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No. 1-02-3615

JUSTICE REID delivered the opinion of the court:

The trial court granted the defendants, James Collins,Chicago Youth Center (CYC), Chicago Board of Education (theBoard) and Sports Supply Group (SSG)⁽¹⁾, summary judgment. Onappeal, the plaintiffs, Ryan Murray and Joyce Mayers, argue that:(1) the trial court erroneously determined that Collins, CYC andthe Board were afforded immunity under sections 2-201 and 3-108(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees TortImmunity Act (the Act)(745 ILCS 10/2-201; 3-108(a)(West 1992))and (2) the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment toSSG because the risks of a spinal cord injury from using a mini-trampoline are not open and obvious and the warnings affixed tothe mini-trampoline were inadequate. For the reasons thatfollow, we affirm the decisions of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

Bryn Mawr elementary school (Bryn Mawr) is public schoolthat is operated by the Board and located on Chicago's southeastside. In response to community needs, the Board organized a gangand drug prevention program at Bryn Mawr. As part of theprogram, an after-school tumbling program was started. When thegang and drug prevention program ended in 1989, Bryn Mawr decidedto continue the tumbling aspect of the program.

During the 1990-91 school year, the tumbling program washeld after school and was supervised by Steve Yergovich, who wasa physical education instructor at Bryn Mawr. Sometime in 1991,the Board purchased two mini-trampolines for Bryn Mawr, which theschool received in November or December of that year. At the endof 1991, Bryn Mawr discontinued the after-school tumblingprogram.

In early 1992, Robert Lewis, the assistant principal at BrynMawr, spoke with an administrator of CYC. The two discussed theavailability of an employee from CYC to run a tumbling programduring school hours. Consequently, Collins, who was an employeeof the CYC, became the supervisor of the new tumbling program atBryn Mawr.

The tumbling program at Bryn Mawr was an extracurricularactivity. Students who elected to participate had to go througha tryout with Collins. The students attended the tumblingprogram two days a week and each session lasted approximately 50minutes.

On December 14, 1992, Ryan, who was an eighth-grade studentat Bryn Mawr, sustained injuries resulting in quadriplegia whileusing a mini-trampoline during his regularly scheduled tumblingclass at the school. Collins was present and supervising thetumbling class when the accident occurred.

On the day in question, Murray performed several basictumbling maneuvers during the more structured portion of theclass. Afterwards, while participating in the freelance portionof the class, Murray lined up to use one of the mini-trampolines. He subsequently performed a jump off the mini-trampoline withoutincident.

However, Murray then took a running approach toward themini-trampoline and from approximately six yards away bounced offthe mini-trampoline, flipped twice in the air and landed on hischest in sort of a "belly flop." Murray landed approximately 10to 15 feet away from the mini-trampoline. This fall caused hisinjuries. At the time, Murray was not using any safety equipmentand there was no spotter present to assist him.

The mini-trampoline that was used when Murray was injuredwas distributed by the defendant SSG. Affixed on the front ofthe mini-trampoline is a red and white warning label. On thelabel in bold block letters appears the word "CAUTION," followedby this statement:

"Any activity involving motion or height createsthe possibility of accidental injuries. This equipmentis intended for use ONLY by properly trained andqualified participants under supervised conditions. Use without proper supervision, or abuse, could beDANGEROUS and should NOT be undertaken or permitted.

Before using, KNOW YOUR OWN LIMITATIONS and thelimitations of this equipment. If in doubt, alwaysconsult your instructor.

Always inspect for loose fittings or damage andtest stability before each use."

