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THIRD DIVISION

          JUSTICE KARNEZIS delivered the opinion of the court:

          This appeal arises from an order of the circuit court granting plaintiff TerrenceO'Donnell's motion for a permanent injunction enjoining defendants the City of Chicagoand City of Chicago officials Mayor Richard M. Daley, Superintendent of Police TerryHillard and Director of Revenue Hugh Murphy from enforcing sections 4-156-150, 4-156-190 and 4-156-280 of the City of Chicago's Municipal Code (Code) (ChicagoMunicipal Code §4-156-150 (amended July 25, 2001), §4-156-190 (amended April 1,1998), §4-156-280 (amended April 1, 1998)). Defendants argue that the court erred infinding the Code sections, which relate to automatic amusement devices used in illegalgambling, unconstitutional and invalid. We reverse.

Background

           On April 1, 1998, the City of Chicago enacted amendments to chapter 4-156 ofthe Code relating to the prevention of illegal gambling. Effective May 9, 1998,amended section 4-156-150 provided the following definition":

" 'Illegal amusement device' means an automatic amusement device[previously defined] that: includes a knock-off circuit; or allows more than 10replays or free games, or maintains a count of payoffs or the number of times aperson has won a game played on the device; or maintains a tally of players'scores other than the tally displayed to players; or fails to display in the requiredmanner a tax emblem required by chapter; or has been used for illegal gambling.'Illegal amusement device' does not include a device that properly displays arequired tax emblem, that is not used for illegal gambling and that qualifieseither as a crane game as defined in the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 or as aredemption machine as defined in the Illinois Criminal Code. An automaticamusement device shall not be deemed an illegal automatic amusement devicebecause of internal diagnostic devices or capabilities that are able to record andmaintain statistical data such as the number of coins or tokens deposited, thenumber of games played or the number of games won, if such diagnosticdevices or capabilities are intended and used exclusively for auditing of gameperformance." Chicago Municipal Code § 4-156-150 (amended April 1, 1998).

Amended section 4-156-190 provided for the seizure of an illegal amusement device asfollows:

"If the mayor, superintendent of police, or the director of revenue or theirduly authorized enforcement officer shall have a reasonable basis for believingany amusement device is an illegal amusement device, said device or any partor contents thereof may be seized by any duly authorized enforcement official,followed by an administrative hearing with notice to the owner within seven daysof such seizure for the purpose of reviewing the appropriateness of the seizure,and held until such time as the owner of such device pays the delinquent tax,reimburses the department of revenue for actual cartage cost incurred in theseizure and pays to the department of revenue $20.00 for each day or part ofday said device has been in storage. If criminal charges involving the use orcondition of the device are pending, the device shall be held until disposition ofthe criminal charges. If it is determined at the hearing by a preponderance of theevidence that the seized device is not an illegal amusement device, it shall bereturned to the owner without charge. If it is determined at the hearing that theautomatic amusement device was used for illegal gambling, it shall be destroyedby the city, and all money found within the device at the time of confiscation shallbecome the property of the city, and shall be used to defray the costs of cartage,notice, storage and hearings. If the owner of the device does not claim theautomatic amusement device within 14 days after the mailing of the notice, thedevice and its contents will be treated as abandoned property and the device willbe destroyed." Chicago Municipal Code § 4-156-190 (amended April 1, 1998).

          The City also amended sections 4-156-280 and 4-156-510, which provide forpenalties to be imposed if an automatic amusement device is used for illegal gambling. Chicago Municipal Code §§ 4-156-280, 4-156-510 (amended April 1, 1998).

          On May 8, 1998, plaintiff, an owner, lessor and operator of automaticamusement devices, filed a complaint against defendants, asserting, in salient part,that the amended ordinances are vague, ambiguous and overbroad and violate thefreedom of speech, equal protection and due process constitutional guarantees; theCity's "eminent domain" seizure and destruction of automatic amusement deviceswithout just compensation would constitute an unconstitutional taking of plaintiff'sproperty; in enacting the amendments, the City exceeded and violated its home rulepower for the aforementioned reasons; and plaintiff was entitled to a declaratoryjudgment that the amended ordinances were invalid, unconstitutional andunenforceable.

