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Third Division
December 5, 2001

PRESIDING JUSTICE HALL delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Ezekiel McDaniel, also known as Lucius (defendant), a14-year-old minor tried as an adult, was indicted for first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. OnJuly 14, 1998, a hearing was held before the Honorable JohnMoran, on defendant's motion to suppress his confessionstatement. Defendant's motion was subsequently denied.

On September 18, 1998, following a jury trial before theHonorable Kenneth Wadas, defendant was found guilty offirst-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. On October 28, 1998, defendant was sentenced to 50 years'imprisonment for first-degree murder and 20 years'imprisonment for aggravated battery with a firearm, to beserved consecutively.

On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) his confessionstatement was involuntary under the totality of thecircumstances test; (2) he was denied a fair trial when theState introduced into evidence and read out loud to the jurya confession statement he denied making and refused to sign;(3) the trial court abused its discretion when it failed toenforce his subpoena to compel the appearance of aneyewitness to the shooting that would testify that he wasnot the shooter; (4) the trial court abused its discretionin sentencing him to 70 years' imprisonment; and (5) hisconsecutive sentences must be vacated pursuant to theholding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed.2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). For the following reasons,we reverse and remand.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 25, 1996, at approximately 10 p.m., gunshotswere fired at a passing car occupied by members of the NewBreed-Gangster Disciples street gang. Travis Hughes, anoccupant in the car, was killed. Latonya Lemon, an innocentbystander, was severely injured.

Bree Harrington testified that on August 25, 1996, atabout 10 p.m., she and Latonya Lemon, also known as Pig,were sitting on a bench at Wilcox and Pulaski, engaged in aconversation, when she heard gunshots. Harrington testifiedthat approximately 15 feet from where she was sitting, shesaw defendant standing in the street, shooting towardPulaski. She saw defendant shoot his handgun about twotimes. The streetlights provided good lighting. She andLemon were between where defendant was shooting and Pulaski. Harrington ran down Wilcox, away from Pulaski, and duckedbehind a parked car. Lemon ran toward Pulaski. Harringtonheard about three more gunshots after she had ducked behindthe parked car.

Harrington testified that after the shooting stopped,she saw Lemon lying on the ground at the corner of Pulaski. Lemon looked like she was bleeding from a neck wound. Defendant, who was standing a couple of feet away fromLemon, asked her if she had been shot; specifically,defendant asked, "Pig, are you shot, did I hit you?" Harrington testified that she then ran over to Lemon andcalled her name. Defendant ran away from the scene, northup Pulaski.

In a suppression hearing that was held prior todefendant's jury trial, the defendant unsuccessfully movedto suppress his confession statement on the ground that itwas not voluntarily given. The following relevant factswere presented at the suppression hearing. On August 28,1996, at approximately two o'clock in the morning,defendant, then 14 years old, was arrested at his mother'shome for the shooting that occurred on August 25, 1996, inwhich Travis Hughes died and Latonya Lemon was severelyinjured.

Detective Kato testified that after defendant was takeninto custody he was advised of his Miranda and juvenilerights while he was in the squad car being transported tothe Area 4 police station. Defendant's mother, Ms.McDaniel, was not present when defendant was read hisMiranda and juvenile rights. Prior to taking defendant fromthe apartment, Detective Kato informed Ms. McDaniel thatdefendant was being transported to Area 4 for questioning inconnection with a shooting. Ms. McDaniel responded that shewould get transportation to Area 4.

Detective Kato testified that he and defendant arrivedat Area 4 around 2:25 a.m., and Ms. McDaniel was not at thestation when they arrived. Detective Kato testified thatMs. McDaniel arrived at Area 4 approximately 20 minutes tohalf an hour later. Detective Kato escorted defendant intothe interview room, but he never individually interviewedhim. Detective Kato testified that he was never alone withthe defendant in the interview room and the defendant wasnot handcuffed. Detective Kato testified that when thedefendant was told what he was being charged with heresponded that he wanted to make a statement. DetectiveKato testified that the defendant also stated that he didnot want his mother present when he gave the statement. Detective Kato then informed defendant that he could notgive a statement until the assistant State's Attorney andthe youth officer arrived. Defendant remained in theinterview room from approximately 2:20 a.m. to 8 a.m.,except for one or two times when he was escorted to thewashroom.

