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No. 1-01-2624                                                                                                              First Division
                                                                                                                                      June 24, 2002

PRESIDING JUSTICE COHEN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant Terran Quinn, a/k/a Terrance Veal,⁽¹⁾ was convicted ofpossession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a church andsentenced to seven years in prison. 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2), 407(b)(1) (West 2000). Defendantthen pled guilty to a violation of probation and received a three-year concurrent sentence (00 CR7792). Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court impermissibly restricted hisconstitutional right to cross-examine the surveillance officer with respect to his exactsurveillance location.

The State's evidence established that on May 30, 2000, Chicago police officer HerbertBetancourt, using binoculars from a distance of 75 to 100 feet, observed defendant conduct fournarcotics transactions near 810 North Springfield, which was within 613 feet of a church locatedat 901 North Springfield. Each time, Officer Betancourt observed an individual approachdefendant and hand him currency. Defendant then walked north to a wooden fence, bent downand tore an object from a strip of tape, and returned tendering the object to the individual. Afterthe fourth transaction, Officer Betancourt radioed the information to backup officers andinstructed them to detain "a male black wearing a New York jersey with jeans, jean shorts." Officer Betancourt remained in his surveillance location to watch defendant's arrest and direct anofficer to the base of the fence to recover the strip of tape.

Officer Betancourt testified that the police had used the secret area of surveillance prior toand after defendant's arrest. Officer Betancourt identified photographs depicting the church, thearea in which he observed the defendant conducting the transactions, and the wooden fence fromwhere defendant retrieved the narcotics.

On cross-examination, Officer Betancourt testified that none of the four individuals whoapproached defendant were detained, and neither his police report nor his grand jury testimonyinclude the fact that he was using binoculars. He then answered a series of questions about thesurveillance which established that he was on foot, in uniform, south of Chicago Avenue, in the700 block, on the east side of the street, and on the same side of the street as a vacant lot shownin one of the photographs. The trial court sustained the State's objections to the followingquestions: "Were you in a building? *** You were not in the vacant lot. *** Were you south ofthat vacant lot?"

Officer Patrick Thelen, one of the enforcement officers, testified that he received a radiocommunication from Officer Betancourt instructing him to apprehend a male black, about fivefeet nine inches tall and weighing 150 pounds, wearing a blue New York jersey and blue jeansshorts standing at approximately 810 North Springfield. Officer Thelen maintained radio contactwith Officer Betancourt, who subsequently verified that the officers had the correct person andthen directed the officers to the strip of tape containing narcotics. The officers recovered thestrip of tape containing 12 objects, 6 of which were tested and contained 1.1 grams of cocaine,and $78 from defendant's pocket.

On appeal, defendant contends that his constitutional rights under the confrontationclause (U.S. Const., amend. VI) were violated when the trial court precluded him from cross-examining Officer Betancourt as to the exact location of his surveillance. Defendant asserts thatthe exact location of Officer Betancourt's surveillance should have been disclosed based on thiscourt's decision in People v. Knight, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1117 (2001), which was decided subsequentto defendant's trial and sentencing hearing.

A defendant has a fundamental right to confront witnesses against him, but the trial courtmay limit the scope of cross-examination. People v. Criss, 294 Ill. App. 3d 276, 279 (1998). Adefendant's right to confront a witness is not absolute, and the right to cross-examine is satisfiedwhen the defendant is permitted to expose the fact-finder to facts from which it can assesscredibility and reliability of the witness. People v. Averhart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 492, 497 (1999). The trial court's determination regarding the latitude permitted on cross-examination will not bedisturbed "absent a clear abuse of discretion that resulted in manifest prejudice." Criss, 294 Ill.App. 3d at 279-80.

