

The one-act, one-crime doctrine prohibits multiple convictions when they are carved fromthe same physical act or where one of the offenses is a lesser included offense of the other. People v. Lindsey, 324 Ill. App. 3d 193, 200 (2001). The supreme court has defined an "act" as " 'any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense.' " People v.Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 188 (1996), quoting People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977).

The appellate court addressed a similar contention to defendant's in People v. Carter, 344Ill. App. 3d 663 (2003), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, People v. Carter, 213 Ill.2d 295 (2004). In Carter, the defendant was convicted of several counts of unlawful possessionof a weapon by a felon and one count of possession of a firearm without a valid FOID card. Onappeal, the defendant contended, inter alia, and the State conceded, that his conviction ofpossession of a firearm without a FOID card, in conjunction with his conviction of unlawfulpossession of a firearm contravened the one-act, one-crime doctrine. The appellate court agreed,finding "[t]he defendant's offense of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon was based on thesame conduct as his offense of possession of a firearm without a FOID card. Particularly, bothoffenses were based on the defendant possessing a .22-caliber handgun." Carter, 344 Ill. App. 3dat 672.

Here, too, defendant's aggravated UUW convictions, one based on his possession of anuncased, loaded, accessible firearm, and the other based on his possession of the weapon withouta valid FOID card, were each based on the same act, specifically, defendant's possession of thefirearm. Accordingly, we find that the two convictions cannot stand under the one-act, one-crimedoctrine and reverse one of the convictions.

Defendant next contends that his sentence should be vacated and that his case should beremanded for resentencing because, in sentencing defendant, the trial court mistakenly believedthat aggravated UUW was a Class 3 felony, which carried a minimum sentence of two years and amaximum sentence of five years (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(6) (West 2002)), when it was, in fact, aClass 4 felony, which carried a minimum sentence of one year and a maximum sentence of threeyears (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(7) (West 2002)). We agree with the State that defendant has waivedthis issue because he failed to object at trial and to raise the issue in a posttrial motion. SeeEnoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186. However, we will grant defendant's request that we review hiscontention under the plain error rule because "[a] claim that the trial court misunderstood theminimum and maximum sentences for the offense falls within the second prong of the plain errorrule." People v. Wilkins, 343 Ill. App. 3d 147, 149 (2003), citing People v. Hausman, 287 Ill.App. 3d 1069, 1071-72 (1997).

"According to People v. Eddington, 77 Ill. 2d 41, 48 *** (1979), '[a] misstatement of theunderstanding of the minimum sentence by the trial judge necessitates a new sentencing hearingonly when it appears that the mistaken belief of the judge arguably influenced the sentencingdecision.' (Emphasis added.)" Hausman, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 1072. "In considering whether amistaken belief influenced the trial court's sentencing decision, courts look to whether the trialcourt's comments show that the court relied on the mistaken belief or used the mistaken belief asa reference point in fashioning the sentence." People v. Hill, 294 Ill. App. 3d 962, 970 (1998).

In support of his contention, defendant analogizes the facts of this case to Hausman. InHausman, during sentencing, the trial court stated that, because of certain mitigating factors, itwould sentence the defendant to the minimum sentence of three years. However, the minimumsentence for the defendant's offense was actually two years. On appeal, the court vacated thedefendant's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, holding that, though the trialcourt was entitled to impose a three-year sentence, its comments during sentencing indicated thatits mistaken belief that the minimum sentence was three years "arguably influenced the judge'ssentencing decision." Hausman, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 1072.

We agree with the State that Hausman is distinguishable from the case at bar. Instead, thefacts of this case are more similar to the facts of Wilkins. In Wilkins, the defendant's indictmentand presentencing report indicated that the offense of which the defendant was convicted wasnonprobationable. During sentencing, the trial court commented that the offense wasnonprobationable and sentenced the defendant to 10 years in prison. However, the offense wasprobationable. On appeal, the court rejected the defendant's contention that the trial court'smisunderstanding of the law arguably influenced its sentencing decision. The court foundHausman distinguishable because, "based on the court's comments at the sentencing hearing andthe ultimate sentence imposed, the court clearly had no intention of sentencing defendant to theminimum sentence." Wilkins, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 150.

In this case, during defendant's sentencing hearing, the State noted that defendant hadbeen convicted of two counts of aggravated UUW and that the offense of aggravated UUW is aClass 4 felony that may be punished by between one and three years in prison. After indicatingthat it had considered the parties' arguments in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court stated,"[o]n [aggravated UUW] Counts 3 and 4 which are Class 3 felonies, your sentence is three yearsIllinois Department of Corrections." The mittimus, which was thereafter signed by the trial court,also indicated that aggravated UUW was a Class 4 felony. Here, as in Wilkins, the trial court didnot indicate that it wished to sentence defendant to the minimum or maximum sentence available. The three-year sentence was not the minimum nor the maximum prescribed for a Class 3 felonyand was, in fact, within the range prescribed for a Class 4 felony. Moreover, the record indicatesthat the court was notified that aggravated UUW was a Class 4 felony both by the State and themittimus. In sum, there is simply no indication on the record that the trial court "relied on themistaken belief or used the mistaken belief as a reference point in fashioning the sentence." Hill,294 Ill. App. 3d at 970. Accordingly, the trial court's misstatement, that aggravated UUW was aClass 3 felony, did not arguably influence its sentencing decision and we refuse to vacatedefendant's sentence on this ground.