Detective Kato testified that he first spoke to Ms.McDaniel at Area 4 when she arrived at the station around 3a.m. She wanted to know about the investigation but did notask to see the defendant. Detective Kato next spoke withMs. McDaniel shortly after 8 a.m., after Assistant State'sAttorney (ASA) Robert Heilingoetter had interviewed thedefendant.

The defendant was interviewed at approximately 8 a.m..Detective Kato testified that he was present for theinterview along with youth officer Small, ASA Heilingoetter,and the defendant. The ASA introduced himself to thedefendant and then he read defendant his Miranda andjuvenile rights. Defendant responded that he understood hisrights and wanted to give a statement. Defendant was alertand responsive during the interview, and he answeredquestions appropriately. The interview lasted for abouthalf an hour. At the conclusion of the interview, thedefendant chose to have his oral statement memorialized as ahandwritten summary. He then told the ASA that he wanted tospeak to his mother. Detective Kato left the interviewroom, found Ms. McDaniel and personally escorted her back tothe interview room where defendant was located, but he neverinformed her that defendant had made a confession. The onlytime Ms. McDaniel was made aware of the defendant'sconfession was when the ASA read defendant's handwrittenstatement back to him.

After ASA Heilingoetter prepared defendant'shandwritten statement, the ASA, youth officer Small andDetective Kato all returned to the interview room where thedefendant was waiting with his mother. The ASA read backthe handwritten statement out loud to the defendant,whereupon the defendant stated that he had not said thethings that were contained in the handwritten statement, andhe refused to sign it. When the defendant refused to signthe handwritten statement, Detective Kato, ASA Heilingoetterand youth officer Small all signed their names to thehandwritten statement, in the presence of the defendant andMs. McDaniel.

Detective Kato testified that neither he nor any of hisfellow officers, in his presence, ever removed a handgunfrom a holster and placed it on a table in front of thedefendant.

ASA Heilingoetter testified that on August 28, 1996, atapproximately 8:15 a.m., he interviewed defendant at Area 4,in the presence of Detective Kato and youth officer Small. Prior to interviewing the defendant, ASA Heilingoetter wasbriefed by Detective Kato. ASA Heilingoetter was informedthat the defendant was 14 years old and that his mother, Ms.McDaniel, was present at Area 4. ASA Heilingoettertestified that Detective Kato told him that the defendantdid not want his mother present in the interview room whenhe gave his statement.

Immediately before the interview began, ASAHeilingoetter introduced himself to the defendant and thenread defendant his Miranda and juvenile rights. Defendantresponded that he understood his rights and that he wantedto make a statement. During the interview, defendant wascooperative and responsive to questions regarding theshooting incident and he did not appear to be sleepy,drowsy, or frightened. The interview lasted approximately20 minutes. At the conclusion of the interview, thedefendant chose to have his oral statement memorialized as ahandwritten statement. ASA Heilingoetter then askeddefendant if he needed anything. Defendant responded thathe wanted to speak to his mother. Prior to this time, thedefendant had not asked to speak to his mother. The ASAthen instructed Detective Kato to bring defendant's motherto the interview room. When the ASA was alone withdefendant, he asked him how the police had treated him. Defendant responded that he had been treated fine. Defendant also responded that no threats or promises hadbeen made to him in return for his statement.

ASA Heilingoetter testified that around 8:55 a.m. heleft the interview room for approximately 20 minutes toprepare the defendant's handwritten statement. After thehandwritten statement was prepared, ASA Heilingoetter,Detective Kato, and youth officer Small returned to theinterview room, where the defendant was waiting with hismother, Ms. McDaniel. ASA Heilingoetter testified that thiswas the first time he had seen Ms. McDaniel. He testifiedthat he did not recall if he ever explained to Ms. McDanielwhat defendant had been charged with. After the ASA readthe defendant's handwritten statement back to him, out loud,and asked defendant to sign the statement, defendant refusedto sign, responding that he had not made such an oralconfession. ASA Heilingoetter testified that he never heardMs. McDaniel tell defendant not to sign the handwrittenstatement. He also testified that the summarizedhandwritten statement was substantially of the same contentas his prior oral conversation with the defendant.

