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                                                                                                            THIRD DIVISION

                                                                                                            DECEMBER 21, 2005

1-04-1660 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                   )          Appeal from the

                                                                                             )          Circuit Court of

                        Plaintiff-Appellee,                                          )          Cook County.

                                                                                             )

            v.                                                                              )          No. 99 CR 26084

                                                                                             )

LAWRENCE McCOLLER,                                                 )          Honorable

                                                                                             )          William G. Lacy,

                        Defendant-Appellant.                                     )          Judge Presiding.

            JUSTICE ERICKSON delivered the opinion of the court:

            Defendant Lawrence McColler was convicted following a bench trial of one count of homeinvasion, two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and two counts of attempted aggravatedcriminal sexual assault. Defendant received a 45-year extended-term sentence for home invasion, a7-year sentence for each aggravated criminal sexual abuse conviction, and a 15-year sentence for eachattempted aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction, to be served concurrently.

            Defendant contends on appeal that: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond areasonable doubt of home invasion because the evidence was insufficient to prove he knew one ormore persons were in the home; (2) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubtof home invasion, aggravated criminal sexual abuse and attempted aggravated criminal sexual assaultbecause the evidence was insufficient to prove the knife he used constituted a "dangerous weapon";(3) one of his attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault convictions must be vacated where therewas only one act of attempted penetration; (4) his conviction for home invasion must be vacatedbecause it is a lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault based on homeinvasion; (5) his convictions must be reversed and the cause remanded for a fitness hearing becausea bona fide doubt as to his fitness was raised; and (6) the cause must be remanded for properadmonishments pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(a) (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21(October 17, 2001), R. 605(a), eff. October 1, 2001).

BACKGROUND

            Defendant's convictions arose after he attempted to assault the 13-year-old victim, S.S., whileshe was alone at her foster mother's home on October 30, 1999. Defendant was charged with sixoffenses: two counts of home invasion, two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and twocounts of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault. The State nol-prossed the second count ofhome invasion (alleging defendant entered S.S.'s dwelling place, when he "had reason to know thatone or more persons were present therein") and tried defendant on the first count of home invasion(alleging defendant entered S.S.'s dwelling place, when he "knew that one or more persons werepresent therein") as well as the remaining offenses mentioned above. (Emphasis added.)

            Prior to trial, on November 13, 2000, defendant, who was represented by the public defender'soffice, moved for a behavioral clinical examination (BCX), which came back indicating he was fit tostand trial with medication. A fitness hearing was later held on February 6, 2001, and the partiesstipulated that Dr. Stafford Henry would testify that defendant was fit to stand trial with certainmedications. The trial court found defendant fit with medication.

            On March 13, 2002, defense counsel advised the court that defendant had a "misfortune" overthe weekend and that he had to "go to [the] psychiatric ward." The trial court again ordered a BCXto determine defendant's fitness to stand trial and continued the matter. Defendant's dissatisfactionwith appointed counsel dominated the next several court proceedings. At the April 19, 2002, proceeding, defense counsel indicated that defendant has "previously had [two] examinations forfitness both of which found *** him fit for trial with medication," that "[h]e appears to be taking hismedication," and that he wanted an attorney other than the public defender. No further mention ofthe second BCX was made.

            Defendant, represented by private counsel, was tried on August 22, 2003. The victim testifiedthat on October 30, 1999, at approximately 7:45 p.m., she was blow drying her hair in her rearbedroom while alone at her foster mother's apartment. The victim's father had been visiting andreminded her to lock the door after him when he left. The door, however remained unlocked, and10 minutes after her father left, the victim heard the door slam. The victim went to investigate andsaw defendant.

            Defendant approached the victim in the living room and told her that he would not hurt her. Defendant then grabbed the victim, and she hit him in the face with an iron. Defendant then threwher down and started to choke her. Defendant ripped off her pants, lifted up her shirt and removeda "gun-knife" from his pocket. Defendant licked the victim's breast, touched her vagina with hishands, and removed his penis from his pants. At that moment, the victim's sister, Sarah S., and herfoster mother returned from the grocery store. Sarah S. threw a bag of eggs at defendant anddefendant left. The victim's foster mother called the police, and later that night, the victim identifieddefendant as the offender from the back of a squad car two blocks away from her home.

