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FOURTH DIVISION

March 7, 2002

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal arises from an action in quo warranto filed byrelators, Pressol GmbH and Company KG (Pressol KG), its subsidiary,Pressol Manufacturing Company (Pressol USA), and Rudolph Schlenker,purported president and member of the board of directors of PressolUSA. Relators sought to challenge the authority of defendants, Klausand Heide Pressl, to act as officers and directors of Pressol USA andsought their ouster.

After the trial court granted the relators leave to file theircomplaint, defendants filed a motion to vacate the order, allegingthat the relators lacked standing to bring a quo warranto proceedingdue to their German citizenship. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308(155 Ill. 2d R. 308), the trial court certified the question whetherthe Quo Warranto Act's use of the term "citizen" precludes out-of-state private parties from filing suit (735 ILCS 5/18-102 (West2000)). However, for the following reasons, we lack jurisdiction toaddress the merits of the appeal.

On May 15, 2001, the trial court entered the order certifying thequestion for appeal and included the requisite Rule 308 language. 155Ill. 2d R. 308. On May 30, 2001, one day after the 14-day periodprovided for by Rule 308, defendants filed their application for leaveto appeal. On June 12, 2001, relators filed their opposition to theapplication and requested that it be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. Subsequently, defendants filed a motion to treat theapplication as timely filed, stating by affidavit that the late filinghad been due to a family medical emergency. Thereafter, on July 2,2001, this court entered an order, treating the application for leaveto appeal as having been timely filed and granting defendants'application for leave to appeal.

Relators initially contend that, due to defendants' failure tofile within the time provided for in Rule 308, this court lacksjurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal and that, given thejurisdictional nature of the time limit imposed, we are withoutauthority to extend the time for filing an application for leave toappeal. Accordingly, we must review our treatment of defendants'application for leave to appeal.

Rule 308, governing permissive interlocutory appeals, provides inpertinent part:

"(a) Requests. When the trial court, inmaking an interlocutory order not otherwiseappealable, finds that the order involves aquestion of law as to which there is substantialground for difference of opinion and that animmediate appeal from the order may materiallyadvance the ultimate termination of the litigation,the court shall so state in writing, identifyingthe question of law involved. Such a statement maybe made at the time of the entry of the order orthereafter on the court's own motion or on motionof any party. The Appellate Court may thereupon inits discretion allow an appeal from the order.

(b) How Sought. The appeal will be sought byfiling an application for leave to appeal with theclerk of the Appellate Court within 14 days afterthe entry of the order in the trial court or themaking of the prescribed statement by the trialcourt, whichever is later. An original and threecopies of the application shall be filed." 155Ill. 2d R. 308(a), (b).

Illinois courts have repeatedly held that where the parties failed tofile an application for leave to appeal within 14 days, as required byRule 308, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to address themerits of the appeal. See In re Petition of Filippelli, 207 Ill. App.3d 813, 817, 566 N.E.2d 412, 414-15 (1990) (appellate court lackedjurisdiction over certified question under Rule 308 where respondentfiled petition for leave to appeal after the 14-day time limit); Campv. Chicago Transit Authority, 82 Ill. App. 3d 1107, 1111-12, 403N.E.2d 704, 707-08 (1980) (appellate court lacked jurisdiction overcertified question where defendant filed notice of appeal in thecircuit court, but failed to file application for leave to appeal withthe appellate court); Rotogravure Service, Inc. v. R.W. BorrowdaleCo., 36 Ill. App. 3d 606, 610, 344 N.E.2d 554, 557-58 (1975)(interlocutory order was not appealable where no application for leaveto appeal was filed within 14 days of the entry of the order in thetrial court); see also Renshaw v. General Telephone Co. of Illinois,112 Ill. App. 3d 58, 60, 445 N.E.2d 70, 72 (1983) (noting thatapplication filed one day after 14-day time limit was too late to vestappellate court with jurisdiction). Such findings are consistent withthe general interpretation that Rule 308 is to be strictly construedand sparingly exercised. Camp, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 1111, 403 N.E.2d at707.

Except as specifically provided for in the rules, the appellatecourt is without jurisdiction to review orders which are not final. Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 162 Ill. 2d205, 210, 642 N.E.2d 1264, 1266 (1994). Rule 308 contains no specificprovision allowing for an extension of time to file an application forleave to appeal as is provided for in other circumstances. See, e.g.,155 Ill. 2d R. 303(d) (governing appeals of right from finaljudgments); 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(e) (governing certain interlocutoryorders appealable by petition). Defendants argue that no specificprovision is necessary to extend the time for filing because of thediscretionary nature of a permissive interlocutory appeal. However,the court's discretion to consider an application for leave to appealis only implicated if the application is filed within the 14-day timelimit. Furthermore, we note, where the supreme court has chosen toextend the time for filing other permissive interlocutory appeals, ithas done so expressly. See 166 Ill. R. 306(e). Accordingly, thiscourt was mistaken in its treatment of the application as having beentimely filed. We have no inherent power under the rule to forgive aparty's failure to comply with the 14-day time limit even for goodcause shown, and consideration of the substantive issues raised by thedefendants is foreclosed at this time by their procedural default. Wenote that defendants are not precluded from raising the issue againupon a final judgment.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

HOFFMAN, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.