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                                                                                                               SECOND DIVISION
                                                                                                               August 1, 2000

This quo warranto proceeding was brought by petitioner the Village of Orland Hills (Orland Hills) following competing attemptsby Orland Hills and respondent the Village of Orland Park (OrlandPark) to annex a group of unincorporated parcels of property(collectively, the subject property). The complaint sought adetermination that Orland Hills' annexation of the subject propertywas valid and that Orland Park's annexation of portions of thesubject property was void. The parties filed cross-motions forsummary judgment. After hearing the arguments of the parties, thetrial court granted Orland Hills' motion for summary judgment,denied Orland Park's cross-motion, and ousted Orland Park fromexercising jurisdiction over the subject property. Orland Park nowappeals.

Orland Hills is a municipality located in southern CookCounty. Orland Park is a municipality located in southern CookCounty and northern Will County. The subject property is made upof four separate parcels of land: the Purpura, Duffek, Schwab, andSmith parcels. The Purpura, Duffek, and Schwab parcels arerectangular in shape and all border 167^th Street on their southernend. On the other side of 167^th Street is Cook County ForestPreserve property. The Smith parcel is irregular in shape andextends north and west of the Schwab parcel. The subject propertyand Orland Hills do not share a common boundary. However, theforest preserve land that abuts the southern border of the subjectproperty also abuts the western border of Orland Hills.

The owners of the parcels that make up the subject propertycommenced voluntary annexation proceedings with Orland Hills in1995. Pursuant to section 7-1-8 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS5/7-1-8 (West 1996) (concerning annexation of territory contiguousto a municipality)), the owners of each parcel filed separateannexation petitions and entered into annexation agreements withOrland Hills (the 1995-96 annexation agreements). Orland Hillsthen adopted annexation ordinances pertaining to the subjectproperty (the 1995-96 annexations). The 1995-96 annexations werelater found to be technically-flawed in a separate proceeding andare not the subject of this case.

In June 1996, Orland Park published notice that it intended toinvoluntarily annex the Purpura, Duffek, and Schwab parcelspursuant to section 7-1-13 of the Municipal Code, as well as aparcel immediately south of the Smith parcel (this parcel isreferred to in the record as the "southwest parcel"). 65 ILCS 5/7-1-13 (West 1996). Under section 7-1-13, a municipality mayforcibly annex unincorporated territory of less than 60 acres whichis wholly surrounded by one or more municipalities or other typesof property listed in the statute, such as forest preserve districtor State property. 65 ILCS 5/7-1-13 (West 1996).

Prior to July 1, 1996, John Daly, the Village Administrator ofOrland Hills, was advised by attorneys for Orland Hills that the1995-96 annexation proceedings were potentially defective ontechnical grounds. Daly proceeded to obtain new petitions forvoluntary annexation from the owners of the subject property. OnJuly 1, 1996, at approximately 2:15 p.m., Daly brought the newpetitions to the Orland Hills Village Hall (Village Hall) andsubmitted the petitions to a clerical employee for filing.

On the evening of July 1, 1996, the corporate authorities ofOrland Park adopted an ordinance annexing the Purpura, Duffek, andSchwab parcels of the subject property, along with the southwestparcel.

On July 9, 1996, Orland Park commenced a quo warrantoproceeding against Orland Hills, in which it challenged the 1995-96annexations by Orland Hills on procedural grounds. On December 12,1996, by court order, the 1995-96 annexations were found to bedeficient for various reasons and were thus declared void and of nolegal effect.

On June 18, 1997, the corporate authorities of Orland Hillsacted on the petitions filed on July 1, 1996, by adoptingordinances annexing the parcels that made up the subject propertyto Orland Hills.

