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FIRST DIVISION
August 11, 2003

Following a bench trial, defendant, Gabriel Marin, was convicted of aggravated unlawfuluse of a weapon and sentenced to 24 months of probation. On appeal, defendant contends he wasnot proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant further contends that the aggravatedunlawful use of a weapon statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2002)), under which he wasconvicted, is unconstitutionally overbroad, thereby violating his right to due process. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Three witnesses testified during defendant's bench trial. Chicago police officer SeanLoughran testified that while on patrol with his partner, he observed defendant and three otherindividuals standing in front of a house at 5753 South Campbell Street in Chicago. Loughranstated that defendant was holding a small, shiny metallic object in his right hand, which Loughranbelieved to be a gun. Loughran's partner stopped the unmarked police car about 25 feet awayfrom the four individuals and, when Loughran emerged from the car, defendant dropped thesuspected gun and Loughran heard it hit the ground. After the officers apprehended the four men,Loughran recovered a semiautomatic, .22-caliber, loaded handgun from the porch of the house. The men were handcuffed and searched, but nothing further was recovered. Defendant was takento the police station after the three other individuals, who were minors, were released.

Loughran testified that upon arriving at the police station, defendant waived his Mirandarights. Defendant then told Loughran that he purchased the handgun for $80 or $90 and wascarrying it for a street gang, the "Party People," with which he was affiliated. He further statedthat the gun was not worth more than $50.

Andrew Martinez, a minor who was detained with defendant, testified that he, defendantand two other young men were standing on the porch of 5753 South Campbell when they wereapproached by two police officers. Martinez stated that he was holding the gun when the policearrived and that he dropped the gun in the grass. Martinez asserted that, although he told thepolice the gun was his, the police implicated defendant because Martinez was a minor anddefendant was not.

Finally, defendant testified at trial that he and his brother were walking his dog when afriend called him over to the porch at 5753 South Campbell. After speaking with the individualson the porch, he returned to walking his dog. As he walked away from the porch, however, twopolice officers arrived and detained him and three other individuals who were on the porch. Afterasking the four young men their ages, the officers took defendant to the police station. Defendantdenied that he was holding a gun. He further denied that he was a member of a street gang andthat he made a statement to the police officers at the police station.

The trial court found defendant guilty of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon andsentenced him to 24 months of probation. The court noted that it found Officer Loughran'stestimony to be credible, while inconsistencies between the testimony of Martinez and defendantrendered them not credible as witnesses.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, defendant contends that the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute(aggravated UUW) is unconstitutional on the grounds that the statute requires no culpable mentalstate and thereby punishes innocent conduct, resulting in the contravention of the due processprovisions of both the state and federal constitutions. Defendant further contends that he was notproven guilty of aggravated UUW beyond a reasonable doubt. For the following reasons, we findthe statute to be constitutional and affirm defendant's conviction.

With respect to defendant's due process contentions, we initially note that this courtrecently rejected this exact argument in the cases of People v. McGee, No. 1-01-2637 (June 30,2003), and People v. Grant, No. 1-01-1134 (May 22, 2003). We do the same here for thefollowing reasons.

The aggravated UUW statute provides:

"(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon whenhe or she knowingly:

(1) Carries on or about his or her person or in any vehicle or concealed onor about his or her person except when on his or her land or in his or her abode orfixed place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm; or

(2) Carries or possesses on or about his or her person, upon any publicstreet, alley, or other public lands within the corporate limits of a city, village orincorporated town, except when an invitee thereon or therein, for the purpose ofthe display of such weapon or the lawful commerce in weapons, or except when onhis or her own land or in his or her own abode or fixed place of business, anypistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm; and

(3) One of the following factors is present:

(A) the firearm possessed was uncased, loaded and immediatelyaccessible at the time of the offense; or

(B) the firearm possessed was uncased, unloaded and theammunition for the weapon was immediately accessible at the time of theoffense; or

(C) the person possessing the firearm has not been issued acurrently valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card; or

(D) the person possessing the weapon was previously adjudicated adelinquent minor under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for an act that ifcommitted by an adult would be a felony; or

(E) the person possessing the weapon was engaged in amisdemeanor violation of the Cannabis Control Act or in a misdemeanorviolation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act; or

(F) the person possessing the weapon is a member of a street gangor is engaged in street gang related activity, as defined in Section 10 of theIllinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act; or

(G) the person possessing the weapon had a[n] order of protectionissued against him or her within the previous 2 years; or

(H) the person possessing the weapon was engaged in thecommission or attempted commission of a misdemeanor involving the useor threat of violence against the person or property of another; or

(I) the person possessing the weapon was under 21 years of ageand in possession of a handgun as defined in Section 24-3, unless theperson under 21 is engaged in lawful activities under the Wildlife Code ordescribed in subsection 24-2(b)(1), (b)(3), or 24-2(f).