After ASA Heilingoetter finished testifying, the Staterested and defendant's motion for a directed verdict wassubsequently denied. Defendant then presented thetestimonies of Ms. McDaniel and police officer Cleon Sykes. Defendant testified on his own behalf.

Ms. McDaniel testified that on August 28, 1996, atapproximately 2 a.m., police detectives knocking at her backdoor awakened her. She admitted the detectives into herapartment, and they asked if the defendant was in theapartment. Defendant was awakened and subsequently taken toArea 4. Contrary to Detective Kato's testimony on thismatter, Ms. McDaniel testified that she rode in the samesquad car with the defendant as they were transported toArea 4. She and defendant arrived at Area 4 atapproximately 2:30 a.m. and were subsequently separated. Defendant was taken to a room and she was left sitting in awaiting area. Ms. McDaniel testified that after 2:30 a.m.she did not see defendant again until later that afternoon,even though she repeatedly asked police officers to allowher to speak to the defendant.

Ms. McDaniel further testified that at approximately 4a.m. she used a pay phone in Area 4 to call police officerCleon Sykes at her home. Officer Sykes is the defendant'sgodmother. Ms. McDaniel hoped that Officer Sykes would beable to help her find out why the police had taken defendantand how she could get to see him. Officer Sykes advised Ms.McDaniel to return to the front desk and ask the policeofficer on duty if she could see the defendant. Ms.McDaniel also placed a second phone call to Officer Sykesthat morning.

Ms. McDaniel testified that when a police officerfinally came and escorted her to the interview room to seethe defendant, the officer informed her that the defendanthad confessed to murder. She testified that this was thefirst time she was told what defendant had been chargedwith. Ms. McDaniel testified that when she saw thedefendant in the interview room there were two policeofficers with him. Defendant was not handcuffed, he was notcrying and there were no marks on his face. Ms. McDanieltestified that when ASA Heilingoetter read the statementback to defendant, she listened and made no comments. Afterthe ASA had finished reading the statement, she askeddefendant if he had made such a confession, and whendefendant denied making the confession, she told him not tosign the statement.

Officer Sykes testified that she met Ms. McDaniel atthe church they both attend. She is the defendant'sgodmother. Officer Sykes testified that on August 28, 1996,at around 2 a.m., she received a phone call at her home fromMs. McDaniel, who was calling from Area 4. Ms. McDanielwanted to know why defendant had been arrested and why shehad not been allowed to see him. Officer Sykes told Ms.McDaniel that she would not see defendant until she spoke tothe police and to call her back after she had done so.Officer Sykes received a second phone call from Ms. McDanielat around 6 a.m.. Ms. McDaniel was still at Area 4, and shestill had not seen the defendant. Officer Sykes theninformed Ms. McDaniel that she probably would not be able tosee the defendant until a youth officer arrived at Area 4. Officer Sykes testified that she did not call Area 4 on Ms.McDaniel's behalf because she did not know why the policewere holding the defendant, stating that she does notinterfere in police business and that she knew Ms. McDanielwould call her back with further information.

Defendant testified that when the police arrested himhe was at home asleep on his mother's couch. One of thedetectives informed him that he was being taken down to Area4 for questioning. Defendant testified that the arrestingdetective never read him his rights and did not inform himwhy he was being taken to Area 4 for questioning. Defendantand his mother rode in the same squad car to the Area 4police station. When they arrived at Area 4, Detective Katotook defendant to an interview room and his mother was takento an unknown area of the police station. Defendant did notsee his mother again until ASA Heilingoetter read thehandwritten statement back to him.

Defendant testified that Detective Kato took him tothree different rooms at the Area 4 police station. In thefirst room, Detective Kato took a black handgun and placedit on a table in front of defendant, with the gun's barrelpointed at him. The detective then took defendant's Bible,which he had received from his mother, and told him to "cutthe bullsh-t." He told defendant that witnesses hadidentified him as the shooter. Defendant responded that hedid not shoot anyone and that Detective Kato was lying. Detective Kato then took his hand and slapped defendant onthe right side of his face. Defendant started crying andasked Detective Kato why he was doing this. Detective Katotold defendant to stop acting like a little church kid, thathe was a murderer and the enforcer for the Black Soulsstreet gang, and that he would go to jail for life if he didnot cooperate by giving a statement. Defendant testifiedthat he was in this first room for about 15 minutes.

