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SECOND DIVISION
Date Filed: June 30, 2005

JUSTICE HALL delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, defendant Matthew Givens wasconvicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 60 years'imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that his convictionshould be reduced to involuntary manslaughter because his actswere merely reckless. Defendant also contends that his sentenceis excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm.

On December 15, 1999, defendant pushed the victim, KeithRadloff, down a set of five stairs leading into Union Station inChicago. Radloff landed head first onto a concrete landing anddied shortly thereafter due to the severe injuries he suffered asa result of the fall.

The events that ultimately led to the deadly fall began atapproximately 4 p.m. on December 14, 1999, when defendant, a bikemessenger, and Radloff, a commuter on his way to Union Station,collided on the Franklin Street bridge in Chicago. WitnessRobert McDonough testified that defendant fell off of his bicycleas a result of the collision but that Radloff continued to walksouth on the bridge. Defendant immediately confronted Radloffstating "hey, what did you f***** hit me for?" Radloff replied,"I didn't hit you, you hit me" and kept walking. Defendantsubsequently got onto his bike, pulled out a metal "u-shape" bikelock, raised his hand and swung the lock into the back ofRadloff's head as he rode past him. Defendant rode his bicycleto the end of the block and circled in a driveway area. Meanwhile, Radloff approached a police car, reported the incidentand pointed to defendant who, at that point, left the area.

At approximately 4 p.m. the next day, December 15, 1999,defendant and Radloff encountered each other again outside anoffice building located at 150 North Wacker Drive. According towitnesses, defendant was cursing at Radloff for almost pushinghim in the river the previous day. Defendant was swinging a bikelock in his hand and he told Radloff that he was going to "kickhis mother f***** a**." Nadine Lewis, a security guard on dutyat the time, attempted to speak with defendant but he responded,"b****, you don't know what you talking about" and told her shehad nothing to do with the situation. John Wilkins, a fellowbike messenger, arrived during the altercation and also attemptedto calm defendant down. Lewis and Wilkins testified that Radloffappeared to be nervous and afraid. Lewis also stated thatRadloff tried to apologize to defendant and eventually walkedaway towards Union Station.

The evidence at trial revealed that defendant continued tofollow Radloff for blocks as he walked to Union Station. Defendant shook the bike lock in his hand while continuing tocurse at Radloff. As they walked west towards Union Station onthe Madison Street bridge, Robert Jones testified that defendantwas yelling at Radloff stating, "look at my pants, mother f*****,[w]hat the f*** you gonna do about my pants." Defendant wasyelling various obscenities at Radloff as they crossed the bridgeand according to witness Kheiri Gandi, defendant was very loudand appeared to be very angry. Witnesses testified that Radloffkept his head down as he walked and that he appeared to benervous.

Eventually, defendant followed Radloff into Union Station. According to witnesses, when they reached the top of the stepsleading into the train station, Radloff turned around, shook hishead and appeared to make a gesture as if to say "no." Defendantsubsequently "lunged" at Radloff and pushed him on the chest withboth hands. According to witnesses, Radloff "flew" backwardsdown the set of stairs and landed head first on the concretelanding below. According to witnesses Brian Moore and Lyn Dudek,Radloff's legs "flew up from underneath him" and he was"airborne" before he landed on the back of his head at the bottomof the stairs. Moore testified that defendant stood at the topof the stairs pointing down at Radloff screaming "I told youmother f*****, come on, get up." According to witness AbanaTabb, before defendant pushed Radloff, he stated, "f*** you,mother f*****," "I'm gonna get you" and "I'm gonna scatter yourbrain." Dudek and witness Crystal Kenny-Perez also testifiedthat just before he shoved Radloff down the stairs, defendantstated, "I'll splatter your mother f***** brains all over thestreet." According to witness Thomas Kuhn, when Radloff turnedaround at the top of the stairs, defendant stated, "just try tosay anything, I dare you and if you do I'll nail you." Kuhn alsotestified that after Radloff landed on the concrete, defendantstated, "get up, you mother f*****." Defendant immediately fledthe scene.