* * *

(c) This Section does not apply to or affect the transportation or possession ofweapons that:

(i) are broken down in a non-functioning state; or

(ii) are not immediately accessible; or

(iii) are unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shippingbox, or other container by a person who has been issued a currently valid FirearmOwner's Identification Card.

(d) Sentence. Aggravated unlawful use of a weapon is a Class 4 felony; a secondor subsequent offense is a Class 2 felony. Aggravated unlawful use of a weapon by aperson who has been prevsiouly convicted of a felony in this State or another jurisdictionis a Class 2 felony." 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2002).

Defendant contends that, because the statute only requires a knowing mental state anddoes not require criminal intent, it sweeps too broadly and permits felony convictions for whollyinnocent conduct in violation of substantive due process. By way of example, defendant assertsthat a hunter who receives a call about an emergency at home, thereby forgetting to unload orcase his gun before he drives away, would be guilty of a felony. Similarly, he asserts that a GoodSamaritan, who does not have a firearm owner's identification card, would be guilty of a felony ifhe found a gun on the street and, not wanting a neighborhood child to find it, put it in his car totake to the police station. Defendant argues that because the aggravated UUW statute punishessuch wholly innocent conduct, it is not sufficiently confined to solely remedy the particularpurpose targeted by the legislature, which he alleges is to limit gun possession by gang membersand organized crime figures. The State responds to defendant's contentions by arguing that theaggravated UUW statute has valid applications and that the statute is not vague as applied todefendant under the facts of this case. Because the evidence was sufficient to establish thatdefendant was a gang member and was on gang-related business when he was apprehended with aloaded weapon, we agree that a vagueness challenge would fail. However, the basis ofdefendant's constitutional challenge is not vagueness, but overbreadth; and vagueness andoverbreadth are two different legal principles. See People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 416, 790N.E. 2d 846, 856 (2003) (a statute is unconstitutionally vague where its prohibitions are notsufficiently definite "to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning as to what conduct isprohibited," and it does not provide "sufficiently definite standards for law enforcement officersand triers of fact that its application does not depend merely on their private conceptions");compare People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24, 740 N.E.2d 755, 767 (2000) (a statute is overbroadwhere it does not bear a reasonable relationship to a public interest to be served and the meansadopted are not a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective). Therefore, we noteat the outset that our analysis of the statute's constitutionality will be focused solely on thequestion of overbreadth.

We examine defendant's constitutionality challenge pursuant to the following well-established principles. Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law to be reviewed denovo. People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 486, 786 N.E.2d 994, 1004 (2003). A challenge to theconstitutionality of a criminal statute may be raised for the first time on appeal (People v.Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 510, 722 N.E.2d 1102, 1108 (1999)); however, statutes are presumedto be constitutional, and it is the burden of the party challenging the statute to establish itsinvalidity (People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 24, 740 N.E.2d at 766). The legislature has widediscretion to establish penalties for criminal offenses; however, this police power is limited by theconstitutional right that a person may not be deprived of his liberty without due process of law. In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 550, 714 N.E.2d 491, 496 (1999). When legislation does not affect afundamental right, its compliance with substantive due process requirements is determined underthe rational basis test. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 24, 740 N.E.2d at 767. It is well established that theright to bear arms is not a fundamental right. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265, 29 L. Ed.615, 619, 6 S. Ct. 580, 584 (1886) (the right to bears arms is not a right granted by theConstitution; instead the second amendment restricts Congress and the national government, butnot the state, from infringing on the right); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp.1169, 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (the right to bear arms may be "limited by the states through the validexercise of what has come to be known as the 'police power,' without fear that any United StatesConstitutional provisions will be infringed"); People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos, 68 Ill. 2d 88, 97,368 N.E.2d 903, 907 (1977) (only those rights associated with the expression of ideas, inparticipation in the political process, in travel among the states, and in privacy with regard to themost intimate and personal aspects of one's life are regarded as fundamental). Because it is not afundamental right, we analyze the constitutionality of the legislation at issue pursuant to therational basis test. Under the rational basis test, a statute is upheld where it "'bears a reasonablerelationship to a public interest to be served, and the means adopted are a reasonable method ofaccomplishing the desired objective.'" Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 24, 740 N.E.2d at 767, quotingPeople v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390, 581 N.E.2d 637 (1991).

