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Fifth Division
June 30, 2003

Nos. 1-98-1413, 1-00-0914 consolidated

JUSTICE GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal is before us again because of a supervisory order of the Illinois SupremeCourt entered on December 31, 2002, directing this court to vacate and reconsider its previousorder in this appeal, People v. Deloney, Nos. 1-98-1413, 1-00-1914 cons. (July 26, 2002)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), in light of the supreme court's recent holdingin People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89 (2002), which provides that the trial court may not summarilydismiss a postconviction petition solely on the basis of its untimeliness.

The underlying facts of this case have been set forth adequately in the order concerningdefendant's direct appeal. Accordingly, we state herein only those facts necessary to thedisposition of this postconviction appeal, including the procedural background that follows.

On October 6, 1994, following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of three countsof first degree murder. Defendant appealed this judgment, asserting that he was not proven guiltybeyond a reasonable doubt because the eyewitness testimony was unreliable and his statementwas given involuntarily and uncorroborated by the evidence. We affirmed the trial court'sjudgment on March 21, 1997. People v. Deloney, No. 1-95-0199 (1997) (unpublished orderunder Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant petitioned for leave to appeal our decision, but wasdenied by the Illinois Supreme Court on June 4, 1997. People v. Deloney, 173 Ill. 2d 532 (1997).

On November 21, 1997, defendant filed a combined postconviction petition and a petitionfor relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS5/2-1401 (West 1998)), asserting multiple grounds for relief, including police brutality andcoercion; actual innocence; ineffective assistance of trial counsel; judicial bias; and prosecutorialmisconduct. After reviewing defendant's petition, the trial court found that it was untimely and,furthermore, that all of defendant's claims were frivolous and patently without merit. Thus, onFebruary 19, 1998, the trial court summarily dismissed defendant's petition. Defendant appealedfrom the trial court's decision and the case was docketed as appeal number 1-98-1413. One dayafter filing his opening brief in the appeal, defendant filed a motion to supplement the recordwith an affidavit from identification witness Brenda Marie Hall, in which she recanted her trialtestimony. On March 19, 1998, without commenting on the timeliness or the merits ofdefendant's petition, this court ordered that appeal number 1-98-1413 be dismissed with leave toreinstate, directing the trial court to reconsider its earlier dismissal of defendant's postconvictionpetition in light of Hall's affidavit. On January 7, 2000, after reviewing defendant's originalpetition with Hall's affidavit, the trial court again dismissed it on the basis of its untimeliness andfrivolousness.

On February 2, 2000, defendant filed his appeal of the second dismissal of hispostconviction petition, which was docketed as appeal number 1-00-0914. This courtconsolidated defendant's post-conviction appeals. Accordingly, we consider defendant'sarguments and briefs filed under both case numbers together.

On July 26, 2002, we affirmed the trial court's dismissal, finding that defendant failed toestablish that the untimely filing of his petition was not due to his own culpable negligence. Deloney, Nos. 1-98-1413, 1-00-1914, cons., citing 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 1998). Recognizing that our affirmation of the trial court's summary dismissal was based solely on theuntimeliness of the petition, we did not address the issue of whether defendant's petitionpresented the gist of a constitutional claim. However, soon after we issued our order, thesupreme court ruled that the issue of timeliness of a postconviction petition "should be left forthe State to assert during the second stage of the post-conviction proceedings" and should notserve as the basis for summary dismissal by the court in the first stage. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at102. As such, we vacate our order of July 26, 2002, which addressed only the issue of thepetition's untimeliness, and must now determine whether the trial court's finding that the claimsof the petition were frivolous and without merit provides an independent basis on which to affirmthe dismissal.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition because it presentedfactual allegations that stated the gist of a valid claim of a violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, he asserts the following grounds in support: (1) that newly discovered evidenceregarding police brutality by officers involved in defendant's case establishes a pattern of abusewhich supports his claim that his confession was coerced; (2) that defendant is actually innocentbecause his conviction was based on coerced and inherently unreliable evidence, includingwitness testimony which has been recanted since trial, and that he had an alibi for hiswhereabouts the night of the murders; (3) that defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failingto move to suppress or otherwise challenge the identification testimony of several witnesses andfor failing to establish at trial the pattern of coercive tactics used by the police in obtaining hisstatement; and (4) that the prosecution engaged in misconduct by participating in the intimidationof witnesses and the defendants and by failing to provide the defense with information that someof the officers involved in the case were under investigation for allegedly using abusive tactics.⁽¹⁾

