People v. Nor

Case Date: 06/11/2001
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-99-1374 Rel

FIRST DIVISION
June 11, 2001

 

No.1-99-1374


THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

                    Plaintiff-Appellee,

          v.

TELLY NOR,

                    Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County



Honorable
Fred G. Suria, Jr.,
Judge Presiding.

 

JUSTICE O'MARA FROSSARD delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, defendant Telly Nor was convicted of the first degree murder ofAlfonso Garner and the second degree murder of Rico Spears. Applying section 5-8-4(a) of theUnified Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998)), the trial court sentenceddefendant to consecutive sentences of 50 years' imprisonment for first degree murder and 14 years'imprisonment for second degree murder, for a total sentence of 64 years. On appeal, defendantchallenges only the imposition of consecutive sentences, contending that pursuant to Apprendi v.New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), section 5-8-4(a) of the Codeis unconstitutional.

The State contends that defendant has waived this issue because he did not challenge thecharging instrument prior to the conclusion of his trial or challenge his sentence in a postsentencingmotion. However, a party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute at any time. People v.Wagener, No. 88843, slip op. at 9 (June 1, 2001). Therefore, we consider the merits of defendant'sargument.

In this case, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences pursuant to section 5-8-4(a) of theCode, which provides in relevant part as follows:

"The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses whichwere committed as part of a single course of conduct during whichthere was no substantial change in the nature of the criminalobjective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant wasconvicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflictedsevere bodily injury, or where the defendant was convicted of aviolation of Section 12-13, 12-14, or 12-14.1 of the Criminal Code of1961, in which event the court shall enter sentences to runconsecutively." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998).

Apprendi held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty fora crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyonda reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. InWagener, our supreme court held that Apprendi concerns are not implicated by consecutivesentencing, as consecutive sentences remain discrete and therefore "*** a determination thatsentences are to be served consecutively cannot run afoul of Apprendi, which only addressessentences for individual crimes." Wagener, slip op. at 14-15. The court further noted that each ofdefendant's individual sentences was within the statutory range established by the legislature.Accordingly, the Wagener court determined that section 5-8-4(b) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b)(West 1998)), which allows the imposition of consecutive sentences where the sentencing court isof the opinion that such a term is necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct bythe defendant, passes constitutional muster. Wagener, slip op. at 15. Following the reasoning ofWagener, we conclude that section 5-8-4(a) of the Code also passes constitutional muster. Here, thesentences which run consecutively to each other are not transformed into a single sentence, but arediscrete sentences each within the statutory range established by the legislature. None of thepenalties for any of the individual sentences has been increased. Accordingly, we find no Apprendiviolation and affirm the imposition of consecutive sentences.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

McNULTY, P.J., and COHEN, J., concur.