On May 19, 1998, the plaintiffs filed their initial suit. Thereafter, on July 19, 1999, the plaintiffs filed an 11-countsecond amended complaint on behalf of Ryan Murray for hispersonal injuries and on behalf of Joyce Mayers under the Rightsof Married Persons Act (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 1992)). In theirsecond amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Collins andthe CYC were willful and wanton in that they knowingly andintentionally or with reckless disregard acted in one or more ofthe following respects:

"a. Knowing trampolining was a hazardousrecreational activity, failed to supply appropriatesafety and protective equipment, including a harness,safety belt, and adequate landing mats to Ryan Murraywhen defendants knew or should have known participationin this activity created a substantial risk of spinalcord injury to any participant;

b. Failed to provide any instruction to RyanMurray on how to perform a maneuver involving asomersault off of the trampoline before allowing him toperform a maneuver involving a somersault;

c. Failed to instruct Ryan Murray that he couldnot perform a maneuver involving a somersault without aspotter;

d. Allowed Ryan Murray to perform a somersaultoff the trampoline without a spotter;

e. Failed to evaluate Ryan Murray's individualability, with reference to perform[ing] a maneuverinvolving a somersault, before allowing him to use amini-trampoline to perform a somersault;

f. Did not guard Ryan Murray in any way from thedanger of spinal cord injury while on the trampolineperforming a somersault without a spotter whendefendants knew or should have known of the substantialrisk of harm created by allowing Ryan Murray toparticipate in this hazardous recreational activity;

g. Did not warn Ryan Murray of the danger ofspinal cord injury or quadriplegia as he performed asomersault without a spotter on a mini-trampoline whendefendants knew or should have known of the substantialrisk of harm it created by allowing Ryan Murray toparticipate in this hazardous recreational activity;

h. Failed to guard Ryan Murray from the dangerof spinal cord injury while using a trampoline toperform a somersault without proper protective gear,including a harness, safety belt, and adequate landingmats, when defendants knew or should have known of thesubstantial risk of harm it created by allowing RyanMurray to participate in this hazardous recreationalactivity;

i. Defendants, who knew or should have knownthat Ryan Murray did not have knowledge of thesubstantial risk of spinal cord injury or quadriplegiaassociated with trampolining, failed to warn RyanMurray of the risk of spinal cord injury if he used thetrampoline to perform a somersault; and

j. Aware that students were using the trampolineto perform a somersault unsafely, failed to stop classand prohibit further use of the trampoline."

Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the Board waswillful and wanton in the following respects:

"a. Failed to supply a harness and safety belt toRyan Murray, while doing a somersault with a mini-trampoline, when defendant knew or should have known ofthe danger of serious spinal injury associated withthat activity;

b. Supplied gymnastic floor mats, not landingmats for trampolining, which were not adequate as acushion to prevent serious spinal cord injury to RyanMurray."

As to SSG, the plaintiffs alleged that Murray was injureddue to SSG's failure to provide adequate warnings on the mini-trampoline.

On November 4, 2002, the trial court granted summaryjudgment to all defendants concerning each count of plaintiffs'second amended complaint. The plaintiffs timely filed theirnotice of appeal on December 2, 2002.
 

ANALYSIS

I

We first address the issue of whether the trial courtproperly determined that the Board, Collins and CYC are affordedimmunity under sections 3-108(a) and 2-201 of the Act.

Summary judgment is proper "where the pleadings, affidavits,depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, when viewed in thelight most favorable to the nonmovant, reveal that there is nogenuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant isentitled to judgment as a matter of law." Busch v. Graphic ColorCorp., 169 Ill. 2d 325, 333 (1996); 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West1996). If the party moving for summary judgment supplies factsthat, if not contradicted, would warrant judgment in its favor asa matter of law, the opponent cannot rest on his pleadings tocreate a genuine issue of material fact. Purtill v. Hess, 111Ill. 2d 229, 240-41 (1986); Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co.,57 Ill. 2d 376, 380 (1974); see also Fitzpatrick v. Human RightsComm'n, 267 Ill. App. 3d 386, 391 (1994). Our review of an ordergranting summary judgment is de novo. Zekman v. Direct AmericanMarketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 374 (1998).

The Tort Immunity Act governs whether and in what situationslocal governmental units such as the Board are immune from civilliability. Here, we are called upon to interpret sections3-108(a) and 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act. The principles tobe applied in construing provisions of the Act are wellestablished:

" '[O]ur primary goal is to ascertain and giveeffect to the intention of the legislature. We seekthe legislative intent primarily from the language usedin the Tort Immunity Act. We evaluate the Act as awhole; we construe each provision in connection withevery other section. [Citation.] If we can ascertainthe legislative intent from the plain language of theAct itself, that intent must prevail, and we will giveit effect without resorting to other interpretive aids.[Citation.] We must not depart from the plain languageof the Act by reading into it exceptions, limitations,or conditions that conflict with the expresslegislative intent.' " Epstein v. Chicago Board ofEducation, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 375-76 (1997), quotingBarnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388-89(1996).