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act confers upon the trial court the ability to summarilydismiss a defendant's petition in its first stage of review if it is frivolous or without merit. 725ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998). A postconviction petition is considered frivolous or patentlywithout merit if the petition's allegations, taken as true, fail to present the gist of a meritoriousconstitutional claim. People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 66 (2002), citing People v. Gaultney, 174Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). The "gist" standard is "a low threshold." People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d239, 244 (2001). The allegations in defendant's petition must be supported by the record oraccompanying affidavits, and nonspecific and nonfactual assertions are insufficient to require anevidentiary hearing under the Act. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381-82 (1998).

In determining whether a meritorious constitutional claim has been presented, the courtmay examine the court file and transcripts of the proceeding in which the petitioner wasconvicted and any action taken by an appellate court in such proceeding. See 725 ILCS5/122-2.1(c) (West 1998). The court may summarily dismiss a postconviction petition if theallegations contained therein are contradicted by the record. People v. Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d 216,222 (2001); People v. De Avila, 333 Ill. App. 3d 321, 329 (2001); see also People v. Ramirez,162 Ill. 2d 235, 243 (1994). The dismissal of a postconviction petition for failure to allege asubstantial deprivation of constitutional rights is a legal determination, which this court reviewsde novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 387-88.

After reviewing, de novo, defendant's petition in this case, we find that each of his claimsis frivolous and without merit. Therefore, because defendant has failed to allege a substantialdeprivation of his constitutional rights, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of defendant'spostconviction petitions.

At trial, defendant moved to suppress the statement he had made to the police while incustody, arguing that it was coerced and given involuntarily because he was abused by the policeofficers who interrogated him. The trial court denied his motion and allowed the statement in asevidence, finding "no reason to believe that he was ever touched or punched or slapped orthreatened or abused verbally in any way." On direct appeal, defendant again argued that hisstatement was involuntary and uncorroborated by the evidence, and, therefore, he was not provenguilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Deloney, No. 1-95-0199, slip op. at 10. This court foundthat the trial court's determination that defendant's statement was voluntary was not against themanifest weight of the evidence and, accordingly, we upheld his conviction. See Deloney, No. 1-95-0199, slip op. at 12-13, citing People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 181 (1996). Thus, inasmuchas the purpose of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is to address issues of constitutionaldimension that have not and could not have been presented in an earlier proceeding, the doctrineof res judicata bars defendant from now revisiting this same issue. See People v. Haynes, 192Ill. 2d 437, 464-65 (2000); People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 139 (2000). However, defendantnow claims that, since the trial, he has discovered new evidence that reveals a pattern of abuseand torture by the police and supports his previous argument that his confession was coerced. Heargues that with this new supporting evidence, he has stated the gist of a meritorious claim in hispetition which entitles him to proceed to a second-stage review by the trial court.

The supreme court has recognized that, in the interests of fundamental fairness, thedoctrine of res judicata may be relaxed if the defendant presents substantial new evidence. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at 139. To merit a new trial, the evidence must be of such conclusivecharacter that it will probably change the result upon retrial; material and not merely cumulative;discovered since the trial; and of such character that it could not have been discovered prior totrial by the exercise of due diligence. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at 139.

Applying the aforementioned standard, the trial court found defendant's evidence insufficient. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court exceeded its scope of review in thefirst stage by assessing the merits of the evidence and that it applied "an outcome determinativetest" rather than merely determining whether the petition stated the "gist of a constitutionalclaim." We disagree with defendant's reasoning, noting that, in order to withstand summarydismissal, defendant's petition must contain a "simple statement which presents the gist of aclaim for relief which is meritorious when considered in view of the record of the trial courtproceedings." (Emphasis added). People v. Dredge, 148 Ill. App. 3d 911, 913 (1986). Thus, inorder to determine whether a "gist" of a meritorious constitutional claim has been presented, thecourt must inquire into the relevance and merit of the defendant's supporting documents. Suchan assessment is implicit in conducting a first-stage review.