Defendant testified that Detective Kato took him to asecond room after he refused to cooperate. Detective Katohandcuffed him behind his back and then attached onehandcuff to a steel pole. The detective then told him thathe would remain in the room until he was ready to talk. Defendant testified that he remained in this second room fora long time. He was eventually taken to a third room wherethe interview with the ASA subsequently took place.

Defendant testified that he was not read his Miranda orjuvenile rights until about five minutes before he wastransferred to the juvenile detention center. He testifiedthat he never made the oral confession that was included inthe summarized handwritten statement prepared by ASAHeilingoetter. He also testified that he was scared when hearrived at Area 4 because even though he had been arrestedfor disorderly conduct, this prior arrest occurred when hewas younger, he was never charged with a crime, and he wasimmediately released into his mother's custody.

Defendant further testified that he asked DetectiveKato on two separate occasions if he could speak to hismother. On the first occasion, Detective Kato told him thathe could not see his mother until the detective was readyfor him to see her. On the second occasion, Detective Katotold him to quit asking for his mother and to stop actinglike a "b---h," because he was not going to see his motheruntil he decided to cooperate. Defendant testified that ASAHeilingoetter finally allowed him to see his mother.Defendant testified that after he refused to sign thehandwritten statement and was alone in the interview room,Detective Kato returned to the room, looked at him and shookhis head, but the detective did not say anything.

Defendant also testified that the ASA never asked himhow the police had treated him. Defendant denied that heever told Detective Kato that he did not want his mother inthe interview room when he was being questioned. Defendantfurther testified that ASA Heilingoetter never questionedhim about the case before the handwritten statement was readback to him. He testified that the ASA basically told himthat he had done the shooting.

Youth officer Small testified in rebuttal, on behalf ofthe State. She testified that she was present in theinterview room with Detective Kato, ASA Heilingoetter, Ms.McDaniel and the defendant when ASA Heilingoetter readdefendant's handwritten statement back to him, out loud. After the defendant refused to sign the handwrittenstatement, she took him into custody and began processinghim at approximately 9:30 a.m. At approximately 9:55 a.m.defendant was taken to the lockup to be fingerprinted andphotographed.

On cross-examination, youth officer Small testifiedthat she had seen Ms. McDaniel prior to the defendant'sinterview with the ASA. Ms. McDaniel was standing in thehallway. Youth officer Small testified that she neverintroduced herself to Ms. McDaniel and she never spoke toher. She testified that during defendant's interview withthe ASA, defendant was not nervous and he appeared to befine. The ASA conducted the interview, which started around8 a.m. and lasted about 20 minutes.

In response to questioning by the court, youth officerSmall testified that the ASA asked defendant questionsduring the interview and defendant responded to thosequestions. She further testified that she heard the ASAread back the handwritten statement to the defendant andthat the handwritten statement was substantially the same asthe previous conversation between defendant and the ASA.

The trial court subsequently denied defendant's motionto suppress his confession statement, ruling that DetectiveKato, ASA Heilingoetter, and youth officer Small alltestified credibly and consistently regarding defendantmaking the statement. The trial court determined thatdefendant had made a statement and that his denial in thisregard damaged his credibility as to everything else hetestified to.

The trial court reasoned that if the State had trulyattempted to prevent Ms. McDaniel from seeing the defendantand influencing him regarding his confession, then the Statewould not have allowed her to see him until after he hadsigned the handwritten statement. The trial court alsofound that the defendant's allegations of physical contactwere unfounded because he had filed a motion to suppress andan amended motion to suppress neither of which containedallegations of physical contact. There was no evidence inthe record that defendant complained to anyone of beingphysically abused. Defendant only alleged physical contactat the present hearing.

ANALYSIS

I. Voluntariness of Defendant's Confession

A. Standard of Review

Defendant first contends that his confession wasinvoluntary under the totality of the circumstances, andtherefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant hismotion to suppress his confession statement.

