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SECOND DIVISION
June 1, 2004

PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Does a circuit court judge have the authority to sua spontedismiss a complaint for mandamus before summons is issued to thedefendant?

This question has been answered differently by two districtsof this court, but is a matter of first impression in the FirstDistrict. The Fourth District answered affirmatively, findingtrial courts have the "inherent authority" to protect theirdockets from the numerous, frivolous mandamus requests filed byinmates. Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill. App. 3d 834, 840, 774 N.E.2d457 (2002). The Second District disagreed, holding trial courtsmust follow the mandamus procedure, including service on thedefendant, outlined by the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill. App. 3d 175, 802 N.E.2d 381 (2003)pet. for leave to appeal granted, No. 97831 (March 24, 2004). Weagree with the Fourth District's conclusion, but for differentreasons.

FACTS

Plaintiff Tyrean Owens pleaded guilty to charges of deliveryof a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance,and criminal damage to property on August 9, 2000. The circuitcourt sentenced him to three consecutive prison terms: fiveyears for delivery of a controlled substance, two years forpossession of a controlled substance, and three years forcriminal damage to property. The circuit court also admonishedplaintiff that he would be placed on mandatory supervised releasefor three years. Plaintiff never filed a motion to withdraw hisplea and did not pursue a direct appeal.

Plaintiff did file a post-conviction petition contendingthat his sentence violated the holding of Apprendi v. New Jersey,530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Thetrial court summarily dismissed his petition and this courtaffirmed on appeal. People v. Owens, No. 1-01-0772 (2002)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

On October 9, 2002, plaintiff filed his pro se complaint formandamus against defendant Donald Snyder, the Director of theIllinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). In his complaint,plaintiff alleged IDOC would improperly begin his mandatorysupervised release after his discharge from prison. He contendedhis term of mandatory supervised release should run concurrentlywith his prison terms; otherwise, he could possibly serve moretime than he agreed to in the plea agreement, because an inmatemay be re-incarcerated if he violates the terms of the supervisedrelease (see 730 ILCS 5/3-3-9 (West 2002)).

On October 18, 2002, the circuit court "summarily" deniedplaintiff's complaint, a sua sponte dismissal, without priornotice to him. No reason for the dismissal appears in therecord.

On October 30, 2002, the Circuit Court Clerk of Cook Countysent plaintiff a letter advising him that "the Honorable JudgeStuart E. Palmer denied [his] motion for petition for Mandamus,off call." The record does not show summons to Director Snyderwas issued or that he was served a summons or the complaint. Snyder never responded to the complaint. We assume there was nosummons or service.

Plaintiff now appeals, contending the circuit court lackedthe authority to summarily dismiss his complaint for mandamusunder the relevant provisions of the Illinois Code of CivilProcedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/14-101 et seq. (West 2002)).

DECISION

By challenging the circuit court's power to sua spontedismiss his complaint for mandamus under the Code, plaintiffpresents an issue of statutory construction. Questions ofstatutory construction are questions of law, reviewed de novo. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Machine Corp., 345 Ill.App. 3d 645, 648, 302 N.E.2d 1228 (2003).

Mandamus is an extreme remedy used to compel a publicofficial to perform a nondiscretionary, ministerial duty. Peopleex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457, 464, 804 N.E.2d 546(2004). To prove a legal right to relief by mandamus, thecomplainant must demonstrate a clear right to the requestedrelief, the respondent's clear duty to act, and the respondent'sclear authority to comply with the terms of the order. People exrel. Madigan, 208 Ill. 2d at 465.

Article XIV (the mandamus statute) of the Code provides theprocedural framework for mandamus actions. 735 ILCS 5/14-101 etseq. (West 2002). In section 14-102, the Code provides:

"Upon the filing of a complaint formandamus the clerk of the court shall issue asummons, in like form, as near as may be assummons in other civil cases. The summonsshall be made returnable within a timedesignated by the plaintiff not less than 5nor more than 30 days after the service ofthe summons." 735 ILCS 5/14-102 (West 2002).

Section 14-103 requires served defendants to answer orotherwise plead in response to the complaint within a set periodof time. 735 ILCS 5/14-103 (West 2002). Other sections underthe mandamus statute provide for the plaintiff's reply andamendments to an inadequate complaint. See 735 ILCS 5/14-104,14-108, 14-109 (West 2002).

Plaintiff contends the summary dismissal is a void orderbecause the trial court did not follow the proper procedure setforth in the Code. Plaintiff contends the Code requires thecourt to follow specific procedures, such as issuing defendant asummons (735 ILCS 5/14-102 (West 2002)), prior to dismissing acomplaint seeking mandamus.

When interpreting the statute, this court must ascertain andgive effect to the intent of the legislature, which usually isdetermined by applying the plain meaning of the statute'slanguage. Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Illinois Gaming Board, 346Ill. App. 3d 18, 27, 803 N.E.2d 914 (2004), citing MidstateSiding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 320, 789 N.E.2d1248 (2003). We also adhere to the "deeply rooted" principlethat statutes should not be construed in a way that producesabsurd results. Emerald Casino, Inc., 346 Ill. App. 3d at 34,citing People v. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 800 N.E.2d 1201 (2003).

A statutory notice provision, like the summons requirementin section 14-102 (735 ILCS 5/14-102 (West 2002)), serves threepurposes: (1) the defendant is notified of pending litigation;(2) it enables the defendant to appear and defend; and (3) itvests jurisdiction in the trial court over the defendant. Nelsonv. Kenne Corp., 283 Ill. App. 3d 7, 10-11, 669 N.E.2d 665 (1996)(interpreting section 2-201(1) of the Civil Practice Law whichsays, "Every action, unless otherwise expressly provided bystatute, shall be commenced by the filing of the complaint. Theclerk shall issue summons upon request of the plaintiff"). Ajudgment rendered against a defendant without proper service of asummons is void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction over thedefendant. Nelson, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 11.

Although plaintiff contends the trial court's dismissal isvoid, he does not claim the trial court lacked jurisdiction. When issues implicating the circuit court's jurisdiction arise, areviewing court has a duty to consider them. Belleville Toyota,Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334,770 N.E.2d 177 (2002). We consider the jurisdictional issuebefore addressing plaintiff's contention that the dismissal isvoid because the court lacked statutory authority to sua spontedismiss the complaint.

If a court lacks subject matter or personal jurisdiction,any subsequent order is void ab initio, and can be attacked atany time. Schak v. Blom, 334 Ill. App. 3d 129, 134, 777 N.E.2d635 (2002). Subject matter jurisdiction is derived entirely fromthe Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,