The defendants assert that the trial court's decision togrant them summary judgment was proper. The defendants arguethat they were afforded immunity under both sections 3-108(a) and2-201 of the Act.

Section 3-108(a) of the Act states:

"Except as otherwise provided by this Act andsubject to subdivision (b) neither a local publicentity nor a public employee is liable for an injurycaused by a failure to supervise an activity on or theuse of any public property." (Emphasis added.) 745ILCS 10/3-108(a) (West 1992).

Section 2-201 of the Act states:

"Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a publicemployee serving in a position involving thedetermination of policy or the exercise of discretionis not liable for an injury resulting from his act oromission in determining policy when acting in theexercise of such discretion even though abused." (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1992).

Since Murray was injured while trampolining on publicproperty, the defendants aver that their alleged failure toproperly supervise the activity is absolutely immunized undersection 3-108(a) of the Act. Additionally, the defendantsmaintain that Collins' decision not to use a harness, safety beltor appropriate landing mats was a policy decision or an exerciseof his discretion which is also afforded immunity under section2-201 of the Act. See Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit SchoolDistrict No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475, 484-87 (2002).

In response, the plaintiffs contend that since trampoliningis a hazardous activity as defined by section 3-109(b)(3) of theAct, the defendants are liable pursuant to section 3-109(c)(2) ofthe Act because their willful and wanton actions were theproximate cause of Murray's injury.

Section 3-109(a) of the Act states:

"Neither a local public entity nor a publicemployee is liable to any person who participates in ahazardous recreational activity, including any personwho assists the participant, or to any spectator whoknew or reasonably should have known that the hazardousrecreational activity created a substantial risk ofinjury to himself or herself and was voluntarily in theplace of risk, or having the ability to do so failed toleave, for any damage or injury to property or personsarising out of that hazardous recreational activity." 745 ILCS 10/3-109 (West 1992).

Section 3-109(b)(3) of the Act states:

"(b) As used in this Section, 'hazardousrecreational activity' means a recreational activityconducted on property of a local public entity whichcreates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor,trivial, or insignificant) risk of injury to aparticipant or a spectator.

'Hazardous recreational activity' also means:

***

(3) ***, surfing, trampolining, tree climbing, ***." (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/3-109(b)(3)(West 1992).

Section 3-109(c)(2) of the Act states:

"(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection(a), this Section does not limit liability which wouldotherwise exist for any of the following:

***

(2) An act of willful and wanton conduct by apublic entity or a public employee which is a proximatecause of the injury." 745 ILCS 10/3-109(c)(2) (West1992).

In Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378 (1996),the Illinois Supreme Court visited the question of whethersection 3-108(a) contains an exception for willful and wantonbehavior. In Barnett, the plaintiff brought suit against a parkdistrict for the drowning death of her son in a park districtswimming pool. The plaintiff argued that section 3-108 of theAct does not establish unconditional immunity but, rather,provides an exception for willful and wanton misconduct. Infinding that section 3-108 provides immunity for willful andwanton misconduct, the Barnett court stated:

"The plain language of section 3-108 is unambiguous. That provision does not contain an immunity exceptionfor willful and wanton misconduct. Where thelegislature has chosen to limit an immunity to coveronly negligence, it has unambiguously done so. See 745ILCS 10/2-202, 2-210, 3-106, 3-109(c)(2), 4-105,5-103(b), 5-106 (West 1992). Since the legislatureomitted such a limitation from the plain language ofsection 3-108, then the legislature must have intendedto immunize liability for both negligence and willfuland wanton misconduct. See [West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill.2d 1, 6-7 (1992)]; Payne v. Lake Forest Community HighSchool District 115, 268 Ill. App. 3d 783, 785-87(1994)." (Emphasis added.) Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at391-92.

