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SIXTH DIVISION
December16, 2005

JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the opinion of the court:

A jury found defendant Kelvin Norwood guilty of aggravated arson and first degreemurder committed in an exceptionally brutal or heinous manner indicative of wanton cruelty. Thetrial court sentenced him to an extended term of 100 years for first degree murder and aconsecutive term of 20 years for aggravated arson. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trialcourt improperly admitted evidence of defendant's other crimes and bad acts; (2) the Stateminimized its burden of proof during closing argument; and (3) the trial court improperly denieddefendant's motion to waive a jury determination of the wanton cruelty, extended-term sentencingissue. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

On Monday evening, January 31, 2000, firefighters responding to a fire discoveredMaryanne Norwood's charred remains in her Chicago apartment. She died of multiple stabwounds and her apartment was burned at some point after her death. Defendant, the victim's son,was arrested in Springfield on February 1, 2000, and later charged with multiple crimes, includingfirst degree murder accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, arson, burglary of atrucking company, possession of a stolen motor vehicle from the trucking company, andpossession of burglary tools.

Defendant demanded a jury trial but moved to waive his rights pursuant to Apprendi v.New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), to have a jury determinewhether exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior existed. The trial court denied the motion,ruling that defendant could not request a jury trial on the charges and waive the jury determinationon the particular factual issue related to the imposition of an extended-term sentence. Defendantalso moved to dismiss the brutal and heinous behavior counts as invalid, arguing the additionalfact was not an element of first degree murder. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that theState properly alleged brutal and heinous behavior in the charging instrument. Defendant alsomoved to bifurcate the hearing to prove the existence of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavioronly after and if the jury returned a guilty verdict for first degree murder. The defense argued itwould be very prejudicial for the jury to consider defendant's guilt or innocence simultaneouslywith evidence, like graphic photographs, associated with the brutal and heinous nature of thecrime. The trial court denied the motion, noting that the photographic evidence was admissibleregardless of the extended-term sentencing issue.

The court granted defendant's motion to sever the counts of burglary, possession of thestolen truck, and possession of burglary tools. However, the court reserved ruling on theadmissibility of evidence concerning the burglary, stolen truck, and circumstances of defendant'sarrest as relevant other-crimes evidence with regard to the murder and arson charges. The courtreasoned that the relevance and prejudice of the other-crimes evidence would be betterunderstood in context during the course of the trial.

At the trial for murder and arson, the State presented evidence that the victim rented anapartment above her landlords, Willie and Hazel Hubbard, for about six years before the fire. About December 1999, the victim introduced defendant to her landlords and asked if defendantcould live with her. Defendant sat in the Hubbards' living room with Mr. Hubbard while thevictim spoke with Mrs. Hubbard in the kitchen. The Hubbards allowed defendant to move intothe victim's apartment.

On Thursday, January 27, 2000, the victim, during a telephone conversation with hersister Amy Harrison, explained that she wanted to "put [defendant] out." The victim also had twotelephone conversations with her sister Annie Bibbs about 10:30 p.m. and 1 a.m. The victim alsohad an hour-long telephone conversation with defendant's girlfriend Connie Burage, who had beendating defendant for a month after meeting him at a Narcotics Anonymous meeting. Whendefendant returned Burage's telephone call about 1 a.m., she asked him why he took the victim'smoney and what was going on. Defendant responded that he lost his job, was depressed andwanted to get high.

On Friday morning, January 28, 2000, Burage telephoned the victim, who said she did notwant defendant to stay at her apartment anymore. The victim also spoke with Harrison, statingthat she wanted to help defendant get off drugs and into church. She also wanted defendant, whowas giving her a hard time, to leave.

On Saturday afternoon, January 29, 2000, the victim told Bibbs that she was going to takedefendant to a minister to get him help. The victim also went downstairs and gave Mrs. Hubbarda dish of mixed greens. Neither the Hubbards nor the victim's sisters heard from the victim afterSaturday.