In applying this test, we must first ascertain the statute's public purpose in order to testwhether its provisions reasonably implement that purpose. Defendant seeks to narrowly confinethe intended purpose of the statute solely to gang activity based on transcripts of discussions inthe Illinois House of Representatives and the Senate. As a result, he contends the statute's scopefar exceeds the purpose to be served. We disagree.

Because the legislature did not explicitly state the purpose of the statute in the statuteitself, we must look to the history (People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 173-74, 788 N.E.2d 707,716-17 (2003) (discussing the legislative debates in determining the meaning and purpose of aportion of the criminal sexual assault statute)) and the language (People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440,456, 771 N.E.2d 374, 384 (2002) (the language of a statute is the best indication of thelegislature's intent and the statute's purpose)) of the statute to determine its purpose.

The overall purpose of the aggravated UUW statute is to protect the public from gunviolence. See People v. Williams, 60 Ill. App. 3d 726, 727, 377 N.E.2d 285, 286 (1978) (theunlawful use of a weapon statute demonstrates a "legislative intent to regulate the possession anduse of weapons for the safety and good order of society"). This purpose is accomplished not onlyby prohibiting the possession of weapons by gang members, but by prohibiting the accessibility toloaded weapons in public places by society at large. The legislative intent to ban the possession ofloaded weapons by the general public, not only by gang members, is articulated in the legislativedebate transcripts provided by defendant. Although defendant argues that the transcripts reflectthe legislature's purpose of solely targeting gang members, review of the transcripts does not lendsupport to this argument. To the contrary, the transcripts support the reading that the legislatureintended to prevent anyone from carrying a loaded or unlicensed weapon in order to protect thegeneral public and police enforcement officers. Not only does the Senate transcript provideexplicit comment that the statute "get[s] at the broader issue beyond streetgang members thatpeople were concerned about, which is whether or not we wanted to allow persons to have a guneasily accessible when they were stopped by police officers" (91st Ill. Gen. Assem., SenateProceedings, April 7, 2000, at 97-98 (statements by Senator Obama)), but it indicates that thelegislature explicitly discussed gang members as only one target of the legislation.

The language of the statute itself further indicates that the purpose of the statute goesbeyond targeting gang members. Although subsection (3)(F) particularly targets persons inpossession of a weapon who are members of a street gang or are engaged in street-gang-relatedactivity (see 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(3)(F) (West 2002)), there are eight other subsections underthe numeral "3," which do not single out gang members. Among other things, these sectionsunequivocally prohibit anyone from carrying an accessible, loaded weapon or an unloaded weaponfor which the ammunition is accessible, outside of his or her own property or fixed place ofbusiness. Had the legislature merely been concerned with gang activity, it would certainly nothave provided such an explicit and exhaustive list of aggravating factors to encompass actionswell beyond such activity. See, e.g., People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62, 67, 481 N.E.2d 676, 679(1985) (the most direct means in achieving the goal of protecting the public from the dangers ofarson would be to categorically ban the setting of fires).

For these reasons, we agree with the conclusion in McGee and Grant that the legislature'spurpose in enacting the statute was to prevent any person from carrying a loaded weapon on hisperson or in his vehicle due to "the inherent dangers to police officers and the general public." Grant, slip op. at 18; McGee, slip op. at 12. There is no question that such a purpose is alegitimate state interest properly regulated by the legislature. See Quilici, 532 F. Supp. at 1176(the possession of guns poses such a threat to society that it is subject to an extraordinary degreeof control by the legislature); Williams, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 728, 377 N.E.2d at 286; Biffer v. Cityof Chicago, 278 Ill. 562, 575, 116 N.E. 182, 187 (1917) ("There can be no question but that theprevention of the carrying of concealed deadly weapons will tend strongly to promote the safetyof the community. Such regulations clearly come within the police power of the State").

Following this identification of the legislature's legitimate purpose, we turn to defendant'scontention that the statute as written is not reasonably related to accomplishing its purpose. SeeWright, 194 Ill. 2d at 24, 740 N.E.2d at 767. Defendant argues that because the statute lacks aculpable mental state, it violates due process by potentially punishing innocent conduct, which isnot intended to be the target of the legislation. We disagree, as we find that the statute isreasonably related to its goal of preventing anyone from carrying a weapon in the name of publicsafety because access to a weapon can lead to criminal behavior despite a lack of criminal intent. See generally Quilici, 532 F. Supp. at 1176; Williams, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 728, 377 N.E.2d at 286;Biffer, 278 Ill. at 575, 116 N.E. at 187.