Furthermore, the specific issue of whether section 3-109(c)(2) provides an exception to section 3-108(a) has beenvisited in Johnson v. Decatur Park District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 798(1998). In Johnson, a student and his parents sued the city parkdistrict, the coach of his tumbling team and the Young Women'sChristian Association (YWCA) after the student sustained a brokenneck while attempting a front flip from a mini-trampoline duringteam practice. The student was taking a tumbling class at theYWCA. The student was also a member of the Power Tumblers, ateam that was run by the park district. The mini-trampoline wasalso owned by the park district and the park district providedthe coach of the team. At the time of his injury, the studentwas practicing with the Power Tumblers at the YWCA.

The plaintiffs argued that the defendants were not affordedimmunity under section 3-108(a) of the Act. In particular, theplaintiffs argued that section 3-109(c)(2) provided an exceptionfor willful and wanton behavior. In disagreeing with thisargument, the Johnson court stated:

"Plaintiffs argue that section 3-109(c)(2) of theAct is a limitation on the absolute immunity granted bysection 3-108(a). Their argument is that use of a minitrampoline is a hazardous recreational activity andthat willful and wanton conduct is not immunized whenit occurs in connection with such activities. Theycite no case so holding. They argue that the plainlanguage of section 3-109 compels this conclusion.

As stated, in this case, plaintiffs have allegedthat the Park District failed to (a) provide a safetyharness or belt, (b) warn of the dangers associatedwith using the mini trampoline and mats, (c) provideadequate spotters, (d) warn and instruct participantsconcerning the dangers associated with using a minitrampoline and mats and of the known serious risk ofsevere spinal cord injury, (e) properly position themats to prevent gaps, and (f) provide a safe coach. The gist of these allegations is that the ParkDistrict, through its employee, Park, failed to warn[plaintiff] of the dangers of spinal cord injuryattendant to use of the mini trampoline and toadequately supervise activities performed on the minitrampoline given the dangers associated with its use. Thus, section 3-108(a) applies to immunize thisconduct. Plaintiffs do not argue otherwise; they seekto avoid the immunity granted in that section byinvoking section 3-109(c)(2) of the Act.

However, plaintiffs have misconstrued the importof section 3-109(c)(2) of the Act. That subsectiondoes not itself create an exception to the absoluteimmunity granted by section 3-108(a) of the Act. Itsimply states that nothing in section 3-109(a) of theAct limits liability 'which would otherwise exist' foran act of willful and wanton conduct by a public entityor employee that is a proximate cause of injury. Thus,if section 3-108 of the Act does not itself contain anexception for willful and wanton conduct in connectionwith supervisory activities, section 3-109(c)(2) of theAct does not apply to provide such an exception, simplybecause the activity involved may be a hazardousrecreational activity. Section 3-108(a) of the Actcontains no such exception; its plain language providesimmunity for supervisory activities, regardless ofwhether the conduct is merely negligent or willful andwanton. We note section 3-109(c)(2) of the Act alsoprovides that nothing in that section creates a duty ofcare or basis of liability for personal injury ordamage to personal property. We therefore rejectplaintiffs' argument that section 3-109(c)(2) of theAct provides an exception to the absolute immunitygranted by section 3-108(a) of the Act." Johnson, 301Ill. App. 3d at 807-08.

We disagree with the holding reached in Johnson. In ouropinion, the Johnson court fails to sufficiently address the"Except as otherwise provided by this Act" language which appearsin section 3-108(a). In our view, Epstein v. Chicago Board ofEducation, 178 Ill. 2d 370 (1997), provides guidance with regardto situations where the immunity that is provided in certainsections of the Act, such as sections 3-108(a) and 2-201, isoverridden due to other sections of the Act.