When defendant and Burage spoke on Saturday, defendant said he would go to aNarcotics Anonymous meeting, but Burage decided not to go. Defendant called Burage about9:30 p.m. and said he would go home after the meeting to get the victim's car and then buy somegroceries for dinner at Burage's place. However, defendant never went to Burage's place thatnight. Burage telephoned the victim's apartment several times after 10 p.m., but no one answeredand the answering machine did not respond. There was still no answer when Burage called at 7a.m. Sunday morning.

About 10 a.m. on Sunday, defendant called Burage and said he had gone to work thatmorning at Roosevelt Moving Company. (However, the owner of Roosevelt Moving testifiedthat defendant had worked on Saturday but not after that day.) Defendant told Burage that he didnot go to her place last night because he and the victim were arguing, she was "tripping," and shedid not want him to go to Burage's home. Thereafter, defendant drove the victim's car toBurage's home and said the victim had gone shopping with one of her sisters. (However, Bibbsand Harrison testified that they did not see the victim on Sunday.) Defendant drove Burage to aNarcotics Anonymous meeting and borrowed $10 from her, saying it was for bus fare for a jobinterview the next day.

On Monday, January 31, defendant drove Burage to work using the victim's car. Later,about 9 p.m., defendant went to Burage's house and explained that he did not need to pick up thevictim from work because she left early and was already home. (However, the victim's supervisortestified that, to his knowledge, the victim never appeared for work on January 31.) Defendantleft Burage's home about 9:20 p.m. with money from Burage to purchase food for her and herchildren, but he failed to return.

About 10 p.m. at the victim's apartment building, Mrs. Hubbard heard the hallway smokealarm and called to her husband, who was lying on his bed. Smoke detectors were installed in thevictim's bedroom and at the landing right outside her apartment. The Hubbards met in their livingroom and talked briefly. The smoke alarm stopped ringing, and Mr. Hubbard heard footstepscoming down the stairs. He opened his apartment door and saw smoke coming from the secondfloor. In the lighted hallway, he met defendant, who stood only three feet away and appeared tobe clutching something under his arm. Mr. Hubbard was not wearing his prescription glasses atthe time. Defendant said that everything was okay and he had merely burned some chicken. Mrs.Hubbard heard the conversation from inside her living room and recognized defendant's voicefrom earlier conversations with him. Defendant left the building, and Mr. Hubbard went back intohis apartment. When smoke started to enter the Hubbards' apartment, Mr. Hubbard went upstairsand found the victim's apartment doorknob was hot to the touch. He summoned the firedepartment.

Mr. Hubbard was 75 years old and, about one year after the fire, had surgery to remove atumor behind one of his eyes. He insisted, however, that his vision at the time of the offense wasunaffected. Furthermore, his grand jury testimony indicated that he opened the victim's apartmentdoor but immediately closed it because the smoke was so intense and the fire was hot.

The fire department discovered the victim's charred remains lying facedown in her livingroom. Expert testimony established that the fire resulted from a human act and had two points oforigin: one near the living room couch close to the victim's body, and the other in the bedroomon a bed. The victim sustained multiple stab wounds and blunt force trauma before the fire wasset. Blows to her face broke her teeth and cheekbones and caused lacerations on her mouth andswelling in her head. She was stabbed several times, including above her left eyebrow, on herneck, behind her left ear, in her back, and on her elbow. The multiple stab wounds caused herdeath.

Detectives investigating the homicide discovered the victim's car at Flash Trucking, wheredefendant had been recently employed. During the early morning hours of February 1, 2000,Flash Trucking employees found that a Mack truck was missing. Furthermore, truck keys, a fuelcard and tollway card were stolen from the office. Outside of Flash Trucking, an evidencetechnician recovered a plastic folder containing defendant's identification and wallet-sizedphotographs of his child, her mother Rachel Dixon of Springfield, Illinois, and Dixon's otherchildren. The police also recovered a smoke detector from the rear passenger seat of the victim'scar. The police investigation determined that the hallway smoke detector outside the victim'sapartment was missing, and only a broken piece of its bracket remained. The State contended themissing bracket piece from the hallway smoke detector was the same part attached to the smokedetector recovered in the victim's car. Furthermore, another smoke detector mounted in thevictim's bedroom was detached from its wall mount.