Defendant relies on three Illinois Supreme Court decisions to support his argument thatthe statute is not reasonably related to accomplishing its intended purpose -- People v. Wright,194 Ill. 2d 1, 740 N.E.2d 755 (2000), People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62, 481 N.E.2d 676 (1985), andPeople v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36, 630 N.E.2d 797 (1994). We find these cases to bedistinguishable for the following reasons.

The statute at issue in Wright required certain individuals, licensed under the IllinoisVehicle Code, to maintain records relating to the acquisition and disposition of vehicles and partsfor three years at their place of business. 625 ILCS 5/5-401.2(a) (West 1996). Anyone whoknowingly failed to do so was guilty of a Class 2 felony. 625 ILCS 5/5-401.2(i) (West 1996). The Wright court defined the purpose of the statute as the prevention or reduction of the transferor sale of stolen vehicles or their parts within the State of Illinois. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 25, 740N.E.2d at 767. However, the court found that the statute was not reasonably designed to achievethis purpose because it potentially punished as a felony a slight lapse in record keeping by anindividual acting with no criminal intent. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 28, 740 N.E.2d at 768-69.

In Wick, the court invalidated a section of the aggravated arson statute that made it aClass X felony to "knowingly" damage a building by fire when that fire injures a fireman orpoliceman without distinguishing to whom the property belonged or the intent of the accused. Ill.Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 20-1.1(a)(3). The simple arson statute, on the other hand, requiredthe offender to knowingly damage by fire property belonging to another without his consent, orany property with the intent to defraud the insurer, thus requiring a greater degree of malice. TheWick court held that because the aggravated arson statute did not require the same unlawfulpurpose as that required for simple arson, the statute was unconstitutional because it could punishwholly innocent conduct. For example, a farmer who legally burns his barn to clear space for anew one would be guilty of a Class X felony if a fireman were injured at the scene. Therefore, thestatute did not bear a reasonable relationship to its purpose of providing a more severe penalty forarsonists whose conduct resulted in injury to a fireman or policeman. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d at 66, 481N.E.2d at 678-79.

In Zaremba, the court invalidated the theft statute, section 16-1(a)(5) of the Criminal Codeof 1961, for reasons similar to those in Wright. The statute made it a felony to obtain or exertcontrol over property in the custody of any law enforcement agency where the person has beenofficially informed that the property was stolen. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 16-1(a)(5). TheZaremba court found that subsection (a)(5) did not provide a culpable mental state and did notbear a reasonable relationship to its purpose of breaking up fencing operations because itpotentially punished wholly innocent conduct. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 40-42, 630 N.E.2d at 799-800. The example of innocent conduct recited in Zaremba was that the section would criminalizethe actions of a police evidence technician who retained the proceeds of a theft for safekeeping. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 38, 630 N.E.2d at 798.

Defendant also cites to In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 714 N.E.2d 491 (1999), in which casethe supreme court found that two sections of the Illinois Vehicle Code violated due processbecause they were capable of punishing wholly innocent conduct without requiring proof of aculpable mental state. K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 552-53, 714 N.E.2d at 497. The sections of the Codeat issue provided that it was a felony to damage, remove any part of, tamper with, enter, set inmotion, or work on a vehicle without authority to do so. 625 ILCS 5/4-102 (West 1996). Infinding the statute unconstitutional, the court noted that the statute would make criminals ofpeople who decorate the bride and groom's car during a wedding ceremony or someone who getsinto a traffic accident. K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 553, 714 N.E.2d at 497. Therefore, the legislation wasnot rationally related to the goal of preventing vandalism and malicious mischief. K.C., 186 Ill. 2dat 553, 714 N.E.2d at 497.