According to witnesses, Radloff was carrying a briefcase inone hand and a shoulder bag or laptop in the other hand. Radloff, who was 51 years old, was described as beingapproximately six feet two inches tall and weighed between 190and 249 pounds. Defendant was approximately five feet seveninches tall and weighed between 130 and 140 pounds. Defendantwas 24 years old at the time of the offense.

Dr. Ronald Knoblock, a fellow in forensic pathology with theCook County Medical Examiner's Office testified as an expert inthe field of forensic pathology. Dr. Darinka Mileusnic performedthe autopsy on Keith Radloff on December 17, 1999, and prepared acorresponding report containing her findings. Upon review of thereport and Dr. Mileusnic's notes and diagrams, Dr. Knoblocktestified that the autopsy revealed that Radloff suffered a skullfracture that extended from the base of his skull, across themidline of the skull, and over to the bone just beneath his eyes. Radloff suffered internal hemorrhaging and bruising to his brain,in addition to internal bleeding around his right kidney, theabdominal cavity and his left chest wall. The externalexamination revealed a bruise on Radloff's chest that wasconsistent with being forcefully pushed with the butt of a hand. According to Dr. Knoblock, in order to suffer this type ofbruising underneath layers of winter clothing, the force wouldhave to be great in order to break the blood vessels. Dr.Knoblock testified that Radloff's injuries were massive and wouldnot have been survivable by many people. Both the report and Dr.Knoblock concluded that Radloff died of cranial cerebral injuriesdue to an assault and that the manner of death was homicide.

Following the close of the State's case, defendant restedwithout presenting any evidence.

Although the court instructed the jury on the lesserincluded offense of involuntary manslaughter, the jury convicteddefendant of first degree murder.

At defendant's sentencing hearing the State entered intoevidence certified copies of defendant's 1994 conviction foraggravated stalking, for which defendant received a two-yearprison term, a 1995 conviction for intimidation, for which hereceived a two-year prison term and a 1998 conviction fordomestic battery, for which he received one year of conditionaldischarge.

In aggravation Tamieka Smith, defendant's former girlfriend,testified on behalf of the State. Smith testified that in 1998,when she came home, defendant was parked in his car down thestreet from her house. When Smith came outside, all of thewindows to her car had been broken. The next day, as Smith wasleaving her grandmother's house, defendant was parked outside. Defendant followed her and when she stopped at a traffic lightdefendant got out of his car, reached into her car and startedpunching her in the face. Following the attack, Smith obtainedan order of protection against defendant.

Barbara Arnold, another former girlfriend, also testified onbehalf of the State. Arnold testified that in June 1994, she waswatching television when she dropped the remote control onto thefloor. When she reached down to pick it up, defendant was underthe bed with handcuffs and a butcher knife. Defendant refused toleave and Arnold called the police who arrested defendant whenthey arrived. Thereafter, in July 1994, Arnold woke up to finddefendant standing over her with a gun. Defendant dragged herout of bed, punched her in the face, jumped on top of her and threatened to kill her. Despite an order of protection againstdefendant, he came to her house three times thereafter andthreatened to kill her. On one occasion, defendant broke intoArnold's apartment, beat her, placed a knife against her face andthrew Arnold's two-year-old son up against a wall. In October1994, defendant again appeared at Arnold's apartment, broke herkitchen window and threatened to burn down the building.

In 1998, defendant was arrested for striking his aunt ArnellGivens and knocking her down onto the floor.

In mitigation, defendant's mother Rhonda Givens read aprepared statement in court. Defendant's mother stated thatdefendant is a decent man with a five-year-old son. SylviaDavis, defendant's fourth and fifth grade library teachertestified that defendant was a kind and obedient student and thathe always helped her.

Erin Scott, a friend of defendant, also testified inmitigation. Scott described defendant as laid back, a goodlistener and easy to talk to. Lastly, Officer Janie McConnell, acorrectional officer with the Cook County Department ofCorrections testified that defendant, who was housed in herprison wing, was respectful and never gave her any problems.

In allocution, defendant stated that he was not a murderer. In addressing the Radloff family, defendant stated that "[thevictim] didn't die in the manner that was theorized by the State. I would like you to know that. In the inventory of the ChicagoPolice Department there are two videos. In those videos, I thinkyou deserve to know this, shows the actual crime that took place. I think you deserve to know the truth for closure for yourfamily. This is something for you. I have remorse."

