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FOURTH DIVISION
June 30, 2003

JUSTICE GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Steven Bramlett was charged with first degree murder for the shooting deathof Tyree Jones. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress the statementhe made to the police, which the trial court denied. Thereafter, he was found guilty in astipulated bench trial and was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. Defendant now appeals fromhis conviction, arguing that there was no probable cause for his arrest and that his statement wasinvoluntary and, therefore, inadmissible. No questions are raised on the pleadings.

We concur with the defendant that his motion to quash arrest should have been grantedand, for the following reasons, vacate his conviction and sentence, and remand for furtherproceedings.

On April 19, 1995, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Tyree Jones was shot in the chest and waskilled. Two other women were also shot in this incident, but neither sustained a fatal injury. Four African-American males, including the defendant, were suspects in the shooting. At thetime of the incident, defendant allegedly was a back seat passenger in the vehicle from which thefatal shots were fired.

Sometime between 2 and 2:45 a.m. on the morning of April 20th, three Chicago policeofficers - Officers Law, Richards and O'Connor - came to the defendant's home without an arrestor search warrant. According to Officer Law, the three officers were acting pursuant toinformation provided by another officer in the gang tactical unit who stated that the defendantwas wanted for questioning in connection with the Jones shooting. However, Officer Law alsotestified that he did not know where his colleague obtained that information and could not attestto its reliability. After arriving at the defendant's home, the three officers entered the apartmentbuilding through the front door, continued to his apartment, and then knocked on the door. Theofficers met defendant's father, Thomas Bramlett, and told him that they wanted to speak with hisson regarding a shooting that had taken place earlier that evening. Mr. Bramlett told the officersthat the defendant was sleeping, and that he would wake him. The parties disagree as to whathappened next.

In the suppression hearing, defendant testified that after his father woke him and heopened his door, "the police officers came right in and was [sic] talking, and put my clothes on." The officers then arrested the defendant and put him in their car but did not have room fordefendant's father to accompany them. Allegedly, they also stated that they could not wait forMr. Bramlett to get dressed and follow them to the 4th district station in his own car, so theygave defendant's father directions. The police then took the defendant to the police stationwhere, allegedly, he was handcuffed to a chair in the gang office.

At approximately 3:15 a.m., Officer Brandenburg began to ask identification-relatedquestions. The defendant claimed that during that process, he told Officer Brandenburg that hewas only 15 years' old and that he wanted to see his father. Despite that request, OfficerBrandenburg chose not to call the Bramlett's home phone number and did not "make a concertedeffort to look for [defendant's] father at the station after he did not see him in the waiting area." Furthermore, defendant noted, Officer Brandenburg had not been told by the arresting officersthat the defendant's father might be arriving at the station. At that point, defendant had made nostatement regarding any involvement in the Jones shooting.

Defendant's father testified that while his son was being processed, he arrived at the 4thdistrict police station, told the desk sergeant who he was, and asked to see his son. Apparently,the desk sergeant told Mr. Bramlett that he could not see the defendant because he was beingquestioned, and that Mr. Bramlett should wait in the hall. Mr. Bramlett waited for approximately30 to 45 minutes in the hall until he saw the defendant being taken out of the station by twoofficers. Again, Mr. Bramlett was not allowed to speak with the defendant, but was told he wasbeing transferred to the 111th Street station. Defendant claimed that he never knew that hisfather had been present at the 4th district police station. Defendant was then taken in handcuffsto the 111th Street Station and was put into a small interview room with a steel bench, table, andchairs.

At the 111th Street Station, sometime before 5 a.m., a Detective Leracz alloweddefendant's father to enter the interview room to speak with the defendant. However, defendantclaimed that was not permitted to speak with his father outside the presence of the police and thathis father was let into the interview room for no more than 10 minutes. In addition, both thedefendant and his father asserted that Detective Leracz never read defendant his Miranda rightswhile they were in the interview room together and that when Mr. Bramlett asked the detectivewhether his son needed an attorney, he was told that a lawyer was not necessary because thedefendant was only at the station for questioning. After spending 10 minutes in the interviewroom, Mr. Bramlett was escorted out of the room but was not informed that the police wouldcontinue questioning the defendant. Rather, defendant's father claimed that he thought thedefendant would be returning home.

