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"Do dishes. Do laundry. I don't do much in the way of the yard work any more. Too much bending over. And I try todo as much as I can within my current parameters."

He also stated that he does very little lifting although he can carry two sacks of groceries of equal weight of 15 to 20 poundseach.

On May 15, 1996, the Board voted to deny Nowak's duty disability application. No findings of fact were adopted by theBoard.

DISCUSSION

One of the relevant issues raised by the parties, and an issue of first impression, is whether section 6-153 of the Coderequires that the Board receive proof of a claimant's disability from at least one Board-appointed physician prior to grantinga disability benefit.

Section 6-151 of the Code provides that an active firefighter (including paramedics) who becomes disabled "as the result ofa specific injury *** incurred in or resulting from an act or acts of duty, shall have the right to receive duty disabilitybenefit." 40 ILCS 5/6-151 (West 1992). Section 6-153 of the Code provides that "[p]roof of duty *** disability shall befurnished to the Board by at least one licensed and practicing physician appointed by the Board." 40 ILCS 5/6-153 (West1992). The circuit court determined, in part, that, because no Board-appointed physician found Nowak disabled, he is notentitled to duty disability benefits.

Nowak first argues that he cannot be denied benefits based on section 6-153 because the Board did not raise that argumentat the administrative level and, therefore, the argument is waived. In response, the Board contends that it was incumbentupon Nowak to comply with section 6-153 to meet his burden of proof, and his failure to do so resulted in the Board'sdenial of duty disability benefits. In addition, the Board points out that it did raise Nowak's failure to comply with section 6-153 in its brief on administrative review. The Board asserts that Nowak failed to (i) respond or object to the argument in hisreply; (ii) orally argue the matter before Judge Green; or (iii) raise the issue of waiver at any time. Thus, the Board contendsit is Nowak who has waived his right to object and cites Wilfert v. Retirement Board of Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund,263 Ill. App. 3d 539 (1994), in support.

Before reaching the parties' substantive arguments regarding the interpretation and application of section 6-153, we firstaddress the waiver issue. Based on our holding in Wilfert, we agree with the Board and find Nowak waived his right toobject. In Wilfert, a plaintiff sought duty disability benefits and listed only one injury in his application. Wilfert, 263 Ill.App. 3d at 546. The plaintiff argued an additional, different injury before the circuit court. On appeal, the Board argued thatit was not required to consider the additional injury because the plaintiff did not list the injury in his application and,therefore, the injury was waived. Wilfert, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 546. The Board did not, however, make that argument in thecircuit court. We held that the Board should have presented its waiver argument before the circuit court when plaintiff firstraised the issue of the additional injury. Because the Board failed to object to the issue at that time, we concluded that theBoard's objection was waived on appeal. Wilfert, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 546. We hold similarly here. Because Nowak did notobject to the application of section 6-153 before the circuit court, he has waived any objection before this court.

We now address the interpretation and application of section 6-153. No cases to date have interpreted the language ofsection 6-153 of the Code. While the Board argues for a literal interpre-tation, Nowak asserts that the Board has not appliedsection 6-153 literally in the past. Nowak argues that the Board has interpreted section 6-153 to mean only that an applicantmust be examined by the Board's physician, not that an applicant must be found disabled by the Board's physician.

"It is well settled that the rules of statutory construction require a court to determine and follow the intent of the legislatureusing the language of the statute as the most reliable indicator of the legislature's intent. [Citation.] Whether a statutoryprovision is mandatory or merely directory depends upon the intent of its drafters. [Citation.]" Hoffman EstatesProfessional Firefighters Ass'n v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 305 Ill. App. 3d 242, 250 (1999). Courts have longrecognized that the legislature's "use of the word 'shall' is generally considered to express a mandatory reading." HoffmanEstates, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 253. Section 6-153 provides that "[p]roof of duty *** disability shall be furnished to the Boardby at least one licensed and practicing physician appointed by the Board." (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/6-153 (West1992). Thus, we find that the plain language of section 6-153 mandates that, before granting a disability benefit, the Boardmust receive proof of the claimant's disability from at least one physician appointed by the Board.

We reject Nowak's assertion that such a reading would make the Board-appointed doctor the trier of fact. The Board wouldnot be bound to find a claimant disabled simply because the Board-appointed doctor so found. The Board would still berequired to review all of the evidence presented.

Because Nowak failed to meet the requirement of section 6-153, the Board's decision denying him duty disability benefitsmust be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we hereby affirm the circuit court's order affirming the Board's denial of Nowak'sapplication for duty disability benefits.

Affirmed.

Zwick, P.J., and Campbell, J., concur.

Buckley, J., specially concurring.

JUSTICE BUCKLEY, specially concurring:

As my opinion makes relevant, this court's hands are tied by the application of section 6-153 of the Code, and we mustaffirm the Board's denial of Nowak's application for duty disability benefits. Nevertheless, I feel constrained to comment onthe sufficiency of the evidence presented in this case. Before doing so, however, let me point out that I am not the firstauthor of an opinion to write a separate special concurrence. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196, 3 L. Ed.2d 729, 735, 79 S. Ct. 666, 671 (1959) (where Justice Brennan concurred with his own opinion); Morizzo v. Laverdure, 127Ill. App. 3d 767, 775 (1984) (where Justice Downing concurred with his own opinion).

This court's function on administrative review is to ascertain whether the findings and decisions of the administrativeagency are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998). A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence when an opposite conclusion is clearlyevident. See City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 204.

In my opinion, the overwhelming evidence in this case leads to only one conclusion, that Nowak is unable to perform thejob of a paramedic. After treating Nowak over a period of nine months, Dr. Cerullo, Nowak's primary treating physician,determined that Nowak was not physically capable of returning to his position as a paramedic. The functional capacityevaluation report indicated Nowak "cannot currently perform at the physical demand level necessary for his previousposition of paramedic with the Chicago Fire Department due to his inability to perform at the Very Heavy Physical DemandLevel." This is an objective report whose validity was not challenged by any of the medical doctors. Dr. Shermer concludedthat "[t]he requirements of duty as a paramedic would clearly preclude this patient from performing in such duties in viewof the findings noted within the records and the assessments noted, as well as the MRI studies noted." Although Dr. Wetzeldeclined to give an opinion regarding Nowak's disability status, he did, however, acknowledge the relevance of thefunctional capacity evaluation and stated that the results appeared to be reasonable.

Moreover, the testimony of Dr. Motto does not support a conclusion that Nowak was not disabled. Although Dr. Mottofound objective fault with the WIN report because he could not reconcile Nowak's subjective complaints with the objectivefindings of the report, the record shows that Dr. Motto misstated Nowak's testimony regarding the subjective complaints. Inaddition, contrary to the Board's assertion, Dr. Feely never unconditionally returned Nowak to work. In both his January 13,1995, "Lay Up Certification" form and his January 27, 1995, report to Dr. Russell, Dr. Feely recommended that a "lift test"or a "work fitness examination" be performed to determine Nowak's lifting capacity prior to being returned to "100% fullactive duty."

Dr. Ryan is the only doctor who unequivocally testified that Nowak is not disabled. However, as Nowak points out, Dr.Ryan did not take into consideration the findings of the WIN report; thus, he lacked the information required to objectivelyevaluate whether Nowak could return to work as a paramedic.

In sum, I firmly believe that the decision of the Board is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Nevertheless, as statedin the majority opinion, we must affirm.