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SIXTH DIVISION
December 28, 2001

JUSTICE O'BRIEN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, William Metcalfe, appeals his convictions for, attempted armed robbery, attemptedaggravated robbery and his sentence of 10 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) thecircuit court erred by denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence; (2) the State failed toprove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) defendant was denied his right to a fair trial where oneof the jurors indicated during voir dire that she was unable to be fair and impartial; (4) the circuit courterred by failing to properly instruct the jury; and (5) the circuit court erred by denying defendant'srequests for appointment of counsel to represent him on his posttrial motions and at sentencing. Wereverse and remand for a new trial.

At trial, Jerry Dudek testified that at about 3:30 p.m. on January 8, 1998, he was using anautomatic teller machine (ATM) in the Citibank branch located at 222 West Adams when defendantapproached him and asked for money. Mr. Dudek said "no." Defendant again asked for money. Mr.Dudek again declined. Defendant then brushed up against Mr. Dudek, stuck his left hand in his pocket,and said "I have got a gun. I want your money." Mr. Dudek begged defendant not to hurt him. Defendant responded by bumping Mr. Dudek and stating, "I want your f----ing money."

Mr. Dudek screamed for help. Defendant took a step back, then reached for Mr. Dudek's wallet,which was on a ledge underneath the ATM. Mr. Dudek grabbed defendant's left arm and prevented himfrom taking the wallet. Defendant then walked to a revolving door and attempted to exit the bank. Mr.Dudek put his foot against the door and trapped defendant inside.

Several bank employees, including an armed security guard, reached the scene. Mr. Dudek toldthem that defendant had tried to rob him. One of the bank employees ran outside through another doorand held the revolving door from that side, preventing defendant from escaping. Mr. Dudek left for awork-related appointment and later spoke with Officer Halloran and signed a complaint againstdefendant.

Officer Halloran testified that at about 3:40 p.m. on January 8, 1998, he received a call of arobbery in progress at the Citibank at 222 West Adams. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Halloranobserved two people (including Mr. Dudek) detaining defendant in the bank's revolving door. OfficerHalloran also observed that defendant's left hand was in his left coat pocket.

Some of the people at the scene yelled that defendant had a gun. Officer Halloran askeddefendant to take his hand out of his pocket. Defendant complied and exited the revolving door. OfficerHalloran then handcuffed him and conducted a pat-down search. Officer Halloran found a sharpenedmeat cleaver in defendant's left coat pocket.

Defendant testified that at about 3:40 p.m. on January 8, 1998, he approached Mr. Dudek at theATM machine inside the Citibank and asked him for some change. Mr. Dudek did not respond. Defendant again asked for money. Mr. Dudek grabbed defendant by the arm and yelled for security. Defendant then attempted to leave the bank through the revolving door, but Mr. Dudek held onto thedoor and prevented him from leaving.

A security guard rushed over with his gun drawn. Defendant told the guard that he had donenothing wrong. The police arrived shortly thereafter, and defendant explained to them that there hadbeen a misunderstanding and that Mr. Dudek appeared to have been drunk.

The officers handcuffed defendant, patted him down, and placed him under arrest. As theofficers were putting defendant into the squad car, they frisked him again and discovered a meat cleaverin his back pocket. Defendant explained that he used the meat cleaver to scrape ice off windshields andto open pop cans.

The jury found defendant guilty of, attempted armed robbery and, attempted aggravated robbery. The circuit court merged the attempted aggravated robbery conviction into the attempted robberyconviction and, sentenced defendant to 10 years in prison. Defendant filed this timely appeal.

First, defendant argues that the circuit court erred by denying his pretrial motion to quash arrestand, suppress evidence based on lack of probable cause. Probable cause to arrest exists where the factsand circumstances known to the police officer at the time of the arrest, are sufficient to warrant a personof reasonable caution to believe that an offense had been committed and that the offense was committedby the person arrested. People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 614 (2000). The existence of probable cause isdetermined by the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 615. Adetermination of probable cause is governed by commonsense, practical considerations, and not bytechnical legal rules. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 615. Since both parties here accept the testimony of thearresting police officer, our standard of review is de novo. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 615.

Officer Halloran testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress, that when he arrived at thescene, he observed defendant being "detained" in the revolving doors by a security guard and Mr. Dudek. Several bank employees were screaming that defendant had a gun, and both Mr. Dudek and the securityguard told Officer Halloran that defendant had tried to rob Mr. Dudek. The security guard also toldOfficer Halloran that defendant claimed to have a gun in his pocket.