            The victim initially thought defendant, who was standing next to the front door when she firstsaw him, was her father returning because "it was so dark" in the apartment. The victim testified thatthe lighting in the apartment consisted of (1) a light in the kitchen, and (2) a light in the hallway. Thehallway, which was between the front door and a basement door, was small, and the light was "verydim." The victim testified that "[i]f you're not standing there you can't see anything." Although it wasdim, the victim was able to see defendant's face while he was in the living room.

            The victim also testified that the knife defendant possessed, which she called a "gun-knife"because its handle was the shape of a gun, was "tiny with a little knife extended right off it." Theknife, which "could be" a novelty, had a blade four to five inches "at the most." It was not sharp anddid not scare the victim. The victim stopped moving when defendant pulled out the knife, and shewas afraid of defendant choking her.

            The victim additionally testified that she had seen defendant one time before in theneighborhood but that she did not know him and never talked to him. She also stated that she didnot invite defendant into her home.

            Sarah S. testified that at about 7:45 p.m. on October 30, 1999, she returned home from thegrocery store and was carrying a bag containing eggs. When she entered her home from the frontdoor, she saw defendant, whom she had seen once before, with his pants down. She testified that thehallway and kitchen lights were on, and that the living and dining room lights were off. Sarah S. triedto grab defendant and threw the bag at him. The next day, Sarah S. identified defendant from a policelineup.

            Chicago Police Officer Haywood, who arrived at the victim's house at approximately 7:55p.m., testified that he obtained a description of the offender from the victim, who was upset. OfficerHaywood then broadcast that description over his police radio. The officer also observed defendant'sknife, which he described as a pocket knife with a pistol handle and a two-inch-long blade. AlthoughHaywood testified he inventoried the knife, it was neither introduced at trial nor admitted intoevidence.

            Chicago Police Officer Montes received a "flash message" containing the description of theoffender. At 9:30 or 10 p.m., Montes saw defendant, who fit the description, walking alone aboutfour blocks away from the victim's home. Montes detained defendant and the victim identified himwhile the defendant was seated in the back of Montes' squad car.

            Chicago Police Detective Noflin testified that he conducted a lineup on October 31, 1999,from which Sarah S. identified defendant. Noflin then spoke to defendant, and read him his Mirandarights. Defendant told Noflin that "he was at the apartment visiting the victim but he did not recallwhat happened during this visitation." When Noflin asked defendant if he knew the victim, defendantdid not respond.

            The State rested. Defendant, after being admonished of his right to testify, rested withoutpresenting any evidence.

            The trial court found defendant guilty of all five counts. The court found that the victim was"in the top five of the witnesses that have testified *** with regard to the issue of credibility," and thatthe State's other witnesses were also credible. The court rejected defendant's arguments that he wasmisidentified as the offender and that he could not be guilty of home invasion where the door wasunlocked. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the knife was not a dangerous weapon.

            At the next court proceeding, defense counsel moved for a BCX to determine defendant'sfitness to be sentenced. Counsel stated that information in defendant's presentence investigationreport (PSI) was "very disturbing" and drew the court's attention to those parts that indicateddefendant had been diagnosed with a mental illness, that he was taking medication including an anti-psychotic drug and an anti-depressant, that he has had "numerous head injuries," that he has hadauditory and visual hallucinations, that he has had visions of shadows trying to suffocate him, and thathe believed he was "able to 'communicate out of his eyes' with the television." The trial court notedthat defendant had previously been found fit to stand trial, but ordered a BCX for fitness to besentenced.

            The matter was then delayed for several months while defendant received treatment for anillness. On April 30, 2004, the court indicated that it had received a report from Forensic ClinicalServices indicating defendant was fit for sentencing and was sane at the time of the offense, and anadditional report from a licensed clinical psychologist indicating that defendant was sane at the timeof the offense. No fitness hearing was held.