For the next eight hours, until approximately 1 p.m., the defendant asserted that heremained locked in the interview room and was questioned by a variety of different policeofficers. He claimed that, during this time, the officers did not permit him to sleep continuouslyand allowed him only a bag of potato chips and two sodas. Sometime between 1 and 1:30 p.m.,Detective O'Boyle, assistant State's Attorney Alesia, and Youth Officer Brooks entered the roomto question the defendant. Defendant stated that while he was introduced to those men, he didnot know the role of the youth officer or the assistant state's attorney. Throughout the entire timethose men were in the room, defendant stated that he never told them that he did not want hisfather present and that, in fact, he specifically asked for his father and mother numerous times.

At approximately 3 p.m., Detective O'Boyle, assistant State's Attorney Alesia and YouthOfficer Brooks returned to the interview room to get a statement from the defendant whiledefendant's father remained in the hallway. Allegedly, defendant requested that his statement behandwritten by the assistant state's attorney. As such, after defendant gave his oral statement, thethree men left the room to transcribe what he had said. The defendant stated that when the menreturned, he was only permitted to read the first page of the written statement. In addition, whenhe was told to sign it in numerous places without being able to read what, in total, he wassigning, he complied. Essentially, he claimed that after more than 12 hours in police custody, hewas so scared and tired that he did not pay close attention to the details of what he was signing.

Defendant's statement asserts that on April 19, 1995, he was with his friends EricGauthreaux, Kevin Winters, and "Scottie," and that Eric and Kevin were in Eric's car and talkingabout shooting a member of the Gangster Disciples street gang. Eric then told the defendant thathe could not get in the car unless he obtained a gun. Accordingly, defendant stated that he beganwalking home and ran into Scottie. At that point, Scottie and the defendant returned to Eric's car,and when Eric asked the defendant whether he had a gun, the defendant replied that he did.Defendant stated that after all four of them got into Eric's car, they drove until they encountered agroup of Gangster Disciples. After the group of Gangster Disciples began to flash gang signs"disrespecting" the Blackstone street gang, Kevin pointed a gun at the group and pulled thetrigger. Because the safety was on, however, the gun did not fire. Then, Scottie shot his .38caliber gun five times at the crowd, which was beginning to run away. Kevin then yelled"GDK," which means Gangster Disciple Killer, and shot 1 to 6 times at the group. Defendantclaimed that he did not see any other guns or weapons in the hands of any person running awayfrom them. They then drove away, and once they got to 75th Street and Colfax Avenue, he gotout of the car and went home. Finally, defendant stated that he did not tell the police about whattranspired that night until the police came to his house.

At the suppression hearing, defendant also claimed that he had been told conflictingthings about his father - that he had gone home or that he would see him soon if he cooperatedwith the police. In other words, he claimed that he believed he would be going home once hesigned the written statement. In fact, however, defendant's father was waiting outside fromapproximately 5 a.m. until 3 p.m. and was repeatedly told to wait and remain seated. A littleafter 3 p.m., an officer came into the hallway where Mr. Bramlett was waiting and told him thatthere was a problem with the defendant and that he had signed some papers. Defendant's fatherclaimed that it was only at that moment that he realized the defendant was in serious trouble andwould not be going home. Immediately thereafter, defendant's father hired an attorney for thedefendant.

