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FIRST DIVISION
March 29, 2004

PRESIDING JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Following a bench trial, defendant, Joseph Herman, was foundguilty of aggravated arson (720 ILCS 5/20-1.1 (West 2002)) andwas sentenced to six years in prison. On appeal, defendantraises the following issues: (1) whether the firefighter wasinjured as a result of the fire or explosion in the mannerrequired by the aggravated arson statute; and (2) whether thetrial court erred in denying defendant's posttrial motionalleging that the complaint was insufficient to charge him withaggravated arson. For the reasons that follow, we affirmdefendant's conviction.

BACKGROUND

Defendant provided a statement to police which wasstipulated to by the parties and read into the record. Accordingto defendant's statement, beginning in late March 2002, defendantobserved drug activity in the parking lot of 6132 South Kedzie.He subsequently provided Chicago police officer Andrew Costellowith information regarding the sale of drugs in the area. OnApril 11, 2002, defendant climbed through one of the back windowsof the building at 6132 South Kedzie and observed a containermarked "biohazard." There were a number of needles in thecontainer which he spread out onto the floor. Defendant saw acouple of people on the second floor who told him not to touch"their stuff." Defendant proceeded to go back downstairs andplaced a T-shirt on top of a cardboard box. He lit the T-shirton fire, climbed back outside the building, and walked to thefront. Defendant made sure that the people he had previouslyseen inside the building exited safely. Defendant acknowledgedthat he had made a mistake in starting the fire and apologized. At trial, Reverend Luis Ruiz testified that in 1998, hepurchased the brick building at 6132 South Kedzie for use as achurch. Services had been held in the building for a period ofmonths before the building was boarded up for remodeling. Ruizinspected the building on April 12, 2002, and it was completelyburned out.

Charles Swan, a 19-year veteran of the Chicago firedepartment, testified that on the morning of April 11, 2002, heresponded to a report of fire at 6132 South Kedzie. There wereapproximately 10 other firefighters at the scene when he arrived,some of whom were already in the burning building, while otherswere on the roof. Swan was assigned to climb a 20-foot woodenladder in order to knock a hole in the roof to allow smoke toescape. Swan and another firefighter took a ladder from thetruck, placed it against the back of the building, and rested theladder on the gravel ground. While climbing the ladder, Swancarried an ax, which weighed approximately 15 pounds, and a pipepole that was approximately 6 feet long.

After Swan climbed to the top of the building, the ladderstarted to "kick *** out from the building." The bottom wassliding away from the building and the top was sliding back. Swan "was holding on and [he] knew [he] was getting ready to comeoff the building the wrong way." Swan fell off the ladderapproximately 18 feet from the ground, broke his right leg andseriously injured his knee. At the time of trial, he was unableto return to work as a result of the injuries he sustained onApril 11, 2002. Swan denied that smoke or fire caused him tofall off of the ladder.

On cross-examination, the following colloquy, relied upon bydefendant, transpired between defense counsel and Swan:

"Q. Isn't there supposed to be somebody down theresteadying that ladder?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was that?

A. The lieutenant.

Q. And he didn't or couldn't or what was it?

A. He didn't.

Q. Did he walk away from that ladder?

A. Yes."

The trial court then posed the following questions:

"[THE COURT]: You say that your lieutenant was at thebottom of the ladder at the time you climbed up?

A. At the time that I climbed up.

Q. Was he supposed to stay there and stabilize thatladder while you climbed up or what is normal procedure?

A. Yes, sir. That's the normal procedure.

Q. Do you know why he did not remain there?

A. No I don't."

Chicago police officer Joseph Nemcovic testified that onApril 11, 2002, he responded to a fire on South Kedzie. Thebuilding was engulfed in flames by the time he arrived. Heobserved defendant standing in the alley behind the building. Defendant was arrested after Officer Nemcovic interviewed aneyewitness who identified defendant as the individual who set thefire.

The trial court found defendant guilty of aggravated arson,reasoning:

"Well, I agree that the firemen [sic] was injured actingin the line of duty and as a result of the arson. The factthat the sergeant walked away, I don't know the facts andcircumstances surrounding it. I don't believe this factalone would be an intervening or superceding circumstancesthat would exempt the defendant under the statute. Andbased on that and my interpretation of the statute I findthat the State has proven their case beyond a reasonabledoubt."

