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THIRD DIVISION
NOVEMBER 08, 2000

Defendant appeals from his convictions for first-degree murder and armed robberyafter a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County. Defendant argues that(1) his guilt of armed robbery was not proven because there was no concurrencebetween his use of force and his taking of the victim's property some time afterthe murder; (2) Public Act 89--689 (Pub. Act 89--689, eff. December 31, 1996)violated the single-subject rule of the Illinois Constitution; and (3) he wasimproperly sentenced to consecutive sentences. We reverse the armed-robberyconviction and remand for resentencing.

FACTS

In conversations with the police and with a jail inmate, defendant confessed tothe murder of 14-year-old Joel Trinidad after defendant and the victim performed asexual act together. Defendant claimed that he had paid the victim money on threeprior occasions to perform a sex act. Defendant claimed that, during the sex act,the victim turned around and slapped him in the face. Defendant said he punchedthe boy in the face and that the victim picked up a hammer. Defendant picked up acrowbar. The victim tried to leave, but defendant hit him on the head twice withthe crowbar. The victim lunged at him, and defendant hit him over the front ofthe head with the crowbar. Defendant strangled him with a tie and then with arope until the victim stopped breathing.

According to a police detective, defendant further confessed that, after themurder, he sat in the bathtub "for a long while." Defendant then took a showerand went to Jewel, where he purchased trash bags for disposing of the body. Defendant cut off the victim's jewelry and took the victim's newspaper route bookand money. He put in the trash bags anything that was bloody, including itemsthat belonged to defendant. Defendant left the body in an alley and threw thetrash bags in another location.

Defendant told the inmate that he took the jewelry and money from the victim tomake it look like a robbery. Defendant told the assistant State's Attorney thathe put the victim's possessions in the trash bags so that police would thinksomeone had mugged the victim and would not think he had done the murder. Defendant showed the police where the disposed items could be found. There werepeople rummaging through the area, and it appeared that the items disposed of bydefendant had been rummaged through. A $20 bill was found in one trash bag. Nothing from the victim was found in defendant's car or apartments or on hisperson. There was no money found on the victim's body or wallet except for somechange. Although the victim wore jewelry, including a necklace, a bracelet, amedallion, and rings, the only item of jewelry found on him was a wooden cross. No jewelry was found in the trash.

After a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and armedrobbery. Although defendant was eligible for the death penalty, he was sentencedto consecutive sentences of natural life for the murder and 30 years' imprisonmentfor the armed robbery.

Defendant appealed.

Defendant first argues that his armed-robbery conviction should be reversedbecause the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the necessaryconcurrence between his use of force and the taking of the victim's property.

The gist of armed robbery is the taking of another's property by force or threatof force. People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 338, 651 N.E.2d 72 (1995). Theoffense is complete when one uses force or the threat of force to cause the victimto part with possession of the property against his will. People v. Blake, 144Ill. 2d 314, 322, 579 N.E.2d 861 (1991).

The use of force or threat of force need not transpire before or during the timethe property is taken; rather the force may be used as part of a series of eventsconstituting a single incident. People v. Cooksey, 309 Ill. App. 3d 839, 849, 723N.E.2d 784 (1999); see also People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 148, 700N.E.2d960 (1998) (there was a concurrence between defendant beating victim to death andthen going to her apartment and taking her television set).

As long as there is some concurrence between the threat of force and the taking ofthe property, a conviction for armed robbery can stand. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d at339. In Lewis, the murderer's taking of the key from the body after the murder inorder to let himself out of the apartment was held to be essentially a singleseries of continuous acts committed by defendant. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d at 340.

Our standard of review is, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorableto the prosecution, whether any rational trier of fact could have found theessential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins,106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985).

We conclude that there was a sufficient time interval between the murder and thetaking of the victim's property that the acts were not a series of eventsconstituting a single incident. Defendant did not remove the property from thevictim until after he bathed for a long time and returned from a trip to thegrocery store. Furthermore, the only evidence of defendant's motivation fortaking the property was that he desired to conceal his involvement. There was noevidence that defendant determined before, or close to the time of, the murderthat he would remove the victim's property. As there is no evidence thatdefendant used the force in order to obtain the property, his conviction for armedrobbery must be reversed.

In addition, we remand the matter for resentencing because it cannot be determinedon this record whether the trial court was influenced by the armed-robberyconviction when it sentenced defendant to natural life imprisonment for themurder. See People v. Blake, 287 Ill. App. 3d 487, 492, 687 N.E.2d 761 (1997).

Defendant has filed a supplemental brief in which he argues that, based on arecent United States Supreme Court decision, the life-imprisonment statute and theconsecutive-sentencing scheme are unconstitutional. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530U.S. __, 147 L. Ed. 2d ____, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). As we have remanded thismatter for resentencing, we do not need to address this supplemental issue.

Defendant next argues that Public Act 89--689, which amended section 104-21(a) ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104-21(a) (West 1998)) toprovide that a defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs shall not be presumedto be unfit to stand trial solely by virtue of the receipt of those drugs,violated the single-subject rule of the Illinois Constitution. Defendant furtherargues that, as the record indicates that he was receiving such medication duringhis trial, the cause must be remanded for a determination of whether aretrospective fitness hearing can be conducted.

The Illinois Constitution provides that bills shall be confined to one subject. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,