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FIFTH DIVISION
October 21, 2005

MODIFIED ON DENIAL OF REHEARING

PRESIDING JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, defendant Otis Douglas was convicted of home invasion and of thefirst degree murder of Michael Carter. The trial court imposed an extended-term sentence of 70years for the murder and a consecutive 30-year term for the home invasion. On appeal, defendantchallenges the effectiveness of his trial counsel, contending that his attorneys failed to object tohearsay evidence and did not request an instruction on concealment of a homicide even thoughcounsel conceded that defendant concealed Carter's death. Defendant also raises severalarguments regarding his extended-term sentence, which was imposed based on the jury's findingthat the killing was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wantoncruelty and the trial court's consideration of various factors. For the reasons that follow, weaffirm defendant's convictions and sentence.

Defendant was charged with first degree murder, home invasion and concealment of ahomicidal death. Before trial, the State dismissed the concealment count via a nolle prosequi andtried defendant on the remaining two offenses.

The testimony presented at trial revealed a love triangle among Carter, defendant andDonna Lindo. Lindo testified that she and Carter began dating in the early 1990s and that theylived together. When Carter moved to Maryland in February 1999, they maintained a long-distance dating relationship. Later in 1999, Lindo met defendant at a club, and they began dating. Lindo testified that shortly thereafter, she told defendant about her romantic relationship withCarter. Defendant told Lindo that he lived with another woman and their child but that hisrelationship with the woman was not good.

Lindo stated that Carter visited her in November 1999 and stayed for two weeks. Meanwhile, Lindo and defendant began to see each other three times a week, with defendantspending the night at Lindo's townhouse in Des Plaines. However, Carter was planning to returnto Illinois from Maryland and wanted to live with Lindo. Lindo testified that when defendant toldher he wanted to move in with her, she said he could not because her boyfriend was "cominghome." Lindo said defendant "seemed upset" at that news. Defendant told Lindo he wanted tocontinue their relationship after Carter moved in, and Lindo refused.

However, defendant spent the night at Lindo's residence on February 14, 2000. The nextday, Lindo told defendant that Carter would be visiting her that week and asked defendant not tocall her or come to her townhouse during Carter's visit. Lindo testified that she communicatedwith defendant solely via his cellular phone and did not know his last name or home address.

Lindo expected Carter to arrive on the morning of February 17, 2000, and she stayedhome from work that morning to wait for him and also to await a furniture delivery. When Lindoleft for work at 10 a.m. after the furniture was delivered, Carter had not yet arrived. Lindotestified that on her way to work, she called defendant and they had a "casual conversation" abouther new furniture.

Carter called Lindo between noon and 12:30 p.m. to tell her he had arrived at hertownhouse and was watching TV and eating crackers in the basement. Carter called Lindo asecond time and told her someone had been calling the townhouse and hanging up when heanswered. Lindo suggested that Carter check the caller ID to determine the origin of the calls. Carter did and said the caller's number was blocked. Lindo called defendant and asked if he hadbeen calling her home and hanging up. Defendant said he was not.

Lindo testified that at about 1:30 p.m., she spoke to Carter for a third and final time. During their conversation, another call came through via call waiting. Carter switched to theother call and then returned to Lindo and told her the phone was "messing up." At that point,their call was disconnected. Lindo's repeated calls to her home were unanswered.

Between 3:30 and 4 p.m., Lindo's son called Lindo as he customarily did when hereturned home from school. Lindo asked him to see if Carter was in the basement. Lindo's sontold her no one was in the basement and that "red stuff" was on the floor and some speakers hadbeen overturned. Lindo returned home to find splashes of blood on the walls of her basementlaundry room and clothing on the floor. A handwritten note left on Lindo's bed upstairs stated:"Bicth [sic], when I come back I'm going to kill you." A jacket and luggage also were found inLindo's bedroom; those items were later identified by Carter's mother as belonging to her son.

Des Plaines police and evidence technicians testified that blood was found on the floor ofthe laundry room and throughout the room, including in the utility sink. A plate of crackers wasfound on the floor of the basement near the laundry room. Footprints led from the laundry roomto Lindo's bedroom, where the threatening note was found.