Defendant filed a posttrial motion challenging hisindictment. The trial court denied defendant's motion for a newtrial and motion in arrest of judgment, reasoning that theindictment "incorporates the statute with the specific wordingtherein right in the indictment. So there should be noconfusion." Defendant was sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

ANALYSIS

I

Defendant contends that the court erred in finding defendantguilty of aggravated arson when an element of the offense was notproved. Specifically, defendant contends that the State failedto prove that the fireman was injured as a result of the fire, astatutory element that he believes the trial court misunderstood. Generally, when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of theevidence, the standard of review is whether any reasonable trierof fact could have found the essential elements of the offensebeyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the lightmost favorable to the State. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237,261 (1985). However, when the issue involves statutoryconstruction and uncontested facts, our review is de novo. People v. A.T., 303 Ill. App. 3d 531, 535 (1999).

Section 20-1.1(A)(3) provides, in pertinent part:

"A person commits aggravated arson when in the course ofcommitting arson he knowingly damages, partially or totally,any building of structure *** and *** (3) a fireman orpoliceman who is present at the scene acting in the line ofduty, is injured as a result of the fire or explosion." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/20-1.1(a)(3) (West 2002).

For purposes of our analysis, we must attempt to understandthe intent of the legislature relative to the statute at issuehere. The principal rule of statutory construction is to giveeffect to the language and intent of the legislature. People v.Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d 218, 222 (1995). In determining legislativeintent, words in the statute are to be given their plain andordinary meaning. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d at 222. Thus, a court mustconsider every statutory provision and attach a reasonablemeaning to every word or phrase. In re S.P., 323 Ill. App. 3d352, 357 (2001). When a statute is unambiguous, it must beenforced as enacted, and a court may not depart from its plainlanguage by reading into it exceptions, limitations, orconditions not expressed therein. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d435, 443 (1997).

The statute here is clear and unambiguous. Our decision inthis case is, therefore, dictated by the plain language ofsection 20-1.1(a)(3). See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc.,202 Ill. 2d 586, 594 (2002), citing Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill.2d 439, 446 (2002) (when statutory language is unambiguous, acourt should not look beyond the language to the legislativehistory).

Section 20-1.1(a)(3) requires that the firefighter, in theline of duty, "is injured as a result of the fire or explosion."(Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/20-1.1(a)(3) (West 2002). The firstrequirement is that the firefighter is acting in the line ofduty. Second, the statute requires that there is an injury. Third, the injury must be a result of the fire or explosion.

In People v. Hanks, 174 Ill. App. 3d 555 (1988), a caseexamined by both parties, the defendant was convicted ofaggravated arson based on the injuries sustained by twofirefighters. On appeal, the defendant argued that the smokeinhalation both volunteer firefighters suffered and the pain inthe wrist of one were not injuries traumatic enough to warrant anaggravated arson conviction. He further argued that thefirefighters could have prevented the harm caused by the smokeinhalation by wearing the protective gear available to them. Hanks, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 558. The appellate court disagreed,reasoning that defendant's interpretation of injury conflictedwith the statute's purpose of elevating the seriousness of theoffense of arson where a firefighter is injured in the line ofduty. Hanks, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 558-59. The court stated:

"But for defendant's act of arson, the health of Russell andSnow would not have been harmed or damaged. Their injuries,however slight, were caused by defendant's criminalbehavior, the fire defendant started. The possibility thefire fighters could have avoided some of their injuries doesnot excuse defendant's conduct." Hanks, 174 Ill. App. 3d at559.

Though the issue before the court in Hanks is not theprecise issue before us here, we find the aforementioneddiscussion helpful. In the instant case, Swan's injuries wereserious. But for defendant's act of arson, the health of Swanwould not have been jeopardized, much less damaged. Swan was onthe ladder at this location because of defendant's admittedactions.