The State's witnesses in the suppression hearing recalled the evening's events differently. Officer Law testified that after he and Officers Richards and O'Connor arrived at the defendant'shouse, they waited for him at the front door. Once the defendant arrived, Officer O'Connor readdefendant's Miranda rights to him in front of defendant's father. Officer Law also stated that afterdefendant responded that he understood each of his rights, the police put him in handcuffs andplaced him in an unmarked police car. Because there was no room for the defendant's father inthe car, Mr. Bramlett had to follow the police car to the 4th district police station using directionsgiven to him by the police. Officer Law stated that while riding to the police station, no officerquestioned the defendant at any time, none knew that the defendant was only 15 years' old, andnone told the defendant that if he provided the information they were seeking that he would beable to return home.

The first officer to see the defendant at the police station, Officer Brandenburger, testifiedthat he told the defendant that he was under arrest and advised him of his Miranda rights using apre-printed card from a Fraternal Order of Police book. Defendant indicated that he understoodhis rights after each was read to him. Officer Brandenburger then asked the defendant, "[d]o youwish to answer the [sic] questions at this time?" and the defendant allegedly replied that he did. Officer Brandenburger proceeded to ask questions regarding the defendant's vital statistics,whereupon he learned that the defendant was 15 years' old. Officer Brandenburger stated thatwhen he finished taking the defendant's basic information, he transferred the defendant to the111th Street Station. The entire time that the defendant was answering Officer Brandenburg'squestions, he allegedly never asked to see a parent or attorney.

Upon defendant's arrival to the 111st Street Station, he was placed in an interview roomand had his handcuffs removed. Detective Leracz, the detective assigned to violent crimes thatday, testified that the defendant's father arrived at approximately 4 a.m. and asked to see thedefendant. Accordingly, Detective Leracz brought the defendant's father to the interview roomand let him speak with the defendant alone. Detective Leracz then stated that at approximately 5a.m., he went into the interview room and advised the defendant of his Miranda rights in thepresence of his father. After he explained each Miranda right, the defendant told DetectiveLeracz that he understood. After defendant recognized the possibility that he could be charged asan adult, he waived his rights and agreed to speak with Detective Leracz. However, DetectiveLeracz claimed that no part of the interview was conducted outside the presence of thedefendant's father.

Eventually, the defendant admitted that he was in the car when the shooting was plannedand when it occurred. At some point after that admission, defendant's father asked DetectiveLeracz if he should get an attorney for the defendant. Detective Leracz asserted that he told Mr.Bramlett that he could not give him any advice as to whether or not to obtain the services of anattorney. Nevertheless, Detective Leracz claimed that he never told the father that he should notget an attorney for the defendant. In any event, Detective Leracz claimed that neither thedefendant or his father ever requested an attorney.

After speaking with Detective Leracz, the defendant spoke with Detective O'Boyle andassistant State's Attorney Alesia. Detective O'Boyle testified that when he first spoke with thedefendant, he knew that he was approximately 15 years' old. Detective O'Boyle claimed thatwhen he entered the interview room on April 20, 1995, the defendant was not handcuffed but thedoor to the room was locked. After entering the room, assistant State's Attorney Alesia advisedthe defendant of his Miranda rights by memory and also told the defendant that he had the rightto have his parents present. Defendant responded that he understood each right as it was relayedto him and agreed to make a statement, but did not want his father present.

Further, Detective O'Boyle testified that at 3 p.m., defendant was told that he couldmemorialize his statement by either giving a statement to a court reporter or a handwrittenstatement, and the defendant chose a handwritten statement. Defendant then described whathappened while assistant State's Attorney Alesia wrote it down. Once defendant's statement wascompleted, he read the statement along with assistant State's Attorney Alesia and made onecorrection on page 4. After he finished, assistant State's Attorney Alesia, Detective O'Boyle,youth officer Brooks, and the defendant signed their names at the bottom. Finally, DetectiveO'Boyle stated that no time while the defendant was giving his statement did he ask for anattorney or for his father and that he was given potato chips and two sodas when he was hungry.

On February 5, 1996 counsel for the defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppressthe defendant's statement, making a two-fold argument: (1) the seizure of the defendant violatedhis fourth amendment rights because the police acted without a warrant and without probablecause; and (2) the interrogation of the defendant violated his fifth and sixth amendment rightsand the due process clause because he was 15 years' old, no juvenile officer was present for mostof his questioning, his parents were absent, and because he did not knowingly waive his rightsagainst self-incrimination and right to counsel.