          Plaintiff simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and emergencymotion for a temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin defendants from enforcingany provisions of the amended ordinances while the case was pending. The same day,finding the contested sections of the Code "cannot be enforced as they are vague,ambiguous and overbroad," the court granted plaintiff's motion for a temporaryrestraining order enjoining defendants from enforcing the ordinances, as amended.

          On July 25, 2001, the Chicago city council again amended section 4-156-150. Effective September 1, 2001, the amendment added the following definitions to section4-156-150:

" 'Knock-off circuit' means any mechanical or electrical device, circuitry ormodification on an automatic amusement device, whereby free games shown onan externally visible indicator are released, while a record of games so releasedis maintained on a second indicator, meter or counter, either inside or outsidethe device. A reset button installed by the manufacturer of the automaticamusement device shall not, without more, constitute a knock-off circuit.

The phrase 'more than 10 replays or free games' means more than 10replays or free games at one time. 'Free game or replay' does not include anextension of a game awarded as a result of the player's skill, such as an extraball in a pinball game or extended playing time in a video game.

'Payoff' means the giving of money or other thing of value in exchange fora player's accumulated points or free games or replays.

The phrase 'a count of payoffs or the number of times a player has won agame played on the device' means a tally, whether on paper, mechanical orelectronic, and regardless of whether maintained inside, on or outside theautomatic amusement device. The phrase is not intended to include a record ofscores, accessible to players of the device, and linked to previous players'names, nicknames, initials or other identifiers, for purposes of comparison andcompetition.

The phrase 'tally of players' scores other than the tally displayed toplayers does not include a record of scores, accessible to players of the device,and linked to previous players' names, nicknames, initials or other identifiers, forpurposes of comparison and competition." Chicago Municipal Code § 4-156-150(amended July 25, 2001).

          In light of the amendment, defendants moved to dissolve the temporaryrestraining order and dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint, arguing that theamendments clarified the terms of the gambling ordinance and thus rendered plaintiff'sclaims moot. The court granted the motion to dissolve the restraining order but stayedthe dissolution until December 20, 2001. The court granted plaintiff leave to file asecond amended complaint and a new motion for a temporary retraining order andpreliminary injunction, which he did on December 17, 2001. Plaintiff's second amendedcomplaint made essentially the same arguments as his original complaint, includingthat the ordinances are facially overbroad, vague, ambiguous and unintelligible andgive enforcement officers unbridled discretion to determine which amusement deviceswere prohibited. The court granted plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order,again enjoining enforcement of the four amended sections of chapter 4-156 pendingresolution of the case. The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the complaintand the case went to trial.

          Following a full hearing, the court issued its order and opinion on October 20,2004, granting plaintiff's request for permanent injunctive relief. Although the courtfound no merit in plaintiff's estoppel argument, it did find sections "4-156-150, 4-156-190 and 4-156-[2]80 * * * unconstitutional, invalid and unenforceable" and permanentlyenjoined the city and its officials "from enforcing any provision" of those sections. OnNovember 1, 2004, pursuant to the parties' agreement, the court ordered that there wasno just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the matter. Defendants filed theirtimely notice of appeal on November 18, 2004.

          Defendants argue on appeal that the court erred in finding that (1) section 4-156-150's definition of "illegal amusement device" is internally inconsistent such that itrenders the term and the section unconstitutionally vague; (2) section 4-156-190'sprovision for seizure of such a device upon reasonable belief of a law enforcementofficer violates the Illinois Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable seizures; (3)section 4-156-190's provision for an administrative hearing without naming theadministrative body with jurisdiction over the hearing violates due process; and (4)section 4-156-190's provision providing that the owner of a seized device may retrievethe device without incurring cartage and storage costs if he can prove it is not an illegalamusement device violates due process because it places the burden of persuasionregarding the illegality of the device on the owner rather than the City of Chicago. Analysis

Standard of Review

          Generally, the standard of review of a court order issuing a permanent injunctionis manifest weight of the evidence. C.J. v. Department of Human Services, 331 Ill. App.3d 871,878, 771 N.E.2d 539, 547 (2002). However, the trial court's order grantingpermanent injunctive relief arose out of its declaration that sections 4-156-150, 4-156-190 and 4-156-280 are unconstitutional, out of its resolution of questions of law, notfact. Accordingly, the issue here is whether the contested ordinances areunconstitutional. We review this question of law de novo. C.J, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 879,771 N.E.2d at 547; People v. Arguello, 327 Ill. App. 3d 984, 986, 765 N.E.2d 98, 101(2002).