Defendant argues that probable cause was lacking because Officer Halloran did not have a "first-hand" statement from the victim, Mr. Dudek, as to defendant's criminal behavior. Defendant's argumentis not well-taken because (as discussed above) Officer Halloran testified that Mr. Dudek made astatement at the scene that defendant had attempted to rob him.

Defendant also argues that probable cause was lacking because Officer Halloran failed to inquireinto the veracity and reliability of the security guard and the bank employees and otherwise failed tocorroborate their statements as to defendant's attempt to rob Mr. Dudek. In effect, defendant argues thatOfficer Halloran should have conducted a mini-trial at the bank, cross-examining the witnesses untildefendant's guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the evidence relied upon by thearresting officers does not have to be sufficient to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt(Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 615); rather, as discussed above, the totality of the circumstances must be such as towarrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that defendant committed an offense. Here, OfficerHalloran was confronted with an identified victim and defendant, statements from bank employees asto defendant's possession of a gun, and a statement from both the victim and the bank security guard thatdefendant had tried to rob Mr. Dudek. Under the totality of these circumstances, Officer Halloran hadprobable cause to arrest defendant, as a person of reasonable caution could believe that defendant hadattempted to commit armed robbery.

Defendant argues that Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983),and Recznik v. City of Lorain, 393 U.S. 166, 21 L. Ed. 2d 317, 89 S. Ct. 342 (1968), compel a differentresult. In Gates, the United States Supreme Court held that an informant's veracity is a relevantconsideration in the totality of the circumstances analysis guiding probable cause determinations. Gates,462 U.S. at 230-34, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 543-45, 103 S. Ct. at 2328-30. In Recznik, the United States SupremeCourt held that statements from unknown "people on the street" concerning defendant's alleged criminalactivity was not sufficient to establish probable cause. Recznik, 393 U.S. at 169, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 321, 89S. Ct. at 344-45.

Neither Gates nor Recznik compels a result different from the one reached here, where OfficerHalloran's information regarding defendant's criminal activity came, not from unknown people on thestreet, but from an identified victim and the bank security guard, and where defendant concedes thatOfficer Halloran had no reason to doubt the credibility of defendant's accusers.

Next, defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question is whether,after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact couldhave found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Smith, 321 Ill. App.3d 669, 673 (2001).

The jury convicted defendant of attempted armed robbery. A person commits an attempt when,"with intent to commit a specific offense, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward thecommission of that offense." 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 1996). A person commits armed robbery whenhe commits robbery (taking property from another by the use of force or by threatening the imminentuse of force (720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 1996)) while carrying on or about his person, or otherwise beingarmed with, a dangerous weapon. 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(West 1996)).

Here, Mr. Dudek testified that defendant demanded his money, bumped him, told him he wascarrying a gun, and attempted to grab his wallet. Officer Halloran testified that defendant possessed asharpened meat cleaver on his person. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, anyrational trier of fact could find that defendant took a substantial step toward robbing Mr. Dudek whilecarrying a dangerous weapon on his person. Accordingly, the State proved defendant guilty of armedrobbery beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed because he never "physically manifested"the dangerous weapon (the meat cleaver) during the commission of the crime. In People v. Addison,236 Ill. App. 3d 650 (1992), the First District Appellate Court rejected the argument that the weaponmust be displayed during the commission of an armed robbery. The court reasoned that the "plainlanguage of the Criminal Code [of 1961 (Ill. Res. Stat. 1985, ch.38, par.18-2)]states that an armedrobbery occurs when a person carries or possesses a dangerous weapon during a robbery. The statutedoes not require that the dangerous weapon be displayed or used." Addison, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 655. Wefollow the well-reasoned opinion in Addison and hold that defendant was not required to display or usehis dangerous weapon to sustain his conviction for attempted armed robbery.

Next, defendant argues that he was denied his right to a fair trial where one of the jurorsindicated during voir dire that she was unable to be fair and impartial. Defendant waived review byfailing to object at trial. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). However, because the issue affectsthe constitutional right to a fair trial, we consider defendant's contention under the plain error exceptionto the waiver rule. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); People v. Wilson, 303 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 1041 (1999).

The federal (U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV) and state constitutions (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,