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JUSTICE REID delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, which was part of three simultaneousseparate juries, the defendant, Ruben Alvarez, was found guiltyof first degree murder and was sentenced to serve 80 years'imprisonment. On appeal, Alvarez maintains that: (1) he wasdenied his due process right to fundamental fairness and hissixth amendment right to present a defense as a result of thetrial court's decision not to admit certain evidence about thepolice investigation concerning different suspects, (2) he wasdenied a fair trial by the admission of improper hearsay, (3) hewas denied a fair trial due to the admission of evidence thatshowed that he had a propensity to commit crimes, (4) he wasdenied a fair trial as a result of the State eliciting aninordinate amount of irrelevant and prejudicial gang-relatedevidence, (5) he was denied a fair trial due to the admission ofevidence concerning weapons that were not connected to the crime,(6) he was denied a fair trial because the State made improperstatements during its closing argument, and (7) his extended-termsentence of 80 years, which was based on a finding by the trialcourt (as opposed to the jury) that the crime was accompanied byexceptionally brutal and heinous conduct, is excessive andimproper. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Alvarez'sconviction and vacate his extended-term sentence.

THE FACTS

On the evening of December 29, 1997, Arnold Mireles waswalking home from work. As he was walking, someone approachedMireles from behind and shot him once in the back of his head. Mireles died as a result of his wound.

Mireles was a community activist who worked at the JuanDiego Community Center, which is located at 8802 South ExchangeAvenue, in Chicago, Illinois. Part of Mireles' responsibilitieswas to take photographs of dilapidated buildings and make reportsto housing court in an effort to have the buildings' owners makeneeded repairs to the properties. Mireles' reports often citedcodefendant Roel Salinas.

Salinas was the owner of a number of buildings that Mireles investigated. Mireles' efforts caused Salinas to have to appearin housing court on many occasions. This resulted in Salinasbeing forced to pay numerous fines and other monies and servejail time in an effort to have his buildings brought intocompliance with city codes.

A particular Salinas building that Mireles caused to beinvestigated was located at 8822 South Exchange Avenue. Salinaseventually deeded this building to codefendant Miguel Martinez. After Martinez became the owner of the building, he, too, wasthen forced to appear in housing court as a result of thebuilding's violations. Alvarez, who was a close friend ofMartinez, lived with Martinez at 8822 South Exchange Avenue.

At trial, Donald Rowans testified that on the evening ofDecember 29, 1997, he was at the home of his friend, MichaelQuiroz, which was located at 8812 South Exchange Avenue. Whilethere, Rowans heard a gunshot at approximately 11 p.m. Sometimelater, he and Quiroz decided to walk to a store that was locatedon the corner of 89th Street and Exchange Avenue. While in routeto the store, Rowans discovered Mireles' dead body lying on theground. Rowans and Quiroz notified the police.

Later that evening, Rowans and his girlfriend went to theTaste of Commercial, which is a neighborhood restaurant. There,he saw Alvarez and Martinez, who were together. Rowans told themthat someone had been shot and that he had just found the deadperson's body. Afterwards, Martinez, who was driving, gaveRowans and his girlfriend a ride to Rowans' home. Rowans livedat 8842 South Exchange Avenue, which was located on the sameblock where Martinez lived. Later that night, Rowans alsovisited Martinez's home. While he was there, the police arrivedand conducted interviews.

The next day, on December 30, 1997, at approximately 6 p.m.,Rowans and Quiroz went to Martinez's home. While he was there,Alvarez asked Rowans to search his gangway for a shell casing. Later that same evening, Rowans informed Alvarez that he hadheard the gunshot from the previous night and that it soundedlike a .38- or .44-caliber gun. Alvarez responded that it was a9-millimeter gun.