While defendant's arson was not the last or the only causeof the firefighter's fall, the statute's inclusion of the phrase"as a result of" brings us into an analysis of proximate cause inthis case. Proximate cause is defined as that cause whichproduces an injury through a natural and continuous sequence ofevents unbroken by any effective intervening cause. Block v.Lohan Associates, Inc., 269 Ill. App. 3d 745, 756 (1993). Defendant's negligence will not constitute a proximate cause ofplaintiff's injuries if some intervening act supercedes thedefendant's, but if the defendant could reasonably foresee theintervening act, that act will not relieve the defendant ofliability. Parsons v. Carbondale Township, 217 Ill. App. 3d 637,647 (1991). An intervening cause is "[a]n event that comesbetween the initial event in a sequence and the end result,thereby altering the natural course of events that might haveconnected a wrongful act to an injury." Black's Law Dictionary212 (7th ed. 1999).

The purposely set fire was the very reason that Swan waspresent at the scene. He was on the ladder because he wasassigned to cut a hole in the roof, also a part of his fire-fighting duties. He fell off the ladder and suffered injury tohis right leg and knee while fighting the fire. It is aforeseeable possibility that individuals, including firefighters,may be injured as a result of the arson one sets. The phrase "asa result of" found in the statute supports the holding that theinjury need not be directly caused by the fire or explosion, butthat there may be a chain of events between defendant's start ofthe fire and the firefighter's injury. The lieutenant's actionsdid not alter the natural course of events that might haveconnected defendant's wrongful act to Swan's injury. The factthat the ladder was not being held as normally done does not riseto the level of an intervening cause sufficient to break thecausal connection and become in itself the sole proximate cause. See Block, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 756-57. We hold that defendant,therefore, is not exempt under this statute and his conviction issupported by the evidence.

II

Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred bydenying his posttrial motion in arrest of judgment (pursuant tosection 116-2(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725ILCS 5/116-2(c) (West 2002))) because the indictment did notcharge that the firefighter was injured "as a result of fire orexplosion," but charged that he was injured "as a result of thearson."

Section 116-2(c) provides:

"(c) A motion in arrest of judgment attacking theindictment, information, or complaint on the ground that itdoes not charge an offense shall be denied if theindictment, information, or complaint apprised the accusedof the precise offense charged with sufficient specificityto prepare his defense and allow pleading a resultingconviction as a bar to future prosecution out of the sameconduct." 725 ILCS 5/116-2(c) (West 2002).

The indictment here charged that defendant committed theoffense of aggravated arson:

"in that, he when in the course of committing arson, bymeans of fire, knowingly damaged a building and structurelocated at or about 6132 South Kedzie, Chicago *** andCharles Swan, a firefighter who was present at the scene,acting in the line of duty, was injured as a result of thearson, to wit: suffered a broken leg, in violation ofChapter 720, Act 5, Section 20-1.1(A)(3) of the IllinoisCompiled Statutes, as amended." (Emphasis added.)

An indictment that has been challenged for the first time througha posttrial motion in arrest of judgment is subject to theprejudice standard of review. See People v. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d245, 256 (1996), interpreting People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23(1976). In other words, the indictment must sufficiently informthe defendant of the charges against him and be precise enough sothat he may not be charged with the same crime again in thefuture. If the charging instrument fails to set forth theelements of the offense, then a motion in arrest of judgment,once made, must be granted. People v. Villareal, 114 Ill. App.3d 389, 394 (1983).

The indictment in the case sub judice states that thefirefighter was injured "as a result of the arson," while thestatute says "as a result of the fire or explosion." We holdthat defendant suffered no prejudice based on the language usedin the indictment against him. The indictment clearly statedthat he was accused of "arson, by means of fire," that resultedin specific injuries to a firefighter. The indictment, in ourview, informed defendant of the nature and all of the elements ofthe charges against him. Defendant admitted to setting the fireand his defense strategy was centered on the argument that Sawnwas not injured "by fire or explosion" and that he was injuredbecause a fellow firefighter did not stabilize the ladder. Defendant has not persuaded this court that the indictment failedto apprize him of the precise offense he was charged with or thatit lacked sufficient specificity to prepare his defense.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County isaffirmed. Also, the State's request for fees in the sum of $100is granted pursuant to section 4-2002.1(a) of the Counties Code(55 ILCS 5/4-2002.1(a) (West 1992)).

Affirmed.

McNULTY and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.