Defendant arrived at Dixon's home in Springfield about 7 a.m. on February 1 and parkedthe Flash Trucking truck in front of her house. He spent the day with Dixon, running errands andnapping. About 2:30 p.m., the doorbell rang, and Dixon answered it while defendant stoodbehind her. Gary Mendenhall identified himself as being with the Department of Corrections,raised his gun and told defendant to come out with his hands up. Defendant pushed Dixonoutside and shut the door. Through the door, defendant told Dixon to get Mendenhall's phonenumber so defendant could telephone him from inside the house. Dixon's infant was crying insidethe house, and defendant said he would give Dixon the infant if Mendenhall backed away from thedoor. However, when Dixon reached for the infant, defendant pulled her back inside the house. Defendant instructed Dixon to hold the baby and walk with him as he paced. He called 911 in anunsuccessful attempt to speak to Mendenhall. He retrieved a steak knife from the kitchen and putit underneath the bedroom mattress. When Mendenhall tried to kick in the front door, defendantgrabbed Dixon around her neck and chest as she held the baby and sat on the ground with hisback against the door and his feet braced against the wall.

Mendenhall and two responding officers kicked open the back door and entered the livingroom with their guns drawn. Defendant let the officers take the infant but pressed a mobile phoneto Dixon's back and told her to tell the officers that he had a weapon at her back. Defendant thenreleased Dixon, who did not comply with his instruction. The officers then arrested defendant.

In accordance with the trial court's prior ruling concerning other-crimes evidence, theState did not elicit testimony that defendant was on parole or that there was a parole violation. During Dixon's cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony that Mendenhall pointed hisgun above Dixon's head while defendant stood behind her, defendant slammed the door shut, andSpringfield police officers arrived on the scene after defendant called 911. At a sidebar, theprosecutors argued that defense counsel had now opened the door to allow the prosecution toelicit testimony that defendant knew the man at the door was a parole officer. The prosecutionargued that the cross-examination had given the jury the impression that defendant slammed thedoor and called 911because a man came to Dixon's door and pointed a gun at them. Defensecounsel responded that the purpose of the questioning was to explain why defendant slammed thedoor and called 911.

The trial court ruled that the State had relevant evidence regarding why defendantslammed the door closed and, due to the defense's intimation during cross-examination, theprobative value of that other-crimes evidence now outweighed its prejudicial nature. Dixon couldnot testify that Mendenhall announced that defendant was wanted for a murder case, but theprosecution now could elicit the testimony that defendant knew that he was on parole and said hewas wanted for a violation. The trial court also agreed to give the jury a limiting instruction.

On redirect, Dixon testified that when Mendenhall rang the doorbell, defendant told herMendenhall was from the Department of Corrections. Dixon, however, thought he was from thehousing authority and asked why the Department of Corrections would want to speak todefendant. Defendant responded that it was about a parole violation. When defendant called 911,he asked why officers were outside the house and indicated that he wanted to speak with theofficers.

After that testimony, the court explained to the jury that evidence was received thatdefendant was involved in offenses other than those charged in the indictment. That evidence wasreceived on the issues of defendant's design and the circumstances surrounding his arrest andcould be considered by the jury only for those limited purposes. The jury must determine whetherdefendant was involved in those offenses and the weight to give that evidence on the issues ofdesign and the circumstances surrounding his arrest.

After defendant's arrest, he telephoned Burage from Springfield. She asked him whathappened and whether he hurt his mother and told him his mother had died. He denied killing hismother and sounded like he was pretending to cry. He tried to convince Burage that he was ather house at 10 p.m. on the night of the fire, but Burage responded that he left her house at 9:20p.m.

After closing argument, the jury returned a verdict of guilty for aggravated arson, firstdegree murder, and first degree murder accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behaviorindicative of wanton cruelty. The trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial andthereafter sentenced him to an extended-term sentence of 100 years for first degree murderaccompanied by brutal or heinous behavior and a consecutive term of 20 years for aggravatedarson. Defendant appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Other-Crimes Evidence

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to useevidence concerning his other crimes and prior bad acts. Defendant argues evidence concerninghis alleged drug use, theft of money from the victim, theft and burglary at Flash Trucking, andparole status was irrelevant, highly prejudicial and served only to show that he had a propensity tocommit other crimes and was a bad person deserving of punishment. Defendant argues theerroneous admission of that evidence, both individually and cumulatively, denied him a fair trial. We disagree, as the record established that the court acted within its discretion in admitting theevidence and gave the jury a limiting instruction.