Alvarez explained to Rowans that he crept behind Mireles andshot him with his 9-millimeter plastic Glock handgun. Alvarezsaid that when Mireles fell to his knees, he ran away. Alvarezran towards Rowans' house and saw that his gun had jammed. Whenhe unjammed it, a shell casing fell but Alvarez did not have timeto find it so he kept running.

On cross-examination, Rowans testified that he was picked upby the police on January 1, 1998, and was transported to Area Twowhere he was interrogated and also appeared in a lineup. Duringthe interrogation he testified that he failed to inform theauthorities that Alvarez had admitted to him that he had murderedMireles. However, on redirect examination, Rowans testified thathe did not tell the police about his conversation with Alvarezbecause he did not want to get involved. Rowans informed theauthorities of Alvarez's admission after Alvarez had beenarrested.

Crispin Uvalle testified that prior to December 1997, he hadknown Alvarez for approximately five months. Uvalle testifiedthat he and Alvarez were friends and in the same gang. OnJanuary 1, 1998, he was sitting in a car in Cicero, Illinois,with Alvarez, Robert Espinoza and the young woman who owned thevehicle. At this time, Alvarez told him that he shot a man inthe back of the head. Alvarez explained that he shot the man onthe corner of 88th Street and Exchange Avenue. Uvalle testifiedthat Alvarez said that "he ran up to him and shot him in the backand the guy fell to his knees and then to his face." Alvarezthen ran through a gangway to Martinez's house. Uvalle testifiedthat Alvarez said that he shot the man for money.

Detective John Murray testified that on January 4, 1998, hewas assigned to assist with the Mireles' murder investigation. On the morning of January 14, 1998, Detective Murray along withhis partner Detective Bob Rodriguez were attempting to locateAlvarez. They first went to Martinez's home at approximately

4 a.m. When they arrived, Martinez's wife, Erasema Martinez(Erasema), answered the door. She explained to the officers thatAlvarez was not there but allowed the detectives to enter wherethey spoke with Martinez. Erasema and Martinez subsequentlyagreed to accompany the detectives to Area Two. After thedetectives transported Erasema and Martinez to Area Two, theycontinued their attempt to locate Alvarez.

The detectives drove to a house that was located at 1803South 61st Court in Cicero, Illinois. Upon arriving, RonaldKulick answered the door and he gave the detectives permission toenter his home. Once inside, the detectives proceeded to thebasement. There, they found Espinoza seated on a couch. Afterfurther searching, Detective Murray testified that he foundAlvarez in a closet attempting to hide behind clothes. Alvarezwas taken into custody. When the detectives continued theirsearch of the basement, Detective Murray testified that he founda ".9 millimeter Glock semiautomatic pistol secreted behind a bararea behind a mirror."

Detective Murray testified that Alvarez was taken to AreaTwo where he was questioned by the detectives. Initially Alvarezdenied having any participation in Mireles' murder. At thispoint, the detectives left Alvarez and spoke with Espinoza forapproximately 45 minutes. When the detectives returned, theyinformed Alvarez that they had spoken to several people at thestation who were his confidants and friends. They explained thatthe people had given them some specific information regardingMireles' murder. After being told this, Detective Murraytestified that Alvarez decided to give the detectives thefollowing oral statement.

Alvarez informed the detectives that he was 17 years old. Alvarez said that during the first week in December 1997, he wasworking on the roof of a building at 88th Street and HoustonAvenue, when he was approached by Salinas. Alvarez knew Salinasbecause Salinas had sold the building at 8822 South ExchangeAvenue to Martinez. Salinas told Alvarez that he knew thatAlvarez had access to guns and that he had a problem which hewanted Alvarez to take care of.

