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THIRD DIVISION
MAY 16, 2001

Defendant, James Little, was charged in a two countindictment with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine)with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1998)), andpossession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent todeliver while within 1,000 feet of property comprising a publicpark (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2), 407(b)(1) (West 1998)). Followinga bench trial in May 1999, defendant was acquitted of the lattercharge but found guilty of possession with intent to deliver. Finding that defendant qualified for an enhanced sentence undersection 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1998)) based on the existence of priorconvictions, the court sentenced defendant to a term of sevenyears' imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing (1) his trialcounsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a pre-trial motionto quash his arrest and suppress evidence; (2) the State'sevidence is insufficient to sustain conviction for possessionwith intent to deliver; and (3) the mandatory sentencing schemeset forth in section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Corrections Code isinvalid pursuant to the recent United States Supreme Courtdecision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct.2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). Because we agree withdefendant's ineffective assistance claim, we reverse and remandfor further proceedings.

The benchmark inquiry in addressing a claim of ineffectiveassistance of counsel is "whether counsel's conduct so underminedthe proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trialcannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052,2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692-93 (1984). A defendant claimingineffective assistance of counsel must typically show that (1)counsel made errors so serious, and his performance was sodeficient, that he was not functioning as the "counsel"guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the federal constitution,and (2) these deficiencies so prejudiced the defendant as todeprive him of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693.

Under the first prong of the Strickland inquiry, thedefendant must demonstrate that "counsel's representation fellbelow an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. Here,deference is paid to counsel's challenged action and the court,without engaging in hindsight, must presume that counsel'sperformance fell within the wide range of reasonable professionalassistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80L. Ed. 2d at 694. Indeed, it is incumbent upon the defendant toovercome the strong presumption that the challenged action ofcounsel was the product of sound trial strategy and not theresult of incompetence. People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 156,544 N.E.2d 357, 371 (1989).

In addition to establishing that counsel's conduct fellbelow an objective standard of reasonableness, the defendant mustshow he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at693. Proof of prejudice requires an affirmative showing of a"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessionalerrors, the results of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at698.

In the present case, defendant maintains his attorney'sfailure to pursue a motion to quash arrest and suppress thecocaine recovered by the officers amounted to ineffectiveassistance of counsel. The law is well-settled that the decisionwhether to file a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidencedoes not represent per se incompetence. People v. Rodriguez,312 Ill. App. 3d 920, 925, 728 N.E.2d 695, 702 (2000); People v.Robinson, 299 Ill. App. 3d 426, 433, 701 N.E. 2d 231, 238 (1998). The decision is traditionally viewed as one of trial strategy,and counsel benefits from a strong presumption that his failureto challenge the validity of the accused's arrest or to seek theexclusion of certain evidence was proper. Rodriguez, 312 Ill.App. 3d at 925, 728 N.E.2d at 702; Robinson, 299 Ill. App. 3d at433, 701 N.E.2d at 238. To overcome these presumptions andprevail on a claim of ineffectiveness based on counsel's failureto file a motion to quash and suppress, the defendant must show,first, a reasonable probability that the motion would have beengranted and, second, that the outcome of the trial would havebeen different if the motion had been granted. Rodriguez, 312Ill. App. 3d at 925, 728 N.E.2d at 702; Robinson, 299 Ill. App.3d at 435, 701 N.E.2d at 238.

The evidentiary record establishes that at about 12:45 a.m.on April 15, 1999, Stanley Snarskis, then a police officer withthe Chicago police department, and his partner, John Chibe, wereconducting narcotics surveillance in the area of 742 SouthCalifornia Avenue in Chicago. At that time, Snarskis noticeddefendant standing approximately 60 feet away, near the street. Snarskis stated he observed, on separate occasions, twounidentified persons approach defendant and give defendant money. Each time, defendant accepted the money, placed it in one of hispants pockets, and retrieved an "object" from another pocket. Defendant gave the "object" to the unidentified person from whomhe received the money and the person then walked away. Based onhis vast experience conducting narcotic surveillance, Snarskissuspected that defendant had been involved in two narcotictransactions. Notably, Snarskis neither identified nor describedthe "object" that was handed by defendant to either of theunknown persons.