Traditionally, the proper standard of review inIllinois for determining whether a defendant's confessionwas voluntary has been the manifestly erroneous standard.See People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 447, 662 N.E.2d 1328(1996). Recently, however, the Illinois Supreme Court hasadopted a two-step approach where the trial court's factualfindings and credibility determinations are reviewed formanifest error, after which the reviewing court applies a denovo standard of review to the legal determination ofwhether suppression of the evidence is warranted under thosefacts. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 727 N.E.2d 1003 (2000);People v. F.J., 315 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1056, 734 N.E.2d 1007(2000). Still, in cases where neither the facts nor thecredibility of the witnesses is at issue, the reviewingcourt proceeds with a strictly de novo review. See People v.Carlson, 185 Ill. 2d 546, 551, 708 N.E.2d 372 (1999). Inthe present case, however, the credibility of the witnesseswas very much at issue, and therefore, our review proceedsunder the two-step approach adopted by the Illinois SupremeCourt in In re G.O.

1. Manifest error review

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion tosuppress, the trial court's factual determinations andcredibility assessments will be reversed only when they areagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Buss,187 Ill. 2d 144, 718 N.E.2d 1 (1999). A trial court'sjudgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence whenits findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or notbased on the evidence. Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207,647 N.E.2d 273 (1995).

In the instant case, the credibility of the witnesseswho testified regarding events that occurred at the Area 4police station was at issue. The trial court found thatDetective Kato, ASA Heilingoetter, and youth officer Smallwere all credible and that the defense witnesses were notcredible. Specifically, the trial court found that: (1) thedefendant stated that he did not want his mother presentduring his questioning; (2) while defendant's mother was atthe Area 4 police station, she never asked to see thedefendant; (3) the defendant was advised of his rights byDetective Kato and ASA Heilingoetter; (4) the defendant wasnot physically abused or threatened in any way, includingthe placing of a handgun on a table in front of defendant,with the gun's barrel pointed at the defendant; and (5) thedefendant agreed to give a confession statement, he wascooperative and responsive to questions, and was treatedwell.

Our review of the record shows that the trial court'sfactual findings were against the manifest weight of theevidence. Significantly, the trial court should have foundthat the defendant's mother asked to see defendant severaltimes between 2:30 a.m. and 8 a.m. and that each time herrequests were denied. It is not believable that thedefendant's mother waited at the Area 4 police station forover five hours, twice calling Officer Sykes for advice onhow she could see her son, without asking to see thedefendant. Moreover, if Detective Kato was not truthfulregarding Ms. McDaniel's efforts to see defendant, then therest of his testimony is suspect as to believability,especially the detective's assertion that the defendant didnot want his mother present during his questioning.

Since we find that the trial court's determinationconcerning witness credibility was against the manifestweight of the evidence, we will conduct a de novo review ofthe defendant's legal challenge under the defense witnesses'versions of events. Cf. People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402,412, 704 N.E.2d 375 (1998).

2. De novo review

The test to determine whether a juvenile's confessionwas voluntary is whether, under the totality of thecircumstances, the statement was made freely, withoutcompulsion or inducement, with consideration given to thecharacteristics of the juvenile as well as the details ofthe interrogation. In re M.W., 314 Ill. App. 3d 64, 69, 731N.E.2d 358 (2000); People v. Ball, 322 Ill. App. 3d 521,531, 750 N.E.2d 719 (2001). In the instant case, given thetotality of the circumstances including defendant's age, hislack of criminal experience, the time of his arrest, and hislong period of detention without the opportunity to conferwith a concerned adult, a de novo review clearly shows thatthe defendant's confession was involuntary and, therefore,should have been suppressed.

B. Factors Reviewing Court Considers in Determining Whethera Minor's Confession was Voluntary

The receiving of an incriminating statement by ajuvenile in the absence of counsel is a sensitive concernrequiring great care to assure that the juvenile's admissionwas not coerced or suggested, or the product of ignorance ofone's rights, adolescent fantasy, fright or despair. Peoplev. Montanez, 273 Ill. App. 3d 844, 853, 652 N.E.2d 1271(1995); People v. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d 470, 476, 363 N.E.2d 371(1977). In cases involving juveniles, courts must beparticularly careful in scrutinizing the record, sincejuveniles can easily become victims of the law. People v.Travis, 122 Ill. App. 3d 671, 674, 462 N.E.2d 654 (1984).