When Alvarez asked Salinas what the problem was, Salinasinformed him that there was a fat guy by the name of Arnold whowas continually having him fined and jailed for problems with hisbuildings. Salinas said that this was costing him a lot of moneyand that he wanted the problem stopped. Salinas then offered$10,000 for the head of Mireles. Detective Murray testified thathe asked Alvarez what he thought Salinas meant by this statement. Alvarez replied that he took Salinas' statement to mean thatSalinas would pay him $10,000 if he killed Mireles. When Alvareztold Salinas that he would think about it, Salinas countered thathe would pay Alvarez the $10,000 if he committed the murder orarranged to have someone else commit the murder. Salinas furthertold Alvarez that he would be gone for three weeks around theChristmas holiday and that he would pay Alvarez when he returnedif the job had been completed by that time. Alvarez explainedthat he knew that Arnold was Arnold Mireles, who ran thecommunity center at the end of his block. Alvarez also statedthat he knew Salinas was having a lot of problems with Mirelesabout his buildings.

Alvarez said that on the night of December 29, 1997, he wasat home with Martinez when they agreed to go to the area of 51stStreet and Maplewood Avenue for the purposes of committingrobberies. The two exited Martinez's home and walked toMartinez's car, which was parked in the front. As the two sat inMartinez car waiting for it to warm up, Alvarez saw Mireleswalking on Exchange Avenue. He then told Martinez to drive intothe alley. Alvarez said that he was armed with a 9-millimeterGlock semiautomatic pistol and a snub nosed .38-caliber revolver.

Alvarez said that once Martinez drove into the alley, hetold Martinez to drive behind his house and to stop. AfterMartinez did so, Alvarez told Martinez to stay there. Alvarezthen exited the car and ran down the gangway of Martinez'sresidence. When he got to the front of the residence, Mireleshad already passed by and was now close to 89th Street.

Alvarez said that he exited the gangway and ran up behindMireles, cocking the .38 as he did so. As he got closer, Alvarezpointed the gun to the back of Mireles' head and fired one shot. Detective Murray testified that Alvarez stated that he saw bloodfly from the back of Mireles' head and that Mireles dropped tohis knees, then fell facedown in the snow. Alvarez then ran backto the alley and got into the car with Martinez and told Martinezto drive away.

Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Thomas Mahoney subsequentlytook Alvarez's court-reported statement where he again gaveessentially the same statement that he gave to Detective Murray.

Over the objection of the defendant the State elicitedtestimony from Evelyn Carvajal, Rita Bautista and Cindy Garciaregarding a conversation that was had when Alvarez returned home. Evelyn allegedly accused Alvarez of shooting the deceased; shethen was allowed to testify that the defendant said "shut thefuck up." The State argued that this was an alleged admission byAlvarez. The State takes the position that Evelyn's testimonywas not hearsay because her accusation was based on her personalknowledge and she was also cross-examined. However, thedefendant argues that the testimony of both Cindy Garcia and RitaBautista was hearsay because it constituted an impropercorroboration of Evelyn's testimony as a prior consistentstatement. Alvarez further argues that the angry responseattributed to him was not an admission because it is not astatement from which guilt can be inferred. On the contrary,Alvarez argues, it is more likely that his retort was a denial ofthe accusation.

At trial, Alvarez testified that he did not know Salinasprior to Mireles being murdered. He said that he met Salinas forthe first time on January 16, 1998, while they both were in CookCounty jail.

On the night of December 29, 1997, Alvarez said that he andMartinez drove to Burger King to purchase food for the women inMartinez's home. The two then drove back to Martinez's home, andAlvarez took the food inside while Martinez waited in the car. While inside, Alvarez got a blanket to take with him when heleft. Alvarez said that he took the blanket because it had begunto grow colder outside and the heater in Martinez's car wasbroken.

Alvarez testified that he was carrying a 9-millimeter gun. He said that he did not have any other weapon at the time. Heand Martinez had planned to go to a nightclub located at 51stStreet and Maplewood Avenue. However, while they were on theway, they decided to stop at the Taste of Commercial restaurant,where they ate and played video games. During this time, Rowansand his girlfriend entered the restaurant and informed them thatsomeone had been shot and killed on the corner of 89th Street andExchange Avenue. They then gave Rowans and his girlfriend a ridehome, and afterwards, the two then went back to Martinez's house.