In Epstein, the court was dealing with the issue of whethersection 3-108(a) of the Act ever provides local governmentalunits with immunity from Structural Work Act claims. Inanswering this question, the Epstein court noted that there weresituations in which there were exceptions to the immunityprovided in section 3-108(a). The Epstein court wrote:

"A further evaluation of section 3-108(a), alongwith the Tort Immunity Act as a whole, also supportsour rejection of the plaintiff's argument. Section 3-108(a) grants immunity '[e]xcept as otherwise providedby this Act.' Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 85, par.3-108(a). Accordingly, section 3-108(a) by its ownterms provides that the only exceptions to its grant ofimmunity are those set forth elsewhere in the TortImmunity Act. Our review of the entire Tort ImmunityAct reveals that it provides exceptions for liabilityunder the Workers' Compensation Act and the Workers'Occupational Diseases Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch.85, pars.2-101(c), (d)), among other things. The TortImmunity Act, however, nowhere makes an exception forliability under the Structural Work Act or forconstruction activities. Nor does the Tort ImmunityAct contain any provision limiting section 3-108(a)'sapplication to only recreational or scholasticactivities. Consequently, none of the assertedexceptions or limitations exist." (Emphasis added.)Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d at 377.

In our opinion, Epstein provides support for the conclusionthat section 3-109(c)(2) provides an exemption to section 3-108(a) and furthermore to section 2-201, which contains similarexception language, for willful and wanton behavior with regardsto hazardous activities. Here, Murray was engaged in a hazardousactivity as defined by section 3-109(b)(3) when he was injured. Section, 3-109(c)(2) provides an exception to the immunity thatis otherwise afforded under the Act, if a willful and wanton actby a public entity or employee is the proximate cause of aninjury to a person engaged in a hazardous activity.

We must reiterate, we evaluate the Act as a whole; weconstrue each provision in connection with every other section. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at 388-89. Section 3-108(a) providesimmunity for a failure to supervise an activity on or the use ofany public property. 745 ILCS 10/3-108(a) (West 1992). Thefollowing section of the Act, section 3-109, provides immunitywith relationship to any person who participates in a hazardousactivity. 745 ILCS 10/3-109(a) (West 1992). However, anindividual who is participating in a hazardous activity can bringsuit if the public entity or employee commits a willful andwanton act which proximately causes that person to be injured.

Consequently, in this particular situation, Murray can bringsuit because section 3-109(c)(2) provides an exception to theimmunity otherwise provided by the Act. When a public entity oremployee's willful or wanton misconduct proximately causes aninjury to an individual participating in a hazardous activity,the Act does not provide immunity. 745 ILCS 10/3-109(c)(2) (West1992). We believe that the Johnson decision was erroneousbecause it fails to address the significance of the specificexception language found in section 3-108(a).

The plaintiffs maintain that the Board's failure to providecertain safety equipment, particularly a harness, a safety beltand appropriate landing mats, amounted to willful and wantonbehavior for which the defendants are liable.

"While the question of whether a defendant's actions amountto willful and wanton misconduct is normally one of fact to beresolved by the jury, it may be determined by the trial court ona motion for summary judgment if the evidence meets the standard enunciated in Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d494 (1967), that is, if all of the evidence, when viewed in theaspect most favorable to the nonmovant, so overwhelmingly favorsthe movant that no contrary determination based on that evidencecould ever stand. (Breck v. Cortez, 141 Ill. App. 3d 351(1986).)" Urban v. Village of Lincolnshire, 272 Ill. App. 3d1087, 1094 (1995).

Here, the trial court's decision was correct because thedefendant's alleged behavior was not willful and wanton. The Actdefines willful and wanton conduct as "a course of action whichshows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which,if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or consciousdisregard for the safety of others or their property." 745 ILCS10/1-210 (West 1992). Also, in Burke v. Rothschild's LiquorMart, Inc., 148 Ill.2d 429, 448 (1992), our supreme courtexamined the use of the term "willful and wanton" in Illinoislaw, and reiterated its view that such conduct "approaches thedegree of moral blame attached to intentional harm, since thedefendant deliberately inflicts a highly unreasonable risk ofharm upon others in conscious disregard of it."