Following his observation of the second incident, Snarskisradioed Chibe, who was nearby in a police vehicle. Chibe pickedup Snarskis and they approached defendant. Snarskis detaineddefendant while Chibe searched defendant's pockets and recoveredsix separate small bags containing 1.5 grams of cocaine. Defendant was ultimately arrested and transported to the policestation.

As defendant asserts, the record clearly reveals thatdefendant's warrantless arrest proceeded the officers' search ofhis person. The fourth amendment of our federal constitutionprotects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.U.S. Const. amend. IV. A search incident to an arrest is oneintrusion that has been deemed reasonable under the fourthamendment. People v. Kolichman, 218 Ill. App. 3d 132, 139, 578N.E.2d 569, 574 (1991), citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). While "[i]t isaxiomatic that an incident search may not precede an arrest andserve as part of its justification" (Sibron v. State of New York,392 U.S. 40, 63, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1902, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 934-35(1968)), the law is well settled that a search may be conductedimmediately prior to arrest and need not take place subsequentthereto as long as probable cause for the arrest exists at thetime of the search. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 & n.6, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2564 & n. 6, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 645-46 & n. 6(1980); People v. Boyd, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1118, 1125, 700 N.E.2d444, 449 (1998); Kolichman, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 139-40, 578N.E.2d at 574-75 (1991); People v. Rossi, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1069,1073, 430 N.E.2d 233, 236 (1981); see also People v. Tyler, 210Ill. App. 3d 833, 839-40, 569 N.E.2d 240, 245 (1991) ("[t]hereare instances where probable cause exists for arrest, and where asearch and arrest are practically simultaneous, it may beimmaterial that the search preceded the arrest").

Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstancesknown to the officers at the time of the arrest are sufficient towarrant a person of reasonable prudence and caution to believethat an offense has been committed and that the offense wascommitted by the person arrested. People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d592, 614, 736 N.E.2d 1048, 1060 (2000); People v. Hardaway, 307Ill. App. 3d 592, 603, 718 N.E.2d 682, 691 (1999). This inquiryrests primarily on the facts and information known to thearresting officers at the time the search and arrest are made. People v. O'Neal, 176 Ill. App. 3d 823, 827-28, 531 N.E.2d 867,870 (1988). While probable cause does not require the degree ofproof necessary to support a conviction and, in fact, need noteven have to rise to a probability that the suspected individualhas committed a crime, more than a mere suspicion or hunch ofcriminal activity is required. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 614-15, 736N.E.2d at 1060; People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 22, 675 N.E.2d910, 921 (1991); see also People v. Elliot, 314 Ill. App. 3d 187,191, 732 N.E.2d 30, 35 (2000) (noting that a mere hunch does notprovide probable cause to search a suspect for illicit drugs).

Whether sufficient probable cause exists is a case-specificanalysis and must be determined by an examination of the totalityof circumstances. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 615, 736 N.E.2d at 1060;People v. Brannon, 308 Ill. App. 3d 501, 505, 720 N.E.2d 348,351-52 (1999). Commonsense, practical considerations, and nottechnical legal principals, govern this determination. Hardaway,307 Ill. App. 3d at 603, 718 N.E.2d at 691.

Upon review of the facts contained in the record, weconclude a motion to quash and suppress would have had areasonable probability of success at trial. We are mindful ofthe limited nature of our inquiry on appeal and we do not pass onthe question of whether such a motion would have been granted ifpresented by defendant's counsel. We simply hold that such amotion would have enjoyed a reasonable probability of success. Resolution of whether the arresting officers in this case wereapprised of sufficient facts and information, in light of thecircumstances surrounding defendant's activities, so as tojustify their search and arrest of defendant is a question forthe trial court.