In his petition, defendant asserts that he was coerced into signing a statement because hewas subjected to repeated threats, beatings and intimidation; denied access to a lawyer; forced towitness the beating of his cousin, Maurice Deloney; and reassured by the police that if he wasmerely a driver and not the shooter in the drive-by murders, "he would have no problems." Specifically, he offers that a grey/light-haired detective punched him in the chest and a silver-haired detective slapped him in the face and chest and threatened to throw him out the window. He further asserts that a detective with "brown hair, glasses, a mustache, and beard" and adetective who was "stocky, tall and clean shaven" were in the room at the time he was abused. The only officers defendant names as having taken part in his interrogation are "DetectivesO'Brien, McKay⁽²⁾, and McWeeney."

As to defendant's allegation that his cousin, Maurice, was abused, he offers no names noreven a physical description of the officers involved, claiming that he did not see their faces at thetime. Defendant attaches a photocopy of an affidavit from Maurice that corroborates the generalallegations of abuse, but again, fails to offer any description of the officers.

Defendant further claims in his petition that his codefendant, Ivan Smith, was alsocoerced into giving a statement soon after defendant's arrest. Defendant claims that Smith wasslapped, punched, put in hand and leg cuffs, denied access to a lawyer, and hit in the chest with aphone book and nightstick until he could no longer breath. Defendant identifies "DetectivesJoseph Stehlik and James O'Brien, and ASAs Michael Smith and Charlie Burns" as Smith'sinterrogators. In addition, defendant alleges that another codefendant, Curtis Milsap, was treatedat a health center "for a crushed testicle after he underwent a lengthy interrogation by the policeofficers investigating this case."

Defendant attaches to his petition over 900 pages of documents, which include newsreports, pleadings, decisions, and police reports from the Office of Professional Standards (OPS)relating to other cases involving police brutality. Defendant alleges that these documentsestablish a general pattern of abuse and brutality by the police which lends support to his claimthat he was abused while in police custody and, in turn, that his statement was the product ofcoercion.

In its brief, the State addresses each of the numerous documents presented by defendantin support of this issue, arguing that not one satisfies the aforementioned test for granting a newtrial based on new evidence. The State first notes that many of the documents were discoveredbefore the trial and that those that were discovered after the trial were not of such a character thatthey could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence. In addition,the State offers reasons why the documents were not of such a conclusive character that theywould probably change the result upon retrial, were immaterial, or were merely cumulative. While we agree with many of the State's arguments regarding this issue, we need not rely on suchin determining that defendant has not presented the gist of a meritorious constitutional claim.

As previously mentioned, a postconviction petition is properly dismissed where theallegations contained therein are contradicted by the record from the original trial proceedings. Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d at 222; De Avila, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 329; see also Ramirez, 162 Ill. 2d at 243. Defendant's asserts in his petition, "Detectives O'Brien, McKay, and McWeeney reportedlyinterrogated Petitioner. During that interrogation, the Detectives subjected him to repeatedthreats, beatings and intimidation." However, this allegation is directly contradicted bydefendant's testimony at trial:

"STATE'S ATTORNEY SMITH: Do you know the names of the detectives thatwere hitting you?

DEFENDANT DELONEY: I don't know their names.

STATE'S ATTORNEY SMITH: Did any of them testify here?

DEFENDANT DELONEY: No.

STATE'S ATTORNEY SMITH: Was it Detective O'Brien?

DEFENDANT DELONEY: No.

STATE'S ATTORNEY SMITH: Was it Detective McWeeney?

DEFENDANT DELONEY: No, sir.

STATE'S ATTORNEY SMITH: Was it Detective Ptak who arrested you?

DEFENDANT DELONEY: No, sir.

STATE'S ATTORNEY SMITH: No one that testified in here or on your motionswere the ones that laid a hand on you?

DEFENDANT DELONEY: No, Sir.Thus, defendant's petition may be dismissed insofar as he claims that any of the officers whotestified at trial were those who abused him, because such a claim would directly contradict therecord at trial. See Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d at 222; De Avila, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 329; and Ramirez, 162Ill. 2d at 243.

Because the only officers named by defendant in his petition are those whom hespecifically exculpated at trial, we are left with defendant's bald allegations of abuse in which heagain fails to identify any of the abusers beyond the brief physical descriptions that he previouslyoffered at trial and on appeal. Thus, without some evidence indicating that the same officers orsupervisors were involved, we have no basis upon which to conclude that any of the evidenceregarding other acts of police brutality is relevant to his claims. See Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at 110;People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 456 (2001) (The defendant "failed to satisfy the cause andprejudice test for relaxing the procedural bar to his newly discovered evidence claim" where hedid not identify the officers that allegedly tortured him either at his trial or in his postconvictionpetition). Accordingly, we find that defendant's allegation that his statement was the result ofpolice coercion and abuse, which has been considered previously at both his motion to suppresshearing and in his direct appeal, remains barred by res judicata. See Orange, 195 Ill. 2d at 455-56.