Over two years later, on April 23, 1998, the trial court denied the defendant's motion tosuppress his statement, finding that the police did have probable cause at the time of thedefendant's arrest, and that the place of the defendant's arrest did not matter because of theexistence of probable cause. The court also thought that the evidence demonstrated that thedefendant was given his Miranda warnings at the police station; that the police allowed thedefendant's father to see the defendant and did not mislead the defendant as to his need for anattorney; and that the defendant was not too mentally and physically exhausted to make avoluntary statement. Finally, the court found that the youth officer was present to protect thedefendant's rights as a juvenile, and that "[t]he fact that the youth officer did not take an activepart in the taking of the statement does not change the fact that the officer was there to protect thedefendant's rights, was there to insure that the defendant's rights were not violated in any way."

After losing the motion to suppress, the defendant agreed to participate in a stipulatedbench trial. Before that could commence, however, the defendant was a victim of an armedrobbery in which he was shot several times in the back, leaving him paralyzed from the waistdown with a spinal cord injury. As a result, the defendant was hospitalized and receivedrehabilitative care on an inpatient and outpatient basis. Since his attack, the defendant has beenconfined to a wheelchair.

Among other things at the stipulated bench trial, it was stipulated that if Dan Perry wereto testify, his testimony would be the same as a handwritten statement he provided to Alesia andO'Boyle on April 20, 1995 and the same as it was in front of the grand jury. In those statements,Perry stated that he is 13 years' old and that he, the defendant, Eric Gauthreaux, Kevin Winters,and "Scottie" are members of the Blackstone street gang. At approximately 8:00 p.m. on April19, 1995, Perry was with his girlfriend at 75th Street and Colfax Avenue when he saw a four-door brown Chevy Malibu driven by Eric pull up near him. Kevin was in the front passengerseat and the defendant was in the rear passenger seat with Scottie next to him. The car had"R.I.P. Mike" written in paint on the back, and Perry indicated that Mike was a Blackstone gangmember who previously had been killed.

Perry stated that after Eric's car stopped, defendant got out and went to a blue car,retrieved a .38 caliber gun, and returned to Eric's car. Then Eric, the defendant, Kevin, andScottie talked about who was going to go retaliate. Perry elaborated that they were intending toretaliate against the Gangster Disciples because they had shot at some other Blackstone memberson April 19, 1995. While they were talking, "Big Lord," a general in the Blackstone street gang,came out of a building on 79th Street, knocked on Eric's car, and said "let Steve [defendant] andScottie go." Perry stated that the defendant, Eric, Scottie, and Kevin then drove away in Eric'scar.

Perry stated that approximately one hour later, Eric pulled up in his car at the intersectionof 76th Street and Kingston Avenue with "Fred," another Blackstone street gang member. Perryasked Eric "what's up?" to which Eric replied, "we just lit them up." This, Perry indicated, meantthat they had just shot at some Gangster Disciples. Eric then told Perry, "I'll tell you later," andthen drove away.

It was also stipulated that O'Boyle and Alesia would identify the defendant in open courtas well as the defendant's statement and his signature on each page. After the stipulated benchtrial, the court found the defendant guilty of first degree murder. In so ruling, the court foundthat there was sufficient evidence to establish defendant's guilt by accountability. In accordancewith that finding, the court sentenced the defendant to 20 years' imprisonment. Defendant filed amotion for a new trial, which was denied, and now appeals.

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in finding that the police had the requisiteprobable cause to arrest the defendant in his home without a warrant. Accordingly, defendantargues, because his arrest violated his fourth amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure,the trial court should have suppressed his statement as a product of that illegal arrest. Initially, asdefendant notes, it is undisputed in this case that the police came to his house, placed him inhandcuffs and into a squad car, and took him into custody. Certainly, because a reasonableperson in the defendant's position would have felt that he was not free to leave police custody(People v. Wallace, 299 Ill. App. 3d 9, 16-18 (1998)), he, unquestionably, was arrested.