Orland Hills then filed the quo warranto complaint that is thesubject of this action. The complaint sought to have the OrlandPark annexation declared void and sought an order ousting OrlandPark from jurisdiction over any of the subject property. OrlandHills moved for summary judgment, arguing that Daly's filing of theOrland Hills annexation petitions on July 1, 1996, gave it priorityover Orland Park's annexation several hours later on the evening ofJuly 1, 1996. Orland Hills further maintained that Orland Park'sannexation was invalid because the property annexed was not "whollysurrounded" as required by statute. Orland Park filed a cross-motion for summary judgment contending, inter alia, that itsannexation should prevail over Orland Hills annexation becauseOrland Hills had failed to comply with statutory filingrequirements and had abandoned its annexation efforts.

Much of the evidence and argument before the trial court onthe cross-motions for summary judgment concerned the filing of theOrland Hills petitions. At the Orland Hills Village Hall, therewas a single counter shared by the Village Clerk, BuildingDepartment, Recreation Department, and other departments of theVillage. Signs above the counter indicated that the counter wasfor persons who had business with the Building Department, ClerksOffice, or Recreation Department. The open area behind the counterwas known as the "general office" or "clerk's office" and wasstaffed by clerical personnel who were available to handle allproblems, questions, and requests for any of the Village'sdepartments. Pursuant to section 7-1-8 of the Municipal Code,which requires that annexation petitions be filed "with themunicipal clerk," Daly went to the counter and asked that thepetitions be filed on behalf of the owners. 65 ILCS 5/7-1-8 (West1994). Sharon Richmond, an administrative assistant for theVillage's Building Department, accepted the petitions. Accordingto Richmond, she, along with the other individuals who worked inthe general office behind the front counter, had the authority toaccept a filing on behalf of the Village Clerk's Office.

The general office had two manual date stamps. One, whichsaid "Building Department," was typically kept by Richmond on herdesk. Richmond accepted the petitions by taking the BuildingDepartment stamp off of her desk and stamping each petition"Received July 1, 1996, Orland Hills Bldg. Dept." She alsoinitialed each petition.

There was also a stamp that read "Village of Orland Hills" inthe office. That stamp was typically kept under the front counter. Various employees testified that there was no hard and fast rulerelated to stamping or which stamp to use and that they generallydid not distinguish between the two stamps. There was no writtenpolicy, procedure or guidelines related to the use of the twostamps. At the old Village Hall, the Building Department stamp hadbeen kept downstairs where the Department was located and the"Village of Orland Hills" stamp had been kept upstairs in theVillage Clerk's office. Richmond brought the Building Departmentstamp with her when the Village moved from the old building to thenew.

After accepting the petitions, Richmond prepared a zoningjacket file for the petitions, put the petitions in the file, andplaced the file in a file cabinet drawer where petitions requiringpublic hearings were kept. Richmond also made copies of thepetitions for the Mayor, Village Clerk, Village Administrator,Building Commissioner, and all of the Village Trustees. The copiesof the petitions were distributed on either July 1 or July 2.

On July 1, 1996, Elaine Hallas was the elected Village Clerkof Orland Hills. The clerk's position was part-time, and payedonly $300 per month. Hallas was rarely, if ever, present at theVillage Hall during the normal workday and was not responsible foroverseeing the day-to-day operation of the Clerk's office. Although there was an appointed deputy clerk, none of the employeesin the Village Hall, including the deputy clerk, were under Hallas'control. The majority of the duties of the clerk's office werehandled by the administrative personnel in the general office. Hallas never received possession of the original annexationpetitions but did receive copies.

Full-time deputy Village Clerk Veronica Griffin handled theday-to-day matters of running the clerk's office. Griffintestified that in her position, she handled matters relating to theclerk's office and that employees for one department wouldsometimes handle duties for another department. Griffin used thestamp bearing the designation "Village of Orland Hills" whenstamping documents received as filed for the Village Clerk. Herreason for doing so was because that stamp was kept right below thecounter and was thus easily available.

