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JUSTICE HARTMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

A jury convicted defendant Bernard Ellis of the first-degree murder of GerardHardy. He was given a 55-year prison sentence. His subsequently filed post-convictionpetition, after a hearing, was denied. Defendant's motion to consolidate his directappeal and his appeal from the denial of the post-conviction petition was allowed. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, the denial of his motions for a new trial,and the denial of his post-conviction petition.

Defendant raises as issues on appeal whether: (1) a juror should have beendismissed for cause; (2) he was denied his right to a fair trial and due process of lawby the State's knowing use of its two eyewitnesses' allegedly perjured testimony andother prosecutorial misconduct; (3) he was denied his right to the effective assistanceof trial counsel; and (4) he is entitled to a new trial based on newly discoveredevidence. Only issue (2) will be addressed in this consolidated appeal in light of thereversal and remandment of the case based upon the determination of that issue.

On July 12, 1991, at about 2 a.m., Ramon Bickham, Tony Scales, and Gerard Hardy,the murder victim, were selling drugs at 13th and Wentworth in Chicago Heights, Illinois. Defendant emerged from the passenger side of a brown or orange Cutlass and walked towardthe victim's white Cutlass, parked nearby. Both Bickham and Scales were standing on thecorners across the street from the victim and defendant's parked car, about 15 to 25 feetaway. Defendant, dressed in black and wearing a baseball cap, called the victim's name,the victim turned, and both Bickham and Scales saw or heard a gunshot. The victim fellto the ground. Defendant had been standing about three to four feet away from the victimwith his arm extended when he shot the victim once in the head. He shot the gun in theair a few more times, jogged back to the Cutlass, which he entered, and the car left. Both Bickham and Scales later identified defendant as the assailant.

Bickham had seen defendant for several months "around the hood," knew him as arival gang member, but never met him. He did not recognize defendant immediately, butdid when he walked closer to the victim. Bickham previously had been convicted ofpossession of a controlled substance and had a current case pending at the time of trial. He asserted that no promises had been made to him regarding his pending case in exchangefor his testimony at defendant's trial. Because he was in shock and scared, Bickham didnot tell the police who the shooter was until January 14, 1992, when he was at theShaunee Correctional Center. Defendant had "rank" or "authority" in the rival gang withwhich they had problems.

Scales had known defendant previously for one and one-half years and had seen himaround the "hood" about one hundred times, the first time at a Gangster Disciples or"folks" meeting in May 1990. He knew defendant had "rank." Scales previously had beenconvicted of possessing a controlled substance. He testified that he had a case pendingat trial time; however, the State made no promises to him in return for his testimony. Scales left the scene when the police arrived because he was scared. He did not tell thepolice that he knew who the shooter was prior to December 17, 1991, because defendant wasstill at large. Scales, who was still living in the area, did not want anything to"happen" to him.

In November 1991, Anthony Willingham, a former Vice-Lord, and Remone Butler, stoodat the corner of 13th and Wentworth, the same corner where the murder took place a fewmonths before, when defendant, whom Willingham knew from the neighborhood, got out of adark-colored Cutlass and approached them while carrying a machine gun. He either pointedthe gun or stuck the gun in Willingham's side and asked the witnesses the whereabouts ofa certain drug dealer, who Willingham and Butler both knew. Defendant told them thattheir friend was a "dead man" and that he was going to kill him. He also bragged abouthaving killed the victim and that he had killed or would kill more "niggers."

In court, prior to trial, the defense requested of the State information as toprevious written and oral defense inquiries concerning "discussions with any of thepotential witnesses about any kind of deals regarding their cases in return for [their]testimony," to which the State responded that, "with regard to those witnesses, Judge,who have pending cases, there's been no agreements or promises of any kind with regardto the disposition of their cases."

Following the instructions conference, closing argument ensued. Defense counselattacked the credibility of all the State witnesses and argued that defendant was beingframed for a murder which occurred due to gang "revenge." During deliberations, thejurors sent a note stating that it was at a "standstill." After consulting with counselfrom both sides, they were told by the court to continue deliberating. One and one-halfhours later, the jury reached the verdict previously noted.

Defense counsel moved for a new trial. Defendant also moved, pro se, for a newtrial, in part on the ground that defense counsel failed to present evidence which wouldhave exonerated him. The circuit court denied both motions. Following the presentationof aggravation and allocution by defendant, who claimed he was in another state at thetime of the murder and that his trial counsel was ineffective in his representation, thecourt sentenced defendant as first noted. Defendant's sentence was to run consecutivelyto the 10-year sentence he had received from the same judge on a prior conviction.