            The parties then proceeded to defendant's motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. The court heard evidence in mitigation and aggravation and sentenced defendant as indicated above. The court also advised defendant of his appellate rights but failed to specifically advise him that anyissue omitted from his motion to reconsider sentence would be waived for purposes of appeal.

ANALYSIS

I

            Defendant first contends that his conviction for home invasion must be reversed because theState failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew one or more persons were present inthe house, an element of the offense as charged in the indictment.

            When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question is whether,after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of factcould have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Bush, 214Ill. 2d 318, 326, 827 N.E.2d 455 (2005) (Bush); People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d267 (1985) (Collins). "Under this standard, a reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferencesfrom the record in favor of the prosecution." Bush, 214 Ill. 2d at 326, citing People v. Cunningham,212 Ill. 2d 274, 280, 818 N.E.2d 304 (2004). A finding of guilt will only be disturbed where theevidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory that there is a reasonable doubt as to thedefendant's guilt. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261; People v. Tackett, 150 Ill. App. 3d 406, 412, 501N.E.2d 891 (1986) (Tackett).

            Relevant to this case, the Illinois home invasion statute provides:

            "(a) A person *** commits home invasion when withoutauthority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of anotherwhen he or she knows or has reason to know that one or morepersons is present *** and

            (1) While armed with a dangerous weapon uses force orthreatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons withinsuch dwelling place whether or not injury occurs[.]" 720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(1) (West 1998).

            "It is well established that '[i]n a prosecution for home invasion, knowledge may be provenby circumstantial evidence so long as the State presents sufficient evidence from which an inferenceof knowledge can be made.'" People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256, 292, 687 N.E.2d 910 (1997), quotingPeople v. Ramey, 240 Ill. App. 3d 456, 462, 608 N.E.2d 512 (1992); Tackett, 150 Ill. App. 3d at420. Although the statute provides that home invasion is committed where the defendant "knows orhas reason to know" the dwelling place is occupied, in this case, count I charged that defendant"knew that one or more persons were present" in the victim's home. (Emphasis added.) The Stateopted not to proceed on count II, which alleged defendant "had reason to know that one or morepersons were present." (Emphasis added.)

            The parties dispute whether the circumstantial evidence presented in this case was sufficientto prove defendant knew the house was occupied. Defendant, relying on facts indicating the onlylights on in the apartment were a "very dim" hall light and a kitchen light, argues the evidence failedto establish he "knew" the house was occupied. Defendant argues that a dark house in the eveningwould suggest that nobody was home, and that because the victim's father had recently left,somebody watching the home could believe it was empty. Further, the victim was in her bedroomwhen defendant entered, which she testified was at the far end of the apartment. Defendant furtherasserts that no witnesses testified that he knew the house was occupied or that he had any informationabout the victim's apartment or family.

            The State, on the other hand, points to defendant's statement to Detective Noflin that he wasvisiting the victim at her apartment and did not know what happened. The State also argues thatbecause several lights were on in the victim's home, and because she was blow drying her hair, anactivity that would include noise, defendant knew the apartment was occupied when he entered.

            We first address defendant's statement to Detective Noflin. Defendant's statement that he was "visiting the victim" constitutes an admission that he knew at least one person, the victim, waspresent in the home when he entered. Defendant's admission could therefore directly lead a rationaltrier of fact to infer that defendant knew one or more persons were present in the apartment thatevening.

            The circumstantial evidence presented in this case corroborated defendant's statement and wastherefore sufficient to prove defendant's guilt. In Tackett, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 420, a case addressedby both parties, this court rejected the defendant's argument that the State failed to prove beyond areasonable doubt that he "knew or had reason to know" that the house he and his accomplice enteredwas occupied. Looking to circumstantial evidence, including that (1) the defendant entered the houseat 1 a.m., "a time when it is likely that occupants of a residence would be at home," (2) the defendantcarried string with him in order to tie somebody up, and (3) the defendant likely saw the victim's carin the garage, this court found that the State proved the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Tackett, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 420. While in this case the State was required to prove that defendantknew that one or more persons were present, Tackett is instructive in demonstrating circumstantialevidence from which a defendant's knowledge may be inferred.