After hearing the arguments of the parties on their cross-motions for summary judgment, the court granted Orland Hills'motion for summary judgment and denied Orland Park's cross-motionfor summary judgment. In so ruling, the court first noted thatthere were no genuine issues of material fact. The court nextnoted that public policy favors voluntary annexation. The courtfound that the July 1, 1996, filing of the Orland Hills voluntaryannexation petitions was in substantial compliance with thestatutory requirements of section 7-1-8 and that Orland Park'sobjections to the filing procedure were trivial. The court foundthat Orland Hills had not been guilty of any unnecessary andunreasonable delay in acting upon the petitions so as to constituteabandonment and rejected Orland Park's collateral estoppelarguments. Finally, the court found that Orland Park's attempt atannexation was void ab initio and that Orland Hills' annexationthrough the forest preserve was valid. The court's order oustedOrland Park from exercising jurisdiction over the subject property.

Orland Park contends that Orland Hills' attempt at annexingthe subject property under sections 7-1-1 and 7-1-8 of theMunicipal Code was fatally flawed because the subject property wasneither contiguous to Orland Hills nor separated from Orland Hillsonly by forest preserve district property. Therefore, Orland Parkargues, the trial court erred in denying Orland Park's motion forsummary judgment in which Orland Park maintained that Orland Hillshad no standing to bring a quo warranto proceeding.

A trial court's rulings on motions for summary judgment arereviewed de novo on appeal. W.C. Richards Co., Inc. v. HartfordAccident and Indemnity Co., 311 Ill. App. 3d 218, 220, 724 N.E.2d63 (1999).

The annexation by Orland Hills in the instant case waspursuant to sections 7-1-1 and 7-1-8 of the Municipal Code. 65ILCS 5/7-1-1, 7-1-8 (West 1996). Section 7-1-8 of the Codeconcerns annexations where the property to be annexed is"contiguous" to the annexing municipality. The parties agree thatOrland Hills is not contiguous to the subject property in the senseof sharing a common boundary. Pursuant to section 7-1-1, however,"[e]xcept in counties with a population of more than 500,000 butless than 3,000,000, territory which is not contiguous to amunicipality but is separated therefrom only by a forest preservedistrict may be annexed to the municipality pursuant to Sections 7-1-7 or 7-1-8 ***." 65 ILCS 5/7-1-1 (West 1996).

The language of a statute generally provides the best evidenceof a statute's intent, and where that language is clear andunambiguous, the plain and ordinary meaning of the words will begiven effect without resorting to extrinsic aids for construction. Brown v. Cook County Forest Preserve, 284 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1100-01, 673 N.E.2d 383 (1996). Under the plain language of section 7-1-1, a parcel of property may be annexed even though the annexingmunicipality and the property do not share a border so long as theyare separated only by forest preserve property. Orland Hillspoints out, correctly, that where the subject property's southernborder touches the forest preserve and Orland Hills' westernboundary touches the same forest preserve property, its annexationappears to comply with the unambiguous statutory language insection 7-1-1.

People ex rel. Ryan v. Village of Bartlett, 151 Ill. App. 3d533, 502 N.E.2d 443 (1986), the only case interpreting the forestpreserve portion of section 7-1-1, also supports the annexation ofthe subject property by Orland Hills. In Bartlett, the plaintiffchallenged the annexation by the defendant village of property thatwas not contiguous to the village's boundaries. The propertysought to be annexed was bordered on part of its eastern side byproperty belonging to the DuPage County Forest Preserve District. That same forest preserve property also touched the southern borderof the defendant village. The plaintiff argued that section 7-1-1should not apply because unincorporated property and parts of threedifferent roads also lay between the village and subject property. Bartlett, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 535. A similar argument is made byOrland Park in the instant case. Orland Park contends that whereproperty lying within incorporated Orland Park also lies betweenthe subject property and the boundaries of Orland Hills, "theSubject Property is not separated from Orland Hills 'only' byforest preserve district land but, in fact, is separated byterritory previously annexed by Orland Park." In Bartlett, thecourt held that the word "only," as used in section 7-1-1, "wasintended to mean that only a forest preserve district separatesterritory which is not contiguous to a municipality and not thatall boundaries of both the territory to be annexed and the annexingmunicipality must be separated only by a forest preserve district." (emphasis in original) Bartlett, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 536. Such aninterpretation was the only logical result, the court continued,because under the plaintiff's interpretation, the only possiblefact situation to which the amendment would apply would be onewhere the entire territory to be annexed was surrounded by a forestpreserve district which, in turn, was wholly surrounded by amunicipality. Bartlett, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 536. We agree withthe Bartlett court's reasoning, and therefore find the argument ofOrland Park in this regard to be without merit.

