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FOURTH DIVISION
December 13, 2001

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

The State of Illinois (State) appeals from an order of thecircuit court of Cook County dismissing several counts of itscomplaint for failure to state a cause of action as a matter of law. At issue in this appeal is whether this court has jurisdiction toaddress the matter and, if so, whether the allegations in thecomplaint were sufficient to state a cause of action upon which reliefcould be granted. For the following reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

The State filed an amended complaint against defendants, Rude WayEnterprises, Inc., now known as Ricci & Associates, Inc., an Illinoiscorporation, Randal Ricci, and Combined Counties Police Association,an Illinois not-for-profit corporation (CCPA). Therein it alleged aviolation of the Solicitation for Charity Act (225 ILCS 460/0.01 etseq. (West 1996)) (count I), common law misrepresentation and fraud(count II), sought an imposition of a constructive trust on fundsimproperly solicited (count III), and further alleged a violation ofthe Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS505/1 et seq.) (West 1996)) (count IV).

On November 26, 1998, the circuit court dismissed counts II, III,and IV as failing to state a cause of action as a matter of law,relying on the holding in People ex rel. Ryan v. TelemarketingAssociates, Inc., 313 Ill. App. 3d 559, 729 N.E.2d 965 (2000), aff'dNo. 89738 (Nov. 21, 2001). The court's order did not include afinding that the dismissal order was immediately appealable pursuantto Supreme Court Rule 304(a). 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). The recordreveals that, at that time, the State indicated its intent tovoluntarily dismiss count I and thereafter perfect an appeal from theadverse ruling on the remaining counts.

However, on April 22, 1999, count I was dismissed for want ofprosecution (DWP). On May 21, 1999, the State filed a motion toreconsider and vacate the DWP. That motion was denied on June 2,1999. On June 14, 1999, the State filed a second motion toreconsider. The circuit court provisionally granted the motion andvacated the DWP, but thereafter on August 31, 1999, the court deniedthe motion to reconsider and reinstated the DWP order.

On September 30, 1999, the State filed its first notice ofappeal, seeking review of the orders of August 31, 1999, and November26, 1998 (appeal No. 1-99-3522). Thereafter, on September 12, 2000,it filed a second notice of appeal, seeking review of the same orders(appeal No. 1-00-3217). However, we note that the State does notraise any issue in its appeal concerning the order of August 31, 1999,or the DWP. Its sole contentions on appeal relate to the November 26,1998, dismissal of counts II, III, and IV.

We commence our analysis by addressing defendants' contentionthat we lack jurisdiction to hear this matter. Specifically,defendants maintain that the entire matter was not final andappealable until after the expiration of the statutory one-yearrefiling period for actions subject to a DWP. Furthermore, defendantsargue that the one-year refiling period began to run upon the denialof the State's motion to vacate. Therefore, the State was required tofile its notice of appeal within 30 days of June 2, 2000. The Statecontends that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 301. 155 Ill. 2d R. 301.

Rule 301 allows appeals from final judgments as a matter ofright. 155 Ill. 2d R. 301. A judgment or order is "final" if itdisposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire case or onsome definite and separate part of the controversy. Dubina v. MesirowRealty Development, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496, 502, 687 N.E.2d 871, 874(1997).

However, under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)),if a trial court's order disposes of fewer than all of the claims inan action, the court must make an express written finding that thereis no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of those claims. Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 465, 563 N.E.2d459, 463 (1990). Without the Rule 304(a) finding, a final orderdisposing of fewer than all of the claims is not an appealable orderand does not become appealable until all of the claims have beenresolved. Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d at 465, 563 N.E.2d at 463. Thus, in thepresent case, the order dismissing with prejudice counts II, III, andIV was a final order but, because there was no Rule 304(a) finding, itwas not immediately appealable until the remaining count I had beenresolved.

The State initially argues that count I was resolved and thematter became final and appealable when the DWP was entered, citingDubina in support. There, a defendant sought to appeal certain finalorders entered in a suit that was ultimately voluntarily dismissed. The court held that the voluntary dismissal terminated the action andthat all orders which were final in nature, but not previouslyappealable, became immediately appealable. Dubina, 178 Ill. 2d at503, 687 N.E.2d at 874-75. However, the Dubina case isdistinguishable given the nature of a DWP order.

Our supreme court in Flores v. Dugan, 91 Ill. 2d 108, 112, 435N.E.2d 480, 482 (1982), explained that a DWP order does not operate asa final order and does not terminate the litigation because the partyhas an absolute right to refile its action within one year pursuant tothe savings statute set forth in the predecessor statute to section13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 1994);see also Wold v. Bull Valley Management Co., 96 Ill. 2d 110, 449N.E.2d 112 (1983).

Thereafter, in S.C. Vaughan Oil Co. v. Caldwell, Troutt &Alexander, 181 Ill. 2d 489, 502, 693 N.E.2d 338, 344 (1998), thesupreme court, relying on Flores, held that it is not until theexpiration of the period for refiling under section 13-217 that a DWPorder becomes a final and appealable order. Thus, unlike thevoluntary dismissal in Dubina, here the order dismissing count I forwant of prosecution was not itself a final order and could notterminate the litigation with respect to all counts until the periodfor refiling under section 13-217 had expired. S.C. Vaughan Oil Co.,181 Ill. 2d at 502, 693 N.E.2d at 344; 735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 1994). Consequently, the State's notice of appeal filed on September 30,1999, prior to the expiration of the refiling period, was premature.

To determine whether the second notice of appeal, filed onSeptember 12, 2000, was timely, we must consider whether the one-yeartime period for refiling began to run on June 2, 1999, the date themotion to vacate the DWP was denied, or on August 31, 1999, the datethe subsequent motion to reconsider was ultimately denied. It hasbeen held previously that, where a timely motion to vacate an order ofdismissal has been filed, the one-year refiling period does not beginto run until the trial court has ruled on the motion to vacate theDWP. See Bowers v. Village of Palatine, 204 Ill. App. 3d 135, 138-39,561 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (1990).

However, in Wilson v. Evanston Hospital, 276 Ill. App. 3d 885,888, 659 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1995), this court rejected the argument thata plaintiff be permitted to extend the refiling period beyond thelimitations period fixed by the statute by filing additional motionsto reconsider after the motion to vacate had been denied. Thus, thecourt held that, "in order to promote certainty and finality ofjudgments, the one-year refiling period of section 13-217 begins torun when the motion to vacate the trial court's dismissal order isdenied, and not when the motion to reconsider is denied." Wilson, 276Ill. App. 3d at 888, 659 N.E.2d at 102.

Applying these principles to the present case, the DWP wasentered on April 22, 1999. The motion to vacate the DWP was denied onJune 2, 1999. Thus, the matter became final and appealable on June 2,2000. The State's notice of appeal filed on September 12, 2000, wastherefore untimely.

While we make no judgment on the ability of a party to filesuccessive motions to reconsider a denial of a motion to vacate a DWP,it is clear that the filing of the successive motion does not toll theone-year limitations period under section 13-217. Otherwise, thelimitations period could be theoretically extended for an indefiniteperiod of time until the successive motions are heard and denied. Such an approach is inconsistent with the promotion of finality andcertainty of judgments and the purpose of section 13-217. Therationale behind section 13-217 is to provide a limited extension toprevent injustice and not to provide a mechanism to prolonglitigation. See Gendek v. Jehangir, 119 Ill. 2d 338, 343, 518 N.E.2d1051, 1053 (1988).

Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over this matter.

Dismissed.

HOFFMAN, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.