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FOURTH DIVISION
Filed: 12/13/01

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Michael Pittman, was convicted of two counts of armedrobbery. The trial court imposed concurrent extended term sentences of 50 years. This courtaffirmed the defendant's convictions and sentences on direct appeal. People v. Pittman, 126 Ill. App.3d 586, 467 N.E.2d 918 (1984). On May 1, 2000, the defendant filed a pro se petition⁽¹⁾ seeking post-conviction or habeas corpus relief in which he raised several allegations not at issue in the instantappeal. On June 9, 2000, the trial court summarily dismissed the defendant's petition, finding thatthe post-conviction petition was frivolous and patently without merit and that the habeas corpuspetition also lacked merit. The defendant appeals from that dismissal order.

On appeal, the defendant has abandoned the substantive claims raised in his pro se petitionof May 1, 2000. Instead he argues that he is entitled to post-conviction and habeas corpus reliefbecause sections 1005--5--3.2(b)(1) and 1005--8--2 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (Ill.Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005--5-3.2(b)(1), par. 1005--8--2), pursuant to which his extended termsentences were imposed, violate the United States and Illinois constitutions in that they, whenapplied in conjunction, permit the imposition of a sentence beyond the statutorily prescribedmaximum upon the finding of facts not submitted to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In support of his argument, the defendant relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 147L. Ed. 2d 435, 455, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000), where the United States Supreme Court heldthat, under the due process clause and the jury trial guarantee of the United States Constitution,"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond thestatutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." We neednot resolve the parties' dispute as to whether the rule announced in Apprendi applies in collateralproceedings because the sentencing provisions at issue do not violate either the United States orIllinois constitutions.

Sections 1005--5--3.2(b)(1) and 1005--8--2, applied in conjunction, authorized the impositionof an extended term sentence where a defendant was convicted of a felony after having beenconvicted of the same or greater class felony in Illinois within the previous 10 years upon chargesseparately brought and tried. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005--5--3.2(b)(1), par. 1005--8--2. As stated above, the Apprendi court clearly exempted prior convictions from the category ofsentence enhancing facts which must be submitted to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. For this reason, this courthas already rejected, on a number of occasions, the argument that sections 5--5--3.2(b)(1) and 5--8--2⁽²⁾ (730 ILCS 5/5--5--3.2(b)(1), 5--8--2 (West 1998)), the current codifications of section 1005--5--3.2(b)(1) and 1005--8--2, applied in conjunction, violate the United States Constitution. See Peoplev. Landrum, 323 Ill. App. 3d 664, 666-67, 755 N.E.2d 18 (2001); People v. Garry, 323 Ill. App. 3d292, 300-01, 752 N.E.2d 1244 (2001); People v. Childress, 321 Ill. App. 3d 13, 26-27, 746 N.E.2d783 (2001). We find no need to analyze the issue further and again reject the argument.

The defendant also argues, however, that the imposition of an extended term sentencepursuant to sections 1005--5--3.2(b)(1) and 1005--8--2 violated his right to a jury trial under theIllinois constitution. We disagree.

Illinois courts generally, though not in all circumstances, apply United States Supreme Courtdecisions interpreting Federal constitutional provisions when interpreting similar provisionscontained in the Illinois constitution. People v. Levin, 157 Ill. 2d 138, 159, 623 N.E.2d 317 (1993).In People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 214, 533 N.E.2d 873 (1988), though, our supremecourt held that "as to the jury trial issue, there is a difference in the language of our State constitutionfrom that of the Federal Constitution, and the difference is one of substance and not merely one ofform."

The right to a trial by jury is discussed in two places in the Illinois constitution. Article I,section 8 provides that "[i]n criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right *** to have aspeedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have beencommitted." Illinois Constitution 1970, art. I,