Therefore, defendant claims, the legality of his arrest must turn on whether probablecause existed. See People v. Lawson, 298 Ill. App. 3d 997 (1998) (when the police arrest asuspect without obtaining a warrant, the State then has the burden of showing there was probablecause). In addition, defendant notes, probable cause must be based on more than facts or rumorsthat trigger one's suspicions prompting them to question a suspect. For example, in People v.Wilson, 260 Ill. App. 3d 364 (1994), this court found that where an arrest was based only on aninformant's tip whose reliability was unknown, "the police had no basis for arresting defendantbeyond mere rumor or suspicion, sufficient bases for questioning him but not for arresting him." Wilson, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 371. Moreover, defendant notes, an inquiry of whether there wasprobable cause can only be based on those facts that the police knew prior to the arrest. Wilson,260 Ill. App. 3d at 372.

Defendant asserts that the only information that the officers had prior to his arrest wasbased on a tip from an unnamed officer - whose reliability was unknown - that defendant waswanted for questioning in connection with the Jones shooting. Like in Wilson, defendant argues,such information is insufficient to demonstrate probable cause to arrest. Defendant claims that attrial, however, defense counsel and the trial court mistakenly presumed that Perry's statement,which was acquired seven and one-half hours later, was available before the police arrested thedefendant. Such was evident, he claims, in the court's finding at the suppression hearing:

"[T]here was probable cause existing because of the statements made by otherindividuals indicating [defendant's] being in a vehicle, a specifically describedvehicle with a specific name or slogan on it that indicated he was involved in thecar with individuals, and he was in that car very shortly after a shooting involvedwith bullets fired out of that particular car. So there was probable cause."

Nevertheless, defendant asserts, nothing in the record supports that presumption.

Therefore, our initial duty is to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that thepolice had the requisite probable cause. See People v. Segovia, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 244 (2000)("[e]ven an arrest made during a warrantless non-consensual entry of a home does not vitiate adefendant's subsequent custody nor does it require suppression of a defendant's subsequentvoluntary statement outside the home, so long as the authorities had probable cause to arrest thesuspect. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18-21, 109 L.Ed.2d 13, 21-22, 110 S.Ct. 1640,1643-45 (1990); People v. Shelby, 221 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1041 (1991); People v. Long, 208 Ill.App. 3d 627, 635 (1990)."). Recently, People v. De Luna, 334 Ill. App. 3d 1 (2002) recited thestandard of review:

"When a court's ruling on a motion to suppress involves factualdeterminations and assessments of credibility, we may not disturb the ultimateruling unless it was manifestly erroneous. See People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d425, 430-31 (2001) (this is because trial court is in best position to observewitnesses and weigh credibility); People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 309 (1998)(generally, ruling on motion to suppress is subject to reversal only if manifesterror); People v. Sweborg, 293 Ill. App. 3d 298, 301 (1997) (when factual matters,from which more than one inference may be drawn, become issues in cause, trialcourt's determination merits deference and should not be disturbed absentmanifest error)." DeLuna, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 8-9.

However, the DeLuna court also discussed the review of suppression motions when the issues arenot factual in nature:

"Recently, our courts declared that when a motion to suppress ultimately turns onquestions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, we must apply a de novostandard of review. See Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 431 (adopting Ornelas v. UnitedStates, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996),which held that de novo review is required for determinations of probable cause orreasonable suspicion involved in motion to suppress); see also People v.DeSantis, 319 Ill. App. 3d 795, 802(2001) (same); People v. Rush, 319 Ill. App.3d 34, 38 (2001) (these determinations require the different standard of reviewfound in Ornelas)." DeLuna, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 9.