The trial court, stating that it considered all of theevidence in aggravation and mitigation, imposed a 60-yearsentence. In mitigation, the court noted that defendant hadsignificant family support, that he was employed at the time ofthe offense, and that his incarceration would cause a hardship onhis mother and son. The court further acknowledged thatdefendant's incarceration would greatly interfere with hisrelationship with his son. The court, however, found that theevidence of guilt was "absolutely overwhelming" and thatdefendant's life demonstrated an "escalating pattern ofviolence." The court further stated to defendant that itregarded it a "virtual certainty if you get out into the publicagain, you will run across something that makes you feel that youhave been greatly wronged and you will react violently." Thecourt then discussed the nature of the offense, pointing out thatdefendant followed the victim for an extended period of time anddid not touch him until he reached the top of the stairs to thetrain station. Furthermore, the victim was twice as old asdefendant and he was off balance due to the laptop and briefcasehe was carrying when defendant pushed him down the stairs. According to the court, defendant had not displayed an "iota ofremorse" and his statements of remorse were not genuine.

In denying defendant's subsequent motion to reconsider hissentence, the court noted that a 60-year sentence was "somewhatunusual" in light of the absence of a weapon. However, the courtagain stated that when taking everything together, the sentencewas absolutely appropriate.

On appeal, defendant does not challenge the evidencepresented by the State. Rather, defendant contends that theevidence only proved that he acted recklessly because the Statefailed to establish that defendant intended to kill Radloff orthat he knew that pushing him down the stairs would cause greatbodily harm.

Contrary to defendant's contention that a de novo standardof review should apply, we review defendant's argument that theevidence supported a conviction for involuntary manslaughterrather than first degree murder as a challenge to the sufficiencyof the evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury. People v.Cook, 352 Ill. App. 3d 108, 130 (2004). In reviewing asufficiency of the evidence claim, the relevant question iswhether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorableto the State, any rational trier of fact could have found theessential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 211 (2004). It is the functionof the trier of fact to assess the credibility of the witnesses,decide the weight to be given to their testimony, resolve anyconflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences fromthe evidence. People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 132 (1999).

A person is guilty of first degree murder when he kills anindividual without lawful justification if, in performing theacts, he intends to kill or do great bodily harm or knows thathis acts created a strong probability of death or great bodilyharm to that individual. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West1998).

Conversely, a person commits involuntary manslaughter if heunintentionally kills an individual without lawful justificationif his acts are likely to cause death or great bodily harm andhis conduct is reckless such that it is likely to cause death orgreat bodily harm to the individual. 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West1998).

The state of mind for murder is knowledge, while the stateof mind for involuntary manslaughter is recklessness. See Peoplev. Lee, 256 Ill. App. 3d 856, 860 (1993). A person is said tohave knowledge when he is consciously aware that his conduct ispractically certain to cause a particular result. 720 ILCS 5/4-5(b) (West 1998). A person acts recklessly when he "consciouslydisregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk thatcircumstances exist or that a result will follow *** and suchdisregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of carewhich a reasonable person would exercise in the situation." 720ILCS 5/4-6 (West 1998). Recklessness therefore typicallyinvolves a lesser degree of risk than conduct that creates astrong probability of death or great bodily harm. People v.DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d 239, 250 (1998).

In order to prove first degree murder, the State is notrequired to prove that defendant had a specific intent to kill orto do great bodily harm. People v. Tenney, 347 Ill. App. 3d 359,366 (2004). Rather, it is sufficient to show that defendantwillfully and voluntarily committed the act, the natural tendencyof which was to destroy another's life. People v. Howery, 178Ill. 2d 1, 43 (1997); Tenney, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 366-67. Intentmay be implied from the character of the act. Howery, 178 Ill.2d at 43. The question of whether defendant acted with theintent to kill or cause great bodily harm or, merely actedrecklessly is a question of fact for the jury and its findingwill not be disturbed on review unless the evidence is soimprobable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt asto the defendant's guilt. People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 330(2000); Cook, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 131.

In the present case, we reject defendant's position thatalthough he indicated a desire to take the life of Radloff, theaction taken to attain that goal, i.e., pushing Radloff down fivestairs, was not done with the intention to kill him. Theevidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendantcommitted first degree murder when he pushed Keith Radloff downfive stairs onto a concrete landing in Union Station. Here, thecircumstances leading up to Radloff's death from the fatal fallbegan on December 14, 1999, with an accidental collision betweenhim and defendant on the Franklin Street Bridge in Chicago and included defendant hitting Radloff in the head with a metal bikelock. Defendant's rage carried over to the following day when hethreatened Radloff and followed him for blocks to Union Station. According to witnesses, defendant "harassed," "taunted" and"intimidated" Radloff with his words and body language. Defendant was so loud that pedestrians across the street heardhim yelling at Radloff. Upon reaching the top of a set of fivestairs that led into Union Station, Radloff, for the first time,turned around to face defendant and shook his head and hand as ifto say, "no." According to Abana Tabb, Lyn Dudek and CrystalKenny-Perez, defendant stated something to the effect of "I'mgonna splatter your mother f***** brains all over the street." At that point, defendant lunged at Radloff and pushed him downthe stairs with both hands. Defendant pushed Radloff with suchforce that witnesses described him as being "airborne" and statedthat he literally "flew" over the stairs before he landed, headfirst, onto the concrete. Radloff landed with such force thathe suffered a skull fracture that started from the rear base ofhis head and extended around to the bone beneath his eyes. Notably, as the trial court pointed out, defendant followedRadloff for blocks without touching him. It was only after hereached the top of the stairs to Union Station and stated that hewould "splatter" Radloff's brains, that defendant shoved Radloffdown the stairs with such force that he left bruises on Radloff'schest underneath layers of winter clothing. Based on the sum ofthis undisputed evidence, a rational jury could have concludedthat the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty offirst degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. It is undisputedthat defendant wilfully and voluntarily pushed Radloff, who wascarrying a briefcase and a laptop, down the stairs onto theconcrete landing below. A reasonable jury could conclude thatthe natural tendency of this act was to destroy Keith Radloff'slife, and defendant knew it, especially given his statement justprior to the act.

Moreover, defendant's intent could be inferred based on theseverity of Radloff's injuries. People v. Reeves, 228 Ill. App.788, 799 (1992). Here, Dr. Knoblock testified that Radloff'sinjuries were so severe and massive that they would not have beensurvivable by many people. Defendant did not gently push Radloffto the side. Rather, he lunged at him at the top of a stairwelland hurled him in the only possible direction, down a flight ofstairs onto a concrete landing. The jury here was instructed onfirst degree murder and involuntary manslaughter and could haveconvicted defendant of the lesser included offense. The jury,however, elected not to do so and this court is without authorityto disturb the jury's verdict where, as here, the evidence wassufficient to support the verdict. Cook, 352 Ill. App. 3d at131.

In reaching our conclusion, we have considered the casescited by defendant; however, we find them distinguishable. First, in People v. Crenshaw, 298 Ill. 412 (1921), the defendanttook the victim by the arm, turned him partially around and toldhim that he would kill him for two cents. The defendant thenimmediately struck the victim in the face with a clenched fist,knocking the victim down to the ground. The victim died shortlythereafter. The supreme court reversed the defendant's murderconviction explaining that the blow with the fist to the side ofthe face or head was not likely to be attended with dangerous orfatal consequences and that no inference of intent to kill waswarranted from the circumstances of the case. Crenshaw, 298 Ill.at 416-17. Additionally, despite the defendant's statement,death was not a reasonable or probable consequence of a blow withthe defendant's bare fist. Crenshaw, 298 Ill. at 417. Unlikethe defendant's actions in Crenshaw, common sense dictates thatdefendant's actions here, which consisted of violently pushing aman backwards with full force from the top of a flight of stairsonto a concrete landing below were likely to cause death or greatbodily harm.