Next, defendant contends that, because he was prejudiced by inadequate Rule 605(a)(Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001), R. 605(a), eff. October 1, 2001)admonishments during his sentencing hearing, his case should be remanded to the trial court withinstructions that it completely admonish defendant.

Rule 605(a) requires that, at the time of sentencing, a court admonish a defendant who hasbeen found guilty following a trial that in order to preserve his right to appeal, he must file noticeof appeal within 30 days of his sentence, that if the defendant wishes to challenge his sentenceprior to taking appeal, he must file a motion to reconsider his sentence within 30 days, that anysentencing issue not raised in the motion to reconsider will be waived on appeal and that in orderto preserve his right to appeal the defendant must file a notice of appeal within 30 days of thedisposition of his motion to reconsider. Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21 (October 17,2001), R. 605(a), eff. October 1, 2001.

Our supreme court recently addressed the issue of incomplete Rule 605(a) admonishmentsin People v. Henderson, No. 98887 (August 18, 2005). The court held that "where a defendantis given incomplete Rule 605(a) admonishments regarding the preservation of sentencing issuesfor appeal, remand is required only where there has been prejudice or a denial of real justice as aresult of the inadequate admonishment." Henderson, slip op. at 13. The court further held that,as in the case before it, "where no sentencing issues were raised on appeal, defendant [is] neitherprejudiced nor denied real justice." Henderson, slip op. at 17. However, the court noted:

"If defendant had presented actual sentencing challenges in his appeal, theappellate court would at least have been alerted to the existence of these issues. The court then could have taken whatever actions it deemed appropriate, includinghearing the challenges itself or remanding them to the trial court." (Emphasis inoriginal.) Henderson, slip op. at 15.

In this case, the court admonished defendant:

"You have the right to file an appeal, but first you must file a motion within thirtydays of today's date. If you cannot afford a lawyer to assist you, you will,however, be given a free lawyer and free copies of transcripts necessary for thosepurposes."

Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence but did not raise the contention,raised here and discussed above, that the trial court based his sentence for aggravated UUW on itsmistaken belief that the offense was a Class 3 felony. Defendant's motion for reconsideration wasdenied.

Because the court did not admonish defendant of the necessity of filing a motion toreconsider his sentence in order to preserve sentencing issues on appeal, we agree with defendantthat it failed to strictly adhere to Rule 605(a). Defendant concedes that incompleteadmonishments alone do not warrant remand. However, he argues that because he has raised awaived sentencing issue on appeal, he has demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the trial court'sincomplete admonishments and remand is necessary.

We acknowledge that defendant has raised a waived sentencing issue on appeal; however,remand is not warranted in this case. As a result of defendant's raising the issue before this court,we are charged with taking "whatever actions [we] deem[] appropriate, including hearing thechallenge[] [ourselves] or remanding [it] to the trial court." Henderson, slip op. at 15. Significantly, defendant specifically requests that we review the alleged sentencing error ourselvespursuant to the plain error doctrine. In the interest of judicial economy, we have complied withdefendant's request and have found that the alleged error does not warrant vacation ofdefendant's sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing. Defendant has not alerted us toother waived sentencing errors. Accordingly, it is not necessary to remand defendant's case sothat he may be completely admonished pursuant to Rule 605(a).

Finally, defendant contends that the compulsory extraction of his blood and the perpetualstoring of his DNA profile, pursuant to section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 2002)), violates his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searchesand seizures. Defendant asserts that pursuant to the "special needs" test, section 5-4-3 is nothingmore than an attempt to aid law enforcement and therefore is unconstitutional in light of the"individualized suspicion" requirement for fourth amendment purposes. In the alternative,defendant asserts that if we employ the "balancing test" the outcome still favors him.

Pursuant to section 5-4-3, any person convicted or found guilty of any felony offenseunder Illinois law on or after August 22, 2002, must submit a blood, saliva, or tissue specimen tothe Illinois Department of State Police for DNA analysis. 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3(a) (West 2002). This court has repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to section 5-4-3. See People v.Redmond, 357 Ill. App. 3d 256 (2005); People v. Foster, 354 Ill. App. 3d 564 (2004); People v.Butler, 354 Ill. App. 3d 57 (2004); People v. Edwards, 353 Ill. App. 3d 475 (2004); People v.Ramos, 353 Ill. App. 3d 133 (2004); People v. Smythe, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1056 (2004), appealdenied, 213 Ill. 2d 573 (2005); People v. Peppers, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1002 (2004); People v. Hall,352 Ill. App. 3d 537 (2004); accord People v. Garvin, 349 Ill. App. 3d 845 (2004) (SecondDistrict), appeal allowed, 212 Ill. 2d 541 (2004). We continue to adhere to the holding thatsection 5-4-3 is constitutional and similarly reject defendant's arguments.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse both of defendant's convictions of defacing afirearm and one of defendant's convictions of aggravated UUW and affirm the other ofdefendant's convictions of aggravated UUW and the sentence associated with that conviction.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

QUINN, P.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.

1. Section 24-5(b) has since been amended to provide: "A person who possesses anyfirearm upon which any such importer's or manufacturer's serial number has been changed,altered, removed or obliterated commits a Class 3 felony." 720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2004).