In his petition, defendant claims that he is actually innocent because the evidence offeredat trial "did not establish [his] guilt because it was either coerced, suggested or inherentlyunreliable under the analysis of eyewitness identification." In support, he offers the photocopy ofan affidavit from Deloris Spraggins, filed in codefendant Brooks' case, in which she states that adetective pushed and screamed at her and that she was pressured into testifying. He also offersBrenda Hall's affidavit in which she recants her trial testimony, stating that she only testifiedbecause she was tired of being questioned by the assistant State's Attorney and that her testimonywas "a mistake" because everything happened too fast for her to see who did the shooting. Inaddition, defendant discusses Jerome Taylor's testimony given in Terrence Brooks' posttrialproceedings in which Taylor recanted his prior identification of Brooks as one of the shooters,claiming that he initially perjured himself because he had been threatened with being "locked up"for contempt by the assistant State's Attorney. In addition, defendant offers a letter, written by analleged "expert in eyewitness identification," analyzing and critiquing the eyewitness testimonygiven in Terrence Brooks' trial.

Defendant also asserts that he had an alibi which, though presented at trial, was notsupported by witnesses. In support, he offers affidavits from his cousins in which they claim thatdefendant was with them at the time of the shootings and that, although they offered thisinformation to defendant's trial lawyer, they were not called to testify.

The trial court found the evidence offered by defendant in support of his actual innocenceclaim also did not satisfy the test for granting a new trial. The court found that some of thetendered evidence was available pretrial, and that, even if it could be considered "new," it wasnot likely to change the result at trial.

Defendant argues that the trial court again incorrectly applied an "ultimate test" whenreviewing the allegedly new evidence. Defendant further claims that the evidence and affidavitsboth establish that there was "intensive coercive conduct against witnesses" and furthersubstantiate an alleged "pattern of police and prosecutorial misconduct." In response, the Stateargues that the trial court applied the correct test and that defendant is merely attempting tochallenge the sufficiency of the evidence, once again, because he has not presented any evidenceof his actual innocence with his petition. We agree with the State for the reasons that follow.

In order to raise a valid "free-standing" claim of actual innocence, a defendant mustpresent newly discovered evidence that is not merely being used to supplement an assertion of aconstitutional violation with respect to trial but, rather, establishes his innocence. See People v.Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 479 (1996). Again, we note that, in order for relief to be granted,the supporting evidence must be new, material, noncumulative, and most importantly, of suchconclusive character as would probably change the result upon retrial. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at488.

We have already discussed how defendant's claim that his own statement was coerced isnothing more than a general allegation that is unsubstantiated by the tenuous evidence he offerswith his petition. Accordingly, we need not revisit this issue in relation to his actual innocenceclaim. Next, we look at defendant's argument that the testimony given by the eyewitnesses at histrial was unreliable. We begin by noting that this issue is barred by res judicata, as defendant hasattacked the reliability of the witnesses both at trial and on direct appeal. Deloney, No. 1-95-0199, slip op. at 11-12. In an attempt to evade this procedural bar, he offers a letter fromLawrence T. White, Ph.D., a professor of psychology. We find, however, that this evidence doesnot rise to the standard set forth in Washington, because it is merely cumulative to defendant'sprevious attempts to discredit Hall's testimony at both the trial and on appeal. Furthermore,though dated posttrial, the letter does not contain any information that is "new" - the professor'sanalysis is based only on the facts that were known at the time of trial. Defendant offers noreason why this statement could not have been procured earlier for the purpose for which he nowattempts to use it. In addition, we note that even if the letter could qualify as "new," it is not ofsuch a conclusive nature that it would likely change the outcome at trial and it would only bearon the sufficiency of the evidence. In other words, it does not establish defendant's actualinnocence. Res judicata also bars defendant's attempt to bolster an alibi that was alreadypresented and rejected at trial. We begin our analysis of this issue by noting that it is illogical fordefendant to claim that this evidence regarding his alibi is new. It is axiomatic that defendantknew of his alibi at the time of trial and, furthermore, both alibi witnesses attest that defendant'sattorney had been given their information, but that no one called them at trial. However,regardless of whether the information was new, it does not meet the other factors required byWashington. Specifically, we note that the trial court already considered and rejecteddefendant's alibi at trial in light of the State's strong evidence contradicting it - evidence thatincluded the defendant's own statement, his codefendants' statements, and eyewitness testimony. Furthermore, because the affidavits are merely cumulative of the alibi testimony defendantoffered at trial and contradict the bulk of the evidence, it cannot be said that the cousins'testimony would have likely changed the outcome at trial.

We are left to consider defendant's assertion that all of the eyewitnesses have recantedtheir previous testimony and the various affidavits that he attaches to his petition in which thewitnesses discuss the coercive behavior of the police. We first note that recantation evidence isgenerally regarded as unreliable. People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 132 (1999); People v. Steidl,177 Ill. 2d 239, 260 (1997). In fact, the recantations of Alan Epton and Jerome Taylor, presentedin codefendant Brooks' case, were specifically considered and deemed unreliable by the trialcourt. The supreme court later upheld these findings in Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d at 132-33, noting that"Taylor's recantation was made under suspicious circumstances."

However, regardless of their reliability, we find that the recantations do not present aconstitutional claim. "In the absence of an allegation of the knowing use of false testimony, or atleast some lack of diligence on the part of the State, there has been no involvement by the Statein the false testimony to establish a violation of due process." People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 94,106 (1995). In Brown, the defendant alleged in his petition that the testimony of the onlywitnesses to the incidents in question was false and that coercion from certain police officers wasinstrumental in persuading the false testimony. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d at 99. In an affidavitaccompanying the defendant's petition, one of the alleged victims (and the State's key witness)recanted his testimony, claiming that he and his brother testified falsely at trial as to the materialfacts and that " '[b]efore trial they [the State] had us listen to some tapes to remember what wehad said.' " Brown, 169 Ill. 2d at 100. The supreme court upheld the lower courts' findings thatthere was nothing in the defendant's petition or the recantation affidavit that "remotely pointed tothe State's knowing use of perjured testimony." Brown, 169 Ill. 2d at 101. While the witnessesin this case make stronger statements implying police coercion in their affidavits than those thatwere considered in Brown, the instant allegations must be examined under the particularcircumstances of this case - specifically, the fact that the witnesses were extremely reluctant totestify because of defendant's gang affiliations. For instance, Epton testified at trial that he was"getting threatened by certain people around [his] house," including members of his own gang;George Cruthard testified that originally he did not want to cooperate with police because he wasafraid for himself and his family; Hall offered in her original statement that she did not comeforward originally because she was scared; Spraggins stated that she was afraid because she livedin the same neighborhood as the defendants; Taylor testified that he initially refused to cooperatewith authorities because of his fear of gang retaliation; and, as discussed in Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d at114, Taylor's later recantation also appeared to be the result of gang influence where it was madeduring a truce between the rival gangs, Taylor's aunt testified that Taylor told her he was beingforced to change his testimony, and he was escorted to the court. Within this context, theapparent tenacity with which the police sought witness testimony was more likely attributable toa need to overcome the witnesses' fear of gang retaliation rather than a desire to elicit falsetestimony.

In any event, because neither defendant's petition nor the accompanying affidavits allegethat the State knowingly used false testimony or even that the alleged acts of intimidation weredesigned to elicit perjured statements from the witnesses, we will not draw that inference.

We further note that, even if defendant had alleged the State knowingly used perjuredtestimony, the witnesses' statements that he offers would not support the claim. First, we notethat Spraggins did not claim that she perjured herself at trial. Indeed, she claims in her affidavitthat she only "saw a taxi-cab that was coming down the street with no lights on" and that she"testified that [she] saw the cab and nothing more" at trial - thus, her affidavit would not supporta claim that the State knowingly used perjured testimony. Next, in regard to Taylor's claim ofcoercion, defendant offers no evidence in support except Taylor's testimony in codefendantBrooks' trial in which he recanted his previous trial testimony, claiming he was coerced intotestifying by the State's Attorney and police. It goes without saying that Taylor's testimonyelicited at Brooks' trial, which was held simultaneously with defendant's trial, was previouslyknown to defendant and cannot be considered newly discovered. Finally, regarding Hall'srecantation, defendant offers no explanation as to why the facts that she now alleges in heraffidavit are of such a character that they could not have been discovered when she testified attrial.

In sum, the evidence that defendant offers in support of his claim of actual innocencedoes not present the gist of a constitutional claim.

Defendant argues that his petition presents a valid claim of ineffective assistance ofcounsel. In particular, he asserts that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to move tosuppress the identification testimony of Hall, Cruthard, and Epton; for failing to present experttestimony or otherwise challenge the reliability of the testimony given by Hall, Cruthard, andEpton; for failing to present a comprehensive case establishing that his statement was coerced;for failing to present "readily available evidence of systemic police abuse and of tampering withwitnesses"; for failing to present the alibi testimony of defendant's cousins that he was with themat their grandmother's home at the time of the shooting; for failing to object to the joinder ofoffenses; and for failing "to object to or make the trial court aware of the obvious confusioncreated by the incomplete severance of the defendant's [sic] trials." The trial court found thatdefendant's claims lacked merit. We agree with trial court's finding for the reasons that follow.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must (1) show thathis counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) demonstratea reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would havebeen different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052(1984). The scrutiny of counsel's performance must be "highly deferential," and courts must becareful to avoid the "distorting effects of hindsight." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d694, 104 S. Ct. 2065. When viewing counsel's performance, there is a strong presumption thathis conduct fell within the range of reasonable professional performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at689, 80 L. Ed. 2d 689, 104 S. Ct. 2065. Decisions on what evidence to present and whichwitnesses to call on a defendant's behalf rest with trial counsel and, as matters of trial strategy,are generally immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Ward, 187 Ill.2d 249, 261-62 (1999). The only exception to this rule is when counsel's chosen trial strategy isso unsound that counsel fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d at262.

In this case, the record reveals that defense counsel conducted significant adversarialtesting, including the challenge of eyewitness testimony and identifications, presentation of amotion to suppress defendant's statement, and an attempt to develop defendant's allegations ofpolice brutality. Defendant alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting experttestimony to challenge the eyewitness testimony. Defendant offers no evidence, however, whichrebuts the presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the range of reasonable professionalperformance in light of the adversarial testing he conducted at trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S at689, 80 L. Ed. 2d 689-90, 104 S. Ct. 2065. Thus, we find that counsel's decision not to callexpert witnesses to challenge the eyewitness testimony does not constitute ineffective assistanceof counsel.

Defendant next alleges that defense counsel was ineffective for not calling potential alibiwitnesses Kenyette Deloney and Cynthia Deloney to testify. The record reveals that defensecounsel had contacted these witnesses and even disclosed them to the prosecution as potentialwitnesses, thus defendant's claim is merely that he chose not to call them, not that he failed toinvestigate them. See People v. Dean 226 Ill. App. 3d 465, 468 (1992), appeal denied, 145 Ill.2d 638 (1992). We find that the record further reveals that defendant's decision not to call thealibi witnesses was strategic. First, we note that the alibi witnesses were defendant's cousins and,as such, their credibility may have carried little weight. See Dean, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 468. Inaddition, defense counsel noted in his closing argument that the State's theory that defendant wasa shooter who rode in the back of the taxi was inconsistent with defendant's statement in whichhe professed that he drove the red LeBaron while fellow members of the Black Disciples streetgang, Maurice Deloney and Ollie Bays, shot at the rival gang members. Inasmuch as defensecounsel was relying on defendant's statement to discredit the State's theory, it would not havebeen strategic for him to further develop the contradictory alibi testimony.

Defendant suggests that People v. Tate, 305 Ill. App. 3d 607 (1999), is controlling in thismatter. We find, however, that Tate is distinguishable from the instant case. In Tate, the recordrevealed "no apparent strategic reason for not calling [the alibi witnesses] to testify." 305 Ill.App. 3d at 612. As discussed above, the record in the instant case reveals that defense counsel'sdecision not to call defendant's cousins as witnesses was reasonable trial strategy.

Regarding defendant's claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move tosuppress the identifications made by Hall, Cruthard, and Epton and for failing to presentevidence regarding the alleged pattern of police abuse, we find that defendant fails to show howhe has been prejudiced. To begin, we note that codefendant Brooks filed motions to suppress theidentification testimony of the same witnesses and each was denied at trial. Later, the supremecourt upheld the trial court's decision. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d at 124-32. Furthermore, defendantpreviously challenged the accuracy of the eyewitnesses' testimony both at trial and on directappeal. Both the trial court and this court have addressed this issue, finding that theidentifications were sufficient. Deloney, No. 1-95-0199, slip op. at 12-13. Accordingly,defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's decision not to move to suppressthe witnesses' identifications.

