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SIXTH DIVISION
OCTOBER 10, 2003

JUSTICE TULLY delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, defendant, Clifford Banks, was convicted of aggravated kidnapingand unlawful restraint of a twelve-year-old boy, and was sentenced to a term of 45 years in prison. Defendant appeals, raising as issues whether the State proved defendant guilty of aggravatedkidnaping and unlawful restraint beyond a reasonable doubt; whether the court erroneouslyconvicted defendant of multiple offenses arising from a single act; whether the court committed aPrim violation; and whether the court erred in polling the jury.

The victim testified that on September 17, 1998, at approximately 7:45 p.m., he was alonein an alley behind his house at 4350 Congress Parkway, Chicago. While standing in the alley, thevictim saw a family friend known as "Coco" riding his bicycle up and down the alley. Cocostopped and asked the victim about his sister and then Coco rode away.

About ten minutes later, the defendant approached the victim and asked whether thevictim wanted to make some money by cleaning out a garage down the alley. The victim startedwalking down the alley with the defendant. As they were walking, the defendant grabbed thevictim's arm and started dragging him toward a gangway. The victim "dug his feet into theground" and struggled with the defendant. The victim indicated on a photograph the distancewhich the defendant pulled him down the alley. That distance appears to be approximately tenfeet.

As the victim struggled to get free, Coco returned to the alley and approached thedefendant and the victim. Coco asked the victim whether he knew the defendant. The victim toldCoco that he did not and the victim stepped away from the defendant. Coco then pushed thedefendant to the ground. The defendant ran out of the alley to a state trooper vehicle that wasparked on Congress Parkway. Coco and the victim went to the victim's house where theyinformed the victim's mother of what had happened. The victim, his mother and Coco then wentto tell the state trooper what had happened.

On appeal, defendant first asserts that his conviction and sentence for aggravatedkidnaping must be reversed because the State failed to prove the essential elements of kidnapingbeyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, defendant argues that the State failed to prove that asecret confinement occurred. Further, defendant contends that the asportation of the victim wasnot established beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no evidence presented that thedefendant moved the victim from one place to another.

The crime of kidnaping occurs when a person knowingly and secretly confines anotheragainst his will, or by force or threat of imminent force carries another from one place to anotherwith intent secretly to confine him against his will. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 10-1.) Akidnapper who takes as his victim a child under the age of 13 years commits aggravatedkidnaping. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 10-2(a)(2).) "Secret confinement," the gist ofkidnaping, is demonstrated by either the secrecy of confinement or the place of confinement, andmust be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Sykes (1987), 161 Ill.App.3d 623, 515N.E.2d 253 citing People v. Mulcahey (1977), 50 Ill.App.3d 421, 365 N.E.2d 1013.

In Illinois, reviewing courts have addressed the necessary proof to establish the "secretconfinement" element of the charged offense. In general, the victim has clearly been "confined" orenclosed within something, such as a house or a car. See People v. Mulcahey, (the victim wasbound to a chair in her own home); People v. Bishop (1953), 1 Ill.2d 60, 114 N.E.2d 566, (secretconfinement in an automobile while it is in motion upon a highway).

In People v. Sykes, the court focused on the "secret confinement" element of kidnaping. There, the defendant confronted the 10-year-old victim as she approached the school playgroundaround 8:30 a.m. Defendant grabbed the victim's arm and pulled her into an alley. Theyproceeded through two or three alleys until they reached a partially vacant building. Afterdefendant was denied entry into the building, they returned to the street where the victim yelledfor help and defendant ran off. Relying upon the definition of "secret" as "concealed; hidden; notmade public * * *," (People v. Mulcahey ) the Sykes court held that such "confinement" was not envisioned by the Illinois courts, nor did it comport with the "secret" component of the statute. Accordingly, defendant's conviction for aggravated kidnaping was reversed since the State failedto prove that the victim was "secretly confined."

While the facts in Sykes are similar to those found in the instant case, our analysis of thestatute brings us to a different result. The Sykes court only looked at the first part of the statutewhich states that a kidnaping occurs when a person knowingly and secretly confines anotheragainst his will. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 10-1(a)(1)). The Sykes court did not address thestatute in its entirety, specifically paragraphs 10-1(a)(2) and (a)(3). These portions of the statuteprovide that a kidnaping occurs when a person knowingly by force or threat of imminent forcecarries another from one place to another with intent secretly to confine him against his will(Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 10-1(a)(2)), and further that a kidnaping occurs when a personknowingly, by deceit or enticement induces another to go from one place to another with intentsecretly to confine him against his will (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 10-1(a)(3)).

In looking at the entire statute and under the factual circumstances presented here, we findthat the State did prove the elements necessary to sustain a conviction for kidnaping. The victimtestified that the defendant approached him in the alley and offered him money to clean out agarage down the alley. As the victim walked down the alley with the defendant, the defendantgrabbed the victim's arm and started dragging him toward a gangway. Significantly, the defendantfirst "enticed" the victim to go down the alley with him by offering the victim money. Then thedefendant "forced" the victim by grabbing his arm and dragging him toward a gangway. Here, the defendant clearly acted with the intent to secretly confine the victim but was prevented from doingso when Coco saw the defendant struggling with the victim and interrupted the defendant'sactions.

We also find that the asportation of the victim was established beyond a reasonable doubt. To determine whether an asportation or detention rises to the level of kidnaping as a separateoffense, Illinois courts have adopted the test announced in People v. Smith, 91 Ill.App.3d 523,414 N.E.2d 1117 (1980). A court must consider the following four factors: (1) the duration of theasportation or detention; (2) whether the asportation or detention occurred during the commissionof a separate offense; (3) whether the asportation or detention that occurred is inherent in theseparate offense; and (4) whether the asportation or detention created a significant danger to thevictim independent of that posed by the separate offense. Smith, 91 Ill.App.3d at 529, 414 N.E.2d1117. "Whether an asportation is sufficient to constitute a kidnaping depends on the particularfacts and circumstances of each case." People v. Casiano, 212 Ill.App.3d 680, 687, 571 N.E.2d742 (1991).

Here, defendant contends that the victim's asportation was for an insufficient durationbecause the victim was merely dragged a few feet down the alley and the whole episode allegedlylasted only a few minutes. However, a kidnaping conviction is not precluded by the brevity of theasportation or the limited distance of the movement. Casiano, 212 Ill.App.3d at 687, 571 N.E.2d742 (victim forced to walk 1