To be admissible at trial, a confession must be free,voluntary, and not obtained by any direct or impliedpromises or by the exertion of any improper influence.People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 516, 561 N.E.2d 57(1990). Factors that are considered in determining whethera confession was voluntary include a defendant's individualcharacteristics, such as his age, intelligence, education,physical condition and experience with the criminal justicesystem; the nature of the interrogation is also considered,such as the legality and duration of the detention, theduration of the questioning, and any physical or mentalabuse by the police. In re A.R., 295 Ill. App. 3d 527, 533,693 N.E.2d 869 (1998); People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484,500-01, 670 N.E.2d 606 (1996).

In cases involving juveniles, additional factors mustbe considered, such as the time of day of the questioningand the presence of a parent or other adult concerned withthe juvenile's welfare. In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d545, 551, 672 N.E.2d 331 (1996), citing People v. Brown, 235Ill. App. 3d 479, 601 N.E.2d 1190 (1992); In re L.L., 295Ill. App. 3d 594, 693 N.E.2d 908 (1998). No single factoris dispositive. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 500. Thevoluntariness of a confession is determined by thecircumstances of each case. In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d227, 238, 689 N.E.2d 1172 (1998).

In the instant case, although the defendant had someprior minimal experience with the criminal justice systemand he professed to understand his constitutional rights,the totality of the circumstances - particularly his youth,the fact that the police frustrated his mother's attempts toconfer with him, the absence of an effective friendly adultduring his interrogation, and the time and circumstances ofhis arrest - rendered his statements involuntary.

1. Defendant's age and prior contact with criminal justicesystem

First, the record reveals that defendant was 14 yearsold at the time of his arrest and interrogation and that hehad very little prior contact with the criminal justicesystem. Therefore, it is unlikely that defendant wassophisticated enough to protect his rights during a policeinterrogation, without the aid of counsel or a concernedparent. See In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d at 238 (statingthat juvenile's prior minimal contacts with the police didnot give him the sophistication or insight on how to conducthimself while being interrogated by the police in a criminalmatter). In Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 8 L. Ed. 2d325, 82 S. Ct. 1209 (1962), the United States Supreme Courtaddressed how the youth of a juvenile defendant can be asignificant factor in determining the voluntariness of thejuvenile's confession:

"The prosecution says that the boy was advised of hisright to counsel, but that he did not ask either for alawyer or for his parents. But a 14-year-old boy, nomatter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have anyconception of what will confront him when he is madeaccessible only to the police. That is to say, we dealwith a person who is not equal to the police inknowledge and understanding of the consequences of thequestions and answers being recorded and who is unableto know how to protect his own interests or how to getthe benefits of his constitutional rights." Gallegos,U.S. at 54, 8 L. Ed. 2d at 328, 82 S. Ct. at 1212.

In the present case, the fact that the defendant wasonly 14 years old at the time of his arrest andinterrogation and had only limited prior contact with thecriminal justice system puts this case on equal footing withGallegos.

2. Parent absent during defendant's interrogation

Second, the evidence demonstrates that the policefrustrated the defendant's mother's attempts to confer withthe defendant prior to his police interrogation. Thepresence or absence of a parent is a major factor toconsider when determining the voluntariness of a juvenile'sconfession. In re S.D.S., 103 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1012, 431N.E.2d 759, 762 (1982). If a parent or concerned adultindicates an interest by his or her presence, then he or sheshould be allowed to confer with the juvenile before anyquestioning begins, as well as be present when anyquestioning occurs. In re J.O., 231 Ill. App. 3d 853, 854-55, 596 N.E.2d 1285, 1287 (1992); Montanez, 273 Ill. App. 3dat 852-53, 652 N.E.2d at 1278; In re Lashun H., 284 Ill.App. 3d at 553, 672 N.E.2d at 336; In re J.J.C., 294 Ill.App. 3d at 234-37, 689 N.E.2d at 1178-80; In re L.L., 295Ill. App. 3d 594, 601, 693 N.E.2d 908, 914 (1998).

It is well established that police conduct thatfrustrates a parent's attempts to confer with his or herchild prior to or during questioning is a significant factorin determining whether the child's confession was voluntary.In re V.L.T., 292 Ill. App. 3d 728, 737, 686 N.E.2d 49(1997); In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3d at 553; People v.Knox, 186 Ill. App. 3d 808, 814, 542 N.E.2d 910 (1989); Inre J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d at 237 (holding that when ajuvenile's parents are present and request to confer withtheir child, and they are effectively refused access to thechild, the presumption arises that the juvenile's will wasoverborne).

