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SIXTH DIVISION
February 2, 2001

This is an appeal from the trial court's order dismissing plaintiff's complaintwith prejudice. Two issues are raised: (1) whether, at the time of the instantcontroversy, car rental companies were permitted to sell automobile insurancewithout a license; and (2) if car rental companies were not so required, whetherplaintiff sufficiently stated a claim for relief.

I. BACKGROUND

In November 1998, plaintiff Gary Newland filed an amended complaint against BudgetRent-A-Car Corporation and its related entities. According to the amendedcomplaint, in October 1997, plaintiff rented a car from Bargain (a Budgetlicensee). As part of the rental contract, plaintiff purchased a supplemental"personal accident and cargo insurance" (PACI) policy.

The amended complaint does not allege that plaintiff was involved in any sort ofaccident or that he attempted to make a claim pursuant to the PACI policy. Nordoes it allege that defendants misrepresented the scope of the PACI policy'scoverage.

The central theory to plaintiff's complaint is that defendants were not licensedto sell insurance, as required under section 492.2 of the Illinois Insurance Code(215 ILCS 5/492.2 (West 1998)). Relying on this contention, plaintiff pled twocounts. Count I alleged that defendants' misconduct resulted in unjustenrichment. Specifically, plaintiff contended that defendants illegally sold PACIand the profits therefrom (i.e., the money defendants collected exceeded the cost ofsuch insurance) constituted unjust enrichment. Count I requested that the trialcourt deem plaintiff entitled to a return of the PACI premium. Plaintiff basedcount II of the amended complaint under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and DeceptiveBusiness Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Count II alleged that defendants engaged in deceptive business practices byselling insurance without a license. Count II further alleged that such insurancewas "of minimal value" and "duplicative of insurance commonly held by renters." Count II's prayer for relief sought damages and injunctive relief.

Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that it failed to statea cause of action. Defendants argued, inter alia, that section 492.2 of the InsuranceCode did not apply and, in the alternative, that plaintiff failed to state a claimunder unjust enrichment and Consumer Fraud Act theories. In March 1999, the trialcourt granted defendants' motion, concluding that section 492.2 did not apply. The court allowed plaintiff 28 days to refile. However, plaintiff elected tostand on his amended complaint. In May 1999, the trial court dismissedplaintiff's case with prejudice pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)).

Plaintiff now appeals, arguing that (1) car rental companies, at the time of thecontroversy, were required to obtain a license in order to sell supplemental autoinsurance; and (2) he sufficiently stated causes of action under an unjustenrichment theory and under the Consumer Fraud Act.

II. ANALYSIS

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code ofCivil Procedure, we interpret all well-pled allegations and supporting documentsin the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. In re Chicago FloodLitigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 189 (1997). Only where the plaintiffs fail to allegefacts supporting a cause of action should the court grant the motion to dismiss. In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 189. Our review of the trialcourt's determination of a motion to dismiss is de novo. In re Chicago FloodLitigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 189.

A. Whether Car Rental Companies Need Be Licensed 

We first address plaintiff's argument that section 492.2 of the Insurance Code(215 ILCS 5/492.2 (West 1998)) requires a car rental company to hold a license tosell supplemental rental insurance.⁽¹⁾ Defendants disagree and contend thatsection 305(f) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-305(f) (West 1998))precludes such a finding.

The principal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect tothe legislature's intent. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Centerof Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (1994). To determine the legislature'sintent, courts first look to the statute's language. Zekman v. Direct AmericanMarketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 368-69 (1998). Courts accord the statute'slanguage a plain and commonly understood meaning. R.L. Polk & Co. v. Ryan, 296Ill. App. 3d 132, 140 (1998). If possible, courts must give effect to everyword, clause, and sentence and may not read a statute so as to render any partinoperative, superfluous, or insignificant. Bauer v. H.H. Hall Construction Co.,140 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1028 (1986). Courts must not depart from a statute's plainlanguage by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislaturedid not express. (See Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990)). Statutes should be evaluated as a whole and each provision should be construed inconnection with every other section. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. IllinoisCommerce Comm'n, 165 Ill. App. 3d 235, 247 (1987). When an apparent conflictexists between statutes, courts must construe statutes in harmony if possible. Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n, 139 Ill. 2d 24, 52 (1990).

We find that the clear language of section 492.2 of the Insurance Code suggeststhat plaintiff is correct. Section 492.2 reads as follows:

"(a) No person shall act as or hold himself out to be an insurance producer unlessduly licensed in accordance with this Article for the class or classes ofinsurance as to which he acts or holds himself out as an insurance producer.

(b) No person shall, for a fee, engage in the business of offering any advice,counsel, opinion or service with respect to the benefits, advantages ordisadvantages under any policy of insurance that could be issued in Illinois,unless that person is

(1) engaged or employed as an attorney licensed to practice law and performingduties incidental to that position;

(2) a licensed insurance producer, limi-ted insurance representative or temporaryinsurance producer offering advice concerning a class of insurance as to which heis licensed to transact business;

(3) a trust officer of a bank performing duties incidental to his position;

(4) an actuary or a certified public accountant engaged or employed in aconsulting capacity, performing duties incidental to that position; or

(5) a licensed public adjuster acting within the scope of his license.