On the day of his arrest, Alvarez testified that he washiding in the closest because at the time he had an outstandingjuvenile warrant. At the police station, Alvarez said thatDetective Murray berated, choked and slapped him. Alvarez deniedadmitting to Detective Murray that he murdered Mireles, and hedenied the admission that was given to ASA Mahoney.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict ofguilty. During sentencing, the trial court found that the murderwas accompanied by exceptionally brutal and heinous behaviorindicative of wanton cruelty, and sentenced Alvarez to anextended-term sentence of 80 years' imprisonment.

ANALYSIS

I

Alvarez contends that he was denied his due process right tofundamental fairness and his sixth amendment right to present adefense as a result of the trial court's improper evidentiaryrulings. Specifically, Alvarez maintains that he should havebeen allowed to: (1) question Arlander Frieson, an African-American, about participating in a lineup in connection withMireles' murder, (2) question Detective Paul Alfini about thefact that he questioned Martha Grande and conducted a lineup offive African-Americans, which Grande viewed, and (3) elicittestimony from Detectives Fassel, Ramirez and Rodriguez that theywere informed that an individual by the name of Brandon Millerhad been bragging about murdering Mireles.

Alvarez complains that he was arrested because overzealouspolice officers were under intense public and media pressure tosolve Mireles' murder. Alvarez argues that the prohibitedevidence was relevant because it supports his theory that thecrime was committed by another individual. Alvarez avers thatthe trial court's evidentiary rulings prevented him frompresenting a defense by excluding details of the policeinvestigation regarding the investigation of other individualswho were suspected of shooting Mireles.

"Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of thetrial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of thatdiscretion." People v. Harris, 333 Ill. App. 3d 741, 747 (2002).

"An extrajudicial declaration not under oath, by thedeclarant, that he, and not the defendant on trial, committed thecrime is inadmissible as hearsay, though the declaration isagainst the declarant's penal interest. [Citations.] Suchdeclaration may, however, be admitted where justice requires. [Citation.] Thus, where there are sufficient indicia oftrustworthiness of such extrajudicial statements, a declarationmay be admissible under the statements-against-penal-interestexception to the hearsay rule. [Citation.]

The Chambers[ v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 35 L. Ed. 2d297, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973),] court referred to four specificobjective indicia of trustworthiness: (1) the statement was madespontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the crimeoccurred; (2) the statement was corroborated by other evidence; (3) the statement was self-incriminating and against thedeclarant's interest; and (4) there was adequate opportunity forcross-examination of the declarant. [Citation.] The presence ofall four factors is not a condition of admissibility. 'They areindicia, not hard and fast requirements.' [Citation.] Thequestion to be considered in deciding the admissibility of suchan extrajudicial declaration is whether it was made undercircumstances which provide 'considerable assurance' of itsreliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness. [Citations.]" People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 342-43 (1994).

Our supreme court has held that a police officer's testimonyrecounting steps taken in a police investigation is admissibleand does not violate the defendant's sixth amendment rights solong as the officer's testimony does not gratuitously reveal thecontent of a nontestifying witness' statement and so inform thejury that the witness stated that the defendant was responsiblefor the crime. People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 304 (1990).

Where the content of the nontestifying witness' statement is notrevealed, the mere fact that the jury could infer that somethingthe nontestifying witness said caused the police to suspect thedefendant does not mean that the defendant has the right tocross-examine the nontestifying witness. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2dat 304. Further, the officer's testimony does not constituteinadmissible hearsay if he does not testify as to the content ofthe nontestifying witness' statement. People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 248-49 (1988).