            In this case, the evidence showed that the offense occurred at 7:45 p.m, a time whenindividuals are less likely to be at work or at school, that a person recently left the house, that severallights were on in the house, and that the victim was engaging in the noisy activity of blow drying herhair. See People v. Frisby, 160 Ill. App. 3d 19, 31, 512 N.E.2d 1337 (1987) (a light on in the roomthe intruder first enters and noise from a radio is indicative of a defendant's knowledge that the houseis occupied). This circumstantial evidence, combined with the direct evidence elicited throughdefendant's admission, was sufficient to prove defendant's knowledge.

II

            Defendant next contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that theknife he possessed constituted a "dangerous weapon." He therefore contends his home invasionconviction should be reversed, his aggravated criminal sexual abuse convictions should be reducedto criminal sexual abuse, and his attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault convictions should bereduced to attempted criminal sexual assault. He additionally maintains that this court should remandhis case for resentencing on the lesser offenses.

            As discussed above, the issue on appeal is whether, after viewing the evidence in the lightmost favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elementsof the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d at 326. The defendant's conviction willonly be set aside if the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there is a reasonable doubtof his or her guilt. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261.

            In this case, defendant's possession of a dangerous weapon, the knife, was an element of alloffenses as charged. The term "dangerous weapon," however, is not defined by any of the offensesof which defendant was convicted.

            Whether a particular object qualifies as a dangerous weapon depends upon the character ofthat object and is usually a question for the finder of fact to be determined based on the totality of thecircumstances. People v. Charles, 217 Ill. App. 3d 509, 512-13, 514, 577 N.E.2d 534 (1991)(Charles). Where the statute involved does not define what constitutes a dangerous weapon, courtsdivide objects into four categories: (1) those, such as loaded guns and knives, that are dangerous perse; (2) those that are never dangerous, such as a four-inch plastic toy gun; (3) those that are notnecessarily dangerous but may be so used, such as an unloaded gun or a toy gun made of heavymaterials; and (4) those that are not necessarily dangerous, but were used in a dangerous manner. People v. Thorne, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1070-71, 817 N.E.2d 1163 (2004) (Thorne).

            Defendant argues that the fact finder must take into consideration the victim's subjective beliefin determining whether an object is "dangerous." He asserts the victim testified that the knife was"tiny," not sharp, possibly a novelty, and that she was not afraid of it. Further, defendant points outthat the judge never viewed the knife, as the State failed to introduce it into evidence.

            In this case, defendant possessed a knife, a per se dangerous weapon under Thorne. We rejectdefendant's contention that Thorne is limited to the armed robbery statute, the statute at issue in thatcase, as there is no indication that such a limitation is intended. Additionally, the cases upon whichdefendant primarily relies, including Charles, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 509, and People v. Guzman, 276 Ill.App. 3d 750, 658 N.E.2d 1268 (1995) (Guzman), do not involve home invasion or aggravatedcriminal sexual abuse. Thus, under defendant's reasoning, neither Charles nor Guzman would haveany bearing on his convictions for those offenses. We further find that under Thorne, the victim'ssubjective belief need not be taken into account.

            Defendant also argues that although Thorne classifies guns and knives as "dangerous per se,"its actual holding is that the gun in that case, a BB gun, was not a dangerous weapon. Whatdefendant fails to point out is that Thorne says a loaded gun is a per se dangerous weapon, and therewas no evidence in that case that the BB gun was loaded. Thorne, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1072.

            Additionally, Charles actually belies defendant's position. In that case, this court rejected thedefendant's argument that his aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction should be reducedbecause the knife he used did not constitute a dangerous weapon. Similar to this case, the victim inCharles testified she was "not as much afraid of the knife as she was afraid of [the] defendant." Charles, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 511-12. Further, the victim in that case only saw the knife, which hada 1 ½-inch blade, for less than a minute. Defendant argues Charles stands for the proposition thatan object used in an aggravated criminal sexual assault must be used in a dangerous manner. Defendant asserts that in Charles the defendant threatened to cut the victim "into little pieces"(Charles, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 511), while defendant in this case told the victim he would not hurt her. This argument fails, as presenting a knife and choking the victim negated defendant's representationthat he would not hurt her, and defendant, by attempting to sexually assault the victim, surely did planon hurting her.