Section 4-156-150

          Pursuant to plaintiff's second amended complaint, the court held that sections 4-156-150, 4-156-190 and 4-156-280 are "unconstitutional, invalid and unenforceable"and issued a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing those sections. The court's holding was, in large part, a result of its finding that the definition of "illegalamusement device" in section 4-156-150 is "ambiguous, contradictory andirreconcilable," notwithstanding the later amendment further defining the terms ofsection 4-156-150. The court considered the section "extremely vague and extremelyambiguous" and "so contradictory that a reasonable person could not understand whatis and what is not illegal," and, thus, unconstitutional. Defendants argue on appeal thatthe court erred in this finding.

          A municipal ordinance is entitled to a presumption of validity and, as the partychallenging the ordinances at issue here, plaintiff has the burden of showing theirinvalidity. City of Aurora v. Navar, 210 Ill. App. 3d 126, 132, 568 N.E.2d 978, 982(1991). In order to overcome the presumption of validity, " 'it must be established byclear and convincing evidence that the ordinance, as applied to [the challenging party],is arbitrary and unreasonable and has no substantial relation to the public health,safety or welfare.' " City of Evanston v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 40, 66, 349N.E.2d 399, 412 (1976), quoting Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. County ofCook, 25 Ill. 2d 434, 440, 185 N.E.2d 250, 253 (1962). However, plaintiff does not limithis challenge to the ordinance's application to his own circumstances. Rather, heargues, as he did below, that section 4-156-150 is unconstitutionally vague on its face.

          "The right to challenge a statute as being vague on its face where the statuteclearly applies to the conduct of the party making the challenge does not exist unlessfirst amendment concerns are involved." People v. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d 379, 386, 537N.E.2d 751, 754 (1989). Unless section 4-156-150 implicates first amendment rights,plaintiff may not, as he did here, challenge the ordinance as vague on its face. Jihan,127 Ill. 2d at 386, 537 N.E.2d at 754. If section 4-156-150 does not implicate firstamendment rights, plaintiff can only argue that the ordinance is vague as applied tohimself, as applied to conduct for which he is being targeted. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d at 385-86, 537 N.E.2d at 754. We can then only examine the ordinance in light of the facts ofthe case at hand, facts that are few given that plaintiff's claim was a preemptivechallenge to the validity of the ordinance on its face rather than a reactive one specificto his circumstances. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d at 385, 537 N.E.2d at 754. As defendantscorrectly point out, the trial court did not address plaintiff's argument that firstamendment rights were implicated by the ordinances. However, we must address thisissue because, before we can consider whether section 4-156-140 is vague on its face,we must first determine whether it implicates first amendment rights such that plaintiffhas standing to file this type of vagueness challenge.

          As with political speech, entertainment can enjoy first amendment protections. Serpico v. Village of Elmwood Park, 344 Ill. App. 3d 203, 210, 799 N.E.2d 961, 967(2003). In order to be accorded such protected status, the entertainment mustcommunicate some element of information or some idea. Serpico, 344 Ill. App. 3d at210, 799 N.E.2d at 967. Simplistic games, such as bingo, pinball, black jack and slotmachines, where the interaction and communication involved is " 'singularly infurtherance of the game' " and " 'totally divorced from a purpose of expressing ideas,impressions, feelings, or information unrelated to the game itself,' " do not constituteprotected speech under the first amendment. Serpico, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 211, 799N.E.2d at 968, quoting Allendale Leasing Inc. v. Stone, 614 F. Supp. 1440, 1454 (D.R.I. 1985). However, automatic amusement games involving "complex plots, theadvancement to different levels, character development, and a 'visual and auditorymilieu in which [a] story line is played out' " have been accorded first amendment freespeech protection. Serpico, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 212, 799 N.E.2d at 968-69, quotingWilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 181 (D. Conn. 2002). It isirrefutable that section 4-156-150's definition of illegal amusement device covers abroad range of automatic amusement devices, some of which could possess protectedfree speech characteristics. Arguably, therefore, since imposing restrictions on thosedevices would implicate first amendment rights, plaintiff could properly challengesection 4-156-150 as vague on its face.