Here, the prohibited evidence was either irrelevant orhearsay, and as such, the trial court's decision was proper. Themere fact that the police questioned Frieson and had himparticipate in a lineup is irrelevant. There is absolutely noevidence which suggests that he was identified as the shooter. In particular, this evidence is irrelevant in proving thedefense's claims that the police were under intense pressure tosolve this case and that they consequently coerced Alvarez intogiving a statement. Instead, it appears the defense's trueintention was to show the jury that an African-American was thefirst initial suspect in this matter.

Regarding Grande, although it was not barred from doing so,the defense did not call her to testify at trial. It appears thedefense did not call Grande because her testimony would not havebeen helpful to its case.

Alfini's testimony concerning Grande's statements do notfall under an exception to the hearsay rule. The detective'stestimony concerning Miller are clearly hearsay. The statementsconcerning Miller were not made by him and cannot be consideredstatements against his penal interest.

Further, if any error occurred, it is deemed harmless in theface of the overwhelming evidence of Alvarez's guilt. The recordreflects that Alvarez made four different admissions to killingMireles. He made oral and written admissions to the authoritiesand also admitted to Rowans and Uvalle that he killed Mireles.

II

Alvarez contends that the trial court improperly allowed theState to introduce testimony that Alvarez told Evelyn Carbajal to"shut the fuck up" when she accused him of killing Mireles. Alvarez argues this testimony was inadmissible hearsay because it did not qualify as an admission. Instead, Alvarez maintains thatthe statement was an angry slang retort that protested Carbajal'saccusation.

Here, it does not appear that Alvarez's statement qualifiedas an admission. However, any error that may have occurred as aresult of the statement being admitted appears to be harmless dueto the considerable evidence of Alvarez's guilt.

III

Alvarez claims he was denied a fair trial as a result of theadmission of evidence which showed that he had a propensity tocommit crimes. At trial, Detective Murray testified that whenAlvarez gave his oral statement, he said that he and Martinezleft Martinez's house with the intent to commit robberies. Alvarez argues that Detective Murray's testimony was irrelevantand that it improperly implied that he had a predisposition orpropensity to commit crimes.

"In general, evidence of other crimes is not admissible ifit is relevant merely to establish the defendant's propensity tocommit crime. See People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 452(1991); People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991). Evidenceof the defendant's commission of other crimes is admissible,however, where relevant to prove any material question other thanthe defendant's propensity to commit crime, including modusoperandi, intent, identity, motive, or absence of mistake. SeeThingvold, 145 Ill. 2d at 452; Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 364-65. Inconsidering the admissibility of other-crimes evidence, the trialjudge must weigh its probative value against its prejudicialeffect on the defendant, and may exclude the evidence if itsprejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.See Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 365. The trial court's ruling as tothe admissibility of other-crimes evidence will not be reversedabsent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. See Illgen, 145Ill. 2d at 364." People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 146 (1998).

Alvarez was not denied a fair trial as a result of DetectiveMurray's testimony. Alvarez's statement evinced a plan to commita future crime, and as such, did not violate the bar againstrevealing a defendant's prior criminal activity. Any error thatmay have occurred was harmless. Also, Alvarez admitted on directexamination that he had committed previous criminal offenses, andas such, he should not have been prejudiced by Detective Murray'stestimony. Again, if any error occurred, it appears to beharmless in the face of the evidence that the State introduced attrial.IV

Alvarez contends that he was denied a fair trial because theState elicited an inordinate amount of gang-related evidence. Alvarez maintains that it was the State's theory of the case thathe killed Mireles for money. Salinas, who was not in a gang,wanted Mireles dead because of Mireles' activities in thecommunity. It was not the State's theory that Salinas wantedMireles dead because of gang affiliations. Alvarez maintains thefact that he was in a gang was irrelevant and extremelyprejudicial as it inflamed the passions of the jury.

