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FIFTH DIVISION
NOVEMBER 12, 2004

PRESIDING JUSTICE CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Edwardo Munizwas found guilty of threatening a public official. The trial court sentenced Muniz to 6 months inthe Cook County Jail (time actually served) and 30 months of probation. Defendant now appealshis conviction and sentence.

The record discloses the following facts. Cynthia Johnson, a custodian at the RooseveltBranch of the Chicago Public Library (CPL), testified that on October 15, 2002, defendantentered the building wearing army fatigues and a headband. Johnson had a conversation withdefendant, during which he said he had worked for the CPL for approximately 20 years, but hadrecently lost his job because he was not keeping up with his rehabilitation program. Johnsontestified that defendant talked about the people in his life who had hurt him and "wished theycould feel his pain."

Johnson testified that defendant said that he wanted to shoot Karen Danzak-Lyons, theFirst Deputy Commissioner of the CPL, explaining that he did not want her to die, but to suffer. According to Johnson, defendant blamed Danzak-Lyons for losing his job. Defendant toldJohnson that on the all-staff day at the Harold Washington Library, he would stand across thestreet and shoot her at a distance. Defendant explained that his training in the armed forces wouldallow him to shoot like a sniper from a distance. Johnson testified that defendant recognized thatothers from the CPL might get in the way and that he might have to shoot them as well.

Johnson reported the conversation to CPL staff. Johnson also testified that she believeddefendant was intoxicated at the time of the conversation.

Danzak-Lyons testified that she was First Deputy Commissioner of the CPL and a publicofficial. Her duties include human resources, labor relations, grievances and terminations. Danzak-Lyons testified that defendant was terminated for misconduct. Danzak-Lyons testifiedthat she did not directly terminate defendant's employment, but made the decision and directedthat the paperwork be done. Danzak-Lyons stated that defendant had not previously threatenedher, but she was aware he had threatened others in the past.

Defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant denied threatening Danzak-Lyons. Defendant claimed that he held Danzak-Lyons in high regard, because she had saved his job adecade earlier. Defendant stated that Danzak-Lyons was not the person who fired him, as thetermination letter was signed by someone else.

Defendant testified that he and Johnson had discussed a sniper story that was in the newsat the time, and that he bragged about his marksmanship skills. Defendant believed that Johnsonmay have misconstrued parts of their conversation because she was cleaning while they weretalking.

The trial court found defendant guilty, noting that Johnson was a bright, articulate witnesswith no motive to fabricate the conversation she had with defendant. The trial court sentencedMuniz to 6 months in the Cook County Jail (time actually served) and 30 months of probation. As a condition of probation, the trial court ordered that defendant have no contact with Danzak-Lyons, and keep away from all CPL buildings and branches. Defendant now appeals.

Defendant first contends that the State failed to prove that he threatened a public official,contending that Danzak-Lyons is not a public official as defined in the statute creating the offenseon which he was convicted.

The statute creating the offense of threatening a public official provides in part as follows:

"(b) For purposes of this Section:

(1) 'Public official' means a person who is elected to office inaccordance with a statute or who is appointed to an office which isestablished, and the qualifications and duties of which areprescribed, by statute, to discharge a public duty for the State orany of its political subdivisions or in the case of an elective officeany person who has filed the required documents for nomination orelection to such office. 'Public official' includes a duly appointedassistant State's Attorney." 720 ILCS 5/12-9(b)(1) (West 2000).

Whether the trial court has correctly interpreted the provisions of the armed violence statute is aquestion of law, which this court reviews de novo. People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135, 766N.E.2d 641, 644 (2002).

The State concedes that First Deputy Commissioner of the CPL is not an elective office. Indeed, the State concedes that the position "is not explicitly delineated by statute ***." Nevertheless, the State contends that the conviction may stand because public libraries are createdpursuant to statute and "it is a logical inference that numerous offices and positions would need tobe created to carry out the library's public duty of providing a local, public institution of generaleducation."

Our purpose when construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of thelegislature; the most reliable indicator of that intent is the language of the statute, which, if plainand unambiguous, must be read without exception, limitation, or other condition. Davis, 199 Ill.2d at 135, 766 N.E.2d at 644. Moreover, as the State itself notes, criminal or penal statutes areto be strictly construed in favor of the accused, and nothing should be taken by intendment orimplication beyond the obvious or literal meaning of the statute. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d at 135, 766N.E.2d at 644.

Here the statute expressly refers to "an office which is established, and the qualificationsand duties of which are prescribed, by statute ***." 720 ILCS 5/12-9(b)(1) (West 2000). Theimplication the State urges this court to make seems to go well beyond the obvious or literalmeaning of the statute. Neither the position at issue nor its duties are prescribed by statute. The State's brief cites the statute that provides for the appointment of a board of librarytrustees. 75 ILCS 5/4-1 (West 2000). This would appear to be the type of office to which thestatute at issue refers. The State argues that a 1992 amendment of the statute replaced a list ofcertain types of officials with the current language, evincing an intent to broaden the class ofpersons protected. This seems correct, as the prior version of the statute probably would nothave applied (for example) to a library trustee. However, had the legislature intended to have thisstatute apply generally to government offices or positions not expressly created by statute, itcould have easily done so, but it clearly did not do so. See 720 ILCS 5/2-17 (West 2000)(defining a "public employee" as "a person, other than a public officer, who is authorized toperform any official function on behalf of, and is paid by, the State or any of its politicalsubdivisions" (Emphasis added.)).

During oral argument, the State suggested that a public official could be identified bylooking to whether the position was involved in making policy. However, the statute makes nosuch distinction. Rather, it refers to offices established by statute with duties prescribed bystatute.

In sum, as a matter of law, the First Deputy Commissioner of the CPL is not a "publicofficial" as defined by the statute. Consequently, defendant's conviction must be reversed. Giventhis conclusion, this court need not reach the other issues defendant raised in this appeal.

For all of the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County isreversed.

Reversed.

GALLAGHER and NEVILLE, JJ., concur.