We further find that defendant was prejudiced by defensecounsel's decision. While the State notes that counselvigorously tested both the credibility of the prosecution'switnesses and the strength of the evidence presented at trial, astrong question exists whether defendant's prosecution would havegone forth had defendant's counsel filed a pre-trial motion toquash and suppress. A motion to quash and suppress would havebeen defense counsel's strongest, and most likely wisest, courseof action. The fact counsel had other defense options availableto him does not excuse counsel's failure not to file a pretrialsuppression motion. Defendant undoubtedly would have notsuffered any harm if defense counsel elected to do so. We do notdiscern any basis in the record to support the State's contentionthat counsel's decision was the product of sound trial strategy.

The State seemingly concedes that the arresting officerslacked probable cause to search and arrest defendant in thiscase. Indeed, the State's response brief never addresses thisissue. Rather, the State maintains that defendant's ineffectiveassistance claim should not be considered in the instant appeal. The State argues that consideration of defendant's contention isinappropriate because the evidentiary record most likely does notcontain a complete recital of the facts relevant to a probablecause analysis. According to the State, the arresting officers"may have had probable cause based on facts which are not part ofthe record." The State asserts the more appropriate place fordefendant's claim is a post-conviction proceeding conductedbefore the circuit court.

Defendant's claim is rightfully before this court and,contrary to the State's assertions, is not better suited forconsideration in a collateral proceeding. The trial court'sconcern in any post-conviction proceeding instituted ondefendant's behalf would involve the same issue confronted by ushere, namely whether defendant's trial attorney was ineffectivefor not pursuing a motion to quash and suppress evidence. Anyevidentiary hearing on such a post-conviction petition would beaimed at determining the reasonableness of counsel's decision inelecting not to pursue a pre-trial suppression motion and not, asintimated by the State, conducted for purposes of determiningwhether the arresting officers acted with sufficient probablecause. Thus, the factual record regarding the information knownand relied upon by the arresting officers would be no moredeveloped in a post-conviction proceeding than it is here. Additionally, to conclude that defendant should wait to raise hisineffective assistance claim in a collateral proceeding wouldunfairly subject defendant to the risk of having his contentionwaived or barred by res judicata.

Based on the above, we reverse and remand for furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion. See People v. Moore,307 Ill. App. 3d 107, 114, 716 N.E.2d 851, 856-57 (1999); SeePeople v. Steels, 277 Ill. App. 3d 123, 129, 660 N.E.2d 24, 29(1995); People v. Stewart, 217 Ill. App. 3d 373, 376, 577 N.E.2d175, 177 (1991). To quell any double jeopardy concerns, we willnow address defendant's attack on the sufficiency of theevidence.

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of theevidence, we are concerned with whether, after viewing theevidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rationaltrier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond areasonable doubt. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 515, 670N.E.2d 606, 620 (1996). A judgment of conviction will beoverturned on appeal only when the evidence is so unreasonable,improbable, or unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt ofthe defendant's guilt. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 515, 670 N.E.2dat 620.

To establish the offense of possession of cocaine withintent to deliver, the State's evidence must show beyond areasonable doubt that (1) the defendant had knowledge of thepresence of the cocaine, (2) the cocaine was in the immediatepossession or control of the defendant, and (3) the defendantintended to deliver the cocaine. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d397, 407, 657 N.E.2d 1020, 1026 (1995); People v. Jones, 295 Ill.App. 3d 444, 452, 692 N.E.2d 762, 769 (1998). Defendant does notchallenge the State's proofs on either of the first two elements. Defendant solely challenges the State's showing on the thirdelement, arguing the evidence is adequate to raise any reasonableinference that he intended to deliver the cocaine recovered bythe arresting officers.