In this case, the facts show that the defendants' actions donot approach the degree of blame worthiness necessary to maintainan action for willful and wanton behavior. There were noprevious accidents involving the mini-trampoline, none of thesafety devices had been removed from the mini-trampoline, Collinshad seen Ryan successfully perform a front flip on more than oneoccasion and Collins' failure to provide a spot for Ryan when hewas performing the flip could amount to no more than negligentbehavior.

The plaintiffs' allegations do not support a finding thatdefendants intentionally caused plaintiff's injury. Nor, in ourview, do these allegations indicate that defendants were utterlyindifferent to or consciously disregarded plaintiff's safety. Atworst, defendants' conduct amounted to negligence.
 

II

The plaintiffs contend that the trial court's decision togrant SSG summary judgment was erroneous because SSG failed toadequately warn of the dangers associated with the use of a mini-trampoline. In response, the defendants contend that the trialcourt's decision was proper because the risk of severe spinalcord injury from using a mini-trampoline is open and obvious.

In Johnson, the court was faced with this very question ofwhether the dangers associated with using a mini-trampoline wereopen and obvious. The Johnson court stated:

"Although the [Pell v. Victor J. Andrew HighSchool, 123 Ill. App. 3d 423 (1984),] case involved amanufacture's duty to warn, it does provide someinsight into the special risks attendant to use of amini trampoline, thus contradicting the [defendant's]open-and-obvious-danger argument. The risks associatedwith use of a mini trampoline cannot be logicallycompared to the risks of falling from a height oractivities such as diving. Use of a mini trampolinerequires a certain level of skill not found in use ofthe recreational equipment involved in the cases citedby the [defendant] or in the diving cases. It is notan activity suited to every person. Further, the PowerTumblers is [the defendant's] program that invitesparticipation by highly skilled tumblers who performfor the public on behalf of the [defendant]. Thus, the[defendant] has assumed a greater responsibility herethan did the defendants in the cases cited by the[defendant]." Johnson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 806.

The plaintiffs also contend that Murray, who was 13 yearsold at the time of the accident, did not appreciate the dangersof using a mini-trampoline because of his age. The plaintiffsmaintain that Murray did not understand the ramifications oflanding on his head or neck. This argument, however, isnullified by a statement Murray made in a discovery deposition. There, Murray stated that he understood that he could be hurt ifhe used the mini-trampoline and landed improperly.

The plaintiffs lastly argue that trial court erred when itgranted summary judgment to SSG because the warnings on the mini-trampoline were inadequate. In particular, the plaintiffsmaintain that the caution which was affixed to the mini-trampoline was too small. The plaintiffs also contend that thewording of the caution is inadequate. The plaintiffs contendthat the caution which is affixed to the mini-trampoline fails tosay anything about the risk of spinal cord injury, paralysis, ordeath. The plaintiffs also complain that the caution fails tostate anything about using a spotter or a safety harness.

In Kane v. R.D. Werner Co., Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d 1035(1995), the plaintiff fell from a ladder. He subsequentlybrought suit against the manufacturer claiming that the warningson the ladder were inadequate. However, the plaintiff never readthe warnings that were affixed to the ladder. The Kane courtheld that a plaintiff who does not read an allegedly inadequatewarning cannot maintain a negligent-failure-to-warn action unlessthe nature of the alleged inadequacy is such that it prevents himfrom reading it. Kane, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 1037.

Here, we find that the trial court's decision to grantsummary judgment to SSG was proper. The plaintiffs admit intheir brief that Murray did not read the warnings. As such, theplaintiffs' argument that the warning affixed to the mini-trampoline was inadequate must fail.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs in this case cannot argue thatthe warning which was affixed to the mini-trampoline wasinadequate due to its placement or size. Here, the warning is anadequate size, appears in red and white and is affixed in plainview on the front of the mini-trampoline. Accordingly, the trialcourt's decision to grant SSG's motion for summary judgment wasproper.
 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decisions of the trial courtare affirmed.

Affirmed.

Campbell, P.J. and Hartigan, J., concur.

1. This defendant was erroneously sued as BSN Sports, Inc.,and GSC Sports. Although this defendant is referred to as BSNSports, Inc., and GSC Sports in the pleadings, it will bereferred to as Sports Supply Group (SSG) in this opinion.