            The issue of whether the knife constituted a "dangerous weapon" was properly left to the trierof fact, the trial judge, who reasonably found:

"And I don't know if it's suggested that because this knife had a handlethat appeared to be a gun, had it been suggested that that is some typeof novelty which would suggest to me that it's some type of toy, well,it's this Court's opinion as a finder of fact that a two-inch blade isn't atoy, that a two-inch blade inserted into a human being's body at astrategic location certainly could result in bodily harm, if not death,therefore, I find that weapon as described by [the victim] and theofficer to be a dangerous weapon."

            The evidence presented supporting this conclusion is not so improbable or unsatisfactory thatthe trial court's determination should be set aside. We therefore conclude the State proved beyonda reasonable doubt that the knife was a dangerous weapon.

III

            Defendant's next contention is that one of his convictions for attempted aggravated criminalsexual assault must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime rule of People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551,566, 363 N.E.2d 838 (1977), because there was only one act of attempted penetration.

            Defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault as alleged in bothcount V and count VI of the indictment. Both provide that defendant "with the intent to commit theoffense of aggravated criminal sexual assault, did any act, to wit: [defendant] grabbed [S.S.],displayed a knife, and removed [her] clothing and attempted to place his penis in her vagina." Theaggravating factors, however, differed: count V alleged only that defendant displayed a knife (720ILCS 5/12-14(a)(1) (West 1998)), while count VI alleged that the act of attempted penetration wascommitted during the commission of another felony, home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-14 (a)(4) (West1998)).

            The State concedes that only one act of attempted penetration occurred; what the partiesdispute is the remedy. Defendant argues that this court must vacate one of his attempted aggravatedcriminal sexual assault convictions and remand for a new sentencing hearing "so that the judge canconsider the proper amount of convictions when sentencing [him]." However, we agree with theState's contention that under People v. Eubanks, 279 Ill. App. 3d 949, 963, 665 N.E.2d 464 (1996),it retains the right to elect which conviction should be retained. We therefore accept the State'selection that count V, premised on the use of a weapon, be retained, and count VI, premised on homeinvasion, be vacated.

            We additionally note that generally, when multiple convictions are obtained for offensesarising from a single act, sentence is imposed on the most serious offense. People v. Cardona, 158Ill. 2d 403, 411, 634 N.E.2d 720 (1994). In People v. Garcia, 179 Ill. 2d 55, 688 N.E.2d 57 (1997)(Garcia), the case upon which defendant relies, the court remanded to the trial court for adetermination of upon which of the defendant's three convictions for aggravated criminal sexualassault (based on use of a dangerous weapon, bodily harm, and threatening the victim) he should besentenced. Remand was appropriate in Garcia because there was no way for the court to determinethe more serious offense. Garcia, 179 Ill. 2d at 71.

            In People v. Daniels, 331 Ill. App. 3d 380, 386-87, 770 N.E.2d 1143 (2002) (Daniels), a panelof this court discussed Garcia, but did not remand the defendant's cause for resentencing where hehad been improperly convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault based on one actof penetration. The aggravating factors in Daniels were (1) display of a dangerous weapon, and (2)bodily harm to the victim. The court held that because an assault involving bodily harm to the victimis a more serious offense than an assault displaying a dangerous weapon, Garcia was distinguishableand remand was unnecessary. We note that in People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 190, 661 N.E.2d305 (1996) (Rodriguez), our supreme court held that an aggravated criminal sexual assault involvingthe display or threat of use of a dangerous weapon is a more serious offense than an assault involvinghome invasion.

            Reading Daniels and Rodriguez together leads us to conclude that count V (display of aweapon) is a more serious offense than count VI (home invasion) and that remand under Garcia isunnecessary. We therefore vacate defendant's conviction under count VI, attempted aggravatedcriminal sexual assault based on home invasion.

