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FIFTH DIVISION
May 11, 2001

Following a jury trial, defendant Harvey Allen, Jr., wasconvicted of four counts of murder and arson. He was sentenced tonatural life in prison without the possibility of parole for themurders and to a concurrent term of seven years for the arson. Hisconviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the UnitedStates Supreme Court denied certiorari. People v. Allen, 249 Ill.App. 3d 1001, 620 N.E.2d 1105 (1993), aff'd, 152 Ill. 2d 563, 622N.E.2d 1212, cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1075, 128 L. Ed. 2d 374, 114 S.Ct. 1657 (1994). Defendant subsequently filed a petition for reliefunder the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.(West 1994)), which the circuit court dismissed on the State's motionwithout an evidentiary hearing. For the following reasons, we affirmthe judgment of the circuit court.

Defendant contends on appeal that his petition established asubstantial constitutional violation of ineffective assistance ofcounsel for failing to allow him to testify. The State responds thatthe petition is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 725ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994). The timeliness of defendant's petition wasproperly raised by the State in the court below. While the trialcourt did not specifically address the grounds for dismissing thepetition, and defendant failed to respond to this issue either belowor on appeal, we note that we may affirm the trial court's judgmentfor any reason appearing in the record even if it was not relied uponby the trial court. Accordingly, we consider whether the defendant'spetition must be dismissed as untimely. People v. Huffman, 315 Ill.App. 3d 611, 613, 734 N.E.2d 479, 481 (2000).

The statute of limitations applicable to the defendant is thestatute in effect at the time he filed his postconviction petition. People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81, 85-86, 529 N.E.2d 227, 228-29 (1988). When defendant filed his pro se petition on March 28, 1995, the Actprovided in pertinent part as follows:

"No proceedings under this Article shall becommenced more than 6 months after the denial of apetition for leave to appeal or the date for filingsuch a petition if none is filed or issuance of theopinion from the Illinois Supreme Court or 6 monthsafter the date of the order denying certiorari bythe United States Supreme Court or the date forfiling such a petition if none is filed or 3 yearsfrom the date of conviction, whichever is later,unless the petitioner alleges facts showing thatthe delay was not due to his culpable negligence." 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994).

Judgment on defendant's conviction was entered on December 22, 1987,and was affirmed on April 22, 1993. His petition for leave to appealwas denied on October 6, 1993. Thereafter, he filed a petition forwrit of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which wasdenied on May 2, 1994. Defendant then filed a petition for rehearing,which was denied on October 3, 1994.

A question arises, as the State concedes, whether the petitionfor rehearing on the denial of certiorari tolls the commencement ofthe applicable six-month limitations period. The State maintains, asit argued in its motion to dismiss below, that the plain meaning ofthe statute and the legislative history does not support such afinding.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, for whichwe conduct de novo review. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457,667 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 (1996). The cardinal rule of statutoryconstruction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of thelegislature. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d at 457, 667 N.E.2d at 1307. Thebest evidence of legislative intent is the language used in thestatute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 435, 657 N.E.2d 1009, 1011 (1995). When a statute is unambiguous, it must be enforced as enacted, and acourt may not depart from its plain language by reading into itexceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by thelegislature. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443, 677 N.E.2d 935,939 (1997).

Applying these principles to section 122-1 of the Act, we findthat the plain language of the statute required defendant to file hispetition for postconviction relief at the latest, within "6 monthsafter the date of the order denying certiorari by the United StatesSupreme Court" (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994)), and that the statute isnot tolled when a petition for rehearing is filed. United StatesSupreme Court Rule 16.3 provides:

"Whenever the Court denies a petition for awrit of certiorari, the Clerk will prepare, sign,and enter an order to that effect and will notifyforthwith counsel of record and the court whosejudgment was sought to be reviewed. The order ofdenial will not be suspended pending disposition ofa petition for rehearing except by order of theCourt or a Justice." (Emphasis added.) U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 16.3.

Based on this rule, the order denying certiorari is legally effectivewhen the order is entered, authorizing lower courts to take whateverfurther appropriate action is necessary. See R. Stern, E. Gressman,S. Shapiro, K. Geller, Supreme Court Practice