"Evidentiary rulings regarding gang-related evidence arereviewed for abuse of discretion. People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill.2d 481, 489-90 (1991). Gang membership evidence is admissibleonly when there is sufficient proof that the membership isrelated to the crime charged. People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40,58 (1990). However, once such a relationship is shown, suchevidence may be admitted so long as it is relevant to an issue indispute and its probative value is not substantially outweighedby its prejudicial effect. People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97,118 (1994); see also People v. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d 461, 480(1992), quoting People v. Monroe, 66 Ill. 2d 317, 322 (1977),quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401 ('[e]vidence of gang affiliation and/organg involvement in gang-related activity is relevant if it tends"'to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to thedetermination of the action more probable or less probable thanit would be without the evidence'"'). One of the purposes forwhich gang evidence is admissible is to 'provide a motive for anotherwise inexplicable act.' Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 58." Peoplev. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 232-33 (2001).

In the instant case, the defendant told the authorities thatwhen Salinas solicited him to kill Mireles: "He came to me andtold me he knew what I was capable of doing. He knew thesituation I was in with the guns. He knows I was able to getguns." On direct examination at trial defendant testified thathe was a member of the Bishops street gang. On cross-examination, defendant testified that he always carried a gunbecause he was a gang member. Defendant also told theauthorities that he disposed of a murder weapon by leaving it in"a hiding spot where the Bishops put all their guns at." Theevidence regarding defendant's gang membership was arguablyrelevant to explain why Salinas solicited defendant and whatdefendant did with the murder weapon. We recognize that theprobative value of this gang evidence may have been outweighed byits prejudicial effect. However, in the face of the evidencethat the State produced and the gang-related testimony thatAlvarez himself gave, the error is harmless beyond a reasonabledoubt.

V

Alvarez claims he was denied a fair trial as a result oftestimony that was permitted about weapons that were notconnected to the crime. Alvarez argues that repeated testimonywas allowed about his 9-millimeter handgun which he maintains wasnot the murder weapon. There was also testimony elicited aboutan AK-47 seen at Martinez's home that was not the murder weapon. Alvarez argues that this testimony should have been disallowedbecause it was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.

Relevant evidence is that which has any tendency to make theexistence of any fact of consequence to the determination of theaction more or less probable than it would be without theevidence. People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 455-56 (1993).Evidence is admissible if it is relevant to a material issue andits probative value is not substantially outweighed by its

prejudicial effect. People v. Burrows, 148 Ill. 2d 196, 231(1992).

The evidence concerning the AK-47 was improperly admitted. It is not the State's theory that Mireles was killed with anassault rifle. However, the evidence concerning Alvarez's 9-millimeter was relevant as Alvarez told Rowans that he used a 9-millimeter handgun to shoot Mireles and he left a shell casing ina hallway at the scene of the shooting. Defendant also told theauthorities that he was armed with a 9-millimeter and a .38-caliber handgun when he shot the victim. There was no ballisticevidence recovered at the crime scene and the medical examinernever stated the caliber of the weapon that was used to shootMireles. The 9-millimeter handgun admitted into evidence wasfound in the basement where defendant was arrested. All of thesefacts support the admission of the 9-millimeter. In light of theoverwhelming evidence of guilt, any error relating to admissionof the AK-47 into evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

VI

Alvarez maintains the State committed reversible error whenit made improper statements during its closing argument that werenot supported by the record. In particular, Alvarez complainsabout the State's comments that: (1) Salinas solicited him tokill Mireles because he had access to guns and was a gang member,and (2) girls in Martinez's house knew that he had shot Mireles. Alvarez contends that these statements were not supported by therecord and tainted the jury so as to deny him a fair trial.