          Due process is violated when "a law is so vague and devoid of standards as toleave the public unsure of what is and is not prohibited [citation] or if it fails to supplyadequate guidelines to the administrative body which must enforce it." City of Aurora,210 Ill. App. 3d at 132, 568 N.E.2d at 982. An ordinance's language "must conveysufficiently definite warning and fair notice of what conduct is proscribed, and whethernotice is adequate is measured by common understanding and practices." City ofAurora, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 133, 568 N.E.2d at 983. An ordinance is unconstitutional if itis "so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at itsmeaning." Waterfront Estates Development, Inc. v. City of Palos Hills, 232 Ill. App. 3d367, 376-77, 597 N.E.2d 641, 649 (1992).

          Plaintiff argued below, and the trial court agreed, that the definition of illegalamusement device in section 4-156-150 is so contradictory as to make itunconstitutionally vague. Section 4-156-190 clearly sets out the parameters of whatmechanisms and characteristics make an automatic amusement device presumptivelyillegal and further defines the terms used to describe those mechanisms andcharacteristics. It also clearly delineates the situations in which the presumption doesnot apply. Provision for these exceptions does not, as the trial court found, makesection 4-156-150 internally inconsistent. It is entirely clear. For example, if anautomatic amusement device includes a prohibited element, such as a "knock-offcircuit" releasing and keeping track of games released or a "tally of players' scores" notvisible to the player, then it is an illegal amusement device. Only if such a prohibitedinternal diagnostic device or capability is intended and used exclusively for auditinggame performance will the amusement device not be deemed illegal. There is noinconsistency in the definition of an illegal amusement device.

          Moreover, plaintiff appears to have abandoned his inconsistency argument. Onappeal, he limits his argument that the ordinance is vague to assertions that variousterms and phrases are not properly defined, are unclear and/or ambiguous. His maincontention is that the term "knock-off circuit" is not properly defined such that a personof reasonable knowledge could determine whether a particular amusement device isillegal under section 4-156-150. Plaintiff essentially argues that there are manydifferent definitions or interpretations of the term possible, leading to the conclusionthat the term is unclear. It is irrelevant that there may be different definitions of "knock-off circuit" elsewhere or that opinions may vary about what a "knock-off circuit" is. Theterm is specifically defined in section 4-156-150 in order to eliminate just suchdifferences of opinion. That description does not conflict with any other term ordefinition in the ordinance and is the definition selected by the city council as bestreflecting its aims in passing the amendment. Accordingly, it is the only definition thatmatters in enforcing the ordinance. It is more than definite enough to let the public andenforcement officials know what the city council considers a "knock-off circuit." Asplaintiff's counsel acknowledged during oral argument before this court, he could notsuggest a definition of "knock-off circuit" that would make the term any clearer.

          Plaintiff similarly argues that the phrases "replay," "free games," "pay off,""internal diagnostics," "statistical data," "reset button" and "tally of players' scores" aresubject to a wide variety of interpretations such that an average person is incapable ofdetermining whether a particular device is illegal. He does not, however, suggestalternate interpretations of these phrases to illustrate his point. Moreover, where aterm is not defined, it is given its "ordinary and popularly understood" meaning. Peoplev. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 349, 747 N.E.2d 339, 347 (2001). Unlike "knock-offcircuit," which arguably has no commonly understood meaning and was therefore fullydefined in the ordinance, none of the contested phrases are particularly complex,difficult to understand or open to much interpretation. In addition, section 4-156-150further defines or limits the application of the few phrases that might be open tointerpretation, such as "payoff" or "free game or replay." Applying the most obviousmeanings and taking into account the definitions and limitations stated in theordinance, we do not find these phrases so indefinite that a reasonable person couldnot determine whether a particular device is illegal.