In the present case, both issues are present. First, the defendant challenges the trial court'sfactual determination that, while the police officers who went to the defendant's home did nothave specific knowledge of the defendant's involvement other than what another officer told him,other officers working in conjunction with the arresting officers had Perry's statement at that timewhich directly placed the defendant in the car during the commission of the crime. Second, thedefendant challenges that trial court's legal determination that any or all of that information couldconstitute probable cause.

In addressing the factual issue, we find that the dearth of evidence in the record makes thetrial court's determination manifestly erroneous. Detective O'Boyle testified at the suppressionhearing that he became involved in the case from its origination, at approximately 9:30 p.m. onApril 19, 1995, and that he spoke to various witnesses that evening and "into the morning hours"the next day. At some point prior to 10 a.m. on April 20, 1995, he obtained Perry's statementimplicating the defendant. Additionally, officers Law, Richards and O'Connor testified thatbetween 2 and 2:45 a.m. of April 20, 1995, they were investigating the crime when they knockedon the defendant's door and arrested him. This constitutes the sum total of evidence put forwardby the State to establish probable cause.

Defendant asserts that because Perry's statement was not memorialized until seven andone-half hours later, it is impossible that Officers Law, Richards and O'Connor could haveknown of its contents. As the State points out, however, simply because Perry's statement wasmemorialized seven and one half hours after the defendant's arrest is not necessarily indicative ofwhen Perry first spoke to the police. In fact, the defendant's argument invites the fairly largepresumption that the police take and immediately memorialize the statement of every witness toevery crime when they receive it.

The fact remains, however, that there is absolutely no evidence in the record that indicatesexactly when Detective O'Boyle procured Perry's statement during his approximate 12 hours ofwork on the case. Consequently, there is no way the trial court could have ascertained whetherOfficer O'Boyle's knowledge existed contemporaneously with the other officers' arrest of thedefendant. Therefore, even in reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, wefind the trial court's factual determination to be against the manifest weight of the evidence whereit is unsubstantiated by any evidence in the record. See Joel R. v. Board of Education ofMannheim School District 83, 292 Ill. App. 3d 607, 613 (1997).

Thereafter, in determining the legal issue of whether probable cause existed for thedefendant's warrantless arrest, we note that a court must find that the police had knowledge offacts which would lead a reasonable person to find that a crime has occurred and that it has beencommitted by the defendant. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 204 (1999). And in making thatdetermination, this court has found that "[w]hen officers are working in concert, probable causecan be established from all the information collectively received by the officers even if thatinformation is not specifically known to the officer who makes the arrest." People v. Bascom,286 Ill. App. 3d 124, 127 (1997). However, in most cases where courts have imputedinformation from one officer to another for probable cause purposes, those courts have foundevidence of some sort of communication between the officers, such as a dispatch of orders. Asthe Bascom court noted, "[c]ertainly, arresting officers may rely upon dispatches to make arrestseven if they are unaware of specific facts that established probable cause to make the arrest. [Citation.] In such a case, however, the State must demonstrate that the officer who directed thedispatch to be issued possessed facts sufficient to establish probable cause to make the arrest. [Citation.]" Bascom, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 127-28. See also People v. Crane, 244 Ill. App. 3d 721,724-25 (1993).

In the present case, the record reveals no evidence that Detective O'Boyle was working inconcert with Officers Law, Richards and O'Connor prior to the defendant's arrest andinterrogation. First, Detective O'Boyle was assigned to the victim's case on the night of themurder; whereas Law, Richards, and O'Connor were on general patrol duty from 5:30 p.m. to 2a.m. the following day. While O'Boyle eventually obtained knowledge that the defendant mayhave been involved in the shooting, there is no evidence that he told anybody he was looking fordefendant, that he directed anybody to arrest defendant, or that he was working with the officerswho arrested defendant at the time of the arrest. And as we previously found, there is noevidence that O'Boyle even had Perry's information at the time of the arrest.