In each of these cases, the provision of a culpable mental state would have eliminated theensnarement of the innocent conduct of concern from the sweep of the statutes without otherwiseinterfering with or diluting their overall thrust and purpose. See Wick, 107 Ill. 2d at 67-68, 481N.E.2d at 679 ("[W]e hold that the legislature's failure to require a culpable intent rendersunconstitutional subsection (a)(3) of the aggravated-arson statute ***. *** Because an effectivemeans of reducing injuries to firemen and police officers resulting from arson is a laudatory goal,we encourage the legislature to cure the constitutional defect of the statute as it is presentlyformulated at the earliest possible time"); Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 43, 630 N.E.2d at 800 ("section16-1(a)(5) is unconstitutional because it fails to require a culpable mental state ***. *** Becausean effective method of breaking up fencing operations is a laudatory goal, we encourage thelegislature to cure the constitutional defect of the statute as it is presently written at the earliestpossible time"); Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 28-30, 740 N.E.2d at 768-69 ("[S]ection 5-401.2 is notreasonably designed to achieve its purpose. *** [E]ven a slight lapse in record keeping by anindividual with no criminal purpose may be punished as a Class 2 felony. *** Because providingan effective system of mandatory record keeping to prevent or reduce the transfer or sale of stolenvehicles and parts is a laudatory goal, we encourage the legislature to remedy this constitutionaldefect at the earliest possible time"). The "knowing" mental state or the lack of any mental state atall simply swept too broadly since the prohibited activity could have been effectively targeted bythis enhancement of the mental state. Because it was the criminal purpose behind the behavior,not the behavior itself, that was intended to be the subject of the legislation, the interposition ofcriminal intent would not have conflicted with the purpose of the statutes.

For example, in Wright, there would be no reason to require the maintenance of vehicletransaction records other than to prohibit the intentional concealment of stolen vehicles or parts. See Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 24-25, 740 N.E.2d at 767. Likewise, there is no reason to criminalizeinjury to a firefighter or police officer under the aggravated arson statute where the setting of a fireto one's own property, which might result in such an injury, is recognized as legitimate in the verysame statute under the subsection for simple arson. In this regard, not only was the underlyingactivity in Wick of burning one's own barn legal, but the purpose of the statute was to enhance thepenalty where the fire was illegally set, not to criminalize a legal activity where it had anunintended result. See Wick, 107 Ill. 2d at 66, 481 N.E.2d at 678-79. Similarly, there was noreason and no intent on the part of the legislature to criminalize the lawful receipt of stolen goodsby a police employee, which was at issue in Zaremba, or, as in K.C., to punish the decorating of abride and groom's car in the absence of a criminal purpose or intent. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d at 38,41, 630 N.E.2d at 798, 800; K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 552-53, 714 N.E.2d at 497. Accordingly, becausethese statutes lacked criminal intent, they ultimately targeted noncriminal or "innocent" actionsinstead of their criminal results.

Here, the imposition of a culpable mental state or criminal intent would entirely defeat thestatute's purpose of protecting the public and law enforcement officers from the danger ofweapons in public places. Were intent to be added to the already included requirement of aknowing mental state, the statute would fail to prevent situations where no criminal intent existed,but criminal conduct resulted despite the lack of intent, e.g., accidents with loaded guns on publicstreets or the escalation of minor public altercations into gun battles or, as the legislature pointedout, the danger of a police officer stopping a car with a loaded weapon on the passenger seat. These scenarios would apply even to defendant's examples of the Good Samaritan and the hunter. Thus, otherwise "innocent" motivations may transform into culpable conduct because of theaccessibility of weapons as an outlet for subsequently kindled aggression. In this regard, unlikethe cases cited by defendant, the underlying activity of possessing or transporting an accessible andloaded weapon is itself dangerous and undesirable, regardless of the intent of the bearer since itmay lead to the endangerment of public safety. See, e.g., 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., HouseProceedings, April 10, 2000, at 70 (statements of Representative Black) ("I don't see anylegitimate reason for a law-abiding, lawful, legal gun owner to transport a loaded gun in the frontseat of his car. *** That is not the way you transport a gun under legal and lawful conditions andthat's prohibited under this [statute], as it should be"). Access to a loaded weapon on a publicstreet creates a volatile situation vulnerable to spontaneous lethal aggression in the event of roadrage or any other disagreement or dispute. The prevention of the potential metamorphosis of such"innocent" behavior into criminal conduct is rationally related to the purpose of the statute, whichis to enhance public safety. Because the legislature has a compelling interest in preventing thepossession of guns in public under any such circumstances, the statute is reasonably related to thelegislature's purpose of "mak[ing] communities in this state safer and more secure for theirinhabitants." McGee, slip op. at 12-13.