The testimony of Izette Curtis and Wilton Jackson, two acquaintances of defendant,established that defendant borrowed a car from them on February 17 and that he was carrying anax. Curtis and Jackson later found bloodstains on a tool found in the car's trunk. In a search ofdefendant's residence on February 18, police recovered a pair of jeans with bloodstains and DNAthat matched Carter.

Lindo had testified that defendant drove a white Lexus. Salvador Avalos, who lived in thetownhouse next to Lindo's, testified that he saw a white Lexus parked near Lindo's unit at about2:30 p.m. on February 17. On prior occasions, Avalos had seen defendant in the Lexus; Avaloslater identified defendant in a police lineup. A second witness testified to seeing a white Lexus inthe townhouses' parking lot between 2 and 4 p.m. Donald Donerson, a neighbor of defendant,testified that he saw defendant washing his car with a hose and cleaning out the trunk between3:40 and 4 p.m. on February 17.

The parties stipulated to defendant's cell phone number and Lindo's home phone numberand to records of phone calls made from and received at those numbers. The parties alsostipulated that defendant cancelled his cellular phone account on February 17 and received a newcell phone number.

On February 29, Carter's partially burned body was recovered from an auto body shop. Adrienne Segovia, a deputy Cook County medical examiner, testified that she performed anautopsy on Carter's body, which was headless. The forearms and lower legs had been severed. Stab wounds were present on the chest and back, and Segovia testified that based on evidence ofhemorrhaging in the wounds and inhaled blood in the lungs, the stab wounds occurred whileCarter was still alive. An ax wound near Carter's spinal cord showed signs of hemorrhaging,which indicated that the wound was inflicted while Carter was alive. Segovia testified that theirregular nature of the wounds that severed Carter's head and limbs also was consistent with beingcaused by an ax. The limbs were severed after death. Photographs of Carter's wounds wereshown to the jury.

The jury was instructed that if it found defendant guilty of first degree murder, it mustthen decide whether the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behaviorindicative of wanton cruelty. The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and homeinvasion and also found that Carter's death was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinousbehavior indicative of wanton cruelty.

Before sentencing, the trial court heard testimony in aggravation and mitigation. Thecourt sentenced defendant to an extended term of 70 years for the murder and a consecutive 30-year sentence for home invasion. Defendant's motion for reduction or modification of hissentence was denied.

Defendant raises three arguments of ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. Defendant firstasserts that Lindo's testimony detailing her telephone conversations with Carter prior to themurder was hearsay and counsel was ineffective in failing to object to its admission. Defendantalso argues that his attorney was ineffective in conceding defendant's guilt as to the concealmentof Carter's body and failing to request an instruction on that offense. Defendant's third claim ofineffectiveness involves the absence of jury instructions defining "brutal" and "heinous" andoutlining the factors to be considered in finding defendant eligible for an extended-term sentence. We initially address defendant's first two ineffective assistance contentions, and we will considerhis argument as to the propriety of certain jury instructions and factors pertaining to his extended-term sentence along with his additional challenges to his sentence.

1. Defense Counsel's Failure to Object to Lindo's Testimony

Defendant first contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to Lindo'stestimony about her three telephone conversations with Carter after he arrived at her townhouse. He asserts that the content of those conversations was inadmissible hearsay that discredited thedefense's theory that although defendant concealed Carter's body, he did not commit the murder.

To support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show thatcounsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, furthermore, thatcounsel's actions resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Because a defendant must satisfyboth prongs of this test to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the failure to establish eitherpoint is fatal. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. People v. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d 139, 159, 792 N.E.2d 1217, 1229 (2001). When an out-of-courtstatement is offered for a purpose other than for its truth, the statement is not hearsay and isadmissible. People v. Brandon, 283 Ill. App. 3d 358, 365, 669 N.E.2d 1253, 1258 (1996). Touse the often-cited Wigmore example illustrating hearsay, if witness A testifies that "B told methat event X occurred," A's testimony would be admissible to establish what B said to A. Northern Trust Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 142 Ill. App. 3d 21, 37-38, 491 N.E.2d 417, 428(1985), quoting 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence