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SIXTH DIVISION
OCTOBER 1, 2004

JUSTICE TULLY delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant, Benjamin Campa, was found guilty of driving under theinfluence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(2) (West 2000)), driving without a license (625 ILCS5/6--101 (West 2000)), and operating an uninsured motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/3--707 (West 2000)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 24 month's supervision and fined defendant a total of $555. Defendant appeals contending, inter alia, that the trial court erred when it denied his petition fordischarge based on a violation of the speedy-trial provision of section 103--5 of the Code of CriminalProcedure of 1963 (the Code) (725 ILCS 5/103--5 (West 2000)) because the trial court incorrectlyheld that he was not "in custody" while participating in the Cook County sheriff's day reportingprogram. We reverse.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Defendant was arrested on August 19, 2001. Therecord is unclear, but he was apparently placed on electronic home monitoring shortly after his arrest. The parties do not dispute that defendant was "in custody" for a period of 15 days while on electronichome monitoring. On September 5, 2001, defendant signed a document entitled "AgreementGoverning Transfer to the Day Reporting Center." The agreement provided:

"This document constitutes an agreement between the above named participant, whohas been released under the Cook County Department of Corrections administrative furlough,and the Department of Community Supervision and Intervention, Day Reporting Program. The agreement specifies the terms and conditions by which the undersigned is released to theDay Reporting Program.

Report to the DRC as scheduled.

Shall not leave the State of Illinois without permission of the court.

Attend all portions of the DRC program as determined and abide by program rules.

Attend all scheduled court dates and inform DRC personnel of any changes in datesor court status.

Submit to urinalysis as scheduled and participate in outpatient and/or residential drugand alcohol counseling/treatment as determined.

Report any changes in address and living arrangements within 24 hours.

If employed or in school, attend as reported.

Upon request of DRC personnel, furnish proof of school and/or employment, ifapplicable.

Notify DRC personnel immediately of any new arrests or outstanding warrants.

Refrain from use of alcohol and/or illicit substances.

Refrain from possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapons.

I have read or have had the above conditions read and explained to me and understandthem. I understand that I am under the supervision of the DCSI Day Reporting Center as acondition of my release under administrative furlough and agree to abide by all DRCconditions and rules. I understand that my failure to comply with the above and anyadditional conditions shall result in the revocation of this agreement and return to the CookCounty Department of Corrections."

Before trial, defendant petitioned for discharge arguing that he was "in custody" and that morethan 120 days had elapsed. The State responded, arguing that participation in the day reportingprogram was no different from being out on bond. The trial court held that defendant was not "incustody" within the meaning of the Code's speedy-trial provision and denied the petition fordischarge. Defendant was subsequently tried and convicted. The State does not contest defendant'scalculation that 157 days, not attributable to him, elapsed before trial.

In a posttrial motion, defendant again raised his speedy-trial challenge to his conviction. Thetrial court again held that defendant was not in custody. Defendant requested the trial court to makea finding regarding whether defendant was released on bail or recognizance, but the trial court refusedto rule on the issue. Defendant timely appeals.

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred when it denied his petition for dischargebecause he was "in custody" within the meaning of the Code while participating in the day reportingprogram. This contention requires us to interpret the meaning of the phrase "in custody" in the Code. The construction of a statute presents a question of law that we may review de novo. People v. Belk,203 Ill. 2d 187, 192 (2003).

The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of thelegislature. Belk, 203 Ill. 2d at 192, citing People v. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d 225, 228 (2001). Thestarting point for determining the intent of the legislature is the language of the statute itself. Peoplev. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996). Section 103--5 provides:

"Speedy trial.

(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by thecourt having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delayis occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section104--13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by acontinuance allowed pursuant to Section 114--4 of this Act after a court's determination ofthe defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. Delay shall beconsidered to be agreed to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by makinga written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record.

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(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdictionwithin 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by thedefendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104--13 of this Act, bya fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance allowedpursuant to Section 114--4 of this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's physicalincapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. The defendant's failure to appear for anycourt date set by the court operates to waive the defendant's demand for trial made under thissubsection.

(d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections (a), (b) and (c) of thisSection shall be discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his bail orrecognizance." 725 ILCS 5/103--5 (West 2000).

In Illinois, criminal defendants enjoy both constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,