Our supreme court has recently refused to adopt a perse rule requiring the suppression of a juvenile's confessionwhere he is denied the ability to confer with a concernedadult either before or during his interrogation. In re G.O.,191 Ill. 2d at 55. Nonetheless, the supreme court foundthat the "concerned adult" factor is particularly relevantin determining whether a juvenile's confession was voluntaryin situations where the police prevent the juvenile'sparents from speaking with him. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at55.

It is the "concerned adult" factor that makes this casedistinguishable from In re G.O. In In re G.O., the supremecourt determined that the testimony revealed that the policenever frustrated any attempts by the juvenile's mother toconfer with him. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 56. Here,however, the testimony revealed that the detectives clearlyfrustrated defendant's mother's attempts to confer with thedefendant. The record shows that Ms. McDaniel arrived atArea 4 either around 2:20 a.m. with defendant or shortlythereafter around 3 a.m. Ms. McDaniel testified that shemade numerous requests to the police to allow her to seedefendant. The record shows that she twice telephonedpolice officer Sykes at the officer's home, in an attempt tofind out how she could contact defendant. Officer Sykes isdefendant's godmother. Ms. McDaniel testified that OfficerSykes advised her to return to the front desk and ask theofficer on duty if she could see the defendant. Ms.McDaniel testified that after her further requests to seethe defendant were unsuccessful she placed a second phonecall to Officer Sykes that morning.

Officer Sykes' testimony corroborated Ms. McDaniel'stestimony regarding her efforts to see defendant at Area 4.Officer Sykes testified that on August 28, 1996, atapproximately 2 a.m., she received a telephone call at homefrom Ms. McDaniel, who was calling from Area 4. Ms.McDaniel wanted to know why defendant had been arrested andwhy she had not been allowed to see him. Officer Sykesinformed Ms. McDaniel that she probably would not be allowedto see the defendant until she spoke to the police and tocall her back after she had done so. Officer Sykestestified that she received a second phone call from Ms.McDaniel at around 6 a.m. Ms. McDaniel was still at Area 4and she still had not seen the defendant. Ms. McDaniel wasnot allowed to see defendant until after 8 a.m. when he hadalready made an oral confession.

Detective Kato testified that Ms. McDaniel never askedhim if she could see the defendant. It is highly unlikelythat Ms. McDaniel would have traveled to Area 4 and remainedthere from 2:20 a.m. to approximately 8 a.m. without askingto see the defendant. See In re Lashun H., 284 Ill. App. 3dat 555 (holding that it goes against common sense to assumethat a mother would remain at a police station for over sixhours without asking to see her son); In re L.L., 295 Ill.App. 3d at 603 (stating that the court could not acceptState's implied theory that parents were not interested inseeing and conferring with their son, where they drove tothe police station in the middle of the night).

The State contends that the defendant requested thathis mother not be present during his questioning and thatthis therefore rendered his confession voluntary. However,courts have specifically held that such an argument"blatantly disregards the interest of the parents in wishingto confer with their child before questioning." In reJ.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d at 237. In People v. Brown, 182Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1053-54, 538 N.E.2d 909 (1989), the courtheld that when a parent is present at the police station andshows an interest in seeing his or her child, the policehave an affirmative duty to stop questioning the child andallow the parent to confer with the child. See also In reJ.O., 231 Ill. App. 3d at 854-55 (agreeing with the Statethat there is no per se rule that juveniles must be allowedto consult with their parents prior to questioning, butstating that if parents indicate an interest by theirpresence, then they should be allowed to confer with theirchildren before any questioning begins, as well as bepresent when any questioning occurs).

In the instant case, the record reveals that Ms.McDaniel arrived at Area 4 either along with defendant orshortly after he arrived, and that she immediately asked tosee him. Under these circumstances and based on theholdings in Brown, In re J.J.C., and In re J.O., thedetectives should have allowed Ms. McDaniel to confer withthe defendant once she arrived at Area 4 and they shouldhave allowed her to be present during his questioning, evenif he requested that she not be present.