IV

            Defendant next contends that his conviction for home invasion must be vacated because it isa lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault based on home invasionunder the one-act, one-crime doctrine. In light of our prior discussion in which we held thatdefendant's conviction for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault based on home invasion mustbe vacated, we need not address this contention.

V

            Defendant contends that his convictions should be reversed and the cause remanded for afitness hearing because there was a bona fide doubt as to his fitness to stand trial or to be sentenced.

            Due process requires that a defendant be fit in order to be tried or sentenced. People v.Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d 212, 218, 817 N.E.2d 472 (2004) (Hanson). A defendant is presumed to be fitto stand trial or to be sentenced; however, once a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness is raised,a fitness hearing must be held. People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 512, 578 N.E.2d 952 (1991)(Eddmonds). While defendant advocates for de novo review, the trial court's determination of bonafide doubt is left to its discretion. Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d at 222.

            The trial court's grant of a defendant's request for a fitness hearing does not necessarily meanit found a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness. Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d at 222. Rather, adefendant's fitness may be determined by a number of factors, including (1) the rationality of thedefendant's behavior and demeanor at trial, (2) counsel's statements concerning the defendant'scompetence, and (3) any prior medical opinions on the issue of the defendant's fitness. Hanson, 212Ill. 2d at 223, citing Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d at 518.

            Defendant acknowledges that one fitness hearing was held on February 6, 2001, prior to trial. However, he argues the trial court did not fulfill its obligation to hold a hearing when his fitness wasagain raised by defense counsel on March 13, 2002 (prior to trial), and prior to sentencing, when hisPSI indicated he suffered hallucinations and believed he had the ability to communicate through thetelevision with his eyes. While fitness evaluations were performed following these two latterinstances finding defendant fit, defendant argues bona fide doubt was raised warranting a fitnesshearing. Defendant points to several factors, in addition to those mentioned above, including that hespent time in the psychiatric ward, that he believed shadows would suffocate him, that he was thevictim of a sexual assault, and that he received psychotropic medication.

            Defendant cannot show the trial court abused its discretion in failing to hold additional fitnesshearings. Significantly, at each instance defense counsel raised the issue of defendant's fitness, afitness examination was ordered. Each concluded that defendant was fit to stand trial or to besentenced.

            This court must consider what was known to the trial court at the time the fitness issue wasraised. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d at 514. Here, the majority of factors defendant cites were not knownuntil defendant's PSI was completed following trial. Thus, defendant cannot establish bona fide doubtas of March 2002.

            Additionally, there was no bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness to be sentenced. Applyingthe Eddmonds factors, we find that defendant was again examined pursuant to counsel's request andwas again found fit. Counsel accepted these findings and did not press the issue. While it is difficultto ascertain defendant's demeanor from the appellate record, the record does not contain anyindication that defendant was behaving irrationally at the time he was sentenced. Therefore, as therewas no bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness at the time he was sentenced, no fitness hearing wasrequired, and reversal of defendant's convictions is unnecessary.

VI

            Defendant's final contention is that his case must be remanded for proper admonishmentspursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(a) (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001),R. 605(a), eff. October 1, 2001) because the trial court failed to admonish him that any issue notincluded in his motion to reconsider sentence would be waived for purposes of appeal.

            In People v. Henderson, No. 98887, slip op. at 13 (August 18, 2005) (Henderson), oursupreme court held that "where a defendant is given incomplete Rule 605(a) admonishmentsregarding the preservation of sentencing issues for appeal, remand is required only where there hasbeen prejudice or a denial of real justice as a result of the inadequate admonishment." The courtfound that because the defendant in Henderson had not raised any sentencing issues on appeal, he wasneither prejudiced nor denied real justice by the incomplete admonishments. Henderson, slip op. at15-16. Therefore, remand for proper admonishments in that case was unnecessary.

            As defendant in this case concedes that "he has not raised a specific sentencing issue onappeal," he similarly cannot show he was prejudiced or denied real justice. Remand for properadmonishments is therefore unnecessary.

CONCLUSION

            For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmedin part and vacated in part.

            Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

            HOFFMAN, P.J., and THEIS, J., concur.