Intent of delivery is rarely subject to direct proof. Consequently, such intent must usually be provencircumstantially. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 408, 657 N.E.2d at1026. This issue, therefore, necessarily involves an examinationof the nature and quantity of circumstantial evidence needed tosupport an inference of intent to deliver. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2dat 408, 657 N.E.2d at 1026. Factors relevant in this inquiryinclude (1) whether the quantity of cocaine possessed is toolarge to be reasonably viewed as being for personal consumption,(2) the degree of the cocaine's purity, (3) the possession of anyweapons, (4) possession and amount of cash, (5) possession ofpolice scanners, beepers or cellular telephones, (6) possessionof drug paraphernalia commonly associated with narcotictransactions, and (7) the manner in which the cocaine ispackaged. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 408, 657 N.E.2d at 1026;People v. Rivera, 293 Ill. App. 3d 574, 576, 688 N.E.2d 752, 754(1997); People v. Beverly, 278 Ill. App. 3d 794, 797, 663 N.E.2d1061, 1065 (1996). Whether an inference of intent issufficiently raised is a determination that must be made on acase-by-case basis after a careful review of the circumstancessurrounding the defendant's arrest. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at412-13, 657 N.E.2d at 1029; People v. Dockery, 248 Ill. App. 3d59, 69, 618 N.E.2d 348, 356 (1993).

Defendant maintains that none of the relevant factors usedto ascertain intent to deliver is established by the State'sevidence. In particular, defendant stresses: a very small amountof cocaine was recovered from his person (1.5 grams), therebyindicating that the cocaine was designed for his personal use;the packaging of the cocaine is insignificant because the cocainecould have been purchased in that arrangement; only a single $10bill was found in his possession; no evidence was introducedindicating the purity of the cocaine; and no drug paraphernaliaassociated with narcotic sales, cellular phones, beepers, policescanners, or weapons were recovered.

As indicated by defendant, a great majority of the factorsindicative of intent is not present. Most glaring is the factthat only 1.5 grams of cocaine was recovered from defendant'sperson. As explained by our supreme court in Robinson, thequantity of the controlled substance alone may be sufficient incertain cases to prove an intent to deliver beyond a reasonabledoubt provided the amount of the substance could not bereasonably viewed as designed for personal consumption. 167 Ill.2d at 410-11, 657 N.E.2d at 1028. However, where the amount ofthe substance is relatively small, as in the instant case,greater circumstantial evidence is required to establish thenecessary intent - "[a]s the quantity of the controlled substancein the defendant's possession decreases, the need for additionalcircumstantial evidence of intent to deliver to support aconviction increases." Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 413, 657 N.E.2dat 1029.

Defendant's possession of 1.5 grams of cocaine canreasonably be viewed as being for personal consumption. SeeRobinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 413, 657 N.E.2d at 1029 (holding that2.2 grams of PCP and 2.8 grams of cocaine, by themselves, wasindicative of personal use). Yet, the amount of drugs recovered,no matter how insignificant, is not dispositive of intent but,rather, is one consideration to be examined in light of thecircumstances in the case. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 410, 657N.E.2d at 1027; Bradford, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 799, 607 N.E.2d at628. Though many of the factors traditionally considered inascertaining intent are not present here, we find thatdefendant's intent to deliver the cocaine packets recovered fromhis person is sufficiently demonstrated by the evidence.

The evidence establishes that at about 12:45 a.m. on themorning in question, defendant was, without doing more, simplystanding near California Avenue when, on two separate occasions,persons approached and gave defendant money. In return,defendant gave the person some type of object which defendant hadretrieved from a pant pocket. The unidentified persons then leftthe area without any further interaction with defendant. Immediately after the second exchange, Snarskis and his partnerrecovered six individuals bags of cocaine from the pockets ofdefendant's clothing from which the objects exchanged wereretrieved. Though no weapons, large denominations of cash,police scanners, beepers, cellular phones or drug paraphernaliawere found on defendant, the manner in which the cocaine waspackaged and the location of where the cocaine was found ondefendant's person, when coupled with the specific observationsmade by Officer Snarskis, who had witnessed numerous drugtransactions in the past, sufficiently raise a reasonableinference that defendant intended to deliver the recoverednarcotics.

Relying on this court's recent decision in People v.Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3d 321, 741 N.E.2d 1026 (2000), defendantargues that for his requisite intent to be established, the Statewas required to prove that the unidentified objects passed by himduring the two exchanges were indeed cocaine. In Jackson, thedefendant was observed receiving money from an unknown individualand directing that individual to a third person, who was standingnearby holding a brown bag. When the unknown individualapproached, the third person reached in the bag and transferredan unidentified object to the individual, who then left the area. The defendant and the third person were arrested and a subsequentsearch of the bag revealed several packets of cocaine and heroin. No other objects were recovered from the bag. A further searchof the defendant uncovered no contraband but $150 in cash. Sincehe was not found to have been in either actual or constructivepossession of the recovered narcotics, the defendant was triedand convicted of possession with intent to deliver under anaccountability theory of liability.