Similarly, defendant cannot show how he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to presentevidence of police abuse. As discussed previously, defendant made only generalized accusationsof abuse and could not identify his alleged abusers; thus, the evidence of other acts of allegedabuse was irrelevant. Furthermore, if we are to believe defendant's previous argument that theevidence regarding police misconduct was only discovered since trial, then we could not deemhis trial counsel ineffective for failing to present it. Even if the evidence was available at thetime of trial, and counsel had failed to discover it, we do not believe that counsel's failure tofurther investigate defendant's claims of police misconduct failed to meet reasonable professionalstandards. We accord a heavy measure of deference to counsel's decision regarding whether toinvestigate the allegations of abuse. See People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 149 (1995). Wherethe circumstances known to counsel at the time of his investigation do not reveal a sound basisfor further inquiry in a particular area, such as where the defendant has presented onlygeneralized allegations of coercive activity, it is not ineffective for the attorney to forgoadditional investigations. People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d at 150-51. In this case, where defendantcould not identify his alleged abusers and he had expressly ruled out the only officers known tohave interrogated him, it was not unreasonable for defense counsel to discontinue furtherinvestigation or development of the claim. In any event, because we may resolve ineffectivenessclaims by reaching only the prejudice component, we need not even address defense counsel'sperformance. See People v. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d 154, 175 (2000).

Finally, defendant's allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to thejoinder and the "confusion" of the case should have been raised on appeal. As such, they arewaived. Furthermore, we find that these allegations are merely conclusory and unsupported bythe record. Defendant does not develop his argument nor does he present any evidence that tendsto show either that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonablenessor that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedingwould have been different. Because defendant has offered no evidence that would require us tolook beyond his waiver, this issue was properly dismissed as frivolous and without merit.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we find that defendant has failed to show in hispostconviction petition that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.

Defendant alleges that the State participated in the systematic abuse and intimidation ofdefendant, codefendants, and witnesses; that prosecutors and police investigators made remarksto potential witnesses suggesting defendant's guilt in the shootings; and that the State failed toinform defendant of exculpatory evidence as required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). As discussed earlier, defendant's claims regarding thealleged "systematic abuse and intimidation" as well as the "suggestive" tactics the policeallegedly used should have been raised on appeal. Defendant could get around this proceduralbar by presenting evidence that is of such conclusive character that it will probably change theresult upon retrial; material and not merely cumulative; discovered since the trial; and of suchcharacter that it could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at 139. However, as is also discussed above, the evidence presented withthe petition does not satisfy this standard. Accordingly, defendant has failed to present the gist ofa constitutional claim as to these issues.

Finally, as to his Brady claim, we find that the allegedly "exculpatory evidence" thatdefendant presents in support of his allegation of police abuse is not material and, therefore, theState did not violate defendant's constitutional rights by not disclosing it. See People v.Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d at 171-72 ("Evidence is considered 'material' if there is a 'reasonableprobability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceedingwould have been different.' "), quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d481, 494, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985). As previously discussed, because defendant neveridentified his alleged abusers, the volumes of evidence regarding police brutality he presentedwith his petition were irrelevant to his claim. Furthermore, if we are to believe defendant'sargument that many of the documents presented in regard to his claim of police brutality were notin existence or not discoverable until after the trial, we could not find that such evidence was"readily available" at the time of trial as he now argues in support of his Brady claim.

Accordingly, we find that defendant has failed to present a gist of a meritoriousconstitutional claim anywhere in his postconviction petition, and therefore, the trial court'ssummary dismissal of his petition was appropriate.

Affirmed.

CAMPBELL, P.J., and QUINN, J., concur.

1. For the sake of economy, we will consider defendant's arguments in support of "actualinnocence" together even though they are presented in two separate briefs. In addition, we notethat while defendant alleged in his petition that there was "judicial bias" at trial, he fails to furtherdiscuss or offer any evidence in support of this issue in either of his briefs. Therefore, weconsider the issue waived on appeal.

2. It is unclear as to whom defendant refers when naming "Detective McKay." The Statesuggests that the reference is to the assistant State's Attorney involved in this case, JamesMcKay. Defendant did not attempt to rebut this plausible explanation.