Defendant filed a notice of appeal and a petition for post-conviction relief.During a hearing on the post-conviction petition, defendant presented his own testimony,in addition to the testimony of certain witnesses who had provided affidavits in supportof his petition, including witnesses who claimed to have been able to provide defendantwith an alibi and one, Anthony West, who claimed that he saw the murder, that defendantwas not the shooter, yet he was not called as a witness. Defendant also presented thetestimony of juror Robert Reed, who had been called into chambers and questioned duringtrial. Scales testified at the post-conviction hearing that his trial testimony,identifying defendant as having shot the victim, was false, induced by Chicago PoliceDetective Joe Fiaoni with a promise of probation on criminal charges pending againstScales. This evidence was never refuted by the State; Fiaoni did not testify.

At the hearing, the State presented the testimony of the prosecutor who tried thecase, as well as the defense attorney who represented defendant at trial. The prosecutorconceded that he "might have" told Scales that he would speak on Scales' behalf at hissentencing in exchange for his testimony at the Ellis trial, that he "might have" saidthat, but did not make the statement to Bickham until after the trial, and "most likely"the same was told to Scales under similar circumstances.

Following the hearing, and a review of the petitions by both parties, theappendices, and all trial transcripts, the post-conviction judge, who also had served asthe trial judge, denied defendant's post-conviction petition. This consolidated appealfollowed.

Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial and due process of law by theState's knowing use of perjured testimony and by other prosecutorial misconduct.

Defendant claims that, at trial, eyewitnesses Bickham and Scales testified thatalthough they had felony charges pending against them at the time of trial, the Statemade no promises to them in exchange for their testimony against defendant, but that atthe post-conviction hearing, Scales admitted that he lied at trial and claimed thatDetective Fiaoni had forced him to testify falsely and promised him leniency on pendingdrug charges in exchange for his testimony against defendant. In addition, defendantasserts, one of the prosecutors admitted that he "could have" told Scales prior to trialthat if he testified truthfully against defendant, he would make this known to the judgepresiding over their pending charges, which he did. As a consequence of the State'saction, defendant alleges, Bickham and Scales received exceedingly lenient sentences,demonstrating that Bickham and Scales perjured themselves at trial and that the Stateknew that Bickham and Scales failed to disclose these promises under oath and concealedthem.

The use of perjured testimony to obtain a criminal conviction violates due processof law. People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 345, 680 N.E.2d 321 (1997) (Olinger). Evenwhere the prosecution did not solicit false testimony, but allows it to go uncorrectedwhen it appears, due process is violated. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 3 L. Ed.2d 1217, 79 S. Ct. 1173 (1959) (Napue). A conviction obtained by the knowing use ofperjured testimony, which reasonably could have affected the jury's verdict, will be setaside. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 345.

During defendant's trial, Scales admitted to the jury that he had been convictedof possession of a controlled substance in 1991, 1992, and 1993 and that he had a similarcharge and an unlawful use of weapon charge pending, but denied receiving anything inexchange for testifying against defendant. At Scales' own sentencing hearing, afterpleading guilty, Scales reiterated that no threats, force or promises were made to himin order to plead guilty. The transcript from Scales' plea of guilty reveals that theState represented to the sentencing judge that it had not promised the witness anyconsideration for his testimony. At the post-conviction hearing, the State acknowledgedthat prior to testifying Scales "might have" been told that the State would inform thecourt if Scales had testified truthfully at defendant's murder trial. Scales was thensentenced to two years felony probation, concurrent on both cases, with fines and costssatisfied by the time that Scales had actually served. The sentencing judge stated that"the only reason I sentenced you to *** [felony] probation *** is *** the representationof the State that you testified truthfully" at defendant's trial.

The other state eyewitness, Bickham, stated at trial that he had been twiceconvicted of possession of a controlled substance, once in 1990 and in 1991, and that hehad a similar case pending. He denied receiving anything in exchange for testifyingagainst defendant. At Bickham's own sentencing hearing, after pleading guilty, he alsostated that no threats, force or promises were made to him in order to plead guilty. TheState in Bickham's case told the sentencing judge that there were no promises oragreements as consideration for his testimony, that Bickham had testified truthfully atdefendant's murder trial, and that "[a]fter the case, [it] indicated to the defendant[Bickham] that [it] would inform the Court" that he testified truthfully. The judgestated that although it was only a "recommendation," he decided to "go along with" the"recommendation" and sentenced Bickham to six months as a condition of one year felonyprobation, terminated satisfactorily instanter, "on the recommendation of the State." The judge stated further, "[n]ormally with a PCS case I give the drug program."