          In the same vein, plaintiff argues that contradictory trial testimony regarding theinterpretation of various portions of section 4-156-150 illustrates the vagueness of theordinance. "Condemned to the use of words, we cannot expect mathematical certaintyfrom our language." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222,228-29, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2300 (1972). Clearly no ordinance can be drafted to cover oreliminate any and all possible scenarios or interpretations that might developthereunder. There will always be differences of opinion. But it is not the case thatsection 4-156-150 is so indefinite that it does not provide adequate guidance to thepublic and to enforcement officials as to what makes an automatic amusement deviceillegal. We find the provisions of section 4-156-150 are sufficiently definite to afford anindividual of normal intelligence adequate notice of what constitutes an illegalamusement device. Section 4-145-150 is not unconstitutionally vague.

Section 4-156-190

          The court found section 4-156-190 unconstitutional because (a) allowing seizureof an amusement device based solely on the reasonable belief of the enforcementofficer that the device was illegal constitutes seizure of property without due process;(b) failing to list the administrative body with jurisdiction over the hearing denied dueprocess; and (c) putting the burden of proof on the owner of the amusement device toprove that the device is not illegal denies due process. Defendants assert that thecourt erred in these determinations.

          Given our conclusion that section 4-156-150 is not unconstitutionally vague, wedo not find, as plaintiff posits, that section 4-156-150 so poorly defines thecharacteristics of an illegal amusement device that the discretion accorded theenforcement officers by section 4-156-190 will be applied unequally, in violation of theequal protection. Equal protection guarantees that "similarly situated individuals will betreated similarly, unless the government demonstrates an appropriate reason to dootherwise." City of Urbana v. Andrew N.B., 211 Ill. 2d 456, 466, 813 N.E.2d 132, 138(2004). Here, section 4-156-150 provides more than adequate information from whichan officer can determine whether a device is illegal and this determination will not, asplaintiff argues, be dependent on an individual officer's "hunches and perceptions" andbe applied unequally.

          Further, section 4-156-190's provision for seizure of an amusement device by anenforcement officer if he has a reasonable basis for believing it to be illegal is not adenial of due process. First, provision for seizure on an officer's "reasonable basis"belief comports with the Illinois and United States Constitutions' prohibitions against"unreasonable" seizures. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6; U.S. Const. amend. IV. A seizureis "reasonable" if, at the time an item is seized, the seizing officer has a reasonablebelief, based on the facts and circumstances known to him, that the item constitutesevidence of criminal activity. People v. Alexander, 272 Ill. App. 3d 698, 705, 650N.E.2d 1038, 1045 (1995). Plaintiff would have enforcement officers seize suspectedillegal amusement devices only when they observe a payoff. But just because there isno payoff does not mean that there is no illegal gambling occurring. More often thannot, a player will gamble on a device but will lose the game. There is no payoff unlessa player wins. If players won consistently, there would be no incentive for bar ownersto have gaming machines on their premises.

          Second, such seizure does not constitute unconstitutional seizure without notice. Courts have repeatedly held that gambling devices are not lawful subjects of propertyprotected by law. City of Chicago v. Sayer, 330 Ill. App. 181, 186, 70 N.E.2d 870,873(1946). " 'The legislature have [sic] determined that gambling implements andapparatus are pernicious and dangerous to the public welfare, and the keeping of themis an offense prohibited by law. They are, therefore, not lawful subjects of propertywhich the law protects, but have ceased to be regarded or treated as property, and areliable to seizure, forfeiture and destruction without violating any constitutional provision.'" (Emphasis added.) City of Chicago, 330 Ill. App. at 186-187, 70 N.E.2d at 873,quoting Frost v. People, 193 Ill. 635, 640-41, 61 N.E. 1054, 1056 (1901). It is " 'wellsettled that things which are capable of no use for lawful purposes . . . are not thesubject of property. * * * If an instrument can have no lawful use, it must be presumed,in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that an illegal use is intended. [Citation.] Its very existence is an imminent danger to the social welfare. [Citation]; and it may beseized under statutory authority, or even under general police regulations.' " City ofChicago, 330 Ill. App. at 187, 70 N.E.2d at 873, quoting Stanley-Thompson Liquor Co.v. People, 63 Colo. 456, 458-59, 168 P. 750, 751 (1917).

