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FOURTH DIVISION

November 12, 1998

No. 1-98-0082

JUSTICE McNAMARA delivered the opinion of the court: The Illinois Secretary of State(Secretary) denied plaintiff's petition for reinstatement of driving privileges or, alternatively, for arestricted driving permit. On administrative review, the circuit court reversed the Secretary'sdecision and ordered the Secretary to reinstate plaintiff's full driving privileges. The Secretaryappeals. For the following reasons, we reverse. The relevant facts are as follows.

On March 8, 1991, plaintiff was stopped by a police officer for improper lane usage and failure tosignal a lane change. The officer reported that he detected a strong odor of alcohol on plaintiff'sperson, that plaintiff's speech was slurred, and that his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. An openalcoholic beverage was found in plaintiff's car. Plaintiff failed the field sobriety tests. Abreathalizer test administered by the officer revealed a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of0.17, well above the legal limit.

Plaintiff testified that he had consumed 10 beers and 4 shots of tequila before embarking on his30-mile drive home. Plaintiff was arrested for and convicted of driving under the influence ofalcohol. His license was summarily suspended, and as required by statute, the Secretary revokedplaintiff's driver's license on October 3, 1991.

Prior to the March 1991 arrest, plaintiff was in the habit of drinking alcohol 2 to 3 times perweek. On each of those occasions plaintiff would drink between 1 and 15 beers. Sometimesplaintiff would substitute 1 to 5 shots of liquor for beer, consuming as many as 12 beers and 5shots in a night. After the March 1991 arrest, plaintiff's drinking increased to 3 to 4 times perweek and 6 to 15 beers per occasion with similar hard liquor consumption. Plaintiff testified thathe was an alcoholic by the age of 21.

Following the arrest, O'Neil completed 75 hours of outpatient counseling. He was designated alevel III dependant alcoholic. Unknown to his counselor, plaintiff continued to drink everyweekend during this period of counseling. After finishing the outpatient program, plaintiff'scounselor recommended weekly Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, monthly aftercaresessions and abstinence. Plaintiff has apparently remained abstinent since January 3, 1993. Hisabstinence is documented and corroborated by letters from family and friends. However, plaintiffhas failed to complete aftercare or become involved in AA. Plaintiff testified that he attended AAmeetings for two months but stopped because he felt uncomfortable. Plaintiff never tried anyother formal support group. Plaintiff also admitted that he was not too familiar with the AArecovery steps.

The hearing officer recommended denial of plaintiff's first application for reinstatement ofdriving privileges because plaintiff had failed to document completion of treatment adequate toaddress his alcohol problem. The Secretary adopted this recommendation by order dated May 10,1996.

Prior to the hearing on plaintiff's second application for reinstatement of driving privileges,plaintiff went to a new alcohol counselor for an updated evaluation. The new evaluator prepareda letter recommending waiver of any additional treatment. This recommendation was basedprimarily on plaintiff's four years of abstinence and the support he receives from his family. Theevaluator did not detail plaintiff's support program any further.

At the hearing on the second application, plaintiff testified that his support group consists of hiswife, his brother, his mother-in-law, and his stepmother. He provided letters from each. Plaintiff'stestimony and the letters indicate that plaintiff's support system consists of (1) engaging inathletic activities with his brother, who is also a recovering alcoholic; and (2) talking to hisfamily members when he has problems.

Plaintiff further testified that he feels the urge to drink on a monthly basis. He testified that asrecently as the Saturday before his second hearing he felt the urge to drink while he was bowlingwith his wife. Plaintiff stated that being in situations where he sees other people drinking sociallycan "trigger" his craving for alcohol.

Plaintiff is employed by W.E. O'Neil Construction company as a project manager. A letter fromhis employer presented at the hearing stated that plaintiff's present ability to perform hisemployment-related duties is significantly hampered by plaintiff's failure to have a valid driver'slicense. The letter further stated that plaintiff was awaiting transfer to the company's Arizonaoffices, but he could not be transferred unless he was granted driving privileges.

Plaintiff was also arrested in 1988 for driving under the influence of alcohol after being involvedin an automobile accident. A blood test revealed a BAC of 0.26, well above the legal limit.

The hearing officer recommended denial of plaintiff's second application, finding that plaintiffhad not established a sufficient ongoing support system to maintain continued abstinence and,therefore, had failed to carry his burden of proving that he would not endanger the public safetyand welfare. The Secretary adopted this recommendation by order dated July 18, 1997.

Plaintiff sought administrative review and the circuit court reversed. The circuit court ordered theSecretary to reinstate plaintiff's full driving privileges. The Secretary appeals. By order enteredJanuary 16, 1998, this court stayed the circuit court's order pending appeal.

The only issue in this case is whether the Secretary's determination that plaintiff had notestablished a sufficient ongoing support system to maintain continued abstinence was against themanifest weight of the evidence. The circuit court found that it was. We find that it was not.

Driving a motor vehicle on the public roads is a privilege, not a right. Grams v. Ryan, 263 Ill.App. 3d 390, 635 N.E.2d 1376 (1994). Once driving privileges have been revoked, theirrestoration is not automatic. 625 ILCS 5/6-208(b)(West 1996); Koeck v. Edgar, 180 Ill. App. 3d332, 535 N.E.2d 1019 (1989). To allow full restoration, the Secretary must determine thatgranting the plaintiff the privilege of driving a motor vehicle will not endanger the public safetyor welfare. Conklin v. Ryan, 242 Ill. App. 3d 32, 610 N.E.2d 751 (1993). The person seekingrestoration has the burden of establishing his entitlement to restored driving privileges by clearand convincing evidence. Koeck, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 337, 535 N.E.2d 1019; Caracci v. Edgar,160 Ill. App. 3d 892, 513 N.E.2d 932 (1987). The Secretary has considerable discretion indetermining whether driving privileges will be restored. Lamborn v. Edgar, 178 Ill. App. 3d 814,533 N.E.2d 1008 (1989).

To aid in exercising that discretion, the Secretary has promulgated regulations which set forth therequirements for reinstatement of driving privileges. 92 Ill. Adm. Code