It is well settled that prosecutors enjoy wide latitude inclosing arguments, and the scope of permissible argument restswithin the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent a clearabuse of discretion, the court's determination of the proprietyof the argument will stand. People v. Hester, 271 Ill. App. 3d954, 957 (1995). Any improper comments or remarks made by aprosecutor in closing argument are not reversible error unlessthey are a material factor in the conviction or cause substantialprejudice to the accused. People v. Sutton, 316 Ill. App. 3d874, 893 (2000). In reviewing allegations of prosecutorialmisconduct, the court must consider the arguments of both theprosecutor and the defense in their entirety and place theallegations of improper comments in context. Sutton, 316 Ill.App. 3d at 893. To warrant a reversal, the prosecutorial remarksmust result in substantial prejudice to the accused, such thatthe verdict would have been different had the improper commentsnot been made. People v. Terry, 99 Ill. 2d 508, 517 (1984).

The State's closing argument was proper because it was basedon the facts that were adduced at trial or reasonable inferencesdrawn therefrom. As to the State's comments concerning whySalinas solicited Alvarez to kill Mireles, Alvarez's statementsupports the State's closing argument. In Alvarez's statement,he stated that Salinas "came to me and told me he knew what I wascapable of doing. He knew the situation I was in with the guns. He knows I was able to get guns." Furthermore, during histestimony, Alvarez admitted to being a gang member.

As to the State's comments concerning the women inMartinez's house knowing that Alvarez committed the shooting, theState's comments were supported by the evidence. EvelynCarbajal, who was staying with Martinez at the time of theoccurrence, testified that she told Alvarez on the night of theshooting, "I know you killed that guy on the corner."

VII

Alvarez maintains that his extended-term sentence of 80years is excessive when his age, previous criminal record andpotential to rehabilitate are taken into consideration. Alvarezcontends that since he was only 17 years old at the time of theoccurrence and only had a juvenile record, the trial court shouldhave only given him the minimum sentence of 20 years. Further,Alvarez argues that the trial court improperly found that themurder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal and heinousconduct, and that his extended-term sentence violates Apprendi v.New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348(2000).

A trial court's sentencing determination must be based onthe particular circumstances of each case, including factors suchas the defendant's credibility, demeanor, general moralcharacter, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999); People v. Perruquet,68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977). Generally, the trial court is in abetter position than a court of review to determine anappropriate sentence based upon the particular facts andcircumstances of each individual case. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at154. Thus, the trial court is the proper forum for thedetermination of a defendant's sentence, and the trial court'sdecisions in regard to sentencing are entitled to great deferenceand weight. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154. Absent an abuse ofdiscretion by the trial court, a sentence may not be altered uponreview. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154. If the sentence imposedis within the statutory range, it will not be deemed excessiveunless it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose ofthe law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of theoffense. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 54.

Our supreme court recently held in People v. Swift, 202 Ill.2d 378, 392 (2002), that for purposes of Apprendi analysis, thesentencing range for first degree murder is 20 to 60 years'imprisonment, and that any sentence greater than 60 yearsrequires additional factual findings that must be proven beyond areasonable doubt. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d at 392. Specifically, thecourt in Swift indicated as follows:

"We conclude that for purposes of Apprendianalysis, the 'sentencing range' for first degreemurder in Illinois is 20 to 60 years' imprisonment.This is the only range of sentence permissible based onan ordinary jury verdict of guilt. Although there isstatutory authorization for higher sentences to beimposed for this crime, any sentence longer than 60years requires additional factual findings. See 730ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 1998) (extended-term sentence);730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b), (a)(1)(c) (West 1998) (lifeimprisonment); 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g), (h) (West 1998)(death penalty). According to Apprendi, any factualfindings which take a sentence above the sentencingrange must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonabledoubt." Swift, 202 Ill. 2d at 392.

Here, the trial court found that the offense was accompaniedby exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wantoncruelty. Alvarez was consequently sentenced to serve anextended-term sentence of 80 years. This determination was madewithout a jury finding, and as such, the State was not requiredto prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was accompaniedby brutal and heinous behavior as required by Swift.