This reasoning is comparable to the reasoning of the court in People v. Thoennes, 334 Ill.App. 3d 320, 777 N.E.2d 1075 (2002), where the Fourth District determined that section 32-5.1of the Criminal Code, stating "[a] person who knowingly and falsely represents himself to be apeace officer *** commits a Class 4 felony" (720 ILCS 5/32-5.1 (West 1998)), was constitutionaldespite its lack of criminal intent. Thoennes, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 326, 777 N.E.2d at 1079-80. Because the statute's purpose was to protect "the public from being deceived into believing anindividual who represents himself to be a peace officer has the authority to act in an officialcapacity when no such authority exists," it did not require the possibility of harm to a citizen norfor the impersonator to have a criminal purpose in mind. Thoennes, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 326, 777N.E.2d at 1080. The court stated that the act of knowingly impersonating a peace officer was initself potentially dangerous and the perpetrator need not have the intent to commit a crime in sodoing. Thoennes, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 326, 777 N.E.2d at 1080. The court provided the exampleof a motorist who has witnessed a serious accident requesting assistance from an impersonatorbelieving her request for assistance will be immediately acted upon and emergency services will becontacted. Thoennes, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 326-27, 777 N.E.2d at 1080.

Similarly, in People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194, 650 N.E.2d 1006 (1995), the supreme courtupheld a statute that prevented a person from knowingly and without authority bringingcontraband into a penal institution. The court held that the accused need not possess a criminalintent to smuggle the contraband to an inmate. To the contrary, the knowing possession ofcontraband was reasonably related to the objective of preventing inmates from gaining access toweapons and drugs due to the threat that contraband could pose in a penal setting. Farmer, 165Ill. 2d at 208-09, 650 N.E.2d at 1013. See also People v. Jamesson, 329 Ill. App. 3d 446, 454,768 N.E. 2d 817, 824-25 (2002) (statute making it a crime to knowingly associate with gangmembers after having received a sentence conditioned on refraining from contact with street gangmembers found to be constitutional despite lack of criminal intent); Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 38-39,740 N.E.2d at 774 (Blandic, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (under certaincircumstances, an absence of culpable intent will render a statute unconstitutional).

As a result, we agree with McGee and Grant that the aggravated UUW statute, inrequiring only a knowing mental state rather than criminal intent unlike the statutes in Wright,Wick, Zaremba and K.C., bears a rational relationship to the objective of protecting the generalpublic and law enforcement from the possession of loaded weapons in public places, and does nototherwise reach beyond its valid scope and purpose.

Moreover, we note that the concern for innocent conduct ensnared in Zaremba and Wrightwas conduct that was recurrent and ongoing in nature, as, arguably, was the activity in K.C. Onthe other hand, in our case, the scenarios of the Good Samaritan and the hunter posturenonrecurrent anomalies, the prosecution of which could well be left to prosecutorial discretion. Arguably, the legislature should not be required to carry the burden of carving out every possibleanomolous exception at the risk of having its statute declared facially unconstitutional. Thescenarios raised by defendant here are not comparable to the commonly recurring activity inWright and the ongoing essential police practice in Zaremba. The statutory violations of thehunter and Good Samaritan are not inevitable as there are a number of simple ways for the hunterand Good Samaritan to act in full compliance. For instance, as we stated in McGee, he or she maytake a moment to unload the gun, or to place it in a nonaccessible place such as the trunk of a car;or the Good Samaritan might ask someone else to call the police while he makes sure a child doesnot touch the found gun. As a result, in addition to the fact that in Wright, Zaremba and K.C. thestatutes would not be undermined or diluted by limiting the prohibitions to conduct with a culpablemental state, those cases are also distinguishable because the innocent conduct ensnared by thestatutes were recurring and on-going, and, in the case of Zaremba, essential to police functions.

Finally, defendant argues that even if we find the statute to be constitutional, he was notproven guilty of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon beyond a reasonable doubt. When adefendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must view the evidence inthe light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact couldhave found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Taylor, 186Ill. 2d 439, 445, 712 N.E.2d 326, 329 (1999). It is the function of the trier of fact to determinethe credibility of the witnesses, decide the weight to be given their testimony, and draw reasonableinferences from the evidence. People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 338, 739 N.E.2d 455, 472(2000). A criminal conviction will not be set aside for insufficient evidence unless the evidence isso improbable or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt. Taylor, 186 Ill. 2d at 445, 712 N.E.2d at 329.

In this case, the court specifically stated that it found Officer Loughran's testimony to becredible. To the contrary, the court indicated that Martinez and defendant provided inconsistenttestimony and were not credible witnesses. Because the court believed Loughran's testimony thathe saw defendant holding a loaded gun at which time he was not on his own property or in hisown place of business, we cannot conclude that the evidence presented at trial was so improbableor unreasonable as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

O'MALLEY, J. and SMITH, J. concur