3. Presence of youth officer

Third, the record also shows that the mother's absencefrom the defendant's interrogation was not offset by thepresence of the assigned youth officer. The facts reflectthat the youth officer showed no interest in protecting thedefendant's rights. For example, youth officer Smalltestified that she saw Ms. McDaniel standing in a hallway atArea 4 prior to defendant's interrogation, but she neverspoke with her. Moreover, she testified that she neverspoke with the defendant, and during the defendant'sinterrogation she never made a comment. Consequently, thesefacts clearly show that youth officer Small did not take aninterest in protecting the defendant's welfare. See In reJ.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d at 237 (noting that the record wassilent on whether the youth officer affirmatively protectedrespondent minor's rights); In re L.L., 295 Ill. App. 3d at601 (the record and trial court's comments revealed thatyouth officer showed no interest in minor's welfare).

4. Time and circumstances of defendant's arrest

Fourth, the arrest of defendant at his mother's home attwo o'clock in the morning also contributed to the coercivenature of the defendant's interrogation. For example, in Inre J.O., the court held that a juvenile's confession wasinvoluntary where he was arrested in the middle of the nightand the police prevented his parents from seeing him. In reJ.O., 231 Ill. App. 3d at 854; See also In re J.J.C., 294Ill. App. 3d at 235-36 (holding that coercive nature ofjuvenile's encounter with the police began when he wasarrested at home and was transported to police station wherehis parents were denied access to him).

In the instant case, the defendant was arrested atapproximately 2 a.m., at his mother's home after he wasawakened by the detectives. Defendant was then transportedto the Area 4 police station, where his mother was deniedaccess to him. This police conduct contributed to thecoercive nature of defendant's interrogation.

The case of Haley v. State of Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 92 L.Ed. 224, 68 S. Ct. 302 (1948), is instructive, where morethan half a century ago the United States Supreme Courtfound that the confession of a 15-year-old, who wasconvicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, wasinvoluntary. The boy's confession was obtained after fivehours of late-night interrogation outside the presence ofhis parents and attorney:

"[W]hen, as here, a mere child - an easy victim of thelaw - is before us, special care in scrutinizing therecord must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficultage for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by themore exacting standards of maturity. That which wouldleave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe andoverwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is a periodof great instability which the crisis of adolescenceproduces. A 15-year old lad, questioned through thedead of the night by relays of police, is a readyvictim of the inquisition. Mature men possibly mightstand the ordeal from midnight to 5 a.m. But we cannotbelieve that a lad of tender years is a match for thepolice in such a contest. He needs counsel and supportif he not to become the victim first of fear, then ofpanic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest theoverpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, maynot crush him. No friend stood at the side of this 15-year-old boy as the police, working in relays,questioned him hour after hour, from midnight untildawn. No lawyer stood guard to make sure that thepolice went so far and no farther, to see to it thatthey stopped short of the point where he became thevictim of coercion. No counsel or friend was calledduring the critical hours of questioning." Haley, 332U.S. at 599-600, 92 L. Ed. at 228-29, 68 S. Ct. at 303-04.

Neither time nor intervening case law has lessened theforce and elegant logic of Haley. See United States v.Young, No. 01 C 3963 (N.D. Ill. September 13, 2001).

Considering all of the above factors in relation to thetotality of the circumstances shows that the defendant'sconfession was involuntary and, therefore, should have beensuppressed.

II. Admissibility of Defendant's Unsigned Confession Statement

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred whenit allowed ASA Heilingoetter to read defendant's confessionstatement (State's exhibit No. 25) to the jury because hedid not sign the statement and it was not transcribed. Wedo not need to reach this issue because we have found thatthe trial court erred in not suppressing the defendant'sconfession.

III. Conclusion

Based on the totality of the circumstances under denovo review, this court finds that the defendant'sconfession was involuntary. This case is reversed andremanded for a new trial without the confession based on thefollowing factors: (1) defendant was 14 years old at thetime of his arrest and interrogation and had very limitedprior contact with the criminal justice system; (2) policeconduct frustrated defendant's mother's attempts to conferwith defendant prior to his interrogation; (3) the assignedyouth officer showed no interest in protecting defendant'swelfare; and (4) the timing and circumstances of defendant'sarrest contributed to the coercive nature of hisinterrogation.

Since we have decided that this case should be retried,we will not address defendant's sixth amendment argument orthe issues regarding the length of defendant's sentence orthe imposition of consecutive sentences.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, thejudgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed andthis cause remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

WOLFSON and BURKE, JJ., concur.