Other-crimes evidence encompasses misconduct or criminal acts that occurred eitherbefore or after the allegedly criminal conduct for which the defendant is standing trial. People v.Spyres, No. 4-03-0883, slip op. at 5 (September 26, 2005). Other-crimes evidence is admissibleto prove any material fact relevant to the case (People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170 (2003)), but is inadmissible if it is relevant only to demonstrate a defendant's propensity to engage incriminal activity (People v. Hendricks, 137 Ill. 2d 31, 52 (1990)). Such evidence may beadmissible when it is relevant to show, among other things, motive, intent, identity, absence ofmistake or accident, modus operandi, or the existence of a common plan or design. People v.Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127, 135-36 (2005). However, even when relevant for a permissible purpose,other-crimes evidence may be excluded by the trial court if its prejudicial effect substantiallyoutweighs its probative value. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 365 (1991).

The admissibility of other-crimes evidence is left to the trial court's sound discretion, andwe will not disturb that decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d at 136. Atrial court's determination constitutes an abuse of discretion if it is arbitrary, fanciful orunreasonable, or if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Illgen,145 Ill. 2d at 364.

1. Drug Use and Theft of Money from the Victim

Defendant contends the State repeatedly and improperly elicited irrelevant and highlyprejudicial testimony that he had a prior drug problem or was a drug abuser and met Burage whilehe was in rehabilitation for his alleged drug problems. Defendant also contends there was nodirect link between the evidence regarding money he allegedly stole from the victim before themurder and arson. Although defendant contends the trial court overruled numerous defenseobjections to the introduction of this evidence, defendant does not support this contention bycitation to the record.

According to the State, evidence of defendant's drug use and theft was admitted in thefollowing manner. Over the defense's objection, Harrison testified that the victim said she"wanted to get [defendant] off drugs." Furthermore, without objection, Burage testified thatwhen she asked defendant why he took the victim's money, he responded that he lost his job, wasdepressed and wanted to get high. Burage also testified, without objection, that she metdefendant at a Narcotics Anonymous meeting and they twice discussed plans to attend NarcoticsAnonymous meetings. When Dixon explained that defendant obtained a picture in his wallet froma woman he met in "rehab," the trial court sustained defendant's objection to this unsolicitedresponse from Dixon. Our review of the record supports the State's account of the evidenceconcerning defendant's drug use and theft of money.

Defendant's failure to object to particular testimony fails to preserve that issue for review. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Although we do not find that the evidence here isclosely balanced, we will review any forfeited issues concerning the drug and theft evidencebecause the erroneous admission of such other-crimes evidence could deprive a defendant of a fairtrial. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79 (2005).

We find that the evidence of defendant's drug use and theft of the victim's money wasadmissible to show defendant's motive. Contrary to defendant's assertions on appeal, the Statedid not argue that defendant killed his mother to get money to use drugs but, rather, that hismotive arose from their dispute over his drug use. Defendant wanted to use drugs, and hismother wanted to stop him. The ensuing rift between them led to her wanting him to leave herhome. His response was to murder her, burn her body, dump her car and flee.

Generally, while any evidence which tends to show that an accused had a motive forcommitting murder is relevant, to be competent, it must at least to a slight degree tend to establishthe existence of the motive relied on. People v. Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d 22, 56 (1984). To support itstheory that defendant killed the victim because they were arguing about his drug use, the Statepresented evidence that, just prior to the murder and arson, the victim informed her sisters anddefendant's girlfriend that she was upset by his behavior. She wanted him to get off drugs andinto church, to get help, and move out of her home. Testimony that defendant characterized hismother as "tripping," and that he was depressed, lost his job, and took her money so he could gethigh gave the jury the necessary and minimum background information to understand theseriousness of the dispute and how it could escalate into murder. See People v. Whalen, 238 Ill.App. 3d 994, 1001-02 (1992) (where money was missing from the murder victim's safe and hisson possessed a large amount of cash after the murder, additional evidence that the son used thatmoney to buy and use cocaine was relevant and admissible to show the son's necessary attitude ofdesperation required to kill his father). There was a direct link between the proffered testimonyand the motive for the murder. The State demonstrated that defendant's drug use was a source offriction between defendant and his mother, and the situation escalated just prior to the murder andarson.