Orland Park also contends that the intent of section 7-1-1would be violated by allowing Orland Hills to annex the subjectproperty. Orland Park points to a portion of Bartlett, 151 Ill.App. 3d at 535, stating that the defendant village "further arguesthat the intent of the amendment to section 7-1-1 is clearly topermit annexation where a forest preserve district creates anartificial barrier which cannot be annexed and which prevents theorderly growth of a municipality in the direction of theintervening forest preserve district." Orland Park maintains thatwhere no "orderly growth" in the direction of the forest preserveis possible because all of the property immediately west of theforest preserve is the territory of Orland Park, the forestpreserve is not creating an "artificial barrier" to the growth ofOrland Hills and section 7-1-1 should not therefore apply. Thecourt in Bartlett, however, in making the above statement, wasmerely setting forth the argument of one of the parties. Althoughthe party making the above argument was ultimately successful, thestatement relied upon by Orland Park was not the holding of thecase. Application of section 7-1-1 is not conditioned upon aforest preserve creating an "artificial barrier" or preventingorderly growth and we do not read Bartlett as finding preconditionsto application of the statute.

Aside from the portion bordering the forest preserve, thesubject property in the instant case was surrounded largely byterritory under the jurisdiction of Orland Park. In Bartlett,however, the land surrounding the subject property aside fromforest preserve was largely unincorporated. Orland Park arguesthat Bartlett is distinguishable on this basis. We again find thatneither the plain language of section 7-1-1 nor the holding inBartlett require a different result based on the types of propertysurrounding the subject property.

Ultimately, the court in Bartlett held section 7-1-1 wasintended to allow annexation in the situation before it where onlythe forest preserve property lay between the eastern boundary ofthe subject property and the southern boundary of the plaintiffvillage. 151 Ill. App. 3d at 536. Similarly, in the instant case,only forest preserve property lies between the southern boundary ofthe subject property and the western boundary of Orland Hills. Wethus find that both the plain language of section 7-1-1 and theBartlett decision support the trial court's ruling here.

During the pendency of this appeal, Orland Park filed a motionfor leave to file a supplemental brief to address new legislationaffecting section 7-1-1. We denied the motion and note that at thetime, the legislation was still pending and did not have the forceof law. On June 13, 2000, the relevant legislation, SB 1647, wassigned into law as Public Act 91-824. The Act amends section 7-1-1to state that an annexation through forest preserve property mayonly occur where:

"the annexing municipality can show that theforest preserve district creates an artificialbarrier preventing the annexation and that thelocation of the forest preserve districtproperty prevents the orderly natural growthof the annexing municipality. It shall beconclusively presumed that the forest preservedistrict does not create an artificial barrierif the property sought to be annexed isbounded on at least 3 sides by (i) one or moreother municipalities (other than themunicipality seeking annexation through theexisting forest preserve district), (ii)forest preserve district property, or (iii) acombination of other municipalities and forestpreserve district property. It shall also beconclusively presumed that the forest preservedistrict does not create an artificial barrierif the municipality seeking annexation is notthe closest municipality to the property to beannexed." Pub. Act 91-824,