The Jackson court reversed the defendant's conviction uponfinding the evidence insufficient to show beyond a reasonabledoubt that the defendant had the intent to deliver the seizedcontraband. Central to the court's finding was the want ofevidence identifying the nature of the object passed by the thirdparty and, specifically, that that object was either heroin orcocaine. While the court acknowledged that the third person wasseen passing an object that was retrieved from the bag and thatthe remaining contents of that bag were shown to be narcotics,the court found "those facts alone are insufficient to establishthat the object transferred to the unknown person wascontraband." Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 324, 741 N.E.2d at1028-29. According to the court, it was "theoretically possiblethat there was something innocuous in the bag which [the thirdparty] handed to the unknown person, notwithstanding that theremaining packets in the paper bag contained cocaine and heroin." Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 324, 741 N.E.2d at 1029. In supportof its holding, the court relied on the supreme court's decisionin People v. Jones, 174 Ill. 2d 427, 675 N.E.2d 99 (1996), inwhich the court held that it was improper for the trier of factto presume that five packets containing a white substance wascocaine where only two of the packets were tested and confirmedto be cocaine. The supreme court explained that such aninference amounted to mere speculation and conjecture andconcluded that a finding that the three untested packetscontained cocaine need to be based on direct evidence. Jones,174 Ill. 2d at 429-30, 675 N.E.2d at 101. Persuaded by thisreasoning, the Jackson court stated "[t]he inference that theunknown object contains narcotics because it came out of a bagcontaining packets of narcotics is clearly analogous topresuming, that because two of five packets in the possession ofa defendant contain cocaine, the other three do as well." Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 325, 741 N.E.2d at 1029.

Notably, the court stated that even if an inference waspermitted that the unknown object from the bag was contraband,the evidence was insufficient to establish the defendant'sinvolvement as the contraband's vendor where the defendant'sconviction was predicated on the observation of a singletransaction. Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 325, 741 N.E.2d at1029. According to the court, its concerns concerning the natureof the one incident would have been substantially dissipated ifevidence had been introduced showing that "more than a singlecustomer approached [the] defendant, gave him money and receivedan object from [the third person] after a nod by defendant in hisdirection." Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 325, 741 N.E.2d at1029.

We disagree with any suggestion made by the Jackson courtthat the nature of an unknown object exchanged during suspecteddrug activity can never be reasonably inferred from thecircumstances but, rather, must be established by direct proof. Rather, we believe that the identity of such an object ascontraband can be reasonably inferred when warranted upon anexamination of the relevant circumstances as whole. Thecircumstances presented by the evidence here support a reasonableinference that the unknown objects passed by defendant to the twoindividuals were cocaine. Most notable is the fact that theobjects exchanged were retrieved from the same part ofdefendant's clothing in which the packets of cocaine wererecovered. We find a rationale trier of fact could have drawnthe reasonable inference that the objects retrieved and exchangedby defendant were cocaine packets. In addition, we note that,unlike the situation in Jackson, more than one person wasobserved approaching defendant, giving defendant money, receivingan object in return, and then immediately leaving defendant'simmediate area. While a theoretical possibility exists that"there was something innocuous" in defendant's clothing that washanded to the two individuals, we do not believe that possibilityprecluded the trier of fact in this case from drawing aninference which is reasonably supported by the totality of thecircumstances.

As defendant observes, the State's case relied heavily onthe observation testimony of Officer Snarskis. Defendantmaintains that Snarskis testimony was contradicted by theevidence and, as such, was unreliable and insufficient to supporthis conviction. Defendant notes that while Snarskis testified hesaw two suspected drug transactions, only a single $10 bill wasrecovered. Defendant argues that if two separate transactionshad in fact occurred then at least two separate bills should havebeen recovered. On this basis, defendant claims Snarskis'testimony is incredible.