Moreover, the evidence of defendant's drug use and theft was not overly detailed. Thetrial judge exercised his discretion to limit that testimony to the minimum necessary to give thejury a complete understanding of the State's evidence regarding defendant's motive for killing hismother. The trial court precluded testimony that defendant ransacked the victim's apartmentsearching for the money. The victim's sister was not allowed to elaborate on the kind of help thevictim wanted to get for defendant. Moreover, there was no testimony about the type, amount orfrequency of defendant's drug use or the amount of money he stole. Furthermore, theprosecution's reference during closing argument to defendant's drug use and theft was propercommentary upon the evidence presented. People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 441 (1993). TheState did not unfairly comment upon or emphasize that evidence but, rather, discussed it as arelevant part of the argument between defendant and the victim to establish defendant's motive. Accordingly, the prejudice from that evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value. We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the drug use and theft testimony.

Defendant's reliance on People v. Maounis, 309 Ill. App. 3d 155 (1999), is misplaced. InMauonis, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery in that he pointed a gun at a businessemployee and took all the money from the cash register. Maounis, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 157. Attrial, the State presented a detective's testimony that the defendant said he was staying in varioustransient hotels with a prostitute buying alcohol and smoking crack cocaine. Maounis, 309 Ill.App. 3d at 157. The trial court instructed the jury that the testimony was allowed for the limitedpurpose of showing motive. Maounis, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 157. The defendant testified anddenied making the statement attributed to him by the detective. The defense also presentedevidence that the defendant cashed several paychecks periodically during the relevant time periodand, thus, had no reason to steal. Maounis, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 158. This court ruled thatadmission of the other-crimes evidence to show motive was error where the evidence establishedthat the defendant had sufficient resources before and after the robbery, and no evidence indicatedhe suffered from any addiction. Maounis, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 160.

Maounis has limited applicability to the instant appeal. In Maounis, evidence of thedefendant's purchase and consumption of alcohol and crack cocaine and patronization of aprostitute was used to show his motive to rob the business. Here, in contrast, evidence ofdefendant's drug use and theft was used to explain the basis of the argument between defendantand his mother that escalated into murder and arson. Moreover, in Maounis, the evidence refutedthe State's claim that the defendant needed money to fund his partying, and it never indicated thathe suffered from any addiction. Here, in contrast, the evidence established that defendantattended Narcotics Anonymous meetings, was depressed, borrowed money from the girlfriend hemet at Narcotics Anonymous, lost his job, was living with his mother, and took her money so thathe could get high. Whereas the other-crimes evidence in Maounis was too speculative to showmotive and was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, here, defendant's drug use and theft weredirectly linked to the dispute with the victim that escalated into violence.

Similarly misplaced is defendant's reliance on People v. Klimawicze, 352 Ill. App. 3d 13,17-18 (2004), where the defendant murdered her mother and the codefendant admitted that heused money the defendant found in the victim's apartment to buy heroin. At trial, the Stateimproperly asked the defendant's father if he knew the offenders would go to the projects to buynarcotics. Klimawicze, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 27. The State also improperly asked the defendant ifshe was using her public aid money to buy drugs. Klimawicze, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 27. CitingMaounis, this court rejected the State's argument that the questions were proper to establish thedefendant's motive, i.e., she killed her mother because she needed money to buy drugs. Klimawicze, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 27. Because the State had already offered evidence that thedefendant used the victim's money to buy drugs, the question about her use of public aid money tobuy drugs was more unfairly prejudicial than probative. Klimawicze, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 27. Asdiscussed above, admission of the other-crimes evidence in the instant case does not conflict withthe ruling in Maounis. Furthermore, Klimawicze did not hold that the testimony concerning thedefendant's use of the victim's money to buy drugs was improperly admitted into evidence.