Furthermore, defendant's reliance on People v. Cates, 111Ill. App. 3d 681 (1982) is misplaced. In Cates, the victimslipped and hit her head on the wall when the defendant pushedher away. The victim died as a result of her injuries. Theissue on appeal was whether the defendant's conduct was reckless,and, therefore, supported his involuntary manslaughterconviction. Cates, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 690. In affirming thedefendant's conviction, the court held that the evidence wassufficient to establish that the defendant acted recklessly. Cates, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 690. Cates provides no support fordefendant's assertion that the evidence in this case wasinsufficient to sustain his conviction for first degree murder.

Lastly, we agree with the State that defendant's reliance onDiVincenzo for the proposition that a court must consider (1) thedisparity in size and strength between the defendant and thevictim; (2) the brutality and duration of the beating; and (3)whether the defendant used his bare fists or a weapon, todetermine whether a defendant has acted recklessly, is misplaced. In DiVincenzo, the issue on appeal was whether the defendant, whohad been convicted of first degree murder, was entitled to a juryinstruction on involuntary manslaughter. The supreme court heldthat the aforementioned factors could be considered indetermining whether the defendant acted recklessly and "whetheran involuntary manslaughter instruction is appropriate." DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 250-51. Here, the jury was instructedas to involuntary manslaughter. Accordingly, his reliance onDiVincenzo is misplaced.

Next, defendant contends that his sentence is excessive inlight of substantial mitigating factors, including his positiveemployment record, supportive family and strong potential forrehabilitation.

A trial court's sentencing determination is entitled togreat deference. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). The trial court is generally in a better position to determine asentence because the court has the opportunity to balancerelevant factors including the acts constituting the crime, thedefendant's credibility, demeanor, general moral character,habits, social environment and age. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209.In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the trial court must lookto the particular circumstances of each case (People v.Dinwiddie, 299 Ill. App. 3d 636, 646 (1998)) and absent an abuseof discretion, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial court'sdecision to impose a sentence that is within the propersentencing range (Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209-10). A sentencewithin statutory limits will not be deemed excessive unless it isgreatly at variance with the spirit of the law or manifestlydisproportionate to the nature of the offense. People v. Fern,189 Ill. 2d 48, 54 (1999).

We find that defendant has failed to demonstrate that thetrial court abused its discretion in fashioning his sentence. First, while defendant received the maximum sentence allowableunder the law, his sentence is still within the applicable 20-year to 60-year sentencing range for first degree murder. See730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 2002). Next, it is presumed thatthe trial court considered all of the factors presented inmitigation, especially where it specifically stated that it didso. See People v. Benford, 349 Ill. App. 3d 721, 736 (2004). Here, the record clearly indicates that the trial courtspecifically considered the mitigating factors defendant now addresses on appeal. Before imposing its sentence, the trialcourt discussed defendant's family support, his employment recordand the hardship his family would endure as a result of hisincarceration. However, weighing these factors against the"absolutely overwhelming" evidence of guilt and severity of thecrime (People v. Blackwell, 325 Ill. App. 3d 354, 361 (2001)),the court determined that a lengthy sentence was necessary toprotect the public.

The seriousness of the crime has been recognized as the mostsignificant factor to be considered in sentencing. Dinwiddie,299 Ill. App. 3d at 646. Here, defendant was convicted of firstdegree murder of a commuter who was walking to the train stationto go home at the end of the work day. The court specificallyfound that defendant's life, which included prior convictions forthree violent offenses, demonstrated an "escalating pattern ofviolence," and that it would be a "virtual certainty" thatdefendant would commit another act of violence should he be"wronged" again in the future. The court also weighed themitigating factors against the fact that defendant had beenpreviously incarcerated and that he displayed not even an "iotaof remorse" for his actions in the present case. After balancingall of these factors, the court determined that a 60-yearsentence was warranted. Furthermore, in denying defendant'smotion to reconsider his sentence, the court acknowledged thatthe maximum sentence was "somewhat unusual" given that no weaponwas used. However, the court, taking everything intoconsideration, determined that such a sentence was "absolutelyappropriate." Based on this record, we find that defendant hasfailed to establish that the court abused its discretion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment ofthe circuit court.

Affirmed.

WOLFSON and GARCIA, J.J., concur.