Also to be considered is Scales' testimony at the post-conviction hearing thatDetective Fiaoni both threatened him and then offered to help him if he fingereddefendant as the shooter and that, as a result, Scales gave perjurious testimony attrial. Two other witnesses, West and Newman, testified to the same alleged improperpressure used by Fiaoni. As previously noted, Detective Fiaoni did not testify at thepost-conviction hearing, nor does the State argue that detective Fiaoni made no promises. Assuming Detective Fiaoni made the promises as claimed, whether known or unknown to theprosecutor, "a due process violation occurred *** [since] there was knowledge [of them]by representatives or agents of the prosecution." People v. Torres, 305 Ill. App. 3d679, 687, 712 N.E.2d 835 (1999) (Torres); People v. Diaz, 297 Ill. App. 3d 362, 373, 696N.E.2d 819 (1998) (Diaz); see also Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 347; People v. Cornille, 95Ill. 2d 497, 513, 448 N.E.2d 857 (1983). The prosecution is charged with the knowledgeof its agents, including the police. People v. Martin, 56 Ill. 2d 322, 325, 307 N.E.2d388 (1974). Neither the facts nor the law allow the State to disassociate itself fromthe conduct of Detective Fiaoni in the present case, and the State is chargeable withthis knowledge.

From the foregoing, the State's intent fairly may be inferred as support for morelenient sentences to be imposed upon Scales and Bickham; and this is exactly whathappened.⁽¹⁾ Not only the leniency, but the timing of Scales' and Bickham's sentencings,support the conclusion that the State furthered its efforts to sustain its murder caseagainst the instant defendant by assuring the cooperation of the two witnesses.⁽²⁾ Eightdays after Scales and Bickham testified at defendant's trial, both Scales and Bickham pled out on the same day that the State'smurder prosecutor made his appearance before the judge sentencing Bickham and made therepresentation previously mentioned. Scales' sentencing judge said he was accepting "therecommendation" of the State and this was the reason the judge deviated from his normalsentencing. The combination of lenient sentences and the timing of the sentencingdemonstrates that the State knew, or should have known, that the testimony denying anypromises or agreements to benefit Scales and Bickham was false and perjurious. The Statefailed to fulfill its duty to correct any false assertion made by the witnesses denyingtheir expectation of any consideration from the State in return for their testimony. People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 677 N.E.2d 875 (1997) (Pecoraro).

Although the witnesses may not have made "deals" specifically requiring the Stateto request leniency in sentencing of their witnesses at their own trials in return fortheir testimony at the instant trial, the sentencing judge in each witness' case clearlyso regarded the arrangements and the understanding reached was a distinct benefit to themabout which the defense and jury previously should have been informed. The State'sagreement with Scales and Bickham did not have to be so specific as to satisfy therequirement of a formal contract. Diaz, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 371. As the supreme courtstated in People v. Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211, 227, 652 N.E.2d 278 (1995) (Jimerson),"due process of law cannot hinge upon such 'gossamer distinctions,'" quoting People v.McKinney, 31 Ill. 2d 246, 250, 201 N.E.2d 431 (1964).

The United States Supreme Court observed in Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d at1221, 360 S. Ct. at 1777, "[t]he jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability ofa given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon suchsubtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that adefendant's life or liberty may depend." That language was quoted with approval inOlinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 345.

Illinois courts of review have addressed the issue of the obligations imposed uponthe State when their witnesses are offered testimony in exchange for some beneficialtreatment from the State. In the case sub judice, Bickham and Scales both testified thatthey received nothing in exchange for their testimony. Yet, the State admits that Scalesmay have been told by the prosecutor handling the Ellis case before trial that the judgewho would sentence him in his own criminal matters would be informed of his cooperation. Evidence of Detective Fiaoni's alleged conduct and promises of probation stood unrefuted. The sentencing judge in each witness' case clearly acted on the State's representationsto the benefit of the witnesses.

In a case analogous to the case sub judice, People v. Perkins, 292 Ill. App. 3d624, 686 N.E.2d 663 (1997), two cooperating inmates testified that they observeddefendant, a Cook County jail guard, permit another inmate to enter a cell interlock,give him a guard uniform and walk him off the tier. More than a year prior to trial,both cooperating inmates pled guilty to the charges pending against them at the time ofthe escape. One, Kmet, was sentenced to 8