The State argues that it is highly probable that the arresting officers obtained theirinformation from O'Boyle because the police did not arrest all the members of the Blackstonestreet gang and only went after the defendant, thus imputing O'Boyle's knowledge of Perry'sconfession to them. However, even if we were to assume that O'Boyle was acting in concert andthat he had procured Perry's confession at that point, Perry's confession cannot provide probablecause to arrest defendant where there is simply no factual evidence demonstrating that O'Boylewas the police officer who provided the others with the tip. In short, not a single officer'stestimony establishes any link between O'Boyle and Officers Law, Richards and O'Connor beforeand during the arrest.

Therefore, because there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding that OfficerO'Boyle's knowledge of Perry's statement coincided with the other officers' arrest of thedefendant, the contents of Perry's statement are irrelevant to whether Officers Law, Richards andO'Connor had probable cause. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in finding thatprobable cause existed for the defendant's arrest and that defendant, therefore, was illegallyseized in violation of his constitutional rights

Such a determination, however, does not resolve the question of whether the defendant'slater confession at the police station should have been admissible at the stipulated bench trial. We recently noted:

"A confession obtained following an illegal arrest may, nonetheless, be admissibleif the confession was sufficiently an act of the defendant's free will such that it ispurged of the primary taint of the illegal arrest. People v. White, 117 Ill. 2d 194,222, 512 N.E.2d 677 (1987). In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 45L.Ed.2d 416, 427, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62 (1975), the United States SupremeCourt set forth four factors to be considered in determining whether a confessionobtained following an illegal arrest was a product of that arrest or was purged ofthe initial taint. These factors are: 1) the temporal proximity between the arrestand the confession; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; 3) the purposeand flagrancy of the police misconduct; and 4) whether Miranda warnings weregiven. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 45 L.Ed.2d at 427, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62. TheState bears the burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence,sufficient attenuation of evidence obtained through an illegal arrest. People v.Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 86, 554 N.E.2d 192 (1990); People v. Wright, 294 Ill.App. 3d 606, 612, 691 N.E.2d 94 (1998)." People v. Ollie, 333 Ill. App. 3d 971,984-85 (2002).

Like Ollie, because the trial court concluded that the police had probable cause to arrestthe defendant, it never considered the question of attenuation. Also like Ollie, the State arguesthat if we find that the defendant was illegally arrested, we should remand the matter to the trialcourt for it to conduct an attenuation hearing. The defendant, however, claims that there are notenough attenuating circumstances to rid his confession of his illegal arrest and that, consequently,we should reverse his conviction, suppress his statement, and remand for a new trial.

We hold that, based on the insufficiency of the record, we cannot make an independentdetermination of the admissibility of the defendant's confession. Therefore, we vacate thedefendant's convictions and sentence and grant the State's request to remand the case to the trialcourt for a determination of whether the defendant's confession was sufficiently attenuated fromhis illegal arrest to make it admissible. See People v. Wallace, 299 Ill. App. 3d 9, 9 (1998);People v. Barlow, 273 Ill. App. 3d 943, 950 (1995). Since the trial court may conclude that thedefendant's confession was not obtained by means of his illegal arrest and was properlyadmissible at trial, we will address defendant's other contention of error.

[The following material is non-publishable under Supreme Court Rule 23.]

[The preceding material is non-publishable under Supreme Court Rule 23.]

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the defendant's conviction and sentence and remandthe cause to the trial court with directions that it conduct an attenuation hearing. If the trial courtshould find that the defendant's confession was sufficiently attenuated, we direct the court toreinstate the defendant's convictions and sentences. If, however, the trial court finds defendant'sconfession to have been procured from his illegal arrest so as to make the confessioninadmissible, we order the court to suppress the defendant's statements and conduct furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion. We also comment that, while we affirm the trial court'sdetermination that the defendant's confession was voluntary, for attenuation purposes, thevoluntariness of a confession is not an issue. See Barlow, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 953, citing Peoplev. Reynolds, 257 Ill. App. 3d 792, 805 (1994).

Judgment vacated and cause remanded with directions.

THEIS, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.