          Lastly, it is not the case that the City can, without more, confiscate and destroy asuspected illegal amusement device at will. Any seizure is merely temporary, pendingadministrative review of the seizure. The ordinance provides for notice of theadministrative hearing to the owner within seven days of seizure. Unless theowner/operator of the device does not claim the device within the 14-day periodspecified in the ordinance or cannot show that it was improperly seized or, if theseizure is determined to be reasonable, that the device is not an illegal amusementdevice, it will be returned to its owner without charge. Granted, once reasonablenessof the seizure has been shown, the burden is on the owner to show, by apreponderance of the evidence, that the device is not an illegal amusement device. However, placing the burden of persuasion on the owner is not a violation of dueprocess. " 'If an instrument can have no lawful use, it must be presumed, in theabsence of evidence to the contrary, that an illegal use is intended.' " (Emphasisadded.) City of Chicago, 330 Ill. App. at 187, 70 N.E.2d at 873, quoting Stanley-Thompson Liquor Co., 63 Colo. at 459, 168 P. at 751.

          Section 4-156-150 does not specify the administrative body that will conduct theadministrative hearing. However, section 2-14-190(a) of the Code provides that, withcertain exceptions, chapter 4-156 not among them, the City's Department ofAdministrative Hearings will provide the "administrative adjudication for theenforcement of all provisions of the Municipal Code." Chicago Municipal Code § 2-14-190(a) (amended April 29, 1998). Accordingly, the Department of AdministrativeHearings will conduct any hearing regarding the seizure of illegal amusement devices.

Section 4-156-280

          Although the court held that section 4-156-280 was unconstitutional andunenforceable, its order does not contain an analysis of why this is the case. However,since section 4-156-280 sets the fines to which a person is subject if he violates anyprovisions in chapter 4-156 of the Code (Chicago Municipal Code § 4-156-280(amended April 1, 1998)), presumably the court found section 4-156-280"unconstitutional" and unenforceable solely as a result of its finding that sections 4-156-150 and 4-156-190 were unconstitutional and unenforceable. Plaintiff makes noargument regarding the constitutionality of section 1-156-280 standing alone. Givenour finding that sections 4-156-150 and 4-156-190 are constitutional and enforceable,we find that the court erred in declaring section 4-156-280 unconstitutional andunenforceable and in enjoining defendants from enforcing this section.

Free Speech Implications

          It should be noted that "standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strictin the area of free expression." National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored Peoplev. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405, 417, 83 S. Ct. 328, 337 (1963). "Theobjectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon absence offair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislativepowers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms,the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application." National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, 371 U.S. at 432-33, 9 L. Ed. at418, 83 S. Ct. at 338. However, " '[t]he government may impose reasonablerestrictions on the time, place and manner of protected speech, provided therestrictions are "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, thatthey are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and that theyleave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." ' "Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1991), quoting Ward v. Rockagainst Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 674, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753(1989), quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 82L. Ed 2d 221, 227, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3069 (1984).

          "A valid time, place and manner regulation * * * must be content-neutral." People v. Jones, 188 Ill. 2d 352, 356, 721 N.E.2d 546, 549 (1999). "Governmentregulation of expressive activity is content-neutral so long as it is justified withoutreference to the content of regulated speech." Rothner, 929 F.2d at 303. Whether anordinance is content-neutral is a matter of legislative intent. XLP Corp. v. County ofLake, 359 Ill. App. 3d 239, 246, 832 N.E.2d 480, 487 (2005), citing City of Renton v.Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47, 89 L.Ed. 2d 29, 37-38, 106 S.Ct. 925, 929(1986). When ascertaining the goals of the legislative body, we may take the preambleto a contested ordinance into account. David E. Shelton Productions, Inc. v. City ofChicago, 167 Ill. App. 3d 54, 57, 520 N.E.2d 1073, 1075 (1988).