In People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335 (2003), following ajury trial, the defendant received an extended-term sentencebased on a posttrial finding by the trial court that the crimewas committed in a brutal and heinous manner. On appeal, thedefendant contended that his extended-term sentence violatedApprendi. The Crespo court determined that Apprendi violationsare reviewed under a plain error analysis. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2dat 347, citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 152 L. Ed.2d 860, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002)(applying plain error test becausedefendant did not object at the time of trial, even thoughApprendi had not been decided until after defendant wasconvicted). Under a plain error analysis, a defendant'sconviction and sentence will stand unless the defendant shows theerror was prejudicial. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 347-48, citingUnited States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508,520, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993), People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d352, 363 (2003).

Alvarez did not object at the sentencing hearing to hisextended-term sentence, which was based on a finding by the trialcourt that the murder was accompanied by brutal and heinousconduct. As such, this issue must be reviewed under a plainerror analysis. In Crespo our supreme court adopted the reasoningof the Supreme Court in Cotton, holding that an appellate courtmay correct an error not raised at trial, only if there was an(1) "error," (2) that is "plain", and (3) affects "substantialrights." Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 348. We find that the facts ofhe present case meet all three of these elements. However, wemay exercise our discretion to notice the forfeited error ' "onlyif (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, orpublic reputation of judicial proceedings." ' Cotton, 535 U.S. at___, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 868. 122 S. Ct. at 1785 [, citation]." Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 348.

In Crespo, our supreme court looked at the facts of theattack which resulted in the victim's death in that case. Amongthese was the fact that the defendant had stabbed the victim 24times with an eight-inch kitchen knife and pulled her hair withsuch force that part of her scalp was torn from her head. Thesupreme court aptly characterized this as overwhelming evidencethat the crime was brutal and heinous. The court concluded: "Wehave no doubt that a jury, presented with these facts, would havefound that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinousmanner, indicative of wanton cruelty. Accordingly, defendant hasfailed to show that the error was prejudicial." Crespo, 203 Ill.2d at 348-49.

The State correctly cites People v. Andrews, 132 Ill. 2d451, 465 (1989), and People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 501(1981), for considering Webster's dictionary definition of"heinous" as "hatefully or shockingly evil: grossly bad:enormously and flagrantly criminal," and defined "brutal" as"grossly ruthless *** devoid of mercy or compassion: cruel andcold blooded." Webster's Third New International Dictionary,286, 1050 (1986). In affirming the defendant's life sentence,the court in La Pointe focused on his significant history ofcriminal activity, callous attitude and complete lack of remorse,and premeditation. Similarly, in People v. McGhee, 238 Ill. App.3d 864, 882 (1992), and People v. Benkowski, 215 Ill. App. 3d615, 620-21 (1991), this court held that premeditation and cold-bloodedness are sufficient to justify an extended sentence. Defendant cites several cases in support of his argument that hisactions did not constitute brutal or heinous conduct: People v.Andrews, 132 Ill. 2d 451, 466-67 (1989), People v. Phillips, 244Ill. App. 3d 237, 240 (1993), People v. Gonzalez, 231 Ill. App.3d 1071, 1078-79 (1992), People v. Fields, 198 Ill. App. 3d 438,444-45 (1990), People v. Anderson, 201 Ill. App. 3d 75, 80-81(1990), and People v. Holiday, 130 Ill. App. 3d 753, 757-58(1985).

In the instant case, we simply cannot say that the evidencewas so overwhelming that the crime was accompanied byexceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wantoncruelty that we "have no doubt" that a jury would have made thisfinding. Consequently, we must vacate defendant's extended-termsentence.

However, we reject the defendant's assertion that he shouldhave been given the minimum sentence of 20 years. Instead, wewill only vacate Alvarez's extended-term sentence of 80 years andreduce it to 60 years.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial courtis affirmed and Alvarez's extended-term sentence of 80 years isvacated. Accordingly, the mittimus should be amended to reflectthat Alvarez's sentence has been reduced to 60 years'imprisonment.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Quinn, J. and Hartigan, J., concur.