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SECOND DIVISION

August 6, 2001

(Nunc Pro Tunc June 28, 2002)

No. 1-00-3235

PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Anthony Jay Mazar appeals from the circuit court's sentencingorder on his convictions. Following a jury trial, in which defendant appearedpro se, he was convicted of two counts of burglary and one count of aggravatedpossession of a stolen vehicle. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to 13years' imprisonment on each conviction, to run concurrently. On appeal,defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to appoint standbycounsel for him, he was denied his fundamental right to a fair trial because hewas forced to proceed to trial in prison clothing, and he was denied due processbecause the trial court's admonishments with respect to how to preserve issuesfor appeal misinformed him. We affirm defendant's convictions, but remand thiscause with directions that the trial court advise defendant of his appeal rightsin conformity with current Supreme Court Rule 605(a) (145 Ill. 2d R. 605(a) (asamended October 1, 2001)), and to allow defendant to file a motion challenginghis sentences.

Defendant's convictions on two counts of burglary and one count ofaggravated possession of a stolen vehicle were based on a series of events thatoccurred on June 3, 2000. The trial court sentenced defendant to 13 years'imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. Because defendant does notchallenge his convictions, the facts of the offenses and events surrounding hisarrest are not set forth in detail. Only those facts pertinent to the issues onappeal are stated below.

Prior to defendant's trial, on July 26, 2000, defendant elected to proceedpro se. The trial court thoroughly admonished defendant with respect to theperils of doing so and specifically stated that it would not appoint standbycounsel. Thereafter, defendant was admonished several more times about theperils, but persisted in proceeding pro se. On August 1, at another pretrialhearing, the trial court noted that defendant was dressed in jail clothes. Defendant stated that that was okay. When told that he could be provided withcivilian clothing, defendant stated that that was a "nice offer. I accept, ifit happens." Again, on August 22, the issue of defendant's clothing arose. Atthat time, before a different judge, defendant indicated that another judge hadadvised him that "they" would get him clothes, to which defendant had respondedthat that was a generous offer and he would accept it if true. The court thenrequested that the public defender obtain civilian clothing for defendant, whichhe agreed to do.

On August 24, just prior to commencement of defendant's trial, defendantrequested appointment of standby counsel. After indicating the problems inherentwith appointment of standby counsel, the court, relying on a United StatesSupreme Court decision, declined defendant's "eleventh hour" request forappointment of standby counsel. At this time, defendant also objected to thefact that he had to wear prison clothes. Defendant had been provided a blueshirt, a blue shirt coat, and a blue polka dot tie by the public defender'soffice. However, the public defender did not have pants to fit defendant and hewas wearing khaki pants issued by the Department of Corrections. Apparently, theprison markings on the pants were only visible if defendant stood. The trialcourt indicated that neither it, the State, nor the public defender's office wasconstitutionally required to supply defendant with civilian clothing. The courtsuggested that at the lunch break, prior to selection of the jury, that defendantturn his pants inside out. Defendant followed this suggestion and proceeded totrial in this manner.

After defendant was convicted, he filed a motion for a new trial,contending, inter alia, that the jury had been tainted because he was a pro sedefendant who had been required to wear "filthy prison garb trousers inside outand flimsy heelless prison shoes," and that the trial court erred in denying hisrequest for standby counsel. Following the parties' arguments, the trial courtdenied defendant's motion, finding that appointment of standby counsel was notappropriate. With respect to defendant's attire, the trial court noted that thepublic defender stated that it had no pants to fit defendant. According to thecourt, defendant had turned the pants inside out and they looked like Dockers,which the trial court did not see as a "problem." Lastly, the trial court statedthat it did not think there was "any problem with the jury knowing somebody wasin custody," and that defendant was "wearing civilian clothing." This appealfollowed.

Defendant first contends that the Illinois Constitution, Article I, section8, grants a defendant the right to simultaneously appear pro se and with theassistance of counsel. According to defendant, the language of ourconstitutional provision is clear and unambiguous. Defendant maintains thatsection 8 is not as limited as the corresponding right in the federalconstitution. Defendant further argues that even if the two provisions were thesame, we can construe Illinois' constitutional provisions independently asproviding more expansive rights. Defendant asserts that this is an issue notpreviously decided by any Illinois court. Defendant further contends that aharmless error analysis is not applicable here because he was denied afundamental right. The State has failed to respond to defendant's constitutionalargument.

Article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution provides:

"In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall havethe right to appear and defend in person and bycounsel." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,