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JUSTICE BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant William Ponyi appeals from the trial court'sdismissal of his pro se petition for postconviction relief. Theissues on appeal are: (1) whether the trial court's determinationof whether the pro se postconviction petition was frivolous orwithout merit was tainted by a discussion that took place betweenthe trial judge and the assistant State's Attorney; (2) whetherdefendant raised the gist of a meritorious claim that his right tothe effective assistance of counsel was denied based on hisallegation that defense counsel failed to explain the plea bargainprocess; and (3) whether defendant raised the gist of a meritoriousclaim that his right to the effective assistance of counsel wasdenied when trial counsel failed to request a fitness hearingpursuant to section 104-21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of1963 (725 ILCS 5/104-21(a)(West 1994)). For the reasons thatfollow, we reverse and remand for the appointment of an attorney.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On January 28, 1994, after a jury trial, defendant wasconvicted of possession of a controlled substance and possession ofa controlled substance with intent to deliver. He was sentenced onApril 22, 1994, to 21 years in the Illinois Department ofCorrections. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on directappeal on June 10, 1996. People v. Ponyi, No. 1-94-1515 (1996)(unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23).

On January 2, 1997, defendant filed a pro se petition forpostconviction relief. Defendant alleged in the petition that hisright to the effective assistance of counsel was denied when histrial counsel failed to inform him of the nature of a plea offermade by the State or to adequately explain the plea. Defendantalso alleged that his right to the effective assistance of counselwas denied when his trial counsel failed to inform the trial courtthat he was on psychotropic drugs at the time of his sentencinghearing. Defendant also alleged that he was denied his right todue process of law when he was denied his right to a fitnesshearing pursuant to section 104-21(a) (725 ILCS 5/104-21(a)(West1994)). Attached to the petition were defendant's affidavit, aprison law clerk's affidavit, and a letter requesting defendant'smedical records from Cermak Health Services. On February 27, 1997,the trial court dismissed defendant's petition as frivolous andwithout merit.

After filing his brief on appeal from the dismissal of thepostconviction petition, defendant filed a motion to supplement therecord with the medical records he received from Cermak HealthServices covering the time period of January 28, 1994, to April 6,1994. The medical records from Cermak Health Services and themedication log sheets from the residential treatment unit indica-ted that Desipramine was administered to defendant from March 8through March 31. Although the medication log sheets for the monthof April were not included with the records, a prescription, datedApril 11, 1994, was included, and it ordered Desipramine tocontinue with 50 milligrams in the morning and 100 millegrams atnight. On August 12, 1998, this court granted defendant's motionto supplement the record on appeal with the medical records andremanded the matter to the trial court "for its consideration ofthe medical records and a reconsideration of its previous order."

On May 21, 1999, the trial court held the remand hearing. Harry Semrow, an assistant State's Attorney, appeared on behalf ofthe State. Defendant was not represented by an attorney. At thehearing, the trial court asked the State several questions aboutthe law and the facts:

"THE COURT: Okay Mr. Semrow, what is thecurrent fitness standard? What does thatprovide?

MR. SEMROW: Well, currently it providesthere must be, absent the showing, before theCourt, that the Defendant is not entitled to afitness hearing. However, at the time thatthis offense occurred, the law provided thatthe Defendant would be entitled to a fitnesshearing in the event that approximate to the,uh -

THE COURT: Date of sentencing.

MR. SEMROW: Well, approximate to thecrucial period of time -

THE COURT: Either the trial or the dateof sentencing.

MR. SEMROW: Yes. That he had ingestedsome psychotropic medications. It was,therefore, in this instance, and I believe theCourt had an opportunity to review the recordsand to make a determination whether or not inthis Court's judgment psychotropic medicationswere ingested at the times approximate, uh -

THE COURT: Prior to sentencing.

MR. SEMROW: Prior to sentencing.

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THE COURT: So the question we have beforeus is whether he was administered medicationprior to - immediately prior to the sentencinghearing which could have certainly affectedhis right to cooperate with Counsel and assistin his defense as to the issue of sentencing. Is that correct?

MR. SEMROW: Yes. I believe the remand ofthe Appellate Court was to have this Courtreview the medical records and the drugingestion records that were submitted.

THE COURT: Didn't I review them oncealready?

MR. SEMROW: Judge, they were not presen-ted to this Court when the post-convictionpetition was presented. This Court initiallydismissed this matter as being frivolous andblatantly without merit because theallegations were totally unsupported. It wasupon the appeal to the Appellate Court thatthe Appellate Court Counsel, I must surmise,got the Petitioner to waive his rights toconfidentiality and acquire those medicalrecords and presented them to the AppellateCourt. The Appellate Court then looked atthose records and sent them back to this Courtsaying given these medical records would thischange your conclusion as to whether or notthis individual was denied his right to afitness hearing because of ingestion ofpsychotropic medications approximate to thetime of the sentencing.

THE COURT: People versus Kincade standson the issue, does it not, how any observationthis Court observed during his sentencing,that is essentially irrelevant. Is that cor-rect?