Initially, it must be noted that the State was not requiredto introduce additional evidence to corroborate the purportedtransactions observed and testified to by Officer Snarskisbecause, as our supreme court has stated, a conviction can bebased upon the testimony of a single credible witness. People v.Anthony, 28 Ill. 2d 65, 69, 190 N.E.2d 837, 839-40 (1963). In abench trial, the trial judge has the responsibility to determinethe credibility of the witnesses, to weigh the evidence and drawreasonable inferences therefrom, and to resolve any conflicts inthe evidentiary record. People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307,537 N.E.2d 317, 319 (1989). Accordingly, such determinations aregranted substantial deference on review (People v. Boclair, 129Ill. 2d 458, 474, 544 N.E.2d 715, 722 (1989)), and we may notsubstitute our judgment for that of the trial judge on thesematters. People v. Banks, 287 Ill. App. 3d 273, 285, 678 N.E.2d348, 356 (1997).

While the recovery of a single $10 bill from defendant'spossession raises some questions, this fact does not renderSnarskis' testimony improbable. As the State asserts, defendantcould have been selling the cocaine packets for $5 and wasrequired to make change for a $10 bill during the secondtransaction. While this scenario is not directly established bythe evidence, it is a reasonable and plausible one under thefacts.

The other cases cited and relied upon by defendant (seePeople v. Nixon, 278 Ill. App. 3d 453, 663 N.E.2d 66 (1996);People v. Thomas, 261 Ill. App. 3d 839, 633 N.E.2d 839 (1994);People v. Hodge, 250 Ill. App. 3d 736, 620 N.E.2d 651 (1993);People v. Crenshaw, 202 Ill. App. 3d 432, 559 N.e.2d 1051(1990)), do not alter our analysis. Significantly, in none ofthe foregoing cases was the accused observed by officers, likehere, engaging in conduct that was suggestive of a drugtransaction. See Nixon, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 458, 663 N.E.2d at69-70) (finding no inference of intent where evidence onlyrevealed recovery of 6.6 grams of cocaine in a single plasticbaggy from the seat crease of a police vehicle in which theaccused was transported, and did not disclose the purity of thecocaine, possession of any weapons, scanners, beepers, phones,drug paraphernalia or large amounts of cash, and where the policedid not act on any tips or observations of drug activity);Thomas, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 371, 633 N.E.2d at 842 (no inferenceof intent raised where the defendant was arrested while sittingon his bed filling 5.5 grams of cocaine into several individualpackets and where the evidence did not disclose either therecovery of any large amounts of cash or drug paraphernalia andfurther failed to link the defendant to a shotgun found in hisimmediate vicinity); Hodge, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 747, 620 N.E.2dat 660 (no inference of intent found where defendant was arrestedin connection with a physical altercation and where a subsequentsearch of the defendant's residence uncovered 4.07 grams of crackcocaine, not individually packaged, and a large amount of cash,but no drug paraphernalia); Crenshaw, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 436,559 N.E.2d at 1053-54 (evidence inadequate to establish inferenceof intent where defendant was found with 11.2 grams divided intoseveral individual packets while driving in his vehicle, but wasnot in possession of any other items relevant in determiningintent). Indeed, in three of the foregoing cases, the courtsspecifically noted the absence of any observations of drugtransactions involving the respective defendants or otheractivity suggestive of such conduct. See Nixon, 278 Ill. App. 3dat 458, 663 N.E.2d at 69; Hodge, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 747, 620N.E.2d at 661; Crenshaw, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 436, 559 N.E.2d at1054.⁽¹⁾

While the evidentiary record is not overwhelming, weconclude that when the evidence is viewed as a whole and in alight most favorable to the State, it is sufficient to supportthe trial court's finding of defendant's intent to deliver beyonda reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we find the evidentiary recordsufficient to support defendant's conviction.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction andsentence is reversed and the case is remanded for furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

HALL, P.J., and BURKE, J., concur.