(c) In addition to any other penalty set forth in this Article, any individualviolat-ing paragraph (a) or (b) is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. Anyindividual violating paragraph (a) or (b) and misappropriating or converting anymonies collected in conjunction with such violation is guilty of a Class 4felony." (Emphasis added.) 215 ILCS 5/492.2 (West Supp. 1999).

Examining section 492.2's clear language, we find no indication that thelegislature intended to exempt car rental companies from the licensingrequirement. To the contrary, section 492.2 uses broad, sweeping languagerestricting the sale of insurance. Further, the legislature articulated severalexemptions to the licensing requirement in section 510.2 of the Insurance Code(215 ILCS 5/510.2 (West 1998)). Car rental companies are not listed among thoseentities, further suggesting that they are not exempt. See Baker v. Miller, 159Ill. 2d 249, 260 (1994); Business Service Bureau, Inc. v. Martin, 306 Ill. App. 3d907, 910 (1999) (noting the statutory construction maxim inclusio unius estexclusio alterius, i.e., the enumeration of specific things in a statute implies theexclusion of others).

Nevertheless, defendants argues that section 6-305(f) of the Vehicle Code exemptscar rental companies. Section 6-305(f) provides:

"Any person who rents a motor vehicle to another shall only advertise, quote, andcharge a rental rate that includes the entire amount except taxes and a mileagecharge, if any, which a renter must pay to hire or lease the vehicle for theperiod of time to which the rental rate applies. Such person shall not charge inaddition to the rental rate, taxes, and mileage charge, if any, any fee which mustbe paid by the renter as a condition of hiring or leasing the vehicle, such as,but not limited to, required fuel or airport surcharges, nor any fee fortransporting the renter to the location where the rented vehicle will be deliveredto the renter. In addition to the rental rate, taxes, and mileage charge, if any,such person may charge for an item or service provided in connection with aparticular rental transaction if the renter can avoid incurring the charge bychoosing not to obtain or utilize the optional item or service. Items andservices for which such person may impose an additional charge include, but arenot limited to, optional insurance and accessories requested by the renter,service charges incident to the renter's optional return of the vehicle to alocation other than the location where the vehicle was hired or leased, andcharges for refueling the vehicle at the conclusion of the rental transaction inthe event the renter did not return the vehicle with as much fuel as was in thefuel tank at the beginning of the rental." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/6-305(f)(West 1998).

Defendants argue that section 6-305(f)'s above-emphasized language is morespecific than that contained in section 492.2 of the Insurance Code and,therefore, exempts car rental companies from the licensing requirement. We rejectthis argument.

First, we note that section 6-305(f) of the Vehicle Code does not specificallystate that car rental companies are exempt from licensing. The text of section 6-305(f) merely lists items for which car rental companies can and cannot chargetheir customers. That section 6-305(f) permits car rental companies to chargetheir customers a fee in order to recover costs for a service does not necessarilymean that they need not first obtain a license to provide the service. We declineto make such a finding. See Kraft, 138 Ill. 2d at 189 (holding that courts mustnot depart from a statute's plain language by reading into it exceptions,limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express).

That section 6-305(f) allows car rental companies to charge for certain servicesdoes not necessarily mean that they can provide such services with unbridledautonomy. Rather, they must still comply with other relevant statutes. Forexample, section 6-305(f) also allows car rental companies to charge customerswhen the company must transport a car from one location to another. However, itdoes not follow that the person transporting the car need not possess a driver'slicense. Section 6-305(f) also allows car rental companies to charge customersfor refueling costs. However, it does not follow that the car rental company canrun its own gas station without proper licensing, permits, supervision by theIllinois Department of Agriculture, and appropriate weights and measuresguidelines.

Defendants correctly note that specific statutory provisions usually prevail overgeneral provisions. See Brown v. Mason, 132 Ill. App. 3d 439, 441 (1985). However, courts only resort to this device when the two provisions conflict. SeeBrown, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 441. We find that section 6-305(f) of the Vehicle Codeand section 492.2 of the Insurance Code can be construed harmoniously and noconflict exists.

B. Whether the Amended Complaint Stated a Cause of Action

Defendants also based their motion to dismiss on the theory that the amendedcomplaint fails to state a claim under an unjust enrichment theory and under theConsumer Fraud Act. We too have some difficulty with plaintiff's assertion thathe sustained recoverable damage as a result of defendants' misinterpretation ofthe Vehicle Code. However, the record indicates that, in granting the motion todismiss, the trial court relied solely upon its finding that the Insurance Codedid not apply. We, therefore, find it preferable to limit our holding to thatissue and remand for further proceedings consistent with this order.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand.

Reversed and remanded.

Campbell, P.J., and Gallagher, J., concur.

1. Subsequent to the trial court's decision in this case, the legislature enacted anew section to the Insurance Code that specifically requires car rental companiesto obtain a limited license to sell insurance. 215 ILCS 5/495.2 (West Supp.2000).