The State enjoys a "qualified privilege" regarding the disclosure of secret surveillancelocations. Criss, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 281; accord Knight, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1128. The need fordisclosure is decided on a case-by-case basis, balancing the public interest with the defendant'sneed to prepare a defense. Criss, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 281. Thus, the trial court should try toprotect the public interest in keeping the exact surveillance location secret but also take the stepsnecessary to ensure accurate fact-finding. Criss, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 281. The factors the courtshould consider regarding the public interest in nondisclosure are the crime charged, the possibledefenses, and the potential significance of the privileged information. Knight, 323 Ill. App. 3d at1127. The Knight court distinguished the extent of the qualified privilege at trial from that at asuppression hearing and held that "at trial disclosure of a surveillance point will be compelled ifthe allegedly privileged information is material on the issue of guilt." Knight, 323 Ill. App. 3d at1126-27.

Initially, the State contends that defendant has waived the issue by failing to make aformal offer of proof at trial. We disagree. An offer of proof "is not required where it isapparent that the trial court clearly understood the nature and character of the evidence sought tobe introduced, or where the question itself and the circumstances surrounding it show thepurpose and materiality of the evidence." People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 458 (1993). Here,the nature of the evidence sought to be introduced was clear, and defendant also included theissue in his post-trial motion.

However, we find no abuse of discretion in this case. Defendant was allowed to cross-examine Officer Betancourt extensively with respect to his surveillance, lighting conditions, andany possible obstructions. Without pinpointing the exact surveillance location, defendant waspermitted to establish the officer's position sufficiently enough to allow the trial court to assessthe officer's credibility and reliability. In addition, defendant was also allowed to elicit thatOfficer Betancourt did not include in his police report or grand jury testimony the fact that he hadused binoculars, a relevant area of impeachment. See Averhart, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 497. Weconclude the trial court properly granted the State a qualified privilege regarding the disclosure ofthe exact surveillance location of Officer Betancourt. Criss, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 281-82.

We find the case upon which defendant relies factually distinguishable. In Knight, thiscourt found prejudicial error when the application of the privilege of nondisclosure severelyhampered the defendant's ability to cross-examine the surveillance officer to cast doubt on histestimony. Knight, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1128. However, in Knight, the identity of the offenderwas contested, and the police officer, who was not using binoculars, admitted he and his partnerlost sight of the alleged offender for one to two minutes as they drove from the surveillancepoint. Knight, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1120. The police officer also testified that "from hisobservation of defendant he could not recall what type of jacket he was wearing." Knight, 323Ill. App. 3d at 1120. In addition, the church pastor testified that defendant had been helpingunload the church van at the location, and she never saw him selling drugs. Knight, 323 Ill.App. 3d at 1120. Defendant and defendant's girlfriend testified that another man defendant knewas "D.C." wore a jacket similar to defendant's had been selling drugs nearby. Knight, 323 Ill.App. 3d at 1120-21.

Furthermore, the officer testified he saw the defendant take money in exchange for an object, butno money was recovered from the defendant when he was arrested immediately thereafter.

Knight, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1119-20. Most notably for purposes of the present appeal, the Knightcourt did not establish an absolute rule but, rather, recognized that a qualified privilege does existat trial for the disclosure of a surveillance location. Knight, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1128.

Unlike the circumstances in Knight, identity was not at issue in this case. OfficerBetancourt radioed a detailed description of defendant, including a description of the clothesdefendant was wearing, and remained in radio contact with the enforcement officers untildefendant was arrested and the narcotics were recovered. Officer Thelen corroborated thattestimony. Moreover, defendant was allowed to extensively cross-examine Officer Betancourtand pinpoint his surveillance location sufficiently enough to allow the trial court to evaluate histestimony without revealing the exact surveillance location. Considering the public's interest inkeeping the surveillance location a secret and the relative insignificance of the exact point ofsurveillance in light of the specificity uncovered on cross-examination, we conclude that the trialcourt did not abuse its discretion by minimally limiting cross-examination. See People v. Green,322 Ill. App. 3d 747, 759-60 (2001)(we look to what a defendant has been "allowed" to do oncross-examination in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Affirmed.

TULLY and COUSINS, JJ., concur.

1. In the record, Defendant is alternately referred to as "Terran Quinn," "Terrance Quinn,"and "Terrance Veal." Defendant signed a jury waiver, using two names: "Terrance Veal" and"Terran Quinn." The order of sentence and commitment refers to defendant as "Terran QuinnAKA Terrance Veal." Defendant told the trial court his correct name is "Veal."