          The preamble to the April 1, 1998, ordinance amending the Code sections atissue here states that the city council enacted the amendments because "someamusements authorized within the City of Chicago have been diverted from lawfulactivity to illegal gambling" and "remedies currently available to deal with the problemof such illegal gambling are insufficient to protect the citizens of Chicago from the evilsassociated with illegal gambling." Chicago Municipal Code ch. 4-156, Preamble(amended April 1, 1998). The preamble shows that the City Council's intent inrestricting the illegal amusement devices was not related to any informational content inthose devices.

          Moreover, section 4-156-150's definition of an illegal amusement device isbased solely on whether an automatic amusement device possesses certainmechanical and/or statistical characteristics, not on the plot, character, story line orinformational content of the device. The purpose of section 4-156-150 and thedefinitions and restrictions therein are clearly unrelated to the content of any speech. Similarly, the provisions for seizure of illegal amusement devices and penalties forpossession of such devices set forth in sections 4-156-190 and 4-156-280 areunrelated to the content of any speech. Accordingly, the contested ordinances arecontent-neutral. Rothner, 929 F.2d at 303.

          A content-neutral time, place and manner restriction on constitutionally protectedspeech is subject to an " 'intermediate level of scrutiny.' " Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 357, 721N.E.2d at 550, quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal CommunicationsComm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 662, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497, 530, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2469 (1994). Tobe constitutional, a content-neutral regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve asignificant government interest and leave open ample alternative channels forcommunication of the restricted information. Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 357, 721 N.E.2d at550, citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 675, 109 S. Ct. at 2753.

          There is no question that "the protection of its citizens from the problemsassociated with illegal gambling" (Chicago Municipal Code ch. 4-156, Preamble(amended April 1, 1998)) constitutes a " 'substantial' governmental interest." Posadasde Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341, 92 L. Ed.266, 281, 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2977 (1986). Indeed, "gambling is an activity which is'subject to regulation or to complete prohibition.' " Phillips v. Graham, 86 Ill. 2d 274,286, 427 N.E.2d 550, 555 (1981), quoting Finish Line Express, Inc. v. City of Chicago,72 Ill. 2d 131, 138, 379 N.E.2d 290 (1978). The ordinances were intended to addressthe problems associated with the diversion of automatic amusement games from lawfulactivity to illegal gambling. To that end, section 4-156-150 identifies the characteristicsof an illegal gambling device and defines those characteristics narrowly, even providinga few exceptions to and limitations on the general definition in order to prevent anoverbroad application. The ordinances are precisely tailored to curtail the possessionof only those devices possessing these characteristics, characteristics identified by theCity Council as providing the most telling indicators of use of a device for illegalgambling, and then only if used for illegal gambling. Should a device possess thesalient "illegal" characteristics but not be used for illegal gambling, the ordinanceprovides for a hearing upon seizure of any suspected illegal amusement device andlawful use of the machine can be shown at that time. We find the ordinances arenarrowly tailored to serve the significant government interest in protecting citizens fromthe evils associated with illegal gambling.

          Lastly, any free speech information implicated by the ordinance can becommunicated in a myriad of other ways. The players of these devices are free to playany device, automatic or otherwise, expressing the identical informational or storycontent, as long as the device does not contain the prohibited mechanical or statisticalcharacteristics identifying it as a gambling device. These characteristics are entirelyunrelated to the plot, character, story line and informational content of the device. Theyare nothing more than tools used by the owners and operators of the devices to trackmoney made and lost on the machines, unrelated to the expression of a player's ideasand feelings, to the character development of a game or the mileau in which the gameis played out. If a player is truly not gambling on an amusement device, he has nointerest in these mechanisms and can find a machine to play that does not containthem. Accordingly, because the restrictions in the contested ordinances are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave opena myriad of other channels for communication of the information contained in toamusement devices, the restrictions are reasonable and the ordinances are alegitimate restriction on protected first amendment expression.

          For the reasons stated above, we find plaintiff has not met his burden ofrebutting the presumption that sections 4-156-150, 4-156-190 and 4-156-280 areconstitutional and reverse the decision of the trial court permanently enjoiningdefendants from enforcing these Code section.

          Reversed.

          HOFFMAN, P.J., and ERICKSON, J., concur.