MR. SEMROW: That would be irrelevant dueto the fact that if he were ingestingpsychotropic medications at that time,pursuant to the statute, and I don't remeberthe section offhand, but pursuant to thestatute, the individual was ingesting drugsapproximate to that time. He was entitled byvirtue of that fact and that fact alone to afitness hearing. And the determination then,therefore, would be whether or not he ingesteddrugs approximate to -

THE COURT: Correct me if I'm wrong. Therecords show that Mellaril and Sinequan wereadministered February 3 and March 27.

MR. SEMROW: I believe that's accurate,Judge.

THE COURT: And Desipramine was adminis-tered March 7 and April 7. And he was sen-tenced 4-22. So there's a fifteen day span,is there not?

MR. SEMROW: By my calculations that'saccurate.

THE COURT: Well, it's this Court'sconclusion that a fifteen day period, andcertainly, it does not appear that he wasoverdosed, that he was provided in this inthose medical quantities on those dates, a 15day period would certainly be a sufficientperiod, this Court finds, to dissipate anyeffect that it would have in him."

Thereafter, the trial judge ruled that the original dismissal orderwould stand and requested that the assistant State's Attorneyprepare something for his signature.

Defendant filed a supplemental brief addressing the trialcourt's decision on limited remand.

DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 etseq. (West 1994)) provides a remedy to criminal defendants whoclaim that a substantial violation of their federal or stateconstitu-tional rights occurred in their trial or sentencinghearing. See People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). Thescope of a post-conviction proceeding, which is a collateral attackon a prior conviction and sentence, is limited to inquiry intoconstitutional issues involved in the conviction and sentence thathave not been, and could not have been, adjudicated previously ondirect appeal. See Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 502.

An evidentiary hearing on the petition is required only whenthe allegations of the petition, supported by the trial record andthe accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing of aviolation of a constitutional right. See People v. Hobley, 182Ill. 2d 404, 428 (1998). For the purpose of determining whether togrant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in thepetition and in the supporting affidavits are to be taken as true. See Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 503. If the circuit court determinesthat the petition should be dismissed without an evidentiaryhearing, its judgment is subject to de novo review. See Peoplev. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).

B. INPUT FROM STATE DURING PROCEEDING

In its supplemental brief addressing issues raised at thehearing on limited remand, defendant contends that the State'sinput at the remand hearing "tainted the circuit court'sindependent evaluation" of the petition and, thus, the court'sdenial of the petition should be reversed.

Under the Act, a postconviction proceeding that does notinvolve the death penalty has three distinct stages. 725 ILCS5/122-2.1 (West 1994). In the first stage, the defendant files apetition and the circuit court must, within 90 days, determinewhether it is frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2)(West 1994). In this first stage, the Act does not permitany further pleadings from the State. "Instead, the circuit courtconsiders the petition independently, without any input from eitherside." People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). If thepetition is not dismissed after the first stage, it advances to thesecond stage for the appointment of counsel. 725 ILCS 5/122-4(West 1994). In the second stage, the State may file a motion todismiss or answer the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 1994). Ifthe circuit court does not dismiss or deny the petition in thesecond stage, the proceeding advances to the final stage where thecircuit court conducts an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122-6(West 1994).

As noted in Gaultney, although the Act specificallycontemplates that the State may file a motion to dismiss or answeronly after the trial court has made its "first stage" independentevaluation of the petition to determine if it is frivolous, themere premature filing of a motion or responsive pleading in thefirst stage does not per se contaminate the circuit court'sdetermination of frivolousness. See Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418-19. This is because such a premature filing does not necessarilyprevent the judge from conducting an independent evaluation. SeeGaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 419 However, "reversal is required wherethe record shows that the circuit court sought or relied on inputfrom the State when determining whether the petition is frivolous." Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 419 and cases cited therein.

Here, the trial court clearly relied on the State's input whenit reconsidered defendant's petition and denied it. The courtsought input from the State when it asked the State about thecurrent fitness standard. The court also questioned the Stateabout the contents of defendant's medical records. The Staterepresented to the court that the last time the defendant receivedmedication was on April 7. However, as pointed out in defendant'sbrief on appeal, the medical records also contained a prescriptiondated April 11, 1994, and it ordered Desipramine to continue with50 milligrams in the morning and 100 milligrams at night. Thus,the record suggests that defendant was taking medication beyond theApril 7 date. Had the judge independently reviewed the record, hemay have realized that fact. Instead, the judge relied on theState's concurrence that defendant last received medication onApril 7. Therefore, we find that the circuit court's ruling wasimproperly tainted by the State's input.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the circuit court's order dismissing defendant'spetition is hereby reversed and the cause is remanded for furtherproceedings consistent with sections 122-4 through 122-6 of theAct. Consequently, we need not reach defendant's arguments relatedto the merits of his petition.

Reversed and Remanded.

Zwick. P.J., and Campbell, J., concur.