2. Burglary and the Stolen Truck

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing evidence concerninghis burglary of Flash Trucking and theft of a truck. The State argues the evidence was admissibleto establish defendant's identity as the murderer and arsonist, his consciousness of guilt, hisoverarching plan to get away with the murder of his mother, and to explain his arrest inSpringfield.

When the trial court severed the charges of burglary, truck theft and possession ofburglary tools from the murder/arson trial, the court precluded evidence of defendant's forcedentry at Flash Trucking and possession of burglary tools but reserved ruling on whether someonefrom Flash Trucking could testify regarding whether defendant had permission to take the FlashTrucking property. At trial, only Tim Long, a Flash Trucking manager, testified that defendantdid not have permission to take the Flash property and referred to the truck as "stolen." After thejury heard the testimony concerning the Flash Trucking theft and unlawful restraint of Dixon, thecourt instructed the jury to consider the other-crimes evidence for the limited purposes ofdefendant's design and the circumstances surrounding his arrest. We find the trial court did notabuse its discretion in admitting evidence that defendant stole Flash Trucking's property and atruck.

The evidence concerning the Flash Trucking theft was admissible because it wasinextricably intertwined with evidence identifying defendant as the murderer and arsonist. Peoplev. Jackson, 304 Ill. App. 3d 883, 896 (1999) (evidence of other crimes is admissible if it isintertwined with the instant offense or relates to the events which occurred earlier in the eveningwhich led to the charged offense); People v. Lewis, 243 Ill. App. 3d 618, 625-26 (1993). Specifically, no one saw the victim after Saturday and defendant lied about her whereabouts onSunday and Monday and was in possession of her car; on Monday night, a smoke detector alarmwas triggered and removed from the victim's residence; the landlord saw defendant leave thevictim's apartment with something tucked under his arm shortly before the fire was discovered;the victim's car containing the smoke detector was abandoned at Flash Trucking, where defendantwas formerly employed; fuel and tollway cards, keys and a truck were missing from FlashTrucking; defendant's wallet-sized photographs and identification were recovered at the scene ofthe Flash Trucking theft; and defendant parked the missing truck in front of Dixon's house shortlybefore his arrest. See People v. Mikka, 7 Ill. 2d 454, 461-62 (1955) (in a prosecution for armedrobbery of a tavern, evidence that defendants in a speeding car fired a gun at another motorist wasadmissible to show consciousness of guilt and to connect defendant to the getaway car and gun).

The truck theft evidence was also admissible as inextricably intertwined with evidenceestablishing defendant's consciousness of guilt and attempts to avoid apprehension. People v.Lenhardt, 340 Ill. 538, 545-46 (1930); People v. Aleman, 313 Ill. App. 3d 51, 64-65 (2000). Specifically, defendant tried to conceal the murder through arson, fled the Chicago crime scene,abandoned the victim's readily identifiable car by exchanging it for a truck, and drove the truck toSpringfield. The theft also contradicted defendant's explanation to Dixon that he was validly inpossession of the truck and on layover from work.

In addition, the truck theft was admissible to explain the circumstances of defendant'sarrest in Springfield. People v. Coleman, 158 Ill. 2d 319, 336 (1994); People v. Young, 118 Ill.App. 3d 803, 809 (1983); People v. Robinson, 98 Ill. App. 2d 285, 288-89 (1968). The stolentruck and tollway and fuel cards explained to the jury how defendant left Chicago in the victim'scar after he committed the murder and arson and then resisted arrest in Springfield several hourslater. The trial court properly instructed the jury to consider the other-crimes evidence for thislimited purpose.

We also agree with the trial court's instruction that the truck theft was admissible as partof defendant's design. A common design or scheme refers to a larger criminal scheme of whichthe crime charged is only a portion. People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 239 (1993). The severalcrimes must have some degree of identity between the facts of the crime charged and those of theother offense in which the defendant was involved. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d at 239. The commondesign or scheme "refers to the notion of a series of crimes, wrongs, or acts employed usually toestablish identity * * * with respect to the crime for which the accused is on trial, such asidentification of the accused as having stolen the gun used in a shooting * * *. Graham, Cleary &Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence